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THE RUSSIANS

IN

BULGARIA AND RUMELIA

IN 1828 AND 1829;

DURING

THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE DANUBE, THE SIEGES OF BRAILOW, VARNA,
SILISTRIA, SHUMLA, AND THE PASSAGE OF THE BALKAN
BY MARSHAL DIEBITCH.

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From the German of

BARON VON MOLTKE,

MAJOR IN THE PRUSSIAN SERVICE.

LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
1854.

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PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET,
AND CHARING CROSS.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

THE following work, by Baron von Moltke, contains so lively and accurate an account of the country now once more the theatre of war, and of the Russian campaigns of '28 and '29, that it can scarcely fail to interest the English public at the present time. Baron Moltke, who is now dead, was despatched to the Turkish army by order of his own sovereign, at the express request of Sultan Mahmoud, and served with it through the campaigns here described. His book was published without any preface.

My first intention was to make an abridgment of the book—leaving out all purely military details—but as I proceeded in the work I was so much interested by the vivacity and clearness with which even technical matters are described, that I thought even those among my readers who are as ignorant of the art of war, as I am myself, would have cause to regret their omission. I have therefore only condensed some of the political speculations relating to bygone events, and left out a few unimportant passages.

I could not safely have ventured so far beyond my depth in a science of which I know nothing without very efficient support and assistance, which have been most kindly afforded me by Mrs. G. Wrottesley, the daughter of Sir J. Burgoyne, and Mr. Jekyll, late Captain Grenadier Guards, throughout the work, and by Mr. Charles Izod, surgeon, in the part relating to his profession.

Thus the correctness of the version of Baron von Moltke's book now offered to the English public has been secured; but the Translator must crave indulgence towards any inelegance of style caused by the endeavour to make the book as clear and as short as possible.

THE TRANSLATOR.

May, 1854.

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PART I.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1828.


TURKEY
IN EUROPE
AUSTRIAN EMPIRE
TRANSYLVANIA
MOLDAVIA
RUSSIA
HUNGARY
Bannat
SCLAVONIA
BOSNIA
SERVIA
WALLACHIA
BULGARIA
HERZEGOVINIA
DALMATIA
MONTENEGRO
ALBANIA
ROUMELIA
ADRIATIC
ITALY
BLACK SEA
Sea of Marmora
ASIA MINOR
Belgrade
Sophia
Adrianople
Philippopolis
Constantinople
Varna
Silistria
Ragusa
Durazzo
Janina
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Gallipoli
Dardanelles
Thaso
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Bucharest
English Miles
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THE RUSSIANS

IN

BULGARIA AND RUMELIA.

INTRODUCTION.

POLITICAL RELATIONS.—THE TURKISH AND RUSSIAN ARMIES.

The hostility which broke forth between Russia and Turkey in 1828 had been imminent for a number of years. Both powers accused each other of having broken the treaty of Bucharest, and it was only owing to the great zeal and ability of the European diplomatists that the rupture was so long delayed.

Canning expressed in the clearest language the true cause of the moderation of one party, and the headstrong obstinacy of the other.

"Let me be understood," said Mr. Canning, in his speech of the 12th of December, 1826, on the affairs of Portugal—"Let me be understood, however, distinctly as not meaning to say that I dread war in a good cause (and in no other may it be the lot of this country ever to engage!), from a distrust of the strength of the country to commence it, or of her resources to maintain it. I dread it from an apprehension of the tremendous consequences which might arise from any hostilities in which we might be engaged. . . . . . I said that I feared that the next war which would be kindled in Europe would be a war not so much of armies as of opinions. . . . . I much fear that this country (however earnestly she may endeavour to avoid it) could not in such case avoid seeing ranked under her banners all the restless and dissatisfied of any nation with which she might come in contact. It is the contemplation of this new power in any future war which excites my most anxious apprehension."

In Spain, in Italy, and in Greece, the people had risen simultaneously against their rulers: the general discontent had manifested itself in every country by insurrectionary movements: even in Russia this feeling had shown itself by conspiracies which resulted in the death of the Emperor Alexander. The governments which had to repress this popular tendency were banded together at this period to maintain the public peace and order. Their main object was to keep down the revolution, and a war which was sure to spread over all Europe was the subject of dread to every power. Moreover, the finances of every country were in an unhealthy state, in consequence of the heavy expenses attending the wars against the French empire; so that peace was absolutely necessary for all governments.

The most difficult problem of the day was the revolt of the Greeks against the Turkish government. The insurrection in the Morea arose from a cause very different from Carbonarism; excessive oppression had forced the Greeks to rebel. They fought for their religion and their liberty. The Christian powers were hardly justified in taking measures which would have delivered those who professed the same faith over to the vengeance of the savage Moslem; they wished to remain neutral, and hoped that the Turks would put down the insurrectionary movement, and tide over the danger by making timely concessions.

The worst was that it soon became manifest that the Greeks would secure their freedom without the intervention of European diplomacy; and the moment this contingency appeared possible, there arose a vague feeling of distrust among the powers of Europe, lest some neighbour, forgetting the principle of non-intervention, might stretch forth the right hand of fellowship, and thus obtain lasting influence and great political importance.

Former schemes of conquest, religious sympathies, and the geographical position of Russia, pointed to that country as the most dangerous neighbour. A war against the old arch-enemy was looked upon in Russia as the only means of putting an end to the disquiet that had prevailed since the Emperor Alexander's death. Russia was the natural protector of all those who professed the Greek religion and who lived under the dominion of the Turk. The Turks, contrary to their promises, still kept possession of Moldavia and Wallachia. They had interfered in Servia without the consent of Russia, and had stopped the navigation between the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Why should not Russia occupy Turkey in the same manner that Austria held Italy, France Spain, or England Portugal? The Russians were clearly in the right, as the treaties had not been fulfilled. It was another question whether these treaties were not decidedly contrary to the laws of nations. They contained within themselves the seeds of future wars; the mere fact of giving to a foreign monarch rights of protection over the subjects of the Porte might lend an appearance of justice to the most arbitrary attack on the part of that monarch.

From the meeting of the Congress of Verona, Europe was divided into two hostile camps: on one side was England, on the other the Holy Alliance. Austria remained true to her policy. She required the Greeks to submit to their liege lords, at the same time that she impressed upon the Porte the necessity of making concessions to its subjects.

England had as little desire as Austria that the Porte should be weakened, but looked upon the liberation of Greece as a *fait accompli;* she was the first European state to recognize Greece as a power *de facto* in 1824.

The same motives had their effect in France. An attempt to secure to the Porte, by means of the mediation of all the European powers, the possession of the territories of which she was then seized, failed, as was to be expected, with the Russian court. From her geographical and commercial position, Russia is destined to exercise a decided influence at Constantinople; indeed, without this she cannot develop the resources, nor secure the frontiers, of her southern provinces. This influence was again secured to her by the treaty of Akkerman, and there was therefore no overpowering reason why Russia should precipitate the downfall of the Ottoman empire. But it was a very different matter to guarantee the stability of a state which threatened to fall to pieces from internal dissensions. An union of the European powers to protect Greece against the Turks, and Turkey against any other power, was, under the circumstances, impossible. But it was important so to entangle the northern giant in a treaty with England and France, that he should be prevented from entering into any independent or one-sided line of action. The treaty of London of the 6th of July, 1827, in the negotiation of which the several parties had opposing objects, was purposely vague in its meaning, and doubtful in its terms. Its results were precisely contrary to the intentions of the English and French governments.

For seven years European diplomatists had endeavoured in vain to bend the stubborn obstinacy of the Porte; the Sultan arrogantly refused to listen to any agreement with the European powers. The Reis-Effendi declared the treaty of London to be one which his master could not accede to; the note remained unsealed on his divan, and never was answered. Political prudence would have suggested to the Porte to agree to the treaty of the 6th of July, 1827: the Greeks might have been changed from bitter foes to zealous supporters—the example of Servia is to the point—and the Porte might then have relied upon the support of England. It was thought that the appearance of an English, French, and Russian fleet might open the Sultan's eyes; it was intended as a demonstration by means of which a character like that of Mahmud II. might be intimidated. The "untoward event," the battle of Navarino, destroyed the Turkish naval power. Thus one of the great hindrances to any attack by Russia on the Turkish empire was removed, entirely contrary to the intentions of the contracting powers, and the upshot of the war could no longer remain doubtful.

The treaty of London and the obstinacy of the Porte placed England in a false position: she was playing into the hands of Russia, as it was impossible for her to wage war in favour of the Turks against the Russians, whose ostensible object was the liberation of Greece. Thus it was that Russia and Turkey were left to fight out their quarrel alone.

If we ask how it was that the Porte ventured to trust to its own resources, and to oppose the wishes of all Europe, we shall find that, even if Sultan Mahmud had not possessed a determined unbending spirit, he was compelled to assume that character: he resisted every appeal from foreign governments, because he was powerless at home. Every concession to Christian powers would have been made at the risk of his life and his throne.

The bond that unites such various nations, Kurds, Arnauts, and Arabs, under one head, is a common faith, and devotion to a dynasty which has ruled over them for five hundred years. The thirtieth ruler of this race had been borne to power by a revolt of the Janissaries on the 28th of July, 1808. Mahmud had sacrificed his brother Mustafa, and was the last surviving male in direct descent from Osman. Frequent revolts among the Janissaries rendered fresh sacrifices necessary: one vizier after another fell victims to this wild soldiery; it was impossible to take any steps in favour of the Christian population; and yet these very undisciplined troops, which involved the Porte in constant dissensions with other nations, were everywhere beaten in the field, so that the Janissaries might be looked upon as the real cause of the diplomatic embarrassment and the military decrepitude of the Porte.

Long and bitter experience had taught Mahmud that it was impossible to make his own power felt so long as the Janissaries existed: he was determined to destroy these Moslemite Prætorian guards: this was an undertaking in which five of his predecessors had already lost their thrones, and two of them their lives.

When the victorious followers of Osman overran the most fruitful provinces of three parts of the globe, they gave the conquered their choice between death, conversion, or paying tribute. According to the Koran, the soil belonged to the Sultan as God's vicegerent; the Moslems were not to cultivate the land themselves, but were specially appointed to wage war for the spread of their religion. It was therefore agreeable to them if the greater portion of the conquered subjected themselves as "Rayahs," for the Moslems had no intolerant lust for conversion. The "Rayahs," or Christian subjects, not only retained the right of exercising their religion, but were left in possession of their properties, paying a capitation and land-tax. The Moslem warriors were, on their side, allowed to raise the taxes paid by the "Rayahs" to a certain extent, with the understanding that for this privilege they were to fight for Islam, or to provide substitutes to fight in their stead.

Thus it was that a regular feudal system arose in the East. In Turkey the Osmanlis were exactly what the nobles had been in Europe—a privileged class; only they were not, like them, of the same faith or blood with the mass of the population.

The same circumstances which in Europe replaced, by standing armies, the nobility called into existence by the feudal system, made the Janissaries a necessary complement in the East to the Spahis and Timarlys. The corps of Janissaries was recruited originally from Christian children, mostly Bulgarians, who were taken when quite young from their homes, and became the most zealous adherents of their new faith. It was they who conquered Constantinople, Rhodes, and Belgrade, and carried the Crescent triumphantly to the walls of Vienna. But this very corps of foot-soldiers, which for three centuries had been the support of the Osmanli empire, became, from causes unconnected with military matters, the source of the ruin of the Turkish empire.

To protect themselves against an arbitrary government, the Turks established various corporations—such as the Ulemas, or servants of the law; the guilds or fraternities in the towns; but more especially the widely-spread corporation of Janissaries. In Sultan Mahmud's time there were 196 ortas, which reckoned 400,000 members—the famous thirty-first orta alone counted 30,000—and yet, out of this 400,000, there were only 40,000 men capable of bearing arms; for mechanics and civilians, rich and poor, old men and young children, were admitted into the body of Janissaries.

Sultan Selim had raised the Nizam Dschedid, or regular army, as a check to the Janissaries, but this had led to violent outbreaks, and cost the Sultan his life. His nephew, Mahmud, pursued the same course; but with greater cunning and with success. He formed fresh troops, who were paid and exercised in the European form, and whom he lodged in large barracks. The new Aga of the Janissaries, Hussein, was named Pacha, and these new troops, the Askjiri-Muhammidje, were placed under his command. The new Pacha was devoted to the Sultan, and equally determined to break the pride of the wild mass who had selected him to be their chief and protector. After various outbreaks the Janissaries went into open revolt on the night of the 14th of June, 1826, and directed their chief rage against Hussein, whom they suspected of treason. But he took refuge in the Seraglio, surrounded by strong walls, and situated on the tongue of land between the harbour and the Sea of Marmora, where the Sultan was also. The Asiatic troops encamped near Scutari, under Mohammed Pacha, were rapidly brought over to Constantinople, and united with those under the Sultan on the European side of the Bosphorus. The Sultan unfurled his holy standard and advanced against the rebels, declaring his determination to destroy the Janissaries to the last man. He succeeded in dispersing the rebels, and their power was broken by death and exile.

Many thousands were still dispersed about the capital and its provinces, but the body was broken up, and the great work of destruction accomplished; at one blow the incubus that had oppressed Turkey disappeared, and the Osmanli ruler thought himself lucky in having destroyed the Osmanli army, at the very moment when one-half of his subjects was in open or secret rebellion against him, and when the hordes of his dreaded neighbour were ready to pounce upon his possessions in Europe and Asia.

Under these circumstances the Sultan's great object was to gain time, so as to build up something new in the room of that which was destroyed. Thus it was that after some delay the convention of Akkerman was entered into on the 25th of September, 1827. The terms of this convention were so onerous, that the Sultan would never have signed them, except with the full determination to break them on the first opportunity. In his Hatti-scheriff of the 20th of December of that year he declared to his people that they must perceive that "he had only gone to work in this friendly manner with the unbelievers, so as to gain time;" every Moslem was the born foe of the unbeliever.

The war was inevitable, and Sultan Mahmud felt that success was essential to give the necessary sanction to his reforms in the eyes of the Moslems; and the reconstruction of a force that should be equal in the field to the European armies, and a trusty instrument in his own hands, was the object of his most strenuous exertions.

The institution of the Timarlys and the Spahis was allowed to continue, as the Government, by withdrawing the fiefs, held the means in its own hand of securing to itself the devotion and faith of these horsemen. On the other hand, instead of the Janissaries, an army of 48,000 men was shortly raised, clothed, armed, and disciplined after the European fashion. The Sultan directed the drill in person, after learning the cavalry exercise from European officers.

The novelty of these measures, the opposition they encountered, the necessity for immediate action, and the want of time, caused everything to be hurried. Among his own followers Sultan Mahmud found no one enlightened man to aid him with his counsel: all had to be done by means of foreigners, and by the Sultan's own iron will. The recruits were seized in their villages, often carried in chains to Constantinople, and there kept as prisoners. There was an utter lack of intelligent native officers, and religious prejudice stood in the way of the employment of foreigners. The Rayahs were excluded from the military service. The youngest men were selected from among the Moslems, in the hope that they would sooner get accustomed to the tiresome constraint of discipline, and remain longest in the service. But the dislike of the Turks to the service, their close quarters in the overcrowded barracks, their vices, and the wretched hospital arrangements, made sad havoc in their ranks, so that new levies were constantly required. The army therefore was composed of men disciplined after the European fashion, wearing Russian jackets and Turkish trowsers; with Tartar saddles, and French stirrups, and English sabres: it consisted of Timariots, or troops giving feudal service; of troops of the line, whose service was for life; and of militia, who served only a term of years, of whom the leaders were recruits and the recruits mere children. The system of organization was French, and the instructors were men from all parts of Europe. The splendid appearance, the beautiful arms, the reckless bravery of the former Moslem horde, had disappeared; but yet this new army had one quality which placed it above the numerous host which in former times the Porte could summon to the field—it obeyed.

The Turkish empire, just before the outbreak of the Russian war, stood on the brink of perdition. The Turkish army had been destroyed by the Sultan at Constantinople, the Turkish navy by the Franks at Navarino. The Russians were waiting on the frontiers both of Europe and Asia, ready to advance. The French held the Morea, and Ibrahim Pacha was reduced to great straits. The Greek flag was free, and the Mediterranean was closed by the maritime powers. In addition to this, the finances were much embarrassed, the population partly in open revolt, and all discontented. Well might the Sultan exclaim to his vizier—"Keep your wits together, for Allah knows the danger is great!"

His first object was to put down the rebellious Greeks, and then to attack his foreign foes. But he was beaten in the Morea. After all this it can surprise no one to find the Sultan so utterly unprepared for the emergency, although war with Russia had so long appeared inevitable.

From the year 1822 the frontier fortresses on the Danube had been restored, and on the land front of Constantinople immense barracks had been constructed, which might be considered as detached forts. The coinage had been debased, recourse had to oppression to procure money, and every measure taken to raise a military force. But the institutions were too new to take root, and the army in no condition to hold its ground against the Russian host in the open field; it was also too weak for the Sultan, much against his wish, not to have recourse again to the irregular Asiatic hordes. Wallachia and Moldavia were considered untenable, and most of the troops in those Principalities were withdrawn for the defence of the fortresses on the Danube. From Bosnia, a remarkably warlike and Mahommedan province, it was intended to send 40,000 men on to the Drina. But there opinion was strongly opposed to the Sultan's reforms. The Janissaries maintained their influence, and no one would subject himself to the Nizam's control. Abderrahman Pacha preferred to have the Sultan's firman read by one of his officers, but the firman, and the European clothes that accompanied it, were torn to pieces by the infuriated mob, and Bosnia did not contribute one soldier to the Turkish army during the whole campaign: it was with some difficulty that the Bosniaks, who were acting on the Danube, could be retained in the Turkish service. Bulgaria was half-peopled with Greek Christians, whom it was not thought safe to arm. Most of the irregular troops had to be drawn from Asia, and these could not be reckoned upon during the winter. The only hope of the Turks was in the Persians; but after a short and glorious campaign, General Paskiewitch forced Persia to come to terms on the 2nd of November, 1827; the Persians agreeing to pay a contribution of 18,000,000 rubles, and to give up the Khanat-Erivan. This acquisition of territory enabled the Russians almost to surround their still unconquered possessions in the Caucasus, and to become the immediate neighbours of the Turks in Asia. Persia attempted to throw off the yoke, but was forced again, by the vigour of the Russian general, to make peace on the 22nd of February, 1828; so that, before the Turks entered the field against Russia, Persia was humbled, and a peace, upon still harder terms than before, was forced upon her. The corps of General Paskiewitch could be used against the Asiatic possessions of the Sultan, who was therefore obliged to raise a force especially for this service, and to divide his army.

It is impossible to give an accurate account of the number of men the Turks could bring into the field against the Russians. According to an authentic statement, proceeding from the office of the grand vizier, the irregular unpaid horde in Europe and Asia (not including the men who could be summoned to bear arms in case of urgent necessity) consisted of 97,050 men, chiefly Asiatic horsemen. The paid troops were reckoned at 80,000 men. The infantry of the latter consisted of 33 regiments of 3 battalions each, 500 strong; each had besides 120 artillerymen, who formed a separate company, and served 10 battalion guns. Besides this there were 2 regiments of Bostangis, or guards, amounting to 6000 men; so that there were about 60,000 infantry. The cavalry consisted of 10,000 Spahis, or men bound by feudal tenure to follow their lords into the field, besides 2600 regular cavalry, who formed 4 regiments of 6 squadrons, consisting of 152 men—altogether about 12,000 or 13,000 horse. The artillery consisted of 8 troops and 84 foot companies, and 2600 sappers, miners, and bombardiers; besides 41 companies for the conveyance of the baggage. The number of the field-guns cannot be correctly estimated, but, compared with the nature of the service and the number of the forces, it was very small.

The whole disposable force may therefore be reckoned at 180,000 men, of whom one-third at least was cavalry.

The clothing of the new infantry represented the transition from the Oriental to the European dress: it consisted of a woollen waistcoat, over which was a broadcloth coat, reaching to the hips, and fastened in front with hooks and eyes. Instead of the turban the shubarra was used, a sort of cloth cap without a rim, shaped like a melon and of various colours. A red shawl girt many times round the waist protected the body. The Asiatic trowsers were retained; they were of dark cloth, wide and loose as far as the knee, and then forming a sort of half-gaiter. The gaiters were made of impervious felt, the shoes very broad, and mostly of red leather. The felt cloak had a hood, which in bad weather served as a covering to the head, and in fine weather hung down the back. The musket, of French calibre, and provided with a bayonet, was mostly of Belgian manufacture; the sabre very crooked. The cartouch-box was a novelty. The arms and the clothing were altogether well suited to the nature of the troops, of the climate, and of the soil.

Although it was difficult to teach this infantry regular movements in compact bodies, nevertheless we shall see later, on occasions when their courage carried them away, and they threw off the severe control placed upon them, that they could charge the foe with their old impetuosity.

The cavalry were clad in a similar manner: they were armed with a broad crooked falchion, a carbine and pistols. They were drilled into a sort of discipline, but could not manœuvre, or charge in a compact body. The impetuosity of the old Turkish mode of attack was not yet quite broken.

The horses, especially those of the Asiatic Spahis, were small, but fiery, well broken, capable of enduring great fatigue and privations. The Kurdish and Cappadocian horses were accustomed to be picketed, and to bear the mid-day heat and the midnight cold. They were only watered once a day, and kept in condition without barley, when fed on the coarsest fodder. The light and easy fitting palanu, or saddle, made of felt, remained on their backs day and night, so that the horseman was ready at any moment to mount. The bit was very severe for so well-broken an animal, and was intended to stop the horse suddenly in mid career, or to wheel him round in a moment. The bar of the bit was often five or six inches long, and instead of the curb chain there was a ring. The round shoe was admirably suited to its purpose. The steel was forged cold, was thin and light, lasted five or six weeks, and protected the hoof admirably on stony ground. Although they use no cruppers, the Turkish horseman rides down the most precipitous places, covered with brushwood or trees, at full gallop. They ride only stallions, as the mares are kept at home for breeding, and are very dear.

Although the Turks had made great improvement in their artillery, still they were very far behind their opponents. The Turkish horses are not accustomed to draw; for this purpose Wallachian horses are mostly used. Most of the drivers in Turkey are Wallachians to this day. The guns were 3, 6, 8, 12, and 24-pounders, roughly mounted, and the shot ill cast. The effect of their artillery in battle could never be very great; nevertheless, as the Turks laid great stress upon this arm, it had its moral worth.

The camp-followers of a Turkish army were most numerous. Not alone those high in authority and their servants accompanied the Vizier into the field, but also the whole retinue of the Pacha, the Kadi-asker or judge, the post, which was served by Tartars, the Imams or clergy, the Dervishes or monks, and a whole array of servants, merchants, mechanics, dancers, jugglers, and other vagabonds swelled the mass. As tents, provisions of corn, oxen and sheep, and even hundreds of dogs, accompanied the army, the number of beings was enormous. This mob of human beings and animals was under the command of the Bonaldbaschi, who had under him hundreds of assistants.

This force was divided in the following manner:—

About 30,000 men remained at Constantinople and on the Bosphorus, so as to keep order in the capital, and protect the fortresses in the straits. The Dardanelles required 7000 men, and other forts not exactly in the seat of war, 25,000 more. 10,000 men were placed in Thessaly as a check upon the Greeks, and 30,000 men were employed in Asia Minor against the Russians. 25,000 men held the fortresses on the Danube and the Dobrudscha. The reserve in Adrianople consisted of 30,000 men, and there remained only 25,000 to defend Shumla, but these latter were mostly regular troops. These calculations, however, are based chiefly on conjecture. The troops were late before they appeared in the field, and it is certain that at the beginning of the campaign the Turks were very weak, and that they increased in numbers during its course: when the Russians crossed the Pruth, the passes of the Balkan were still unoccupied. It was only on the 31st of May, when Brailow had been already besieged fourteen days, that Hussein Pacha, the Seraskier, left Constantinople for Shumla. Nuri Pacha followed him a little later with a second detachment, and on the 3rd of July Capitan-Pacha Isset Mohammed marched with horse and foot to Varna. The Grand Vizier Mohammed Selim left the capital only at the beginning of August on his way to Adrianople. 12,000 Asiatic cavalry under Chapan Oglu did not reach Constantinople until after the fall of Varna. From the very first the Porte had no troops at its disposal except the garrisons in the Danubian fortresses.

The Principalities—even Bulgaria, with the exception of the fortresses—had been given up as untenable, and the defence based upon the chain of mountains. The walls of the fastnesses, the Danube, and the Balkan, the impenetrable nature of the country, the want of subsistence and of means of transport, the climate and pestilence, were the only allies of the Turks. Their fleet, as we have already said, had been destroyed at Navarino.

Such was the Turkish force. But it is surprising to find, after what we have previously said, how small an army Russia brought into the field. The Emperor Nicholas had taken up the gauntlet flung down by the Sultan, but the great moderation and firmness which marked every step of the young czar, caused him to wish to limit the evils of war to the smallest space. The more powerful his means of attack, the more desperate would be the condition of the Turks, and the greater the anxiety of the other powers. The attention of the court at St. Petersburg was directed as much to the west as to the south. A large portion of the Russian forces was meant to intimidate the people who might revolt in the west and to overawe the European governments. Austria especially was so much interested in any attack of the Russians upon Turkey, that it was scarcely to be expected she would tamely witness such an event. If the Austrians advanced into Wallachia, it would necessarily interfere with the plans of the Russians. Moreover the mercantile jealousy of England, and the discontent prevailing in Poland, demanded the greatest attention.

Hence it was that Russia had a large army in Poland, Finland, and the Ukraine. Hence it was, too, that the Emperor took with him his whole diplomatic corps in the campaign: the subsequent coronation in Warsaw, and the visit to Berlin, had their origin in this.

During the interval that preceded the war great reductions and changes had been made in the army. The Cossacks of the Bug and the Ukraine had been formed into lancers, and the unsuccessful experiment of military colonies in the north and the south had been tried. At length the 20th division of infantry, which was most conveniently placed, had been sent to join General Paskiewitsch in Asia.

The recruiting system which then prevailed, but which has since been altered, had considerable influence on the army to be sent against the Porte. This system is intimately connected with the peculiar nature of the country, and explains why the Russian armies are always so much weaker than they ought to be, and why they are often stronger at the end of a campaign than they were at its beginning.

The population of Russia consists of—1. The numerous nobility. This is partly indigenous and hereditary, and partly formed of men who have been in the service of the state; but they are always free from military service. 2. The inhabitants of towns. Of these the upper classes of merchants are free, but pay a certain tax for their freedom. The lower classes of the burghers are liable to conscription, but can release themselves by paying a fine. 3. The serfs, who form the bulk of the nation and of whom the army is composed.

The proceeding was generally in this wise. After discovering the exact number of men wanted, an imperial ukase was issued demanding so many men per cent.—a large margin being left for desertions. The whole number required was then equally divided among the governments, the towns, and the various landed proprietors and villages. In the properties belonging to the nobles the choice of those who were to serve lay with the landed proprietor; in the crown properties with the magistrate. Those were selected first of whom their masters wished to be rid, whether they were married or not, and next those who had no one depending upon them. A sum of 2000 rubles was the price of a substitute, and well-to-do villages paid this sum down to free a certain number of their inhabitants from military service. On the other hand the noble had the right to send a serf whom he wished to get rid of, and to get in return a receipt which secured him when the next conscription was made. It was scarcely possible for any one to escape by flight, and resistance was vain. The men were suddenly seized, and led off in chains to the nearest seat of government.

The man thus forced to serve gave up his whole former existence. The time of service was then twenty years in the Polish provinces, twenty-two in the line in Russia, twenty-four in the guards. As a soldier the serf gained his liberty, but he lost all else. Should he ever return after his time of service had expired, he found his place filled by another, and all memory of himself gone. The garrison-town to which he was sent was hundreds of miles off: he lived with men whose language, manners, religion, and race might differ entirely from his own, and if he did not learn some trade by which he might exist, his only resource was to serve on.

The Emperor Nicholas had shortened the term of service; but this merely made the conscription fall oftener. Every recruit deducted so much from the value of a man's property, and the returned soldier was no longer a serf.

This system of recruiting was so odious a measure that it was as seldom had recourse to as possible. The vacancies in the Russian armies were not filled up every year as in European states, but only when the want of men was seriously felt, or when war was imminent. Spite of the war which had threatened to break out, the army had not been recruited for four years, and as, generally speaking, one-tenth of its numbers quitted the army every year, when the war broke out a deficiency of about 40 per cent. had to be made good. But when the men were raised the army was not much the better for them: it took a long time to discipline them, and they frequently had hundreds of miles to march before they reached their destination.

To get rid of this arbitrary mode of getting soldiers the Emperor Nicholas had recourse to one still worse—military colonization. At the time in question, this system had just begun; but the reconstruction of one part of the army, especially the cavalry—the reduction of five divisions of infantry—the alteration in the recruiting system, and in the mode of drill—and lastly, various old-established abuses in the military constitution of Russia—were sufficient to account for the fact that the army which the Emperor could dispose against the Turks, which was already too small, had not yet nearly reached its proper quota.

The so-called second army, which had been for some years in the south of Russia under the command of Field-Marshal Count Wittgenstein, consisted of the 3rd, 6th, and 7th corps-d'armée. Later in the campaign the 2nd corps-d'armée and a portion of the guards joined Count Wittgenstein. The force originally at the disposal of the Field-Marshal consisted of five divisions of cavalry, eight of infantry, and three of artillery, in all eighty-eight squadrons, ninety-six battalions, and thirty-one batteries.

In a country where the food is so difficult to obtain, and where large masses of troops can scarcely be kept from starving, such a force would probably have been sufficient for its purpose, if the regiments had

had their full complement of men. On paper the three corps amounted to about 120,000 men.

This, however, was by no means the real state of the case, for the reasons we have already given. Moreover in every army, but more especially in the Russian—where every captain had the right to take six "dentschicks," or servants, out of the ranks for his own private use—a considerable number must be deducted from the ranks of the fighting-men. We have no exact means of discovering the actual strength of the Russian forces in Southern Russia; it will be sufficient for our purpose to find out how many men under arms appeared on the scene of action, and after allowing ample margin for deficiencies it would appear that the 3rd corps-d'armée consisted actually of about 30,000 men; the 6th of about 20,000; the 7th of 15,000 men at the outside: so that we may reckon the real effective strength of this corps-d'armée at 65,000 men. In this number we include 4000 Cossacks, and exclude from it certain troops which were stationed before Anapa at the beginning of the campaign. The subsequent addition to the army, when the 2nd corps and a portion of the guards joined, consisted of about 32,000 men, so that the whole effective force employed against Turkey in the first campaign may be estimated at about 100,000 combatants.

The whole of the cavalry—even the light horse—were in separate divisions, according to Napoleon's fashion, so that none of it was united with the infantry; and when we consider that during the course of the ensuing campaign the infantry would scarcely engage in any one action without having to do with the enemy's cavalry, this plan seems injudicious. The nature of the service required so many to be detached, that the various corps often advanced into action without their proper support of cavalry.

A still greater defect was, that the Russians were weak in that arm, especially compared with a foe whose chief strength lay in their light cavalry. The Russians were afraid that they should not be able to procure forage for a numerous body of cavalry in Bulgaria. But this want of cavalry rendered them unable to forage.

The Russian cavalry, moreover, was too heavy. The horses were large and handsome, but required good food, which could not be always obtained. They were broken down by the difficulties of the march, and the bivouack. The Emperor Nicholas was aware of the disadvantages of the new system, but could not remedy it. The Russian hussar was heavier and bigger than the heavy Prussian cuirassier. In solid squares the cavalry advanced in order, and with certainty; the light-armed Spahi did not withstand the shock, but hovered round their ranks and surrounded them on all sides. A numerous light cavalry would have been of the utmost importance. In the Cossacks the Russians possessed an arm homogeneous to the Spahis, which might be used with advantage in clearing the way, in protecting the camp, in surprises, and in pursuing the enemy. These Cossacks were near to the scene of action, and could be assembled in large bodies. Nevertheless, only eight regiments of them, each one consisting of 500 horse, making up about 4,000 men, accompanied the army across the Danube. Moreover, just those regiments were selected which had been placed for some time on the frontier, and had, as was usual with them, exchanged their good horses from the Don for bad horses of the country. Of military colonists, only the lancers of the Bug (who had been Cossacks) were with the army, but they did not answer the expectations that had been formed of them.

The cavalry were provided with fire-arms. Besides pistols, the hussars had short firelocks, not rifled; the dragoons had carbines armed with bayonets. The lancers were not capable of fighting single-handed with the lance against their Turkish adversaries; their horses were ill bitted and worse shod.

The infantry as well as the cavalry was deficient in light troops, although the nature of the ground, as well as the mode of fighting of their adversaries, required such an arm. There was no such thing as a rifle in the whole army. The dress of the men was inconvenient, and impeded their free action, and they were overweighted. The skirmishers had to carry at least 61 pounds Russian.

Altogether the military education of the soldier, spite of the long period of service and the severe treatment of the men—possibly in consequence of these very complicated arrangements—was incomplete. Their movements were those of a machine, reduced to certain forms. On the other hand, the infantry went through all their evolutions with perfect order, and were perfectly steady under fire.

The materiel of the artillery, which is the arm most prized by Orientals, was excellent. The Russians were in this respect so far superior to the Turks, that the greatest results were expected wherever this arm could be used. They were not, however, very expert in their practice.

The spirit of the troops was very good; the Russian soldier looked to war to better his condition, and a combat with the Mussulman was in his eyes a religious action. The officers were paid in silver, and the soldier was glad to exchange the tiresome duties of the parade, and the petty annoyances of garrison life, for the difficulties and the excitement of the field.

The superiority of the Russians at sea was incontestable. Besides the fleet in the Archipelago, they had in the Black Sea 16 line-of-battle ships with 1254 guns, 6 frigates with 286 guns, and 7 corvettes carrying 139 guns.

CHAPTER I.

THE THEATRE OF WAR, WALLACHIA — THE DOBRUDSCHA — BULGARIA — THE LINES OF THE DANUBE — THE BALKAN.

ANY one acquainted with the present condition of Wallachia may easily infer what must have been the state of that province after a period of seven years, during which the Porte had systematically laid it waste, in order to cripple the resources of Russia in that quarter.

Wallachia is essentially an open country. The rivers and brooks which empty themselves into the Danube in a south-easterly direction, rise in the high range of mountains on the northern frontier, and pursue their rapid course through a vast plain, along deep channels with very steep banks; but their broad pebbly beds are only filled after very heavy rains or rapid thaws, and may be easily forded at most seasons both in summer and winter. Most of the towns are half in ruins, and without means of defence; for the inhabitants had been so completely cowed by the constant invasions of the Turks, that they no longer dreamt of offering any resistance, and sought safety only in flight into the mountains, or across the Austrian frontier. In the course of forty years, all who had anything to lose fled no less than seven times, and the Boyars were always the first to set the example. With the exception of a few handsome churches in the Byzantine style, with domed towers, the buildings are all of lath and plaster, and the streets are laid with boards or rough logs. The villages lie hidden in the valleys, for those who cannot seek safety in flight endeavour to find it in concealment and poverty. Even yet the villages are without gardens, trees, churches, nay, one might almost say without houses, for their "Kolibes" are mostly underground, and merely roofed in with a thatch of brushwood; so that after a heavy fall of snow, a horseman might almost ride over a dwelling of this kind without being aware of its existence. The traveller may go on for days and days without seeing any farmhouses, mills, avenues, plantations, bridges, or country houses.

In the hilly district of Lesser Wallachia, on the west of the province, and also on the north, there still are some fine forests; but throughout Great Wallachia, and especially along the whole course of the Danube, the plains are bare of trees, and overgrown with a stunted underwood of oak, equally difficult to eradicate or to convert into forest. Only a very small portion of the fertile land is cultivated, as the peasantry till but just enough for their own immediate support, knowing only too well that anything more would be seized by those in authority, In the course of seventy years the province was successively governed by no less than forty Hospodars, every one of whom wanted to make a rapid fortune.

The Wallachians are of Roman descent, and their language is not unlike the Italian; they are a remarkably fine handsome race, but so completely subdued by their long subjection to the Turks, that they have completely forgotten how to bear arms. The Wallachian is afraid of every stranger, and submits, without resistance, to all his demands. Indolent by nature, and because industry would avail him nothing, he is perfectly satisfied if he can creep into his hovel underground, dry his wet rags at a blazing fire, roast a few ears of Indian corn for food, and smoke his pipe. As his dwelling contains neither provisions nor furniture of any kind, the Wallachian, when he goes out with his knife, his pipe, and his tobacco-pouch in his girdle, leaves nothing at home worth watching, and has pretty much the same to hope and to fear, either from friend or foe. The former campaigns taught the Wallachians that a Russian occupation, spite of the community of faith, was very little better than the rule of the Ottoman Porte; but it was equally certain that they would not attempt to resist it, seeing that the Hospodar would not desire to do so, and that they had neither fortresses, arms, nor soldiers. Thus the Russians could reckon with absolute certainty on the resources to be derived from this province, and, thanks to the inexhaustible bounty of nature, these were by no means inconsiderable, even after all the ravages of the Turks. Spite of the scanty cultivation, the country afforded a tolerable supply of corn, and cattle for food and for draught; the extensive meadows along the banks of the Danube produced abundance of hay, and some of the Boyars were rich.

No such supplies were to be hoped for in the Dobrudscha, which is a barren waste, such as could scarcely be supposed to exist in Europe. There are not above 300 inhabitants to five square miles, including the population of the towns. It is true that the country was only laid utterly waste during the retreat of the Tartars, in the former campaigns, but in 1828 it was manifest that the nature of the ground would present great obstacles to the transit of an army. Towards the north of the Dobrudscha are the steep mountains of Matchin, the well-wooded Betschepte, or "five mountains," and the range of Baba-Dagh, or "father of mountains." Towards the south the whole face of the country is undulating and hilly, only a few hundred feet above the level of the sea. The soil is nothing but fine grey sand, which instantly absorbs all moisture, nor is it stopped by the limestone rock beneath. The valleys are entirely without springs or streams, so that there is no water even to drink, save the scanty supply which is drawn with ropes of bast, out of wells above 100 feet deep, in the widely scattered villages. What with the dearth of water, and what with the scantiness of the population, there is hardly any cultivation at all in the Dobrudscha, and consequently no hope of finding either stores of grain in the villages or forage in the fields, for the grass is completely withered by the middle of the summer, and nothing is to be seen but a boundless expanse covered with tall dry stalks waving in the wind. The numerous flocks of sheep and oxen are driven to pasture on the marsh lands by the side of the Danube, and on the islands in the river. Not a single tree or shrub is to be found even in the villages. The part of Bulgaria lying between the wall of Trajan and Bazardjik is just as desolate and dreary, as destitute of wood and water, and even more so of all besides; so that troops marching across the middle of this district would have to struggle with the total want of all the necessaries of life, during a march of about 120 miles.

The Bulgarian plain lying between the Danube and the Balkan is not in nearly so desolate a condition, for although the Turks committed great excesses there, still they looked upon the country as their own, whereas they despaired of keeping possession of the Principalities, and only tried to extort all they could so long as they held them. Throughout the spring until the month of June this plain is covered with verdure; the sides of the deep valleys are covered with wild pear and lime trees; the brooks are bordered by rich meadows, and wherever the ground is tilled abundant crops of grain are produced: even the far greater part of the soil which is totally uncultivated is covered with the most luxuriant herbage. The villages, in which the whole population is crowded together, are few and far apart; but they are large, and generally contain considerable stores of provisions.

In this rich loamy soil the roads are almost impassable during the wet season, and the descent into the deep valleys often presents the greatest difficulties; moreover there are no bridges across the streams in their bottoms. In the winter the snow falls in such quantities that the roads are often not discernible. In the autumn the vegetation withers, and water becomes scarce, in spite of the fountains, "sheshmehs," which have been erected by Mussulman piety wherever it was possible to do so. Owing to this, the cavalry especially are often forced to make very long marches. As the strong positions are almost always upon the edges of the valleys, the running water is in front of the troops, so that the difficulties of procuring the necessaries of a camp, such as wood and straw, are increased by that of securing safe places of encampment. In these hot climates plenty of water is so absolutely indispensable, that it becomes necessary, in order not to fatigue the troops beyond endurance, that they should bivouac close to the water, and in front of the actual position.

The population of Bulgaria is essentially agricultural and pastoral. All the towns are situated on the Danube, or at the foot of the mountains; in the former the Moslems, in the latter the Christians were most numerous. The latter were partly Greeks, but principally Bulgarians, who are at least equal to the Moslems in number. The Bulgarians are an industrious people, inclined towards the Russians both by their Slavonic origin and their Greek faith, and detesting the Turks, who have plundered and oppressed them. They would not, however, be easily moved to rise against their formidable masters unless they could reckon with certainty upon foreign aid. At all events the Turks in Bulgaria could rely upon nothing but the fortified towns on the Danube and along the mountainous range of the Balkan.

Ever since the Turks have been liable to invasion from Russian troops, the Danube has been their first bulwark of defence. It will be necessary for our purpose to give a short description of the nature of the lower part of the course of that river.

Between Golubracz and Gladova, a distance of about 40 miles, the Danube breaks through the limestone rock which runs from north to south between the Carpathians and the Balkan. At the former point, where there is an old Servian castle, the stream, which is not less than 2000 paces wide, is suddenly narrowed to a width of only a few hundred paces, and pursues a very winding course between high and in many places precipitous walls of rock with a very rapid fall. At several points, especially Bibnitz and the Iron Gate (Demir Capu) its bed is crossed by reefs of rock which, when the water is low, rise above the surface of the river, and when it is high create prodigious whirlpools, always rendering the navigation of the river difficult, and at those points impassable. On this point of the river's course are the Turkish fortresses of New Orsova (Ada-Kalessi, the Island Fort) and Gladova (Feti-Islam, the Triumph of the Faith). The width of the stream throughout this tract is on an average 600 to 900 paces, and on both sides lies an almost uncultivated, thickly wooded, and very inaccessible hilly country.

Very little below the Iron Gates, however, the character of the stream changes altogether. On the Servian side, it is true, wooded heights still stretch along the right bank of the river as far as the boundary stream of Timock, but below that the mountains recede far away on either side, and the river flows on through a plain above a hundred miles in breadth down to its mouth. Lesser Wallachia, as far as the Aluta, and the north of Bulgaria are indeed traversed by a few chains of hills branching off from the high mountains, and are altogether less flat and low than the vast plains of Greater Wallachia, nevertheless they are on the whole level countries. There is, however, a very marked difference between the opposite banks of the river. On the Bulgarian side (all the way below Widdin) they rise steep and high, immediately overhanging the stream, while on the Wallachian they are flat and muddy, with extensive meadows intersected by branches of the Danube, and overflowed whenever the water rises. As the river flows on, these low banks become wider and wider, and more and more marshy, and the islands larger and more numerous. Below Rustchuck there is only a single spot, at the mouth of the Dembowicsa opposite Turtukai, where the shore is firm and dry, though flat, down to the edge of the river, which at that point is not impeded by any islands. Opposite to Silistria, too, a road passable at all seasons leads from Kallarasch to the Danube.

In the Dobrudscha, too, the right bank is considerably the highest; the opposite low Wallachian shore is for the most part firm and dry down to the edge of the river as far as the Bortisa branch of the Danube, but the islands form a marsh covered with trees and rushes many miles in breadth, which is always flooded when the river is high. Hirsova is the first point at which the valley becomes narrower, and a passage across the river is practicable. At Brailow the left side of the valley of the Danube first begins to rise from the river in perpendicular terraces of clay of about 80 or 100 feet high. From Brailow and Galatz there are roads across the wide marshes, practicable in the fine season, to Matchin, which place commands their débouchés, and beyond which the fine picturesque tops of the Matchin and

Betschepe mountains rise to a height of above 1000 feet.

Below Isakchi the Danube flows through its delta in three branches, of which only one, the Sulina, is navigable, and this is not above 200 paces wide at its mouth. The whole space, 30 miles in width, between the northern and the southern branches (the Kedrilleh and the Kilibogas) is covered by an unbroken waving sea of rushes ten feet high, above which only the rigging of the ships is visible. The Danube below the Iron Gates, except where it is divided by islands into several arms, is nowhere under 900 paces in breadth, and in many places it is more than double that width. In places it is as much as 70 or 80 feet deep, but at many points it is far shallower. Below Pesth, where a suspension-bridge has been constructed, the mighty river is only crossed by one single bridge of boats, that at Peterwardein. Of the massive bridge built by Trajan at Gladova nothing now remains but the piers and a sort of tower on the Wallachian shore. The stream at this point is very broad and shallow. At Tultcha the river is diagonally crossed by a sandbank which leaves a navigable channel only 14 or 15 feet deep. At this point a bridge on piles might be thrown across the main channel if the approach on the left bank were not rendered impossible by extensive marshes and islands overgrown with reeds. Everywhere else the passage of the river could only be effected by means of boats or pontoons.

Although the fall of the Danube is not nearly so great below the Iron Gates, the current on an average does not even then run less than 2½ miles an-hour.

The natural obstacles offered by this mighty river to the passage of troops, are increased by the great number of strongholds on its banks. Within a course of about 300 miles, there are upon the lower Danube, Nikopolis, Sistova, Rutschuk, Giurgevo, Turtukai, Silistria, Hirsova, Matchin, Brailow, Isakchi, and Tultcha, all situated at the points where the stream might otherwise most easily be crossed, which indeed was the very reason why towns rose at those points: wherever the shore could be approached at all seasons, ferries were established, roads were made, and houses were built; these by degrees became towns, which had to be fortified against hostile invasion. Thus Hirsova was not fortified until after the last war, because the Turks then learnt by experience the importance of the possession of this point to a Russian army advancing into Bulgaria, and especially to one marching from thence into Bessarabia.

Indeed, in the year 1828, there was a Turkish fort at every tolerably practicable point for crossing the river. The outworks of Turtukai alone had not been rebuilt since the former war, and yet that is the most advantageous place for the passage of an army on the whole of the lower Danube.

If Schumla and Varna were to be the first points of operation for the Russian army, its march thither from Bessarabia would lie almost in a direct line through Turtukai. No serious resistance on the part of the Turks could be anticipated in Wallachia, and the march across the Dobrudscha, rendered so difficult by the want of water, and the utter barrenness of the country, would be avoided. The obstacle presented by the commanding height of the right bank was, as we have seen, everywhere the same. Moreover, Turtukai stands in the greatest interval between two fortresses, 24 miles from Silistria, and twice as far from Rutschuk. The Danube is 995 paces in width; the banks are firm and always passable, and the Dembowicza, which flows past Bucharest, and empties itself into the Danube exactly opposite the town of Turtukai, affords facilities for bringing the means of crossing to the spot.

It would, however, have been utterly impossible even here to collect the materials for constructing a bridge 1000 paces long. The navigation of the Danube, properly speaking, does not extend above Brailow and Galatz, whence very large supplies of corn are annually shipped for Constantinople. As these ports were not within the Russian dominions, and therefore the ships lying there could not be seized until war had been declared, it was easy to foresee that they would take their departure in time to escape compulsory service in constructing a bridge. Even supposing that nothing was used but portable canvass pontoons, a good many vessels would be needed to transport the troops who were to cover the bridge, and to resist the Turkish river flotilla. These vessels would have to be brought from Russian ports and out of Russian rivers, and to ascend the Danube, which was clearly impossible until the strongholds commanding the stream were taken.

For this reason the passage could only be effected at some point which might be reached from the Dniester, the Pruth, and the Black Sea, without impediment, somewhere near the mouth of the river, and below Brailow. In the year 1809 the Russians had crossed the Danube at Galatz, where their preparations were greatly facilitated by the proximity of the mouths of the Pruth and the Sereth. Down the latter especially it would be extremely easy to float an abundant supply of excellent timber for shipbuilding. The arm of the Danube which flows between Galatz and the island opposite to it is only 240, and that between the island and the right bank 450, paces in width. The high range which encloses the valley of the Danube recedes at this part of the Bulgarian shore, to about 15 miles from the stream itself, and the marshes which lie between and are covered with tall rushes, can be traversed in separate columns during the dry season.

On this occasion the passage was effected in the middle of August. It would have been impossible in the spring, as the marshes "Kuntsefane" are under water until the middle of June. This was the reason why Satunovo was the point chosen for the passage, although there the descent to the left bank is as difficult as the débouché on the right. There too a flooded swamp had to be crossed, which could only be done by means of a dam constructed with fascines. But then this operation took place upon the Russian side, whereas at Galatz it must have been effected on the hostile shore, where it would have been impossible to guard against surprize amid the lofty rushes. Thus the Russians were compelled, by the peculiar nature of the river, to cross at a point peculiarly unfavourable to the undertaking.

We have already seen that the Russians had little either to fear or to hope from the population on this side of the Balkan. Unless they encountered a Turkish army in Bulgaria, they would have to fear no opposition except from the strongholds on the Danube and on the sea-coast, which, according to European ideas, were of the most miserable description. An outer wall with bastions, but without outworks; a dry ditch with a faced scarp and counterscarp, but narrow and shallow; lines that are enfiladed, and in many instances commanded by heights close upon them; a total absence of casemates; an enceinte filled up with houses built of lath and plaster, but plentifully supplied with arms, ammunition, and artillery—such are the usual characteristics of a Turkish fort.

But then the Turkish commanders have the great merit of being blind to the weak points of their places. Capitulations were not relished by the Divan, and those who made them risked their heads. The garrisons too were defending their own wives, children, and worldly goods within their walls, and fighting for their faith and for dominion over the Rayahs. They make up for the want of outworks by a skilful use of the dry ditch, and their most vigorous defence commonly begins at the point where with European troops it usually ends—from the moment when a practicable breach has been effected. With us a large number of wealthy householders are a serious impediment to the protracted defence of a fortress; but in Turkey it is quite the reverse; every man capable of bearing arms is a soldier, and makes his appearance upon the walls daily. Thus it is from the large towns, and from them only, that a very determined resistance is to be expected.

The places likely to be most formidable to an army entering Bulgaria are, first, Widdin, which, unlike most Turkish fortresses, is not commanded on any side, and presents an unusually strong profile. The garrison was numerous, but then the place lay so far from the actual seat of war, that it was only important on account of the irruptions which might be made from thence into Wallachia. Rutschuk was more formidable, from its vicinity to the seat of war, its tête-du-pont upon the left bank of the river, and the strength of its garrison; but above all there was

Silistria close upon the flank, and Brailow on the rear of every operation undertaken by the Russians against the Balkan.

The mountains of the Balkan which divide Rumelia from Bulgaria, run from west to east, down to the Black Sea; the ridge gradually decreases in height, and suddenly ends abruptly between the two valleys of the rivers Kamtchik and Nadir, with the point called Cape Emineh. Westward of the sources of the Jantra and Tundscha the tops of the mountains are covered with snow till the middle of June. From thence down to the sources of the Kamtchik the mountains are not more than 5000, and further east not above 4000 feet high. In the eastern part of the Balkan the natural indentations which are used as passes, are but little higher than those in the Thuringian forest, with which the Balkan has some resemblance; the prevailing character of the range is round hills, richly wooded, and it is only in the valleys that large masses of rock are found. The southern declivity is far the steepest, and the northern is rendered less striking by the low range of hills which lie in front of it.

The character of these hills is very different from that of the Balkan itself; they are of limestone rock, their tops are perfectly flat, and from these the sides fall in perpendicular walls of rock, varying from 10 to 200 feet in height, often forming most singular defiles; towards the valleys the face of the rock slopes more and more as it descends. The hill tops, therefore, are accessible only at a very few points; they are mostly wooded, not with the magnificent trees of the Balkan, but with almost impenetrable brushwood. The plain at the foot of the mountains is covered for an immense distance with underwood of oak, which renders it impossible for troops to march straight across the country, and in this heavy clay soil the roads are almost wholly impassable during the wet season.

The notion that the mountains of the Balkan are insurmountable is founded not upon the actual height or formation of the mountains, but partly upon tradition, partly upon the number of small difficulties which are accumulated within five or six marches, and which have to be encountered by all the troops in succession, and lastly upon the paucity and badness of the roads across the mountains. These indeed are mere bridle-paths, which could not be traversed by a corps-d'armée, until they had been widened and mended. The defence of the Balkan by the Turks might therefore be carried on not so much by erecting forts on the principal defiles, as by bodies of troops which would occupy them, and with the assistance of barricades, abbatis, &c., oppose a very formidable resistance to any force attempting to cross the mountains.

The small number of passes across the Balkan in any degree practicable for troops, are as follows (*Vide* General Map)—

1. That from Tirnova to Kasanlik. The river Jantra flows along a deep and singularly tortuous valley among the low hills at Tirnova, and entirely surrounds the town, which was the stronghold of the last kings of Bulgaria. The position is very strong, and commands the road on every side; the town itself, which is prosperous and well built, is inhabited chiefly by Greeks and Bulgarians. There is a stone bridge over the Jantra at Gabrova, and from thence the road ascends through a fine forest of beeches, towards the pass of Schibka, which is formed by two deep valleys, in which the Jantra and the Schibka take their rise, with a high and very narrow ridge between them. The sides of these valleys are steep, but not rocky, would afford footing to skirmishers, and the pass might be more easily forced than any of the others. A very steep descent of five miles then leads to the village of Schibka. The valley of Kasanlik, between the southern slope of the Balkan and the low hills of Eski Sagra, is beautiful and fertile; the course of the river is marked by walnut-trees, and the villages are surrounded by orchards. The plain is partly covered with rose-bushes, which are grown here for the manufacture of attar of roses; it also abounds in grain, cattle, water, and wood.

2. The road from Tirnova by Demirkapu to Slivno crosses a very lofty part of the main ridge, and is very little known. There is another road from Tirnova by Stararecka to Kasan, which joins—

3. that from Osman-basari to Kasan, and thence to Selimno on the right, and Karnabat and Dobroll on the left. This road ascends from Osman-basari, across an open country to the summit of the Binar-dagh. Where the roads from Tirnova and Osman-basari join and descend towards Kasan, between two high peaks of rock, there are two old fortifications. Kasan is a small place, squeezed in between high walls of rock. Beyond it the road lies through a narrow defile, called by the same name as the rapids of the Danube, Demirkapu (iron gate). This would be extremely difficult to force, and can only be avoided by climbing the very bad zigzag road to Selimno on the right. Beyond Demirkapu the main road divides into two, both very bad, one to Karnabat and the other to Dobroll (*vide* No. 4). The road to Selimno is rendered very difficult by crossing a number of deep wooded dells, along which brooks run down to join the Kamtchik, and whose steep sides are very hard to descend and to climb. The descent into Selimno is extremely steep and winding, and leads at once down into a new climate; vines, olives, cotton-plants, and a general richness of vegetation, mark the plain of Rumelia, from which the snow has quite disappeared while it still lies thick on the table-land of Bulgaria. Nevertheless the country in the direction of Yamboli and Adrianople is by no means so well cultivated as the valley of Kasanlik. There are boundless plains covered with brambles,

and the lowlands, which in spring are covered with rich herbage, are dried up in the summer. The numerous tributaries of the river Tundscha swell very much after rain, and cannot be crossed without portable bridges. The bare, steep, rocky side of the Balkan is very striking, seen from Selimno. The town contains a small arm manufactory and several cloth factories.

4. From Shumla, by Tshalikavak and Dobroll, to Karnabat.

We shall have to describe Shumla hereafter, and need only now observe that it does not close any pass over the Balkan. The celebrated entrenched camp lies at the foot of a separate group of hills in front of the Balkan, round which a circuit may be taken through an open cultivated country, both from Rutschuk to the right, through Eski Djumna and Eski Stamboul, to Tshalikavak, and from Silistria to the left, through Bulanik, Marasch, and Smadova, to Tshalikavak. The country itself presents no difficulty, but of course it is another question whether such a manœuvre could be executed in the face of a hostile army encamped at Shumla. The Kamtchik is 20 or 30 paces broad, but not deep; has a fine stony bottom, and is not difficult to cross: this is also the case with the small river Beiram, which has to be forded several times. Tshalikavak, in the Lesser Balkan, is a good halting-place, well supplied with water, green food, and wood. The march from thence to Dobroll is very difficult. The road winds through deep ravines, and along the sides of precipices to the summit, which is defended by an old fortification, and thence rapidly descends through the Derbent to the Deli Kamtchik, by a long steep defile easy to defend. The river can be forded only at a few points, and is crossed by a wooden bridge. Beyond this the road winds up a steep wooded mountain-side, and then slopes gently down, towards Dobroll, through an open country. From there to Karnabat the ground is uneven, overgrown with brushwood, and intersected by a number of brooks. Karnabat is a very good halting-place, but between that and Adrianople is the difficult defile of Bujukderbend, besides a great scarcity of grain and forage.

5. From Kosludja to Pravadi, and by Koprykoi or Jenikoi to Aidos. The little town of Pravadi is at the bottom of a ravine at least 600 or 700 feet deep, in the midst of mountains perfectly open and level at top. This ravine is about 1000 paces wide, and above 2 miles long, with perpendicular walls of rock on either side. The river Pravadi traverses it in a southerly direction, and opens a passage through the mountains. A very narrow point of rock juts out into this ravine and forms a natural fortress, which might be rendered impregnable, although it could easily be surrounded. This defile may, however, be avoided by a circuit on either side, but with some difficulty. Both the

Pravadi and the Kadischoi rivers must be crossed by means of temporary bridges. The passage at Koprykoi presents considerable difficulties, which may, however, be avoided by crossing 2 miles above or below the village. On the other hand, there is great risk in passing in single file along the deep, narrow valley of Delishdereh, which is 15 miles in length. This pass is called Kirk-getschid, or the Forty Fords, because the brook may be forded at all seasons. At Gok-behuet-arakdsche the valley is narrowed between high perpendicular walls of rock to a width of only 50 paces, and could easily be blockaded at this point.

A more advisable route is that by Jenikoi, where the Kamtchik, 30 paces in width, is crossed by a ferry in winter and forded in summer. The right bank is bare of trees. The Deli Kamtchik is fordable at almost every point near Tschenga; beyond which the road rises very rapidly, and may be completely blocked up by an abattis.

The two roads from Pravadi join at the top of the mountain, upon a tract of open level ground above a mile broad. This plateau, which lies between two rocky hollows, of which one runs to the Deli Kamtchik and the other to the Delishdereh, might easily be defended and fortified. Close to this spot the open ground of Bairamovo affords a good halting-place; and as there is a practicable road from Koprykoi to Varna, a corps posted at

Bairamovo could easily débouche upon that fortress and upon Pravadi.

6. From Varna, by Derweesh-jowann, to Burgas and Missivri: Varna will be described at length hereafter. Beyond that fortress several not very steep forest-roads cross the ridge which terminates in the promontory of Galataburnu upon the sea. At the village of Podbaschi the road crosses the Kamtchik—which at this point is united, 50 paces wide, and very swampy—by a bridge of boats. In 1827 the Turks erected a fort close upon the shore at this spot. The stream flows between perpendicular banks of earth, from 6 to 13 feet high. There was another fortification at Derweesh-jowann, upon a gentle rise on the opposite side of the valley of the river, which is 5000 paces wide, very marshy, and thickly wooded. Hence two roads, which, though only wide enough for one pair of wheels, are practicable, branch off to Burgas and Missivri. Both cross the eastern extremity of the Balkan by a tolerably gradual ascent, and traverse an almost impenetrable forest. They traverse the deep valley of the Kosakdereh, besides several smaller dells, which, though not defensible positions, are very troublesome to cross, especially in wet weather. The forest is everywhere so thick that it would be impossible for troops to fall into order, and the roads form continuous defiles.

In the mountains there are no cross-roads at all connecting the several passes, but there are a few in the valleys of the Kamtchik, and at the southern foot of the mountains, from Missivri and Burgas to Aidos, Karnabat, and Selimno.

Thus, then, if passes 4, 5 and 6 are those most important to a Russian army coming from Bessarabia, it is manifest that an army stationed at Aidos might offer effectual resistance to every successive column as it débouched singly from the mountain passes; and that, so long as Varna and Shumla, or even only one of them, can maintain itself, passing the Balkan will always be a very hazardous undertaking,

CHAPTER II.

PLANS OF OPERATION.

It is impossible to say what were the political schemes which moved the Russians to begin the Turkish campaign, or by what military movements it was intended to accomplish them. Thus much is certain,—that it was of the greatest importance to Russia not to excite the jealousy of the other European governments, and at the same time to deter them, by a great display of strength and a good understanding with Prussia, from interfering in the dispute with Turkey. Accordingly the Russian government officially declared that it had only taken arms in order to enforce existing treaties, and that a compliance with them, and at most an indemnification for the expenses of the campaign, would end the war. Moreover the main body of Russians remained on the western frontier, while only a small army marched into Turkey, and was reinforced by degrees. No attempt was made to excite the religious enthusiasm of the Servians and Bulgarians, or to arm them against their rulers; probably because such a course would have been too flagrantly opposed to the principles laid down by the Holy Alliance, and would have rendered it difficult to terminate the war suddenly should the condition of affairs in Europe require it. Another great sacrifice made to political at the expense of military expediency was the delaying the campaign until late in the spring.

The Russians cherished a well-founded conviction that they could overcome any Turkish army, however superior to themselves in numbers, in the open field; the only subject of anxiety was the difficulty of communication, transport, and supplies, in such a country as Turkey. To meet this, the Russian plan of operations must necessarily have included the investment of Brailow and Silistria, before entering Bulgaria, besides a constant watch to be kept upon Rutschuk and Widdin. Further operations would naturally take place along the coast, as the supremacy of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea would ensure a supply of provisions for the troops. The chief obstacle to their advance was Varna, and, in order to lay siege to Varna with effect, it would be necessary to post a body of troops before Shumla, strong enough to hold the Turkish army assembled there in check. We may assume it was within the bounds of possibility and the scope of the Russian plan, to cross the Balkan should Varna fall in time, and to march upon Constantinople, should they succeed in forcing the Turks out of their entrenchments at Shumla, and in beating them.

This plan of operations is so unavoidably marked out by the nature of the country and the circumstances of the case, that it must be applicable in its general outlines, not only to the campaign of 1828, but to every future Russian campaign in Rumelia.

The Turkish plan of operations, or rather the course which the Porte was forced by circumstances to pursue, was purely defensive. The Sultan seems to have thought it possible that a Russian army might land close to Constantinople. On no other grounds can it be explained why he kept the bulk of his forces in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital until late in the summer, while the Balkan, Varna, and Shumla, were almost undefended, and only the fortresses on the Danube were garrisoned.

CHAPTER III.

OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN—OCCUPATION OF MOLDAVIA AND WALLACHIA—PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE AT SATUNOVO.

THE Turkish Hatti-sherif of the 18th of December, 1827, was not answered by a declaration of war on the part of Russia until the 28th of April of the following year.

The Russian army was collected in Bessarabia at the end of March, and by the middle of May it was concentrated between the Pruth and the Dniester. On the 7th May the Russians crossed the Pruth in three places, and it was not till the 8th of June that they passed the Danube. The time thus lost by the Russians was employed by the Turks in strengthening their Danubian fortresses.

The Russian forces were to take the field in the following order:—General Rudjewitsch, with the 3rd and strongest corps, was to cross the Danube below Isakchi, to cross the Dobrudscha, and to enter Bulgaria, where he might expect to encounter the enemy at the northern foot of the Balkan. The two other weaker corps were to cover his flank, and to conquer a base for further operations. The seventh, which included the battering train, and was commanded by the Grand-Duke Michael, was to take

Brailow, and the sixth, under General Roth, to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia. On the 7th of May, a detachment from General Roth's corps, under General Kleist, crossed the river at Sculenie, and entered Jassy next day. The feeble Turkish garrison withdrew immediately, the body-guard of the Hospodar Stourdsa was disarmed, and himself ostensibly taken prisoner.

The principal passage of the sixth and seventh corps across the Pruth had been effected lower down at Falschi and Woduly Isakchi, where the bridges were kept up and guarded, so as to maintain a constant communication with Bessarabia. The Pruth, which was much swollen at this time, is 90 paces wide at Falschi; the valley is marshy, and between 2000 and 3000 paces in width; the sides of the valley are high and steep.

On the 12th the Cossacks, and on the 16th the gros of the 6th corps, entered Bucharest, while the 7th corps advanced upon Brailow. The Hospodar Ghika placed himself under the protection of Russia. From hence the advanced guard, under General Geismar, pushed forward at once to the river Aluta, and the Cossacks entered Crajova, the capital of Lesser Wallachia, on the 21st.

Count Pahlen was appointed by the Russian government Governor-General of the two Principalities. These unfortunate provinces had been called upon to deliver 20,000 loads of corn, 10,000 head of cattle, 30,000 sheep, and a million of piastres, for the use of the Danubian fortresses. Not half of this was collected, but the Arnaut troops had ravaged the country, and both the chief towns were almost entirely burnt down. Nevertheless, the Russian staff compelled the inhabitants to furnish 250,000 measures of grain, 400,000 loads of hay, 50,000 kilderkins of brandy, and 23,000 oxen, to be paid for in bills, at a rate fixed by the Russians themselves; moreover, 16,000 peasants were sent to make hay on the banks of the Danube, and an immense number of waggons and horses put in requisition. Many of the Boyars took refuge within the Austrian frontier, and the peasants fled by thousands into the forests with their cattle. Plague, famine, and devastation reigned triumphant in these provinces, afflicted with the curse of always being the seat of war.

The 6th corps encountered no resistance until the 2nd June, when a small body of Turks crossed from Rutschuk to Slobodja, where they were joined by a considerable force of infantry and cavalry. A skirmish took place, and the Turks were forced to retreat into their fortresses. On the 8th July, at Kalafat, General Geismar, with 4000 men, repulsed a corps of 4000 infantry, 5000 cavalry, and 10 guns, who had made a sortie from Widdin. On the other hand, the projected passage of the Danube at Oltenitza, for which every preparation was made, had to be abandoned, partly because the Turks had taken up a position on the opposite bank at Turtukai, and partly because it would have been useless and dangerous for the 6th corps to enter Bulgaria until the 3rd corps could advance on the same line, and until Silistria could be surrounded, and its numerous garrison confined within its walls. Thus the 6th corps was compelled to remain inactive, while the 7th was besieging Brailow, and the 3rd commenced active operations.

This corps was in Bessarabia waiting for the completion of the preparations for crossing the Danube at Satunovo, which lies between lakes Kagul and Kortal, upon a point of land surrounded by meadows, always swampy, and frequently flooded. The distance from Satunovo to the shore is about five miles, and the latter half of the way is a marsh, overgrown with rushes, and intersected by pools of water. On the other side of the river the shore consists of somewhat higher meadow-land, which, in places, is boggy and covered with brushwood, but affords sufficient footing for infantry. The edge of the valley on the right is more than 100 feet above the level of the river; not far above the crossing-point, the ridge of hills which enclose the valley rise immediately from the stream on the right to a height of upwards of 50 feet, while below it they slant away to a distance of about 300 paces. About Isakchi the ground is marshy and completely overlooked, both from the fortress itself and from the neighbouring heights.

This point is very favourable for drawing up troops to defend the passage of the Danube, especially as the vicinity of Isakchi would render it impossible to turn their left flank, while the right would rest behind the brake, upon a large meadow, which might indeed be crossed, but where every hostile movement might be observed and defeated.

Although a report had been spread that the passage would take place at Ismail, the Turks had inferred the real intentions of the Russians from the preparations they were making, and had entrenched themselves opposite to Satunovo. Their fortifications were admirably adapted to their purpose, both in position and construction; *a* and *d* were well calculated to sweep the opposite shore, and *b* and *c* the river itself. (*Vide* Plan I.)

The construction of redoubt *a* was very peculiar, but well fitted for its purpose. It consisted of two tiers, the lower with embrasures for artillery, the upper surrounded by a rampart 8 feet high, with a parapet 6 feet high and 4 thick, with loopholes intended only for skirmishers. All the escarpments were perpendicular and faced with wattles. The ditch had no revetment, but the escarpments were cut down very steep for one-tenth of their height in a stratum of stiff clay. The facing of the whole redoubt was, in fact, like a gabion.

Trenches *b*, *c*, and *d* were merely thrown up with earth without any revetment, and with the usual profile of fieldworks. Line *e e* was intended rather for the protection of an outlying line of skirmishers than as a safe communication between the works. The artillery consisted of 12 guns, 2 howitzers, and 1 mortar, all of large calibre.

Hazardous as the passage of the Danube must appear under the circumstances, it was resolved upon and executed. In the beginning of June a dyke, *h*, *i*, *k*, 7000 paces in length, was begun across the broad marshes on the left bank of the Danube. This was a very difficult undertaking, as a distance of at least 3000 paces could only be rendered passable by wooden bridges, and the neighbourhood afforded neither timber nor brushwood for fascines, &c. Moreover, the men were concealed while at their work by the tall rushes, but by no means protected from the Turkish guns, until at length a battery, mounting 12 24-pounders, able to return their fire with effect, was erected, with infinite labour, at point *g*.

The two divisions of infantry, under General Rudjewitsch, which had been directed upon Satunovo, were to force the passage, and on the 7th of June the Emperor arrived there.

Part of the Danubian flotilla, with the pontoon train, advanced up the stream from Ismail, bringing a battalion of Chasseurs as a reinforcement to the corps that was to cross the river. This was further strengthened by the Zaporogue Cossacks, who had migrated from Russia to the Dobrudscha in consequence of religious disputes under the Empress Catherine. They dwelt upon the banks of the Lower Danube, supported themselves by fishing, and had done the Porte excellent service in all its wars with Russia. Their Hetman held the rank of a Pasha of two tails in the Turkish army, but they had retained the Greek faith and the Russian language, and once more took the side of their former rulers. Hetman Gladkoi, and his whole tribe, declared for Russia at Ismail on the 27th of May. Their co-operation was most valuable in the actual passage of the river. Hidden by the flotilla from the enemy, they carried the battalion of Chasseurs ashore in their light boats, and landed them on the right bank behind the brake, *f*. The Turks did not perceive the landing of their enemies until it was too late, and even then took no effective steps to prevent their forming. The Russians instantly advanced upon entrenchment *c*, took it by storm with the loss of 50 men, of whom 15 or 20 were killed by fougasses, constructed, oddly enough, by the Turks underneath, instead of in front of, their breastworks.

At this unexpected result the Turkish corps, about 10,000 to 12,000 strong, and chiefly cavalry, were seized with such a panic that they abandoned all the entrenchments without further resistance, and fled, partly to Bazardjik and partly to Isakchi.

By 11 o'clock the Russians were masters of the position, after a short struggle in which the Turks had shown no science and very little courage.

At 3 in the morning the bridge across the Danube was begun, and by 2 o'clock on the following morning it was completed. It consisted of 63 large wooden praams, 12 feet wide and 36 feet long, pointed at one end and cut off quite square at the other, and constructed like pontoons with knees made of oak. In addition to these praams it took 12 canvas pontoons to reach across the river, which is fully 900 paces wide at this point. The bridge itself was 18 feet wide from beam to beam, and the platform rested on a framing fastened with iron bolts and chains instead of ropes. The space between the pontoons was 12 feet on an average. Each pontoon was secured by an anchor—cast alternately one against the stream and the other against the wind. The bridge had a railing on each side.

This bridge had been constructed by several detachments of pioneers under General Ruppert, who likewise superintended the erection of the two redoubts, *t* and *y*, on the right bank. This important passage was further protected by the erection of tête-du-pont P.

We have seen that on the whole long course of the Lower Danube the Russians could cross nowhere but at Satunovo, and even here it seemed almost impossible to effect a passage. The left bank could only be reached by means of a dyke—which it took weeks to build, and which betrayed its own destination; still more difficult was the débouché upon the opposite shore, where the Turks had had plenty of time to entrench themselves strongly upon the heights by which it was commanded. The immediate vicinity of a Turkish fortress, the presence of a considerable hostile force, and the fifteen pieces of heavy artillery, masked, and placed so as to direct a most effective fire upon the river and upon the dyke, would have rendered it impossible to construct a bridge at this point in the teeth of any resistance. And that 10,000 men should run away at the approach of a handful of newly-landed Cossacks and Chasseurs was hardly a thing to be reckoned upon.

In fact, the passage of the Danube by the third corps was a brilliant and successful piece of daring; but it may be questioned whether the first important move in a campaign should be an act of this kind; and whether it would not have been more advisable to attempt the passage on boats and rafts rather than by means so difficult and hazardous as the bridge.

The materials for an undertaking of this kind, which must doubtless be executed upon a grand scale, might easily be brought in sufficient quantities down the Pruth and up the Danube, past Isakchi, which does not command the main arm of the river. A landing might have been effected at Reni, or, indeed, at any point where the Turks were not so well prepared for resistance as at Satunovo. Seventy praams and a proportionate number of rafts would be sufficient to transport a brigade of infantry and a light battery across the river, and to land them in the course of 10 minutes. The enemy might have been deceived by false demonstrations, and a surprise would almost infallibly have been successful. The success of the affair at Satunovo was owing, after all, to a landing effected by the boats of the Zaporogues. Again, when a Russian division had once gained a firm footing on the right bank of the Danube, and invested Isakchi, a bridge of boats might have then been constructed so as to establish a safe and easy communication. The most important point of all was that, by this means, the passage of the Danube might have taken place simultaneously with that of the Pruth, instead of being delayed for more than a month by the construction of the bridge; the advantage that this would have been is evident, when we remember how backward were the Turkish preparations for defence even during the spring.

Again, supposing it was absolutely necessary to cross the Danube by means of a bridge, it is unintelligible in a military point of view why the preparations for its construction were begun so late. It was notorious that the low banks of the Danube are under water until far into June; and there never could have been an intention of waiting till the middle of summer for the floods to go down. Even taking for granted that the declaration of war was delayed until the end of April by political motives, no one could prevent the Russians from assembling any number of vessels on their own rivers, or from constructing a dyke upon their own bank of the Danube. These preparations might have been made quietly, and the bridge thrown across at once. The invasion of Wallachia, the investment of Brailow, and the advance into the Dobrudscha, would thus have taken place simultaneously and have supported each other; while, executed as they were at different periods, they excited the jealousy of Europe, roused the Turks from their apathy, and afforded them an inestimable time for completing their preparations.

CHAPTER IV.

THE STRONGHOLDS OF THE DOBRUDSCHA.

WHEN the Russian army had landed on the right bank of the Danube, and were laying siege to Brailow, the next point for consideration was the nature of the strongholds in the Dobrudscha, which lay on the line of march towards the wall of Trajan. The first of these was Isakchi, which was only 4000 paces distant from the landing-place. The plan of this fortress is given in plan I.; but it must be borne in mind that at this time the suburbs had been burnt down.

Isakchi stands near the Danube, upon a hill, surrounded within musket-shot by two valleys, which are not commanded by the fortress: no advantage is taken of the lay of the ground, and the correct instinct by which the Turks are usually guided in the disposition of their lines seems to have altogether forsaken them here. The profile is shown in the plan; we have only to add that the ditch was 10 feet deep, and the scarp and counterscarp faced with strong walls built of limestone from the left bank of the Danube; but on the northern front, which lay very low, the ditch was altogether wanting. In the ditch was a weak palisade, made of very slight stakes. As usual, there were neither outworks nor covered way, only a narrow footpath inside the glacis, which was 3 feet high. The ramparts were so narrow that there was not room for the guns, except in the bastions, which were tolerably large. The inner scarp of the rampart was supported perpendicularly with wattling; a measure which in 1810 had so much embarrassed the besiegers of Rutschuk. The inner slope of the parapet was partly lined with palisades, and their outer slopes on the bastions as well as the embrasures were lined with gabions.

The stiff clay soil rendered it possible to make excavations beneath the ramparts without any props; and in like manner the barracks for the troops were mere holes in the earth, covered first with stout planks and then with a layer of clay, and thus rendered bomb-proof. The powder was stored in private cellars, and the arsenal was a mere wooden shed.

The usual dislike of the Turks to outworks and outposts had led them to leave an island exactly opposite the town, and only 200 paces distant from it, entirely unoccupied. With the view, however, of commanding the river, they had established a cavalier upon the northern bastion, which was so utterly inefficient that, even before the passage of the river at Satunovo was fully effected, a detachment of the Russian river flotilla sailed up, without let or hindrance, to assist in the attack upon Brailow.

The point of attack upon the fortress comprised the two northern sides of the polygon, which could be enfiladed in their whole length from the heights towards the south. The besieging force would not need any entrenchments or other works; they would only have to erect a battery near the bank of the river at 500 or 600 paces distance from the fortress, to secure themselves from attack by detached bodies of troops, and to effect breaches in the escarps, which at that point is not defended by any ditch.

It was manifest that no very effectual resistance could be anticipated, but the actual event was equally unexpected. No sooner had the Russians succeeded in crossing the river than the garrison was seized with a panic, and surrendered on the very same day.

The fortress contained a large store of arms and ammunition, besides 85 guns of large calibre, mounted on very clumsy carriages.

Of equal importance was the fortress of Matchin, which forms as it were the tête-du-pont to Brailow; the two fortresses mutually support and strengthen each other, especially when the communication between them is secured by a flotilla on the Danube.

The population of Matchin* at this time was from 1000 to 1500; it stands upon a ridge which juts out into the Danube, and ends in a precipitous descent into the stream; on the west it is defended by an impassable marsh. The lofty mountains which rise in jagged points on the south-east are too far off to be dangerous, and the intervening ground slopes off gently towards the fortress, and forms a plain on the eastern side. The walls of the town form a heptagon, defended by six small bastions. The ditch was dry, and the scarp entirely, and the counterscarp partially, reveted. On the top of the lofty northern precipice, over the Danube, stands citadel A, upon a granite rock. This citadel commands the town and its walls, the ground in front of it, and the Danube with all the islands, within the range of the guns. Although the citadel had no ditch, it presented a very formidable relief, with escarps 50 feet in height, rising 25 feet above the enceinte of the town, which was so small that it was commanded in every part from the high cavalier, even with musketry. Thus it would have been almost impossible for an attacking party to occupy the town while the citadel remained in the hands of the enemy; and on the other hand, no attack could be made upon the citadel until the enceinte of the town were taken. In fact, the citadel, occupied by a resolute garrison, was impregnable by any other means than a well-directed and vigorous bombardment; and even this would by no means ensure the surrender of the place.

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* The accompanying drawings of Matchin, Hirsova, and Köstendje (*Vide* Plans 9 and 11) were not made by measurement until 1836, but they serve to show the state of the places at the time of the campaign.

Hirsova, which stands at the point where the Danube may most easily be crossed, is a tête-du-pont, formed as it were by nature against the Turks. The town, which then numbered about 4000 inhabitants, but now contains only 40 families, is an irregular quadrangle, enclosed on three sides by rocky heights, which slope gently on the inside and abruptly on the out, and on the fourth side by the Danube. At one point, where a perpendicular face of rock, 80 or 100 feet high, rises out of the stream, stood an ancient castle, of which the Russians took possession in 1809. They made trenches round the town, threw a bridge of boats across the river, withdrew again to the other side of the Danube in the following year, and recrossed it the next. The attention of the Turks was called to the place by these proceedings, and in 1822 they made Hirsova into a fortress, by very slight additions to the natural strength of its position.

The enceinte consisted of five short fronts, defended by bastions, and without outworks. The ditch was dry, 14 or 15 feet deep, with a scarp and counterscarp of masonry; the bastions mounted 10 guns each; the inner slope of the parapet was partly protected by palisades.

Several circumstances combined to render the Turkish fortifications of Hirsova less strong than they might have been made. The enceinte was not carried near enough to the edge of the declivity which formed the natural glacis, so that a considerable space at the very foot of it was completely hidden from the guns of the fortress. Neither had the Turkish engineers known how to defilade the ramparts against the nearest range of hills. They had endeavoured to remedy this defect by traverses in some places, 50 feet high; this was done with great labour and difficulty, but to no effect. Finally, they had, as usual, entirely neglected to fortify the island opposite to the town. The platform on the top of the castle, and the high bastion beneath those upon the Danube, were indeed able to direct a few guns upon this island, but the arm of the river beyond it was not commanded by them at all, so that the Russian flotilla was able to sail up to Silistria quite unmolested. If the Russians succeeded in establishing themselves upon the island, they would thence be able to lay the town in ruins, as it lies like an amphitheatre before it. Moreover, the side of the town abutting upon the river was only defended by an embankment about 700 paces in length, with a very insufficient ditch, and 10 pieces of artillery. On the other hand, Hirsova was able to offer a very effective resistance to any attack in the direction of the Dobrudscha.

Matchin and Hirsova then lay on the right flank of the Russian line of march, and on the left were Tultcha and Kö[illegible]tendje.

The former had been the tête-du-pont of Ismail:

since the capture of that place Tultcha was important to the Turks, inasmuch as no Russian corps could convey materials for the construction of a bridge up the main branch of the Danube, without first taking Tultcha.

The town stands upon a broad ridge of hills with a steep declivity towards the Danube, but separated from it by a marsh 400 paces wide. On the western side, the ground slopes gently down towards the fortress.

The enceinte formed a slightly irregular hexagon, with bastions and without outworks. The sides of the polygon were 360 paces in length, and the profile would seem to have been exactly like that of the fortresses already described. The western bastion, part of the adjoining curtain, and a wall closed at this point against the town, formed a kind of citadel. On the northern side it was possible to advance to within 400 paces of the town without being seen or fired upon in a direct line, and accordingly there are the traces of a detached entrenchment upon an isolated hill in this direction. The remains of some still earlier trenches or lines on the western side might be used as parallels by a besieging force. We have no exact account of the condition of the place in 1828. Now the ancient site of the town is completely abandoned, the works have been entirely undermined and blown up by the Russians, and within the walls there is nothing but a heap of ruins and ashes. The new town of Tultcha has been built about a mile lower down the Danube, on a spot eminently fitted to command the navigation of the Sulina, which is not 400 paces wide at this point. The town could scarcely be fortified in its whole actual extent, but, if the southern part were sacrificed, the northern, which is surrounded by the Danube, a marsh, a lake, and a commanding height, might be converted into a small fortress which would require but a slender garrison. But then it would be essential to the safety of the place to erect an outwork upon the further extremity of the island, opposite to the place which, like all the islands in the Danube, was ceded to Russia at the last peace.

Köstendje stands upon a point of land, so that on three sides it is defended by the sea, and by chalk cliffs upwards of 100 feet in height, and too steep to be scaled, and is therefore only accessible from the west. The total absence of safe harbours on the western coast of the Black Sea gives importance to that of Köstendje, bad as it is, especially for an army whose operations are directed upon Varna. The water in the harbour is not above 7 or 8 feet deep, and it is wholly exposed to the southerly gales. Only a very few small vessels can anchor in it, and ships of war cannot approach within effective range without great danger. In 1828 the population of Köstendje was about 2000, now it does not contain above 40 inhabited houses. The Turks had defended the side towards the land, only 500 paces in width, by three bastions and short curtains; the ditch was faced with stone. The old Roman embankment, which connects Trajan's wall with the sea, and now affords a ready approach to the fortress, ought to have taught the Turks how to lay down their lines so as to command the ground. At any rate the three hillocks at the northern corner ought to have been taken into the fortifications. A detached outwork, open at the rear, had been erected on one of them; but it could not be supported by the fortress.

The country which had to be traversed between the fortresses has already been described.

By far the best line of march upon Bazardjik lay up the right bank of the Danube, by Kusgun, a route on which there are many villages and a good supply of water and of forage. But then there were the fortresses of Matchin and Hirsova, and the strong and easily defensible position of Tjernavoda, behind the marshes and lakes of Karasu,* which can only be avoided by taking a circuit nearly 20 miles to the east. In order to operate along the sea-coast, and to base the support of a column upon a fleet, it would have been essential to have had possession of the strongholds upon the sea-shore—Köstendje, Mangalia, Kavarna, and Baltjik.

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* These have been erroneously supposed to be a choked-up branch of the Danube, a supposition upon which the project of a canal to Köstendje was founded. According to the survey made by Major v. Vincke, of the Prussian staff, in 1837, the lowest points of the valley of the Karasu near Köstendje and its commencement are 164 feet above the level of the Black Sea. As there is not a drop of water to be found on the high ground, the canal would have to be cut to that depth for a distance of 10 miles through a bed of limestone rock—evidently an impossible undertaking.

Granting therefore that it was necessary to march straight across the Dobrudscha by Kasimze and Karasu, it was essential that the corps should be no larger than could find means of subsistence, and yet strong enough to answer the purpose in view, namely, to offer effectual opposition to the hostile army in northern Bulgaria.

The Russian corps which had crossed the Danube at Satunovo consisted, after it had been joined by the 1st division of mounted Chasseurs, of 48 battalions, 32 squadrons, 2 regiments of Cossacks, and 128 field-pieces, but did not number in all more than 24,000 foot and 5000 horse, or at most 30,000 men in all.

	Bat.	Squadrons.	
Of these there remained in Isakchi . . .	2	0	
And there were detached—			
Upon Tultcha, under General Uschakow .	4	2	
Upon Matchin, Colonel Ragofski . . .	2	0	
Upon Hirsova, Lieut.-Gen. Prince Matadof	4	2	
Upon Köstendje, Gen. Rudiger	4	8	30 guns.
Upon Bazardjik, as advanced guard . . .	4	7	
Total	20	19	30 guns.

Or about 14,000 men.

The main body with which the Emperor advanced upon Karatai, close to the wall of Trajan, to the east of Karasu, and which was reinforced by a few squadrons of lancers from the Bug, did not consist of more than 16,000 men. It must also be borne in mind that the detachments sent against the strong places did not on an average consist of more than 2000 men, and could scarcely hope to effect anything against at all a determined resistance, especially as they were accompanied only by field-pieces, and the only Russian battering-train was engaged before Brailow.

In the mean time the 7th corps, commanded by General Woinow, under the direction of the Grand-Duke Michael, was engaged in the siege of Brailow.

CHAPTER V.

SIEGE OF BRAILOW.

BRAILOW, or Ibrail, contained about 24,000 inhabitants, of whom about 7000 or 8000 were men capable of bearing arms. The place stands upon a plateau, which falls with an open, gentle slope towards the fortress, and then with a nearly perpendicular wall of clay, about 80 feet high, down to the Danube. On the right bank wide and partly marshy meadows extend as far as Matchin. Thus this fortress, unlike other Turkish strongholds, was not commanded on any side. (*Vide* Plan 2.)

The contour was almost semicircular, surrounded by eight sides of a polygon, lay upon the high ground, and joined the lower part of the stream by the enclosed work B. The 9 bastions were unusually large, their flanks being 20 or 30, and their fronts 50 or 60, paces in length. On each of the former were placed 2, and on the latter 3, pieces of artillery on wooden platforms. All the guns were fired through embrasures, and were protected with timber and wattle blindages, even on the fronts not attacked. Upon the curtain, a few feet beneath, were mortars.

The profile of these fortifications is remarkable, inasmuch as the escarp wall rises 20 feet above the natural level of the ground, which gives the main wall a command over the ground in front of it, very rare in Turkish fortresses; altogether the relief is more considerable than in any other place in Rumelia or Bulgaria.

The inner scarp of the rampart was faced with wattles, and, thanks to the natural hardness of the ground, perpendicular; the inner scarp of the parapet was lined with palisades, which projected several inches above the summit—a mistaken use of them very common with the Turks, and found at Rutschuk, Silistria, Hirsova, Isakchi, and Varna. The parapet was above 16 feet thick; the ditch in front of the bastions was 5 or 6 roods, in front of the curtain 8 or 10 roods wide. The revêtements had been constructed in 1821, and were in perfect repair; there were no outworks whatever.

The citadel, A, within the walls, presents the same profile as that which we have already described, but with a somewhat smaller ditch. It had round bastions and plenty of artillery.

Work B was especially intended to command the Danube, by three tiers of terraces.

The streets of the town were most irregular, and were laid with planks instead of pavement, the houses very slightly built, in many cases only of brushwood and clay. The only bomb-proofs were excavations behind the curtains sunk in the earth up to the roof-trees, and covered in with 6-inch beams, surmounted by a layer of earth a foot or more deep. The corn was stored in flask-shaped pits dug in the dry hard clay soil, like the silos of the Arabs. The place was more than amply provisioned, and further supplies could always be sent from Matchin so long as the Turkish fleet held possession of the Danube. The place was armed with 278 guns and mortars.

In short, Brailow was by far the strongest place on the whole of the Lower Danube, not excepting even Widdin,—defended by a numerous and well-provisioned garrison, and might be expected to offer a very determined resistance.

The seventh corps, with a suitable engineer and artillery park, one battalion of Sappers and Miners, and a working-party equal to two battalions, was sent to besiege Brailow, under the command of the Grand-Duke Michael; the whole besieging force amounting altogether to 16,000 or 18,000 men.

General Suchasaniet was chief in command under the Grand-Duke, and Generals Gerois and Trusson were in command of the engineering department.

The first detachment of the seventh corps reached Brailow on the 11th of May, and the main body with the battering train of 100 guns on the 21st.

Operations commenced with the construction of redoubt No. 1 and batteries 2 and 3. 100 Sappers and Miners and a working party of 400 labourers completed the works without the loss of a man by the night of the 19th of May. The object of these works was to fire upon the Turkish ships on the Danube as well as upon the batteries at B, and to keep the garrison in doubt as to which was to be the real point of attack.

It turned out that the Russian artillery had little or no effect at 3000 paces distance, and it was resolved to abandon these posts and to erect a couple of batteries for 6 12-pounders each on the more effective points, 4 and 5. These forts subsequently played a great part in the victory gained by the Russian flotilla over that of the Turks.

It is necessary to premise that the besieging force had very insufficient information as to the strength of the garrison and the construction of the fortress. For instance, they mistook the line of contour, *a*, *d*, *e*, *f*, as laid down in a plan of the year 1810, sent by the engineering department in Petersburg, for the actual line of the enceinte of the town. The garrison was no less erroneously estimated at only 3000 or 4000 men.

On the bank of the Danube, above the fortress, the ruins of the demolished suburb afforded protection to the trenches, which on every other side had to be made in the open ground. This decided the choice of the point of attack. On the 21st of May the erection of battery 6 was begun. The work lasted two nights, during which time a vigorous fire was kept up from batteries 4 and 5 in order to divert the attention of the garrison; the fire was returned with equal vehemence and equally slight effect. Even when battery 3 was sufficiently advanced to be observed by the Turks, but not far enough to be defensible, they neglected making a sortie upon it. This battery was finally armed with 24 pieces, partly 24 and partly 12 pounders, in order to silence the guns on the side of attack.

Between this time and the 25th the Russians were occupied in preparing the gabions and fascines for the trenches and batteries: owing to the total want of brushwood in the neighbourhood, gabions and fascines were made of rushes, which turned out light, durable, and strong.

During the night of the 25th the Russians opened their first parallel, which lay, under cover of the ruined suburb, at a distance of only 800 or 900 paces on the left wing; and 500 or 600 on the right, from the counterscarp of the fortress. This whole line of parallels was completed in one night by a working-party of 3725 labourers as far as the trace extended, and the breadth of the same was from 14 to 18 feet. The difference in the distance of the two wings occasioned the piece extending from *g* to battery No. 7 to be called the first, and that from the same point to *h*, where the trench joined on to battery No. 6, the second parallel.

Every precaution was taken in the execution of this work, complete silence was maintained, and no interruption was offered by the Turks; so that there was time to erect the mortar-battery No. 10. It was not till towards morning, when the moon rose, that the garrison observed the construction of the mortar-battery, and directed their fire upon it, but without doing any harm to the Russians. During the same night two large communications were constructed in its rear to the depôts for materials.

From the 26th to the 29th the dismounting batteries Nos. 8 and 9 were erected, and all the other works in the rear completed; the works being chiefly carried on by night, both for safety and to avoid the heat.

The garrison directed their fire principally on battery 6, where they did great damage to the embrasures and dismounted two guns. On the other hand, a heavy fire was kept up from this very battery upon bastion 2; the gate of the main wall was so much perforated that the besiegers could see into the town; and the explosion of a magazine of grenades caused a fire which was put out principally by the rain.

During this time the Turks had endeavoured to gain some knowledge of the progress of the evening's operations by lighting large fires upon the works at night, but had not attempted any energetic interruption of them. They fired a great deal, even upon single persons who happened to show themselves outside, or even within the trenches. Their best defence was a well-directed fire of shells upon the second parallel, which caused a daily loss of 10 or 15 men, and killed or wounded several officers. Several sorties were made, with great spirit, but in small numbers, and with very little result.

On the night of the 31st of May battery 7 was erected in order to dismount the guns on the second bastion on the left wing of the fortress, the existence of which had but just been discovered. It had not yet been ascertained whether the fortress had real bastions with faces and flanks, or only small circular ones like the citadel, as the merlons of the embrasure were rounded off on the outside, and embrasures cut in the shoulders, which gave the bastions the appearance of round towers externally. By reason of this, and of the small extent of the bastions, the Russians constructed no ricochet batteries, either here or against the curtain. Subsequently the flank redoubt, No. 11, was erected from the first parallel. 200 or 300 men worked all night, and by the 3rd of June the approaches were finished as far as the third parallel, *c*. Up to this point the works had been traced out with fascines, and consisted of a trenched earthwork, without gabions, thrown up in flying sap; but from hence they were continued by the full sap, with half and whole traverses alternately, as a very sharp and well-directed fire of musketry had now begun to do a good deal of mischief.

In order to defend the lines of approach which were made at night, a few light howitzers were placed at their heads, which did good service during the day in repulsing sorties, and could be placed very advantageously upon the ruins of the suburb, across which the works had to be carried.

Between the 4th and 6th of June the 3rd parallel was completed, at a distance of 120 to 150 paces from the counterscarp, and the two branches of the traversed sap were brought to within a few rods of the crest of the glacis-shaped mound; and now, not satisfied with the effect of the dismounting battery of 12 and 24 pounders, the Russians erected batteries 12 and 13, as well as the mortar-battery 14 in the 3rd parallel, and heightened battery 6, in order to fire from it with 24 pieces of artillery over the works in front.

All the trenches were made deep enough to afford cover even to a man on horseback; in the parallels they were 18 or 20 feet wide, and in the approaches 12 feet, so that artillery could be moved along them in safety. By this means, of course, it had been possible to construct very strong parapets, but the expenditure of time and labour had been greatly increased without corresponding advantage. Both in the parallels and the approaches, banquettes had been made; and here and there, especially near the fortress, loopholes for riflemen were formed of sand-bags placed upon the gabions. For the most part there was no other headwork to the gabions than a fascine laid across them to prevent the pressure of the earth from forcing them out of their places. The great depth of the trenches rendered a regular heading of fascines unnecessary; and moreover the materials were wanted for the batteries.

The gabions used by the Russians, both in the saps and for the batteries, were 4 feet high, and 2 to 2½ wide. Such large dimensions would have rendered it difficult for one man to handle a gabion woven of fresh brushwood, and nothing but the lightness of the rushes used for the purpose made the manipulation possible. The fascines were always 18 feet long, and had to be carried by two men. The tracing was done partly with these fascines, and partly by placing successive rows of gabions upon the intended line, which was done by relays of men running forward with them. In the trenching work two relays of workmen were employed.

The stiff clay soil rendered the use of pickaxes indispensable in the earthworks before Brailow, and accordingly a third of the workmen were provided with them.

In order to cover the advance with the double sap, three sap rollers were used, the foremost of which was rolled in front of the interval left between the other two. They were filled with cotton, 6 feet long and 4 feet in diameter. These were not made of rushes, like the other sap rollers, but of brushwood.

The double sap directed against bastion II., on the left wing of attack, presented considerable difficulty, from being carried across a burial-place. The Turks place large stones upon the graves of their dead; and as they never disturb a grave, and there is no lack of ground, their grave-yards are of enormous extent. In making this sap, great labour was required to pull up the stones, and a number of decaying bodies which were dug up caused such a stench in the trenches that it produced illness, aggravated by the heat.

As soon as this sap had reached the crest of the glacis, a lodgment was formed close to it, in two semicircular cavaliers, also worked by sap; and another battery, 15, was erected, partly against the face of the opposite bastion, and partly against the flanks of the adjoining ones. According to eye-witnesses, it was not until this point was reached that any accurate knowledge of the front against which operations were directed was obtained:—and it was now determined to advance by mining from the two lodgments, in order to make a breach. Mining operations began on the 7th June.

The defence was still carried on in the manner already described. The effect of the mortar-firing became greater and greater as the besiegers advanced. The Turks fired with remarkable precision at a very high elevation; the shells mostly exploded in the air, and thus did greater damage than if they had burst on the ground. The fire of small arms was likewise kept up with increased vigour; the

Turks made use of very long wall-pieces, and took excellent aim. Frequent sorties were made by about 50 or 100 men, generally at about the same hour—a little before daylight; but they were made without plan, and mostly without effect. The Turks rushed out with the greatest fury, every man holding a pistol in either hand and a dagger between his teeth, and fought with the utmost bravery.

The mining operations proceeded as follows:—

1.—A globe of compression A (Plan, fig. 2) was prepared, which was to overthrow the counterscarp and make an opening in the scarp: it was loaded with 300 pud, *i. e.* above 100 cwts. of powder.

2.—Four mines at B, containing 37 pud each, or almost 50 cwts. the two; and a globe of compression, C, loaded with above 100 cwts., and which was intended to make an opening in the nearest flank and curtain.

3.—Four mines at D, behind the counterscarp, and four more at E, behind the scarp, each containing 37 pud.

Figs. 4 and 5 show how the besiegers reached the chamber of the mine; first by means of a ramp, and then by a flight of 14 steps, of which the lowest lay 14 feet beneath the approaches which formed the Russian lodgment upon the crest of the glacis. A gallery, 6 feet broad and 5½ feet high (*e*, *f*, fig. 4), ran to a spot beneath the bottom. Without the counterscarp the principal gallery was crossed vertically by the horizontal gallery *g h*, out of which issued four chambers, D D D D. From *f* a gallery, 3 feet broad and 4 feet high, ran as far as *b*, where the besiegers came unexpectedly, and fortunately unperceived by the enemy, upon a cunette 10 feet deep, made by the Turks for purposes of observation, which induced them to fill up the two spaces between *c* and *b*. The gallery was accordingly sunk 4 feet, and from *c* another foot deeper; after which it again rose to meet the horizontal gallery *o p* behind the escarpment, along which four chambers, E E E E, were formed outside the gallery. Thus, then, the central points of the chambers D and E lay at a depth of 24 feet, in a perpendicular line respectively beneath the glacis and the crest of the parapet, and distant 18 feet and 15′ respectively from the nearest points of the surface of the counterscarp and scarp. A double calculation of the thickness of the walls gives a line of resistance of 21′ in the directions of α, β, and γ, δ. A wooden mantelet was placed over the entrance to the gallery, in front of the communication to the mine, as a protection against vertical fire.

In gallery *e f*, which, as the entrance to all the others, had been made for convenience 6 feet wide, frames were placed at regular intervals of 3½ feet, but it was only occasionally that roof-planks were driven in; the side-planks were altogether omitted, and even those for the roof were not laid close together, which indeed was rendered unnecessary, by the tenacity of the soil. In like manner there had been no necessity for making a barrier before the place with boards, &c.

The door-posts and thresholds were made of cross-beams of oak 5 or 6 inches in the square. Galleries *f b*, *k l*, and *m n*, were constructed in exactly the same manner, but were neither so high nor so wide. The only exception was gallery *o p*, where the soil was less tenacious, and which was accordingly constructed with Dutch frameworks exactly in the same manner as by German engineers. Chambers D D D D were only hollowed out in the earth without any woodwork, but the chambers E E E E were constructed in the same manner as gallery *o p*.

The galleries constructed with frames, which was certainly a very expeditious method, were completed on an average at the rate of 35 feet to 38½ feet in 24 hours. Those constructed with Dutch frames proceeded no faster, because the dimensions of these galleries also were too large, and the Russians were not yet familiarized with this mode of work. The galleries of the mines A B and C were worked in exactly the same manner as those which have just been described.

It has been seen that at $\alpha\beta$ = 18 feet
to which the thickness of the wall at the
under part of the counterscarp added = 3 feet

thus giving line of resistance = 21 feet

while at $\gamma\,\delta$ = 15 feet
to which the lower part of the wall of the scarp added = 6 feet

thus giving line of resistance = 21 feet

Upon this measurement of the shortest lines of resistance were calculated the charges of 27 pud of powder, to each of which 10 pud more was subsequently added. The whole number of mines intended to be sprung at the same moment contained the enormous charge of almost 350 cwts. of powder.

At D D D D, as well as at B, the powder was carried in chests into the chambers, which were not lowered beneath the sole of the galleries. The chests, instead of being cubic, were flattened, according to Belidorf's plan, so that the horizontal surfaces should be larger than the sides. They were loosely spread in the chambers, and then the gallery *g h* and *o p* was completely tamped, and galleries *e f* and *f b*, from gallery *g h* towards *e* and *b*, to a distance of 35 feet, which was done by means of earth strengthened with timber from time to time. Mines E E E E were not charged by means of chests; the powder was placed there in barrels merely, and connected with the other chambers by a saucisson of canvas filled with F powder, and laid in a square channel. This was to be ignited by a port-fire, which went through the top of the channel, and was fastened to the saucisson.

By the 15th of June all the mines were charged.

The troops advanced into the trenches, with the intention of storming the place through the breaches which would be made by the mines. This movement was executed in the daytime, and observed by the Turks, who took measures accordingly.

The signal for the explosion was to be given at 9 in the morning, by three rockets. When the third rose the train was to be lighted, and the troops had orders to advance at once upon the breaches. The Russian commanders felt assured that these would not fail to be practicable, as the charges had been made far stronger than needful according to the calculation.

The troops were drawn up in two columns, and each column in two divisions. One of the divisions was composed of pioneers, who were to construct lodgments upon the two anticipated breaches in the main wall as soon as they should have been entered and taken. The lodgments were to be made by closing the gorges of the two small full bastions which formed the point of attack with ready-filled gabions. Two more divisions were to enter the place, and the fourth to remain in reserve.

At the appointed hour all was ready for the attack. The three rockets were to go up at intervals of ten minutes. The officer who was to fire the globe of compression at A held his watch in his hand, and saw the first rocket. Ten minutes passed, and no second rocket followed. He waited anxiously for twenty minutes, when he saw another rocket ascend. Misled by the difference between the time appointed and that which had elapsed, he concluded that this must be the third rocket, and that the second had somehow escaped his attention. On this presumption he fired the train, but, as this rocket was in fact the second, which by some accident had not been let off until ten minutes after the appointed time, the consequence was that the globe of compression exploded too soon. A piece of wood which was thrown by the explosion back upon the works of the besiegers struck the officer appointed to fire the mine at B and C, and laid him senseless on the ground. Strange to say, he was quite alone, so that the accident remained unnoticed. Thus, when ten minutes later the third rocket went up, only the mines D and E exploded.

Mine A only threw down the counterscarp; D and E fulfilled their purpose, and opened a practicable descent into the ditch, and a breach 30 or 40 paces long in the main wall. B and C of course did not explode at all.

In accordance with the previous dispositions, the troops immediately advanced to the assault, without further reconnoitring. The smoke and the earth thrown up into the air wholly concealed the scarp from the attacking party. Spite of this, two different divisions of the storming columns, with 120 volunteers at their head, threw themselves from the counterscarp into the ditch, down the descents at A and D. Both divisions were led by officers and generals.

The first division entered the ditch at A, near the Danube; the volunteers who headed it sought in vain for a breach in the scarp, at the point at which they had been told there would be one. In vain did they endeavour to scale the wall by the embrasures in the revêtement of the scarp; it was uninjured, and the Turks received them with long spears and a well-directed fire of small arms from the embrasures and from the crest of the parapet. The Russians nevertheless continued the struggle with such desperate obstinacy, that of the whole body of volunteers none was left alive but a sergeant, who was pushed down into the Danube, and saved himself by swimming.

When all hope of scaling the wall at this point had been abandoned, the assailants turned to the left along the ditch, in order if possible to force their way through the breach at E. It would have been much better to have gone to the right, where it would have been possible to turn the connecting bastion adjoining the Danube, which they had vainly endeavoured to scale, and to force an entrance into the ill-defended gorge of the fortress up the steep but not inaccessible slope towards the river. An attack of this kind would have divided the Turks, and have taken them in the rear. The Russians were too little acquainted with the place to imagine this way practicable.

Meanwhile the storming party on the left wing had not been much more successful, for, although mine E had actually made a practicable breach in the main wall, the loosened earth of the entonnoir greatly impeded the assailants, the more so as the whole column followed the forlorn hope and the pioneers too closely, which caused a very mischievous crowding and delay across the loose and broken ground.

The attention of the Turks must have been excited by the premature explosion of the first mine, and the movement in the trenches caused by the preparations for storming, which were very perceptible in the daylight; and they were accordingly prepared for vigorous resistance on the breach. The Turkish soldier is better equipped for hand-to-hand fighting than the European, and the defenders of a breach obviously have a great advantage over the assailants, provided their courage does not fail them in the moment of danger.

The garrison of Brailow offered the most brave and determined resistance, so that the left Russian storming column was getting very much the worst of the fight, when the right column also pushed up to the narrow breach: this greatly increased the crowd and confusion without adding to the number of the combatants; and as the Turks had placed some light guns on the flank of the bastion of junction 1, and kept up a continual fire of musketry and hurling of stones, hand-grenades, and beams of wood into the ditch, it soon became manifest that the attack must fail. The Russian soldiers could not advance and would not retreat; they undoubtedly displayed the most obstinate bravery. The generals and officers distinguished themselves no less.

At length the Grand-Duke Michael ordered a retreat, but not before all the troops, except the reserve, had been engaged.

The Kasan regiment of infantry had occupied the two semicircular lodgments which had been made by the flying sap close to the crest of the glacis, as well as battery 15: it now covered the retreat of the columns which had descended into the ditch, and which withdrew to the third parallel.

While executing this movement the Russians sustained a considerable loss from the very effective fire of the Turkish musketry. Several sorties, which followed each other in rapid succession, were, however, repulsed by the Kasan regiment. This terrible engagement was finished by about half-past 11; the Russians had not even been able to crown the entonnoirs in the counterscarp, and to keep possession of them, but were forced to retreat into their trenches. On the other hand, the Turks were equally unable to destroy any part of the Russian works, neither did they maintain possession of the counterscarp, but withdrew through the breach into the fortress, and did nothing towards closing it.

The Russians give the following account of their losses on the occasion:—

Generals Wolf and Timrod killed; 1 general, 3 commanders of regiments, 16 staff and 15 subaltern officers wounded; 640 non-commissioned officers and privates killed and 1340 wounded.

Soliman Pasha, who commanded the fortress, rejected a summons to surrender in the most haughty terms.

The siege of Brailow was much forwarded by the arrival of the Russian Danubian flotilla, under Vice-Admiral Zavadowsky, which arrived before the place on the very night following the passage of Satunovo, that of the 8th of June, and at midnight attacked the Turkish flotilla of 32 gunboats with a squadron of only 18. The wind was unfavourable to the Russian boats, and the Turkish flotilla blocked up both the main stream and the branch which flows past Matchin. Nevertheless the Vice-Admiral advanced towards the Turkish boats under the fire of their guns without firing a single shot until he got within the proper distance, when he suddenly opened upon them a fire of canister from all his guns with murderous effect. The Turks retreated with the loss of 13 gunboats, several others were sunk, and the remainder soon left their position at Brailow and returned to Silistria.

Not less important was the surrender of Matchin, which took place immediately after the repulse at Brailow. The Russians had not regularly invested this very strong fortress. They merely bombarded it, and it capitulated without a breach, and without any apparent cause, unless it were that the garrison was afraid of not obtaining tolerably favourable terms if they waited until after the fall of Brailow, which seemed imminent. The badness of the defence was not, therefore, to be attributed to military or local causes, but entirely to personal considerations.

The defeat of the Turkish flotilla, the surrender of Matchin, and the extraordinary determination shown by the Russians in their unsuccessful attack, had already shaken the fortitude of Soliman Pasha. On the 16th of June the two mines, B and C, exploded; the former threw down the counterscarp, the latter merely formed a large entonnoir in the ditch.

On the 17th of June the Pasha offered to give up the place on condition that the garrison should be suffered to withdraw unmolested to Silistria. He and most of the Turks in Brailow had a notion that the whole place would be blown up by degrees; this was shown by the small listening galleries, which had been carried round the faces of all the bastions, and, indeed, was afterwards confirmed by several of the garrison.

Next to the mines, which were executed with greater profuseness than judgment, what struck most terror into the Turks was the manner in which the Russians advanced, step by step, towards the fortress, always keeping themselves covered. A few Congreve rockets, discharged against the place, likewise produced a very great effect.

Soliman Pasha caused the capitulation to be concluded by two of the officers in command under him, Chiboukjee Oglu and Mustapha Aga, but he was himself present at the negotiations, which were carried on under a tent pitched for the purpose in front of the fortress. The negotiations lasted 16 hours, and the Pasha declared that he must eat another meal before their final conclusion, which was granted him.

The garrison of Brailow were allowed to leave the fortress with bag and baggage, and, if they pleased, to continue bearing arms against Russia, and, accordingly, the greater number went to Silistria. The provisions found in the fortress would have been sufficient for a defence of several months. They fell into the hands of the victors, together with 17,000 pud of loose powder and nearly 300 guns; the latter were partly Turkish, of a very ancient date, partly Austrian, English, and French, some of iron and some of brass, and of all sorts of calibres, mostly heavy ones, up to 36-pounders. Among them were a few howitzers and mortars, which threw shells of 150 and 200 lbs. Their most effective artillery, however, were the small moveable 7-pounder Coehorns, with which the Turks fired with small charges of powder, taking most precise aim with a very high elevation for short distances. The shells were very bad and seldom round; even the musket-bullets were used with their shanks. Guns of every calibre were placed without order or method side by side, and in like manner balls of all sizes, both solid and hollow, lay in confused heaps. When the balls were too small the Turks wrapped them in sheepskin. The powder was stored partly in private houses, partly in excavations beneath the walls, and partly in mere wooden sheds. There were no cartridges, and all the pieces had to be loaded with a scoop. Spite of these defects the Turkish garrison artillery had always been very well served, especially the mortars. A 12-lb. shot pierced the parapet of a battery 600 paces off, which was 19 feet thick, and formed of the stiffest clay. This may be explained by the very full charges commonly used by the Turks.

On the other hand, they were totally ignorant of the regular method of attack, and consequently neglected to take advantage of those opportunities when the fire of the besieged can be used with most effect. They fired upon single persons instead of against the batteries or the heads of the sap that were being constructed. It is remarkable, however, that, until the moment of being stormed, the Turks

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should still have had guns in full play against the nearest Russian flank.

The fire of the wall-pieces and of the musketry was most effective at Brailow. Every Turk, be he a soldier or a civilian, has a gun and provides his own ammunition. As the houses afford very little shelter, the whole male population lies dispersed about, behind the parapets of the walls, patiently waiting for an opportunity to bring down a foe. This gives great vivacity to the defence of a Turkish town, especially in the last stages of the assault.

Altogether we may say that the Turks at Brailow made a gallant and honourable defence under favourable circumstances. The place, destitute of outworks, held out against a regular attack 27 days after the trenches had been opened, but only two after a practicable breach had been effected in the main wall.

With respect to the attack, we must observe that the Russian artillery was much inferior both in number and calibre to that of the Turks. Besides the field-pieces of the 7th corps, the Russians had 12 24-pounders; 48 18 and 12-pounders; 30 mortars of heavy calibre, and a quantity of light ones.

The Russian batteries were never ready till twenty-four hours after the trenches, and were never commenced at the same time, as the work was done by the same body of sappers. They lay, in part, at distances of from 1200 to 1800 paces. The effect of their fire therefore was insignificant, and, spite of the great numbers of their guns, it was found, after the capture of Brailow, that most of the embrasures in the attacked front were still serviceable, which is the more remarkable, as they were imperfectly protected. Moreover, the Russians had totally neglected to ricochet the curtain of attack, which might have been easily done, and by which means the fire from the mortars and small arms would have been much weakened.

The number of the working party regularly employed during the course of the siege was 46,260. About 14,789 shot were fired against the fortress, and the enormous charges used for the mines consumed a great quantity of powder.

The Russians estimated their loss before Brailow at 4 generals, 18 staff officers, above 100 officers, and 2251 private soldiers. But this cannot include the sick and wounded, as above 2000 were put *hors de combat* at the storming on the 15th of June. It may be assumed that the capture of Brailow cost the seventh corps at least 4000 men.

One consequence of the capture of Brailow was the fall of Isakchi and Matchin, and of all the other places of the Dobrudscha. Hirsova, Tultcha, and Köstendje were invested and bombarded by very distant and weak batteries, which effected little against these places. They were uninjured, and well provided with all kinds of stores, when they offered to capitulate on hearing of the fall of Brailow. Köstendje sent messengers to ascertain the truth of facts on the spot. But by the time they reached Baba-dagh these gentlemen were quite convinced by the heat and difficulties of their ride, and returned with the confirmation of the intelligence. From Tultcha a Turkish officer really came as far as Brailow, and communicated with the Pasha. The consequence was, that the garrison of Tultcha forced the commandant to capitulate on condition of a free exit to Varna and Silistria.

On the 5th of July all the fortresses on the Danube from Silistria downwards were in the hands of the Russians, who were masters of the whole country as far as Trajan's wall. A transport fleet of 26 sail, laden with provisions and warlike stores from Odessa, entered the conquered harbour of Köstendje.

The remarkably bad defence of the last five places, contrasted with the good defence of Brailow, is easily explained. Small fortresses in Turkey can never make a long resistance, however strong their position or their works. The Porte is not in a condition to devote any considerable portion of its army to garrison fortresses, and the defence is generally left to the inhabitants themselves. A numerous population is therefore a necessary condition for the efficient defence of their towns, as was proved at Ismail, Rutschuk, Brailow, and Varna.

In Brailow and Isakchi alone the Russians found 8000 cwts. of powder. The guns taken in all the captured places and from the flotilla amounted to 800 pieces, of which very few could be used in the field owing to the badness of the carriages. Besides this, a vast supply of stores fell into the hands of the Russians, but what was most important was that the 7th corps was now available for further operations.

Up to this time the Russians had been successful in all their undertakings. They had forced an almost impossible passage over the Danube, and in six weeks they had taken six Turkish fortresses. The belief that it was impossible to resist their arms preceded them, and was sure to have an incalculable influence on adversaries like the Turks, provided this prestige were not destroyed in the subsequent engagements.

CHAPTER VI.

ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS INTO BULGARIA—BATTLES AT BAZARDJIK, KOSLUDJA, AND BEFORE VARNA.

WE have seen how the Russians forced the passage of the Danube at Satunovo. On the 11th of June the whole of the 3rd corps had crossed over the bridge, but it took fourteen days to reach Karasu, near Trajan's wall—a march of not more than 75 miles. Long, however, as the crossing of the river had been delayed, and slow as was the subsequent march, General Rudjewitsch reached his rendezvous too soon, if his further operations were to be conducted in combination with the rest of the corps-d'armée.

The line from Silistria to Köstendje was the first strategical movement of the Russian army, and was to form the basis of future operations. But Silistria was not yet even besieged, much less taken, as the 6th corps, to which this duty had been assigned, had failed in crossing the Danube at Turtukai. The 7th corps was detained till the end of June at Brailow; for although the place had capitulated on the 18th, a delay of ten days had been agreed upon for evacuating the fortress, and the garrison had to be escorted to Silistria. The 3rd corps, therefore, was unsupported, and, with Silistria, Rutschuk, and Shumla in its rear and on its flank, could undertake nothing against Varna. Nor can it be denied that the 3rd corps was in itself too weak. As the Russian fleet could supply the army with all that it required, and thus rendered the possession of Moldavia and Wallachia less indispensable, it would apparently have been better policy not to have occupied those Principalities until the capture of Brailow had released a portion of the 7th corps. The occupation of the Principalities alarmed all Europe, gave the Turks time to arm, and weakened the main army to such a degree that it became incapable of acting vigorously on the offensive, so as to overwhelm the unprepared Turks, and so end the campaign before the European powers could interfere in the matter.

Even as matters actually stood, it may be doubted whether it would not have been better to give up all other offensive operations, and to march with the 3rd corps directly upon Silistria. This fortress was so ill constructed, that it might very possibly have been taken by a coup-de-main before the brave defenders of Brailow could reach it. At all events the third corps might have invested the place with 12,000 men and 80 guns, and have kept the remainder of the corps, 20,000 men and 48 guns, in readiness to act against Shumla and Rutschuk. A party detached upon Turtukai, only 24 miles off, would have opened the passage of the Danube to the 6th corps, as Turtukai lies at the foot of the steep edge of the valley of the Danube, and could not hold out an hour against an attack from the south.

But this did not happen: the main army remained inactive for eight days till the 7th of July at Karasu, and then advanced slowly towards Varna by Bazardjik. On the march towards Bazardjik, which town was found totally deserted, the Russian advanced guard came for the first time during this campaign into action with the Turks in the open field. While General Rudiger, with 12 squadrons of hussars, 200 Cossacks, and 4 battalions, went towards Mangalia, to the left of Köstendje, the advanced guard of the corps under General Akinfief, with 4 squadrons of hussars, 3 of lancers, 4 battalions, and 100 Cossacks, took the straight road from Karasu to Bazardjik. The Seraskier, Hussein Pasha, had pushed forward 8000 men, chiefly cavalry, who evacuated Bazardjik on the approach of the Russians. General Akinfief thought he might attack the Turks without waiting for General Rudiger; but scarce had his advanced guard reached the heights to the right of the town when they saw the Turks immediately behind it. The Russians were beaten back, and the Turks took possession of the town and maintained it against every attack of the Russian troops until the arrival of the artillery, which at length put the Turks to flight with the loss of 200 men. On this occasion the Turkish horse for the first time displayed order in their movements. They were under the control of their leader, and got into rank again after charging with their usual impetuosity. The impenetrable steadiness of the Russian infantry saved the honour of the day; their cavalry had been repeatedly driven back.

At Bazardjik the 7th corps from Brailow joined the main army on the 11th of July. 10,000 men belonging to the 6th had been despatched a long way round, by Hirsova, and then along the right bank of the Danube, to Silistria, which they reached on the 21st of July, and relieved the corps of Generals Benkendorff and Madatow. The latter rejoined their corps at Bazardjik.

The main army was now provided with everything that could be drawn from the interior of Russia during the course of the campaign. It numbered 68 battalions, 52 squadrons, and 4 regiments of Cossacks; altogether not above 40,000 men, with 194 guns. The advanced guard of 8 battalions, under General Rudiger, was at Kosludja; about 4 battalions, under Adjutant-General Count Suchtelen, and a few Cossacks, were before Varna; General Uschakow was on his way from Tultcha to Varna with 4 other battalions; some troops were employed in escorting the Turkish garrison from Brailow to Silistria; and 8 battalions were left behind at different halting-places, or on the flotilla of the Danube—making altogether about 24 battalions. The main army at Bazardjik under these circumstances consisted of 44 battalions and 20 squadrons.

According to numbers the distribution of all the forces about the middle of July was as follows:—

In Wallachia about	11,750 men.
Before Silistria	10,750 „
Escorting troops, on the flotilla, and at halting-places in the rear	5,500 „
Before Varna	5,100 „
The advanced guard in Kosludja	6,000 „
Before Anapa	2,000 „
Altogether, in the several detached bodies	41,100 men.

The corps at Bazardjik might be reckoned at about 24,000 men, of whom not more than 2500 were cavalry—so much in request was that arm of the service elsewhere. We may observe moreover, that the investment of Silistria was not complete, that the Russians had scarce any troops to spare for the observation of Rutschuk and Widdin on the right bank of the Danube, that it was necessary to detach additional troops to Pravadi, and that the two advanced guards sent from Bazardjik to Kosludja and Varna were too weak for their object.

General Rudiger found Kosludja deserted when he entered it on the 12th of July, but encountered the Turks at a short distance beyond the town, drawn up on the road to Jenibazar. The two Russian squadrons of hussars met with a warmer reception from the 8000 Turkish cavalry than they had experienced shortly before at Bazardjik. General Rudiger himself, who came to the assistance of his hard-pressed cavalry, was severely handled. At length the enemy withdrew behind Jenibazar.

Still worse was the reception of Adjutant-General Count Suchtelen before Varna on the 14th of the same month. Without waiting for General Uschakoff, and with only 2500 men, he boldly advanced against the place, but the garrison vigorously attacked him, killed 300 Russians, and drove back the corps to the heights on the north of Varna, whence they next day saw a reinforcement of several thousand men enter the fortress from the side of Burgas. The Turks attacked the Russians again on the 15th, and the latter could only act on the defensive behind some earthworks they had hurriedly thrown up. As the garrison now numbered 12 or 15,000 men, Varna could not well be invested.

The Turks in these skirmishes had hitherto acted with equal prudence and determination, and according to their own views they had everywhere beaten the Russians. They certainly had expected that their adversaries would have brought larger masses of men into the field, and were astonished to find that, with the enormous means at Russia's disposal, only a few squadrons of horse and a handful of infantry should have been brought against them. Unimportant as were the results of these skirmishes, their moral effect was favourable to the Turks, and the confidence of the Russian cavalry diminished with the strength of their heavy parade horses.

The remark that "wherever you see one turban, you may be sure there are a thousand more," is in the main correct. The Turks know nothing of advanced guards, outposts, and other military precautions, but always remain together in large bodies. This forced their adversaries to do the same if they did not wish to encounter the same checks as hitherto.

The Turkish way of fighting is like that of the wild boar, which does not seek its foe, but awaits his approach in its thicket and then rushes blindly upon him. An impetuous attack may be expected from the Turks, but not a lasting obstinate defence. Against Orientals it is no use keeping troops in reserve. The best cards should be played out at once. A few hours always decide the fate of the engagement; and Turkish history affords no example of battles fought, like those in the West of Europe, from sunrise to sunset.

Hitherto the movements of the Russian troops had shown Varna to be the principal object of the campaign. But on the 16th of July the main army quitted the road thither, and joined the advanced guard under General Rudiger at Kosludja. From thence General Benkendorff was sent on to secure Pravadi.

The march of the main army to Kosludja was the turning-point in the campaign of the year 1828.

Of the three roads across the Balkan which have to be considered in a Russian invasion, namely those from Shumla, Pravadi, and Varna, the latter is by far the most important, because it is the shortest line from the Russian frontier to the Turkish capital, and because the invading army can be supplied by sea. Varna is of double consequence, as the key of this road and as a maritime town. The whole force of an invading army ought to be directed against Varna, nor is its investment by any means an easy undertaking, as its position is as strong as it is important. Protected on the east by the sea, on the west by Lake Devna, which is ten miles broad, Varna must be invested by two separate corps, one on the north, the other on the south. This would require at least 12,000 men, whereas, after General Benkendorff had been detached to Pravadi, the Russians had scarcely 10,000 to repel the attacks of the foe, and to observe from Jenibazar the movements of the Turkish army assembled at Shumla. This was too small a force for these purposes, but the Russians had already discovered that their resources were insufficient for the campaign. The guards were ordered from St. Petersburg, and the 2nd corps was sent immediately after the unsuccessful storming of Brailow; but they should have been sent before. The campaigns of 1809-11 had shown that an army of 70,000 men in Bulgaria was so fully occupied by the lines on the Danube, that it had no strength left to cross the Balkan; nevertheless in 1828 the same fault was committed, as the guards could not reach Varna before the end of August, and the 2nd corps could not arrive at the Danube before September, when the time for operations was over.

Another great fault was that three months after the commencement of hostilities the battering train had not yet reached the army drawn up before a fortress on the sea, and that the same park of artillery was intended to serve for both Varna and Anapa.

Most likely it was these deficiencies which induced the Russians to give up besieging Varna for a time, and to direct their attention to the point of the greatest danger. The Russian army at Bazardjik found itself forced against its will, attracted magnetically as it were, towards Shumla. But this change in the original plan of operation was a great strategical error. For supposing that the Russians succeeded in driving Hussein Pasha out of Shumla, which could not be done without great loss, and would be far more difficult than to beat him in the open field, the possession of that extended camp would only be a negative advantage, whereas Varna in the hands of the Russians would have been a positive acquisition, and have formed the basis for further operations. But we must now describe the actual proceedings of the Russians before Shumla.

CHAPTER VII.

THE BATTLE OF JENIBAZAR — DESCRIPTION OF SHUMLA—THE SIEGE OF SHUMLA BY THE RUSSIANS.

WE have seen that the Russian main army detached only weak divisions under Suchtelen and Benkendorff against Varna and Pravadi, and then advanced itself by Kosludja against Shumla. After these deductions, but when augmented by the advanced guard of General Rudiger, the strength of the corps amounted to 48 battalions and 36 squadrons, altogether about 30,000 men. It marched on the 17th of July from Kosludja towards Jasytepe, whence reconnoitring parties were sent out as far as Jenibazar. Head-quarters reached Turk-Arnautlar, a most fruitful spot, on the 18th, and Jenibazar on the following day. General Sisciew was sent forward with a detachment to observe the road from Silistria and Rustchuk to Shumla. On the 20th of July the Emperor advanced from Jenibazar towards Shumla at the head of his army in two columns. The 3rd corps formed the right, the 7th, under the command of General Diebitsch, the left wing.

The army had advanced in order of battle as far as Jenibazar, when the same body of Turkish cavalry which had encountered the Russian advanced guard with some success at Bazardjik and Kosludja, made its appearance on the plateau behind Bulanlik, strengthened by 5 battalions of regular infantry and 18 field-pieces. The strength of this Turkish vanguard might perhaps amount to 10,000 men. This time it had not to deal with a weak force, but with the whole Russian army. The Turkish position was turned on the right wing by the advance of the enemy, while on the other hand it outflanked the Russians with the left. The 1st division of mounted chasseurs advanced on the right into the first line: at the same time the 7th corps crossed the brook on the left by Bulanlik to attack the right flank of the Turks. As soon as the Turks on the plateau became aware of this movement, their cavalry charged, but were driven back by the artillery. The Russian hussars likewise retreated before a Turkish battery of 18 guns. The firing was heavy, but ill-directed, and only cost the Russians seven men, among whom, however, was one officer. The Russians thought at first that this was an outwork of the Turkish fortified camp.

The Turks on their side had crossed the brook of Bulanlik on the right flank of the 3rd corps, and had engaged the Cossacks. Count Orloff advanced against them with the whole division of mounted chasseurs, but owing to the wretched condition of the horses could not get near the light troops of the enemy, and was forced to content himself with a cannonade to which the Turks replied.

After General Rudjewitsch should have crossed the brook with the infantry, it was the intention of the Russians to make a general attack. But the Turks, who then became aware of the threefold superiority of their opponents in point of numbers, did not wait for this attack, but withdrew into their entrenched lines. The Russians lost about 150 men, the Turks some few more. The 3rd corps took up its position on the heights of Makak and Bulanlik, the 7th on the right by Kassapla, between the brooks running from Kadikoi to Pravadi and those running from Shumla towards the Kamtchik.

However desirable it might have been to strike a decisive blow against the Turks, when at length they were fairly encountered in the open field, nevertheless, spite of the numerical superiority of the Russians, the battle of the 20th of July remained without any result. The open nature of the ground, the vicinity of the fortified camp, the prudent conduct of the leaders, and the excellent condition of the Turkish horse, rendered this hope nugatory.

From the flat plateau of Bulanlik, covered with dry grass, the Russians saw the tops of the trees and minarets of Shumla, a town which had never yet been desecrated by a foreign foe. The famous lines (plan 3) stretched out before them into the plain, and ran along the steep heights, till they joined on to the precipitous and rocky walls of the fortress. Detached forts threatened the invaders with their cannon, but the town itself was hidden behind the swelling ground, and it was only on the heights that the green tents of the Turkish outposts could be seen.

Shumla itself lies at the eastern foot of a group of hills, completely separated by the valleys of the Kamtchik from the main chain of the Balkan. The flat upper plateau of this group of hills, on which Shumla is placed, is raised about 600 or 800 feet above the Bulgarian plain: the sides of this plateau fall in a precipitous wall of rock and then sink, at first with rapid and afterwards with decreasing steepness, into the plain below. Shumla itself is built in a short horizontal valley which ends in precipitous ravines. The hills lying to the east of Shumla are precipitous towards the town, but slope towards the outside like a glacis, so that from a distance the houses of Shumla are visible, but are lost sight of on approaching within 2½ miles. The place itself is unfortified, but at the distance of 1000 or 1500 paces the connected lines of the fortified camp run along the crest of the mountain, resting on the left upon the precipitous heights of Strandcha, on the right upon those of Tchengell, which surround Shumla on the north and on the south. The Turks have thought it necessary to continue these lines in their rear and along the steep declivity, where they can be of no use. These lines were mere earthworks without masonry,* and with a narrow but deep ditch cut with a small slope into the hard ground. The extent of the lines from Strandcha, as far as the junction with the heights of Tchengell, is about 8000 paces. On the northern side, near Strandcha, the lines were double, and comprehended the camp where the infantry was lodged; the cavalry was placed in a valley traversed by two brooks. Thus these troops were completely protected. The town contained about 40,000 inhabitants, three parts of whom were Mussulmans. It had several fountains, five mosques, and three baths, and could draw plentiful supplies from its rear. The forts of Tchally-Sultan and Tchengell-Tabiassi did not exist when the Russians first sat down before Shumla, but were erected by degrees. They were narrow earthworks, with ditches, of which the escarpments were not lined with masonry; but they were easily defended from the camp, which was not 1000 yards off, and afforded an excellent point-d'appui for the sorties of the Turks. On the other hand, there remained since the former war, on the road to Constantinople, the fort of Ibrahim-Nasiri (now called Feddai-Tabiasi), and the Turks were erecting two large redoubts at the village of Tchengell, to which the Russians gave the name of Matchin, from an erroneous impression that the Pasha of Matchin was there.

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* The author nowhere found a trace of the walled towers mentioned by travellers; and as Shumla was never entered, even in 1828-9, by a hostile corps, it can hardly be assumed that they could have totally disappeared had they ever existed.

The main road from Rutschuk and Silistria to Constantinople does not cross the mountain-ridge, but turns towards the east to Strandcha, Shumla, and Tchengell. Besides the track to Tchengell, passable only for horsemen, the roads from Trudcha Kotesch, Novosil, Bular, Gradechti, and Dormus converge to it. By all these roads convoys of provisions and men could be forwarded to the Turkish army from districts not occupied by the Russians. They had, moreover, no reason to fear any attack from these quarters, as the upper surface of the plateau is so covered with thick brushwood that it would be impossible even for a single horseman to advance except by the narrow pathway; even skirmishers would find it difficult to penetrate the thicket. The few roads run through long defiles in which it would be impossible to manœuvre.

The most assailable point of this strong place was and still is that which looks the strongest, the ridge of Strandcha, which falls precipitously towards the south, but has a gradual ascent to the north. The fort built on this spot is faced with masonry, but the profile is weak and by no means secure against an escalade. The height can be reached from Gradechti and Dormus through the valley of Kurt-boghas (wolf's glen). In the campaign of 1810 General Kaminski occupied the rocky wooded hills to the north of Strandcha, and it is surprising that this advantage was foregone on that occasion, as from these heights troops might approach along the slopes behind Shumla; and the enemy once in possession of the heights commanding the town, it could no longer be defended. But now Strandcha was included within the lines of defence. The advance of a detachment through the Kurt-boghas would have met with most serious resistance from the Turks, whose mode of fighting is well suited to a rocky and wooded district. A general attack from the north, more especially as neither Silistria nor Rutschuk were yet taken, would have endangered the communication of one part of the Russian army with the other.

According to the most trustworthy accounts, Shumla, which at the beginning of June had scarce any garrison, now contained 40,000 men under the command of the Seraskier Hussein Pasha. There were 12 regiments, or 10,000 regular infantry, 3000 or 4000 cavalry, with 30 field-pieces, and 10,000 Arnauts under Omar Vrione.

Against so large a number of troops, and so strong a fortress—remembering too the defence made by the Turks at Brailow—an assault was not to be thought of. It appeared more feasible to take up a strong position opposite Shumla. This could be done without any great danger, if the invading army were concentrated. But the greatest result to be expected from this was that at the very best the Seraskier would be prevented from quitting Shumla to relieve Varna. But Varna was not yet invested, and could not be so, as all the materials for the purpose were employed at Shumla, and the expected battering train from Russia could not reach Varna for at least four weeks.

The only thing that remained, therefore, was to surround the place. But Shumla, with regard to its supply of provisions, was like a fortress on the seaboard, which, although besieged on one side, can only be blockaded from a distance on the other. The circumference of the high plateau, at the foot of which lies Shumla, amounts to 18 or 20 miles. But unless troops can be placed close under the heights, they must extend their observation of the principal thoroughfares to a much greater distance round the town. To make the investment complete, it would be necessary to detach to distant points numerous divisions, which ought not to be weak, as in the woody and broken ground the enemy could steal upon them unawares, in considerable force, without running any risk of uncovering their own front; whereas the Russians had to take care that in all such cases they remained strong enough in the plain to resist any sudden attack of the enemy. As the investing party, even when united, was weaker than the invested, it ran the risk of being beaten in detail.

But supposing that the Russians succeeded in starving out the garrison—and this could never be effected, owing to the various and distant means of access to the mountain fastness—the possession of Shumla would be of no use to them, as the strategical front of this post is towards the north, and could only be maintained by a large army, which the Russians could not command. Shumla would not open the passage of the Balkan; the subsistence of the Russian army could not be secured in that direction, and they must always fall back upon Varna.

Nevertheless, in the false position in which they had once placed themselves, the Russians chose to invest Shumla closely, as the measure which, while less impracticable than storming the place, seemed to them to promise better results than a mere distant observation of the Turks. The latter plan would, however, have been undoubtedly the right measure to have taken, had Varna been besieged at the same time. Nothing, then, would have been more desirable for the Russians than that the Seraskier should be forced out of his fortified camp at Shumla, by the danger of Varna falling into the hands of the Russians; and a victory in the open field must have decided the fate of the campaign.

Sensible of their weakness, the Russians immediately began to intrench themselves in front of the enemy's lines. A line of redoubts was erected at such a distance from the Turkish camp that they could be reached by the artillery on the walls, but not near enough to return the enemy's fire with any effect with the field-pieces. This line of redoubts was to approach the hills by degrees, and then, so at least it was intended by some, the Russians were to try to gain possession of the heights. But the Turks soon threw fresh obstacles in the way, by erecting the outworks which we have already mentioned opposite those redoubts that were nearest to them. A sharp cannonade, which was intended to prevent this, did not effect its purpose.

On the 27th of July the corps occupied the low heights, then covered with wood, to the north of Strandcha, and at the foot of the precipitous side of the hill on which the fort of Strandcha stands. This induced the Turks to make vigorous sorties on the 27th and the following day. Spite of the hilly and wooded nature of the ground, the Seraskier brought chiefly cavalry into action, and they surrounded a regiment of Jägers that got entangled in the brushwood, and fired upon them in battalions from their horses. The Russian artillery did great damage to the Turks, and the 3rd corps maintained their position on the height, upon which they immediately entrenched themselves. This spot was a point d'appui for the entrenched position of the Russians, as it commanded the open plain in front of the Turkish camp, and flanked the advance near Jochally-Tabia; but was itself much exposed, and would have been easily taken if the Turks had been able to occupy the hill-top to the north of the fort of

Strandcha, which is equally high, and only 1000 yards distant.

On the left flank the 7th corps had likewise erected a line of redoubts, which extended as far as opposite Fort Matchin near Tchengell. The number of redoubts was by this time 19, and shortly afterwards 27, and the garrisons occupying them were spread over a distance of 9 or 10 miles. But all this time the front only of the camp was invested, and the Russians daily saw long strings of camels, bringing provisions and military stores from Eski-Stambul and Eski-Djuma, come down the steep descent behind Shumla. It was essential to close that side also.

After Rasgrad had been occupied by General Schirow with his Cossacks, General Rudiger started on the 30th July with the above object, at the head of 8 battalions of infantry and 8 squadrons of horse, for the south side of the mountains. Near the village of Tjiflik, not far from the narrow pass leading from the heights of Shumla to Trudcha, General Rudiger left General Tarbejef, with 4 battalions and 4 squadrons, to secure his communication; and in order not to expose his men to the danger of passing close under the heights occupied by the Turks, he made a détour by Eski-Stambul, to reconnoitre the pass of Kötesch, which was the one most important to the Turks for keeping open their communication.

On the 31st of July General Tarbejef was vigorously attacked on two points, on the road from Trudja and Tjengell. Although the Russians repulsed the attacking party without any great loss, General Rudiger was forced to return at once, as his position would have been most critical had the enemy succeeded in their attack on Tjiflik. In that village he left General Iwanow, with 4 battalions, 2 squadrons, and some Cossacks, and then joined the rest of the 7th corps opposite the fort of Matchin. The detachment left in Tjiflik rapidly erected a redoubt in front of the village, and endeavoured to keep up its communication with the main body by Marasch, by means of a ford through the Kamtchik.

The Russians could no longer fail to perceive that, owing to the passive conduct of the Seraskier, nothing could be effected at Shumla. But something must be done for the weak corps before Varna. The Emperor left Shumla on the 3rd of August, escorted by a regiment of mounted and foot chasseurs, and 12 guns, to press the siege of Varna. General Woinow was put at the head of the whole cavalry force, and the 7th corps d'armée was placed under the command of Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg. The chief of the general staff of the army, Count Diebitsch, who, being more closely acquainted with the Emperor's intentions, would have had authority to change the plan of campaign, was to stay with the commander-in-chief, Count Wittgenstein. But Diebitsch was ill, and took no part in the conduct of affairs.

The original plan was therefore adhered to; but further developed. The 3rd corps was to remain before Shumla, while the 7th was to act on the offensive in the rear of the Turks. But the 3rd corps was not strong enough even to occupy the numerous redoubts, and had to be reinforced from the 7th. General Rudiger, with a part of the 7th corps, was again to push forward to Kötesch, while the small remainder of the corps was to maintain the communication between the defensive and offensive portions of the army.

On the 7th of August General Rudiger again undertook to reconnoitre Kötesch, and succeeded in driving out the enemy's posts, and taking one gun. He then returned by Trudcha and Tjiflik to the central position of the 7th corps, opposite the Matchin redoubt; for Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, who agreed with General Rudiger in looking upon this advance to the left with inferior forces as an useless measure, pressed upon head-quarters not to compromise that general, or to draw the enemy's attention to the weak side of his position. This view was perfectly justified in a short time, as the Turks entrenched themselves at Kötesch and Trudcha, by which means any further serious enterprise against those positions was rendered very difficult.

Meanwhile the erection of new redoubts in the front of the 3rd and on the right flank of the 7th corps d'armée continued, and the Turks, who feared an attack in the direction of Ibrahim-Nasiri, raised a new work, called Sultan Tabiassi, between Ibrahim-Nasiri and the fort of Matchin, on the declivity of the heights on the road to Constantinople.

On the 8th of August a Turkish foraging party from Shumla, under Alisch Pasha, attacked the Russian baggage-train near Jenibazar, and carried off a considerable number of cattle.

About this time General Woinow undertook an expedition from the right wing, with a division of cavalry, in the direction of Eski-Djuma, in order to harass the enemy on that side, but soon returned to the position of the 3rd corps. In the middle of August General Rudiger was again ordered to march to Eski-Stambul, and thence to Kötesch, with the object of fortifying himself there if possible, so as to cut off the enemy's approaches. This he was to do without the assistance of the rest of the 7th corps, whose presence was required at the entrenched camp before Shumla. General Rudiger surprised a body of 3000 Turks on the morning of the 15th of August, and put them to flight, taking 165 prisoners and 1 gun; but was attacked in his turn by a superior force, against which he could not hold his own in broken ground and a disadvantageous position. On his return through narrow passes and thick woods, he found himself surrounded on all sides, and lost a gun and some hundred killed and wounded. He again took up his original position at Eski-Stambul, and was ordered to remain there. Prince Eugene was forced to go to Marasch, with 8 battalions of the 18th division, in order to be nearer General Rudiger in case he wanted assistance; but was immediately summoned again to the right, as the Turks had suddenly lodged themselves in the neighbourhood of two of the most important Russian redoubts, which they threatened to attack. But General Rudjewitsch had already taken the necessary steps to secure them, and the 18th division retraced its steps to its camp at Marasch, which the prince had surrounded with an enceinte to protect himself against any sudden attack.

The events of the 27th of August proved that the Seraskier at length began to comprehend the awkward position of the Russians before Shumla. Although a night attack is a phenomenon in Turkish military history, a body of Turks, led by Alisch Pasha, suddenly appeared at midnight before the redoubt No. 5, which the Russians had built on the woody heights north of the village of Strandcha. Deserters may have reported the negligent guard kept at this mountain-fort, and thus given the idea of this surprise. The Turks scaled the parapet, killed more than 100 men, and took the guns of the fort. The commandant paid the penalty of his carelessness with his life. A simultaneous attack on the next redoubt to the east, No. 23, was repulsed, as the attention of the garrison had been roused. On the other hand, the recapture of No. 5 required great exertions. General Rudjewitsch stormed the fort with the small amount of infantry he could collect, without success, and it was only the fire of a powerful battery that induced the Turks to retire, taking with them the guns they had captured.

But all this was only a feint on the part of the Turks to distract the attention of the Russians from a still more important undertaking. Prince Eugene, after detaching so many of his troops, remained with only 3800 men, namely 8 battalions of the 18th division and 6 squadrons of hussars, at Marasch; and the Seraskier meditated no less a scheme than to crush this weak corps with an overwhelming force, and then to attack General Rudiger, who was equally weak, and had no retreat open to him. For some days General Rudiger had received from Bulgarian spies reports which confirmed one another, that the whole weight of the enemy's force would be directed upon him, and he had consequently fallen back from Eski-Stambul, and crossed the great Kamtchik; but even so, his communication with the posts of Tjiflik, which General Durnowo occupied with two battalions, or with Prince Eugene at Marasch, was not complete.

Essaad Pasha attacked Prince Eugene at two o'clock in the morning, and drove in the Cossack outposts. The Turks were at their heels, and reached the camp nearly at the same moment; but the first pistol-shots had roused the troops, and the Turks retreated. But the morning had scarce dawned when the Russians saw the whole plain covered with considerable masses of hostile troops, and two compact columns of regular infantry stormed the right wing of the Russian camp, with loud cries. A well-directed fire of grape and musketry made them advance in double quick time in order to return the fire, a manœuvre they performed in excellent order. Three squadrons of horse prepared to charge the exposed flank of the enemy. Their appearance threw the Turks into confusion, and put them to flight; but the tired men and horses could do little against the light-heeled Moslem; only about 100 of them were cut down with the assistance of the Cossacks.

During this first attempt of the enemy, another Turkish column, headed by a few battalions of regular infantry, but mainly composed of irregular horse and foot, amounting altogether to about 15,000 men, with 4 guns, moved along the valley of the Kamtchik, against the left wing of the Russian position, and threatened the village of Marasch, where the hospital was established, with 600 sick, and where the baggage waggons had been collected previous to being sent off as had been intended on that very day. Three battalions had been sent to protect the village, and, as the rest of the detachment was under fire, and could not be spared to assist them, these troops had to stand a very severe contest. Meanwhile, three battalions of Russian infantry and three squadrons of hussars fell on the flank of the enemy, and drove him back into his entrenched camp. General Rudiger and General Durnowo did not reach Marasch until the fight was over; but their arrival there before would have been decisive. The Turks, with all their bravery, proved themselves not yet fit to meet the Russians in the open field; with such a superior force, especially of cavalry, and in the plain, they ought, after their infantry had opened the way for them, to have overwhelmed a small detachment, which, moreover, was hampered by having to defend the camp and the baggage waggons.

The Russians, on their side, now saw the necessity of concentrating their forces. By the so-called investment of Shumla they had not only attained no results, but had suffered great losses in the several skirmishes; for instance, the number of slain was reckoned at 1500 during the surprise of the 26th August. Above all, they could not but feel a conviction that the enemy, who had grown bolder and more observant, was likely to obtain still more decisive advantages by enterprises of a similar nature, conducted on a larger scale.

The Russian troops had already passed six weeks on a bare plain in front of Shumla, with the thermometer at 120 to 135 in the sun at noonday. The privations endured in this wholly exhausted district, the labour of erecting forts and of the daily service, had shaken the physical condition, as much as the apparent uselessness of the long stay, and the ill-success of most of the skirmishes, had lowered the moral tone of the army. The troops lived on biscuit and beef; but the latter was very bad, as the oxen were rendered lean by the long journey, and were sickly. But it was still more difficult, after so long a stay in one place, to procure forage for the horses. The foraging-parties, after exhausting the supplies near them, were forced to extend their search to a distance of above fifteen miles. Had their position been concentrated, they would have allotted especial troops for this service; but, separated as the detachments were, each division was obliged to shift for itself, and thus it happened that nearly all the cavalry was daily employed in foraging expeditions. The smallness of their number was one of the causes why they could not procure food; had they been more numerous, and stronger in Cossacks especially, they would have had less difficulty in getting forage even in much larger quantities.

Under such circumstances the loss of the Russians in horses was enormous. The cavalry, which was reduced now to about 3000 men, lost on an average from 100 to 150 horses a day, and with the increasing fatigue of their animals the men lost courage. Two-thirds of the cavalry were dismounted, and could not be relied upon in the field of battle, or even for the service of outposts.

This chiefly fell upon the infantry, who had to do double duty. The wretched food, the bad chalky water, the over-exertion of the men—lastly, the heat of the days and the comparative cold of the nights—caused much sickness, and the hospitals were overfilled. Scurvy and the itch made sad havoc: there was no water for washing—indeed, scarcely enough to drink; the condition of the sick was wretched in the extreme, as there was no spot within 100 miles in the rear which was secure against a coup-de-main from the enemy.

The Turkish cavalry, to whom the northern entrances into the camp were quite open, could do what they liked, as the heavy and enfeebled Russian horses could never come to close quarters with them. The Turks made excursions to the rear of the Russian camp as far as Jénibazar, where the depôts were kept, and the long trains of loaded waggons and pack-horses fell an easy prey; the Turks became more bold and troublesome every day. But above all, the Russian position was most dangerous; it stretched twenty-five miles from Strandcha, as far as Kötesch, in the face of an enemy superior in numbers and able at any moment to direct their whole force unexpectedly on any single point; the danger became more imminent from the time when the Seraskier seemed to perceive the advantages of his position.

These were the reasons which decided the Russian commander to draw the 7th corps nearer to the 3rd. In order to save appearances, the redoubts on the left flank were held for a few days after the unfortunate combat of the 27th August, when six of them were destroyed; the Turks were not slow to discover that this concentration of the Russian force, necessary as it had long been, must still be considered as the consequence of their victory. On the 29th August Turkish reinforcements and long strings of camels loaded with provisions entered Shumla by the road now opened through Eski-Stambul.

Meanwhile the Seraskier was making preparations for greater enterprises. On the evening of the 9th September trustworthy Bulgarians brought certain intelligence that a Turkish attack might be expected on the following night. The Russians therefore were not unprepared when 8000 Turks attacked the redoubts 11, 12, and 27, in front of General Rudjewitsch's corps, before day-light; the attack was repulsed with great loss. The enemy likewise showed themselves on the extreme left flank of Prince Eugene. The prince, with 3000 cavalry and a body of infantry, advanced to the village of Kassapla. General Rudiger was ordered to attack with his division, and soon forced the enemy to retreat; but the hussars could not make their weary horses come up with the mass of the retreating foe, and during the attack sixteen horses fell down dead from fatigue.

At length General Wittgenstein determined to concentrate his troops at Jenibazar, and to convert the force investing Shumla into an army of observation. But this union, which was to have been effected on the 10th September, was stopped by orders from Varna, and everything remained *in statu quo*, only four more redoubts on the left flank of Prince Eugene were given up as untenable.

The Turkish cavalry made an expedition against the Russian baggage depôt at Jenibazar; another horde attacked the foraging party belonging to the 3rd division of hussars, and took 5 officers and 200 men prisoners. A Russian major of Lancers conveying despatches from Silistria, and 100 men who formed his escort, were captured, and a swarm of Turkish horse, under Halil Pasha, attacked the entrenchments at Pravadi, while some thousand men went to the relief of Silistria. The Grand Vizier, too, at length advanced from Adrianople towards Aidos, and 14,000 men broke up from Shumla in order to reinforce him.

Such was the state of things before Shumla. About this time the greatest anxiety was felt in Wallachia, for fear of an invasion by the garrisons of Widdin, Nicopolis, and Rutschuk, as the reserve battalions that were intended as reinforcements, and which at the opening of the campaign were only skeleton regiments, had not yet reached the Principalities. From Silistria General Roth reported the inadequacy of his resources: the mere blockade of the place was so incomplete, that the Russians could not even prevent the cavalry sent from Shumla from entering Silistria. Lastly, the siege of Varna, the covering of which had been the most important result of the enormous sacrifice of military stores and of time before Shumla, had but just begun, as up to this time a corps had been stationed there which was scarce half as strong as the garrison of the place.

Putting all these circumstances together, there can be no doubt that the Russian army was in a most critical position during the whole of the months of August and September, and that, had the Turkish generals shown greater activity, and had their troops been more to be depended on, the result of the campaign would have been disastrous to the Russians.

CHAPTER VIII.

SIEGE OF VARNA.

VARNA stands where the Devna and its lakes empty themselves into the sea, in a broad open valley, gently undulating, and covered with orchards and vineyards. The northern side of the valley of the river rises above 1000′. and has exactly the same formation as the mountains of Shumla: it falls suddenly with a rocky precipice from the flat Bulgarian plain, and then gradually slopes down to the level ground. The distance from these hills to Varna is about three miles; the southern edge of the valley is nearer, rises more abruptly, and displays the pointed hill-tops and fine forests of the real Balkan. The heights nearest to the fortress, and overlooking it, are above 3000 paces distant. The place therefore is not commanded on any side within some distance, but neither does it fully command the surrounding ground within range.

In 1828 the fortress (Plan 4) was exactly two and a half miles in circumference, but the western half of the space within the walls was not built upon, and was covered only with the graves of the Moslems. The city contained 25,000 inhabitants, and like all

Turkish towns had very narrow streets; it lay along the sea-shore and the valley of the Devna. Although the conduits by which the fountains are supplied might easily be cut off, the town can never want water, as there is a plentiful supply from the wells and from the Devna. On the lowest spot, closely surrounded with houses, is an old castle with walls and towers, the substructure of which is of Byzantine origin, but which is too small and unimportant to be of any use in the defence of the place, and was only used as a powder magazine.

The main enceinte ends at the tower T, on the edge of the precipice which falls perpendicularly down to the sea to a depth of 40′; it is then continued to the north and west round Varna as far as the river Devna. The enceinte consisted of an earth-wall of small height, defended by ten bastions, whose faces were capable of holding six guns, while the narrow flanks only had room for one. Altogether Varna was armed with 162 guns, which were all fired through embrasures, the sides of which were lined with strong wickerwork. The inner scarp of the parapet was faced inside the bastions with strong planks, the outer one with wickerwork. The ramparts along the curtain were so narrow that it was not possible to place guns upon them. Their parapets were protected within by palisades, the tops of which projected somewhat above the crest, and thus protected the skirmishers against the musketry of the besiegers. The ditch was narrow, and with a walled scarp and counterscarp; it was dry everywhere except where a small brook flowed into it at the eastern end. There were no permanent outworks in front of the main wall, and no covered way. On the other hand, the Turks had thrown up three lunettes, *f g h*, about 500 paces before the west front, and a fort, P, which lay some 1500 paces to the north of the place. Although these were mere earthworks hastily thrown up, the gorges remained open, and although the fort, P, could not be supported by the fire of the fortress, we shall find that the Turks maintained themselves in them at a time when the regular attack had advanced so far as to gain possession of the ditch. Besides this, during the course of the siege a regular labyrinth of Turkish lodgments was formed all round the fortress, as the defenders of Varna made use of every inequality of ground to plant a body of men. We shall presently see in how masterly a manner the Turks used the dry ditch as a means of defence. On the southern front a narrow tête-du-pont stood opposite the stone bridge over the Devna, and behind this, from bastion 10 as far as the precipitous rocky wall on the seaboard, the gorge of the fortress was only closed by a detached wall.

The level between the lower part of the Devna lake and the sea is always marshy, and only passable close to the sea where the waves have covered the marsh-land with sand. The Devna also has a marshy bottom, and can only be crossed by bridges above the mill. But it is fordable anywhere below the tête-du-pont. It was, therefore, no impossible undertaking to land troops on the sandy flats somewhere near the burial-ground, and supported by the fire of the gun-boats to throw down the detached wall, and thus to force a way into the town past the narrow tête-du-pont. Such a coup-de-main might have been attended with success in May, and even in June, when Varna was unprepared, and the garrison weak. But the Russians were then occupied in erecting the dyke at Satunovo, and the flotilla was cruizing before Anapa. Later, when the place had a garrison of 15,000 men, of whom 7000 were Arnauts, this was out of the question.

The western side was the natural front of attack in a regular siege. On the narrow road from Pravadi it was possible to approach along lake Devna to within 500 paces of the detached works without being perceived, and a group of low hills afforded shelter as far as *g*; moreover the bastions 7, 8, and 9 would have been easily enfiladed from the hill over which the road leads from Baltjik. The Turks most likely expected an attack on this point, as this was the side which they attempted to protect by outworks. We shall see, however, that at a subsequent period the Russians attacked the north-eastern front of the fortress along the sea, in order to keep open their communication with the fleets. Considering the smallness of their force, as opposed to a strong and enterprising garrison, it was most important for them to secure at least one flank. Here also a small valley, *k*—1200 paces from the main wall—afforded them shelter from the direct fire of the fortress; several ravines worn by the winter-torrents formed natural approaches; and as the ditch before the point of junction near the sea was formed by a broad natural valley, half the height of the walled scarp was visible and open to cannonade from the plain. On the other hand, the main wall from bastion No. 4 to 1 could nowhere well be enfiladed or reached by ricochet fire; as the only height whence this could be done was above 2000 paces distant, and moreover was occupied by the fort P. Moreover the ground on which the wall was built sank so much from bastion 4 to 1 that little could be expected from ricochet fire. Lastly, on this side the main wall showed the most considerable profile, as the ditch along which the small brook ran into the sea attained a depth of 40 feet near its mouth.

We have already mentioned how, on the 14th of July, Adjutant-General Suchtelen advanced with a small division upon Varna, and, even after the arrival of General Uschakoff from Tultcha, could do nothing but observe the town from a distance. On the 17th the Capudan-Pasha arrived from Constantinople with 5000 men, mostly regular troops, and entered the fortress on the south side in the face of the Russians. On the following day General Suchtelen was obliged to return to Kosludja with his corps of 4 battalions and 4 squadrons, leaving General Uschakoff with only 4 battalions and 5 squadrons in front of an enemy far superior to him in point of numbers.

No sooner had the Turks perceived the departure of General Suchtelen, than they attacked the right wing of the Russians on the morning of the 20th of July. General Suchtelen sent back 1 battalion and 2 squadrons, and these troops succeeded in driving back a Turkish division that had crossed over the ford of Gebedje and were attacking General Uschakoff's right flank. The Russians offered a most obstinate resistance. Meanwhile General Uschakoff could not but see that it would be imprudent to remain so close to a very superior foe. The corps of observation, therefore, withdrew to the village of Derbent ("pass"), 10 miles from Varna, where they threw up entrenchments and remained a fortnight inactive awaiting the arrival of General Benkendorff with the 1st battalion of the 10th division.

The fleet, under the command of Admiral Greig, consisting of 8 ships of the line, 5 frigates, some cutters and gunboats, and many transports, after being detained some days by contrary winds at the roadstead of Kavarna, reached Varna at the beginning of August, and anchored about 7 miles off the fortress. It had on board the 3rd brigade of the

7th division, which had hitherto been successfully employed in the capture of Anapa. Vice-Admiral Prince Menschikoff, who now took the command of the besieging army, justly appreciating the opportunity afforded by the appearance of the Russian fleet, broke up his quarters at Derbent, and returned on the 3rd of August to Varna. The Turks had taken up an advantageous position 3 miles to the south of Varna, but were routed by the rapid advance of a Russian battalion, and driven back into the fortress. Hereupon the Russians took up their position. As the convent of St. Constantine, about 7 miles from Varna, had been abandoned by the Turks, the Russians built a landing-bridge there, and made a road over the stony but not very high cliffs. A second landing-place was made nearer Varna, and protected by a redoubt which had a front of 400 paces, and abutted in the rear upon the steep precipice. These works were made by 283 men, mostly sailors, who were chiefly employed at the commencement of the siege of Varna in throwing up earthworks. They, however, proceeded but slowly, and it took four days to complete the redoubt, as the tools were insufficient, and the men were frequently called off for other services. The communication with the fleet was, however, restored. A brigade of infantry had been put on shore at Kavarna, and this brigade, together with the 19th regiment of chasseurs on foot, commanded by the Emperor himself, the horse chasseurs of the regiment Swersk, 50 Cossacks, and 12 guns, all coming from Shumla, arrived on the 5th August before Varna, and raised the investing corps to about 9000 men.

These were as follows:—

Of the 3rd corps	of the	7th division	8	battalions	0	squadrons.
„	„	10th „	6	„	0	„
„	„	mounted chasseurs	0	„	4	„
7th	„	18th division	4	„	0	„
Lancers of the Bug (Cossacks)			0	„	5	„
			18	battalions	9	squadrons.

After the Emperor had reviewed these troops and the fleet, he gave orders for commencing the siege of Varna.

But the means of carrying on the siege with advantage were wanting: the guards had not even reached the Danube, and it was impossible to invest the place on both sides of lake Devna, owing to the strength of the garrison. The Russians were still unprovided with a battering train, and were obliged to make shift with cannon from the fleet, which were served by artillerymen from the ships and by sailors.

In order not to witness a second failure, the Emperor, accompanied by the whole diplomatic corps, sailed to Odessa, where he remained from the 8th of August till the 2nd of September, the period when the much wished-for reinforcements were expected to arrive.

The first thing Prince Menschikoff did was to fortify his position—which was 2000 paces distant from the fortress, and stretched from the sea to lake Devna, a distance of 5 miles—by a line of redoubts. The redoubt No. 2, which was begun on the 6th of August, was finished on the following night by a working party of 150 men and one company of pioneers. A battalion of infantry covered the men while at work, and suffered some loss from the fire of the place, which continued the whole of the following day. We have already said the distance was 2000 paces. 150 men and a company of pioneers finished the redoubt No. 1, which was armed with 3 guns. Moreover the redoubt No. 3, for 5 pieces of cannon, was begun by 3 companies of pioneers, and was finished and provided with field-pieces on the following day. The Turks in a sortie killed one Russian officer and several men.

On the 6th August a sort of first parallel was commenced at a distance of 1000 paces, at a point which was not visible from the fortress.

On the 7th August the Turks again made an attempt to take the redoubt No. 3. Repeated assaults failed, and the combat lasted till nine o'clock at night. The Russians lost 3 officers; 37 men were wounded and 23 killed or missing. A frigate and a bomb-vessel bombarded the town, and on the following night a division of gunboats attacked the Turkish flotilla in the harbour. Spite of the fire of the fortress, the Turks lost 16 vessels with 5 guns; the loss of the Russians was 3 officers and 37 men. The Turks only saved two boats, which were drawn up on shore.

The redoubt No. 4 was then begun, finished, and armed with three guns on the following night; two of these were directed against the Turkish fort P.

On the 9th August the redoubt No. 5 was completed, and commenced firing on the 10th. The Turks again made sorties against the works; during these combats the Russians lost 2 staff officers, 8 officers, and about 190 men killed or wounded. On that same day, at 2000 paces from the fortress and next to the redoubt by the landing-place, the Russians began making a long entrenchment for the skirmishers; on the right wing of this, the redoubt No. 6 was constructed and armed on the 11th August.

During the next few days the Russians were occupied in completing the entrenchment at the landing-place, and in repairing the latter, which had suffered from the surf.

During the night of the 12th a working-party of 320 erected the redoubt No. 7 about 1100 paces from the fortress. The fire which the Turks directed against them did no harm.

The Turks still maintained themselves in their fort P, which intersected the whole fortified position of the Russian army. Not wishing to storm the fort, the Russians, during the night of the 12th August, built the redoubt No. 8, in which they placed three cannon: the object was to make the Turks uneasy about their retreat. During the same night they began a long trench for skirmishers, which ran 600 paces from the redoubt No. 7 to the sea, and was completed on the following day: in it was erected a battery for 2 mortars.

In order, if possible, to invest Varna on the southern side, a detachment of cavalry with two guns under the command of a captain of Don Cossacks, advanced on the 13th against Gebedje. But the detachment fell in with a far superior body of hostile troops, and could not force the passage. Some days later one battalion of chasseurs was sent to reinforce this detachment, and General Akinfief took the command of the whole division, which was provisioned by means of two armed boats which were carried across the land into lake Devna and there floated. So weak a corps could not, however, maintain its position so near the fortress, but was forced to look on from a distance while a very large transport, protected by 3000 infantry and 2000 cavalry with 20 colours, entered Varna; this was soon followed by a second transport convoyed by 3000 men.

During the night of the 15th August the trenches from the redoubt No. 7 were continued to No. 8, and at their junction D, close to the sea, the first dismounting battery was erected at a distance of 1000 paces, and armed with eleven 24-pounders from the ships. Their fire was directed against the bastion next the sea, against a tower, T, armed with a small gun, and against two small flanks of the fortification upon the shore, from whence the Turks fired upon the Russian works. At the same time the approach of the fleet was by this means to be rendered easier. The fleet carried 800 guns, and it was hoped with these to pour a destructive fire into the town. But it was discovered that the water was too shallow to admit of the approach of the larger vessels. When the fleet sailed by the town, and fired at the distance of 2000 paces, the damage done was very insignificant. Subsequently, one man-of-war and some gunboats were always employed on this service, and were relieved from time to time.

(Plan 4, fig. 2.)—At length in the night of the 18th August the real first parallel was opened at a distance of only 300 paces from the fortress. The soil was firm ground, sandy in places; but besides the covering troops the working-party amounted to only 430, who could not do more than finish a space of 300 paces (*a b*). At daybreak, when the besieged perceived the work, they directed a murderous fire of cannon and musketry against it, which was continued during the whole time the work lasted.

At length on the 21st August the parallel was carried as far as the sea-shore, to *c*; a battery for two ship's mortars was built at *b*.

With the view of interrupting the progress of the works of attack, the Turks determined upon a great sortie. During a vigorous fire from their guns they attacked the 13th regiment of chasseurs near the sea, and attempted to turn the right wing of the 14th regiment of chasseurs, which rested on the redoubt No. 8, occupied by two companies. The 7th brigade of chasseurs repulsed this attack and took two colours. The Russians lost 72 men, and among others Prince Menschikoff himself was severely wounded. General Perowsky took the command until General Woronzow, to whom the Emperor had intrusted the command, should arrive from Odessa. The loss of the Turks was reckoned at 500 men.

Had the Russians opened their first parallel nearer, namely, at about 300 paces from Varna, the length would have been so much the less, and would not have exceeded 600 paces. The reason why the attack formed such a point against the place was that the Turks not only kept possession of their redoubt P, and the lunettes *f g h*, but had fixed themselves outside the ditch of the town, and in the immediate vicinity of the Russian lines, at the burial-ground R, to the north and to the east of the bastion IV. There they took advantage of every inequality in the ground to surround themselves with a labyrinth of lodgments, and kept up a communication with the garrison in the town by means of the postern in the front III. IV. The Russians were completely protected on the left by the sea and the fleet, but on their right flank they were very much exposed, and the more so as the lodgments effected by the Turks were there scarcely 150 paces distant from the right flank of the first parallel. The Russians, therefore, at *a*, built a battery to contain light field-pieces, so as to clear the ground. Some companies of chasseurs were ordered to drive the enemy out of his entrenchments between that point and *d*, in which they succeeded, but the besieged soon regained their position and kept possession of it.

The Russians could think of nothing better to do against the Turkish fort than to erect a new redoubt, No. 9 (fig. 1), opposite to it. This new redoubt was made to communicate with No. 8 by enlarging a watercourse.

Near the mortar-battery of two ship's mortars, in the first parallel *b* (fig. 2), a dismounting battery, *e*, armed with two heavy cannon from the ships, was pointed against the bastion III. and was intended to destroy the gate in the curtain III. IV. Besides this, a battery was built at *f*, opposite to the bastion II., and armed with four ship's cannon and one mortar. These works were much impeded by a well-directed fire of shells and musketry from the Turks. The Russians again attacked the Turkish lodgments at *d*, on the right flank of the first parallel. The chasseurs of the seventh brigade, and one division of foot, charged with the bayonet, and killed the whole garrison of 100 men. The Russians lost thirty-one men. Meanwhile the Turks maintained their position in the burial-ground R and at *g*; and as the Russians feared lest the Turks might advance by mining against the approaches that were being constructed, two shafts of mines with listening galleries were made at *e* and *f*. The first parallel was continued from *n* to *d*. In *e* a barbette was built for two guns, which were pointed against bastion IV.

During the night of the 28th of August the Russians built two additional dismounting batteries—the first for one gun at *h*, and the second for five guns at *c*. Of the latter, four were pointed against bastion I., and one against the right flank of bastions II. and III. At *h* a shaft of a mine with listening galleries was commenced, and at *d* a redoubt was constructed for 3 field-pieces, in order to secure the workmen against the sorties of the Turks, and to fire into the Turkish lodgments. Moreover a single sap was carried from *k* in the parallel against the bastion I.

During the night of the 29th of August the besieged made a vigorous attack on the redoubt No. 1, and forced their way through the embrasures, killing and wounding 24 men. A more important attempt upon this redoubt was to take place on the following day. A number of small detachments both of infantry and cavalry came out of the north-western gate of Varna, and mustered behind the lunettes and the small hills. Covered by a vigorous fire from the opposite bastions, the Turkish skirmishers advanced towards the left along lake Devna, in order to turn the Russian right flank. The cavalry remained as much under cover as they could, ready to take advantage of any success of the infantry. General Woronzow, who had arrived at Varna the day before, was in the work I., and, as the fort could only hold 30 files of infantry, the rest of the regiment was ordered to remain on both sides and under cover of the fort. There were only three grape-shot in the work, and the necessary ammunition had to be sent for in great haste from the park of artillery. The Turks had already driven the Russian skirmishers out of their excavations, when three companies of the Mohilev regiment and some Don Cossacks with two guns turned the fortune of the day. After one of the armed boats on lake Devna had hastened to the scene of action and fired upon the rear of the Turks, the latter gave up the attack for the moment, but remained during the whole day outside the wall of Varna, with their standards flying in their front. The Russians did not venture to attack the Turkish position by daylight, but on the following night a division of the Mohilev regiment advanced and took the Turkish lunettes, which, however, they again deserted at daybreak, as they could not well hold them owing to their proximity to the fortress, and their distance from the point against which the main force of the Russians had to be directed.

In consequence of these occurrences it was determined to erect two new redoubts, Nos. 10 and 11, in order better to secure this part of the investing lines. The redoubt No. 11 especially commanded the low-lands by lake Devna, and prevented the enemy from making a covered approach upon the redoubt No. 1.

During the night of the 2nd of September the sap from *k* to *l* came across a Turkish lodgment. The Turks had planted themselves without the counterscarp on the edge of the valley forming the ditch, and prevented the sappers from making any further progress. At about nine o'clock at night a party of volunteers advanced out of the head of the sap, and drove out the Turks at the point of the bayonet, with the loss of 38 men. The pioneers and workmen immediately proceeded to crown the lodgment they had taken, by means of a flying sap, and thus commenced the beginning of the second parallel. This work, rendered more difficult by the intricate position of the Turkish lodgments, and the heavy fire of mortars, cannon, and musketry from the fortress, was so far completed by daylight over an extent of 300 paces, that the sentinels and workmen in the trenches were under cover by the morning. The left flank of the attacking party was now protected against sorties, and the besieged, driven back on this front within the ditch, could no longer oppose the crowning of the glacis. On the 5th of September the second parallel was continued as far as the prolongation of the capital of the bastion II. From the first sap they made their way by means of a sap with traverses, and at the point of junction a cannon from the fleet was planted against the flank of bastion II.

The portion of the first parallel between *a* and *d* was in the mean time replaced by one from *n* to *m*, and a dismounting battery, *m*, consisting of three 30-pounders from the fleet, constructed against the bastion IV.

A frigate cruizing in the Black Sea captured two Turkish vessels, and destroyed a third. Admiral Greig effected a landing at Iniada, south of the Balkan, took 12 guns, and then re-embarked.

On the 8th of September the Emperor arrived before Varna, and took up his head-quarters on board the Paris. He had embarked on the 2nd at Odessa, but was driven back by contrary winds on the 5th, and then made the journey by land through Satunovo, Kostendje, and Kavarna. He there reviewed the reinforcements that had arrived from Russia, and which reached Varna on the 8th and 9th of September. These reinforcements consisted of three divisions of the guards—two of infantry and one of cavalry—in all 16 battalions and 16 squadrons, with their field-batteries. Four reserve companies of the 7th division and the battalion of body-guard sappers had already reached Varna. The whole besieging corps now consisted of 34 battalions and 25 squadrons, and, allowing a margin for losses by death and sickness, the force might be reckoned at from 18,000 to 20,000 men.

This time the Russians, besides doing great injury to the tower T, had completely silenced the fire of the bastions I., II., III., and IV., and had knocked to pieces the houses which lay beyond the front I. II. on the slope. A view was obtained through to the low-lying bastion I. The scarp of the bastion was injured, and the works of attack were carried on to within 50 paces of the counterscarp. On the other hand, the fire from the guns and musketry of the besieged never slackened. It is true that the shells, of which the Turks generally threw four or five at a time, were so ill made that they only burst into a few pieces, and often dropped close to the mouth of the cannon. But their musketry was admirably directed. The Turks maintained their position bravely, close to the Russian sappers and miners, not only in their lunettes and in the fort P, but also outside the counterscarp before the bastion IV., and in the ditch on the side that was attacked. The communications of the fortress with the country on the south side had never been stopped; stores of provisions and reinforcements of troops entered the town, transports of wounded and sick were sent away without hindrance, and the continual sorties show that the garrison were not disheartened. Numerically they were not much weaker than the besiegers, they must even have been stronger than the Russians from the time that the latter divided their forces in order to invest the south front; and when we consider that all the dismounting batteries together were furnished with only 27 ship's guns and 3 mortars, and that, now there could no longer be any doubt as to the side of attack, the Turks might easily mount 100 pieces upon it by simply enlarging the rampart of the curtain which was too narrow to receive them, it must be admitted that the probable result of a two-months' blockade and a three-weeks' siege upon a fortress without permanent outworks, and without a system of mining, were not likely to be brilliant. When, too, the total inadequacy of the means and appliances for the siege are taken into account, the only wonder is that the attack was in any degree successful, and did not end in the destruction of the Russian troops, especially considering the sad plight they were in at this very time before Shumla and Silistria.

No sooner had the reinforcements arrived at their camp than the Russians proceeded to surround the south side of the fortress (by which a reinforcement of 500 men had reached it on the 10th of September), and to complete the blockade of the northern front, which was still broken by the Turkish work P, lying full in the rear of the works of attack. Adjutant-General Gollowin, with a brigade of chasseur guards, 4 pieces of artillery, and 1 company of sappers and miners, joined General Akinfief. This corps was further reinforced by a battalion of the regiment Mohilev, a battalion of the regiment Wellington, and 3 guns; it now consisted of 5 squadrons and 50 Cossacks, 7 battalions and 9 field-pieces, altogether about 5000 men, with which force it crossed the ford of Gebedje, an important point of communication which had been secured by a triangular work with bastions. The situation of so feeble a division, placed between a fortress containing a garrison three times their number and the Turkish reinforcements which were expected from Aidos and Burgas—encamped in the midst of a hilly forest-country, and separated from all support by lake Devna, and a two-days' march—was indeed far from enviable. In order to execute his appointed task without too much endangering his own safety, the Russian commander took up a flanking position on point Galata, protected in the rear by the promontory of Galata Burnu (Plan 4, fig. 1); the wings rested upon deep and rather inaccessible forest-defiles, the front was immediately entrenched, and the corps could be supplied both with provisions and armaments for the work from the fleet. On the other hand, a retreat from this point would have been absolutely impossible, and it cannot be denied that the purpose of cutting off supplies and assistance from Varna was very incompletely answered by its occupation. The high road from Derveesh-Jowann to Varna ran past the position out of cannon-range almost all the way, and, even supposing a few redoubts were thrown forward in that direction, there still remained an interval of 2½ miles between the position and the eastern shore of lake Devna, across which several quite practicable roads led from the high forest-ground down to the fortress. Three redoubts were thrown up, it is true, on the edge of the plain, and close to the foot of the heights between the sea and lake Devna; but they could receive no support from the main position, and were very much exposed to a surprise in the direction of the forest. Such was the extent of the blockade of Varna on the south side. Had the corps been strong enough it would undoubtedly have been better placed at the point where the Turkish corps, sent for the relief of the fortress, subsequently posted itself, *i. e.* on the Kurt-tepe (Wolf's hill), an eminence crossed by the high road, and from which all the gullies radiate down towards the sea, the marshes, and lake Devna.

In order to take the Turkish work P, 8 more field-pieces were set up in battery in redoubt 4, and 2 in redoubt 3, which kept up a vigorous fire against it. The batteries of attack redoubled their activity, and even General Gollowin advanced from his position as far as the marshes, in order to induce the garrison to send a detachment in that direction: of this movement, however, no notice was taken.

General Woronzoff gave the signal for storming P. 300 volunteers from the regiment Simbirsk turned the work, and forced their way in through its gorge, in the teeth of a tremendous discharge of musketry. The Turks were driven out and pursued. Two companies of the regiment Nisoff occupied the northern faces of the work, upon which the fortress now directed its fire.

The capture of the work P completed the investment of the place on the north side, and materially shortened the operations. Redoubt 12 was erected in front of it, and the chains of outposts brought into connection with each other. To guard against sorties the 1st battalion of the Paulow lifeguards with 2 guns were posted as a reserve to redoubts 1 and 11 on the right wing, and the 2nd battalion with 2 guns was allotted as a reserve to redoubt 2. In like manner the Ismailoff regiment of guards was posted as a support between redoubts 4 and 5, and No. 9 was strengthened by two companies of the 7th division. Finally, three batteries were erected for the discharge of Congreve rockets, one close to No. 11, one between 2 and 10, and the third upon the right wing of the trenches.

Meanwhile Major-General Trousson had further extended the works of attack. The besiegers proceeded with double sap from the 2nd parallel towards the points of bulwarks I. and II., and had crowned the counterscarp. In order to drive the Turkish skirmishers out of the first bastion and the curtain, battery *s* was erected in the 2nd parallel for 2 mortars and 4 field-pieces.

During the night of the 12th of September 5 mine-shafts at a distance of 44 feet apart were completed in the crowning *o* of the counterscarp of the opposite bastion I.

At four in the afternoon a large body of Turks made a rapid sortie, first upon the head of the sap proceeding from the 2nd parallel, and then with renewed violence upon the centre and right wing of the line of attack. After very close firing on both sides, which lasted till nearly seven o'clock in the evening, the Turks were at last repulsed, and their lodgment *g*, next on the right of the 2nd parallel, occupied by the Russians.

During the following night the 2nd parallel was extended by flying sap as far as *g*, where a battery was erected for 4 field-pieces, while at the same time the mines at *o* were charged with 90½ cwt. of powder, which was brought up from the fleet by marines. The explosion took place at daybreak. The greatest effect was produced in the ditch, whence a number of stones were hurled over the walls into the town, and occasioned a great loss of men to the Turks both there and in the ditch. The interval of 44′ between each of the 5 mines, however, proved to be too great, as, instead of forming one large entonnoir for the whole, each mine formed a separate one. For fear of accident, all the artillerymen, pioneers, and covering parties were withdrawn from the nearest trenches until after the explosion had taken place.

The prodigious effect produced by the mines did not, however, seem to throw the garrison into any confusion: as at Brailow, it merely became the signal for a vigorous bombardment and fire of small arms, which did not cease until they had ascertained that the explosions were at an end, and what were their results.

Jussuf Pasha did not absolutely reject the proposals of surrender which were sent to him next day, but he employed the time afforded by the negotiations merely in repairing his embrasures, for which reason the Russians declared them at an end on the 15th.

Meanwhile the scarp of the face of demi-bastion I. had been partly battered down, and formed a breach, 50 paces in width, by which a storming party might enter. It was, however, determined to batter another breach in curtain I. II., where it joins bastion II.

It was not until this time that a battering train, as to the strength of which there is no information, arrived before Varna. As the most important batteries were already armed with ship's guns, and the narrow front of attack along the lake afforded but little opportunity for placing artillery, it was resolved to employ the guns, whose arrival had been so ardently desired, only in enfilading the curtains which were already attacked. On reconnoitring the ground more accurately, it appeared that the only spot from which this would be possible, viz. the cemetery R (fig. 1), was still in possession of the garrison, and that even thence the enfilade fire would be very ineffective, owing to a fall in the ground. Thus the only purpose to which the battering train was put was to mount the guns in redoubt 1 in order to harass the town from that point. But as all the dwellings were situated in the eastern part of the enceinte at the distance of above a mile, the effect was very slight; only the Pasha's house, which stood high, was destroyed, and the field-pieces, which the Turks had placed in their lodgments outside the town, were silenced. The wall of the counterscarp in front of bastion 1 was carried back in a straight line, *v*, along the shore to tower T; it formed, as it were, a bâtardeau to the ditch, the sole of which was almost on a level with the sea. In order to approach the tower itself, a way secured by traverses had been carried from the dismounting battery *c* along the slope to *q*; a communication had likewise been made down to the same point from *o*. A battery for 3 12-pounders was erected at *q*, in order to enfilade the coast, and to sweep the flank of the works on the shore.

The construction of this battery presented great difficulties, owing to the deep cutting required to secure it in the light sand of the flat sea-shore. At the same time a way into the ditch was broken through the bâtardeau *v*. The fire of a 12-pounder mounted at *o* set fire to the tower, which was completely gutted; the flank was much damaged, and the Turks withdrew their artillery, probably in order to reserve it in case the fortress should be stormed.

On the right wing of attack the sap was finished as far as the counterscarp opposite bastion II., which was done with great labour owing to the rapid slope of the ground towards the ditch. From thence it was carried to the right and to the left, and a breaching-battery, *r*, was erected for eight heavy ships' guns and two stone mortars.

On the morning of the 20th breaching-battery *r* opened its fire; the scarp was not high, and before long a slope was formed, at an angle of 45°, against the curtain and even against the flank of bastion II. by the falling earth; a long-continued fire produced no other result. During the night of the 21st the sap made towards tower T very nearly reached its foot. As the assailants advanced openings were made in the bâtardeau in order to clear the ditch by rifle-fire. Small as these openings were, a number of Russian skirmishers were wounded through them. Accordingly embrasures were made in the bâtardeau for two field-pieces, in order to sweep the ditch more effectually.

The courage and obstinacy of the garrison in the defence of bastion I. appeared to increase every day; they likewise kept possession of the shell of the burnt tower, from whence they poured an admirably directed and most murderous fire of small arms upon the adjacent works. The project of entering or turning the tower was therefore abandoned, the rather as the assistance afforded by the fleet was far less than had been expected. Accordingly the sap was not carried any further towards the tower. Two field-pieces had been placed behind the bâtardeau to sweep the ditch in front of bastion I. and two more to enfilade the curtain I. II. at a considerable elevation; but it turned out impossible to protect them sufficiently by means of traverses against the main wall by which they were commanded, and they were soon silenced by the incessant fire of small arms and discharge of hand-grenades and combustibles from the tower. Spite of the Cohorn mortars, both small ones, and 20-pounders, which were placed in the entonnoir of the mine, the activity of the defence in bastion I. opposite only increased; the besiegers were already short of ammunition, the fragments of the grenades fell back into the trenches, and altogether the Turks threw more shells and grenades out of the fortress than the Russians could throw into it. Another difficulty was the extreme dryness of the soil with which the works of attack had to be constructed, and owing to which a single shell often destroyed the work of many hours.

There were now two practicable breaches, namely, in bastion I. and in the curtain next to bastion II. The daily losses among the besiegers from the enemy's fire, as well as from hardship and overwork, were very great; alarming diseases, according to some accounts even the plague, attacked the troops; the season was far advanced, the position of the main army before Shumla very critical, and a Turkish army was advancing to the relief of Varna. It was most urgent to end this state of things as soon as possible by the capture of Varna. To take it by storm would, under the circumstances, have been quite in the style of the Russian infantry. The reason alleged for not attempting it was, that in front of the breaches in the ditch there was a watercourse, of which the depth could not be ascertained, as the Turks still kept possession of the ditch with unexampled boldness, and had thrown up some small entrenchments on the sole of it. It is true that this might have given a serious check at the moment of storming; but moral causes probably had greater weight. The self-reliance of the assailants was shaken by the long duration and the smallness of the results of their exertions and sufferings, and that of the besieged strengthened by their successful resistance, while they learnt fresh courage in almost daily sorties. Already they saw the horse-tails of Omar Vrione on the wooded heights behind the fortress, and tidings of victory reached them from Shumla. There their bulwarks were in ruins; but the Turkish soldier, well fed and plentifully supplied with ammunition, was no doubt firmly resolved to defend his wife, his children, his home, and his faith, as long as he could stand in the breach. The conduct of the Turks in so many sorties had made a great impression on the Russians, who had not yet forgotten Brailow. To be beaten back in an attack would, as matters stood in the autumn of 1828, not only have compelled the Russians to raise the siege, but would unquestionably have led to a disastrous termination of the campaign.

In order not to break the thread of this narrative, the proceedings on the south side of Varna shall be related hereafter, the more so as they had no immediate effect upon the progress of the siege.

The Russians, not venturing to storm the place, now directed all their efforts towards the further destruction of the front of attack by mining, to crowning the breaches, and to inducing the garrison to capitulate by the terrors of an assault which appeared more imminent every day. The difficulty was to reach the scarp across the ditch so resolutely defended by the Turks. It was resolved to effect this by means of covered galleries, and to batter down with artillery the places in the walls at which the galleries of the mines were to be constructed.

With this intention three descents into the ditch were undertaken, the first on the left wing in front of the entonnoir *o*, next to the sea, from which the Russians reached the sole of the ditch and crossed it diagonally by covered sap. The mantelets were let down through the wall with ropes, but, in consequence of the enormous loss of sappers and miners, it took three days and nights only to reach the middle of the ditch.

The two other descents were effected on either side of the dismounting battery *r*. The besiegers went forward with covered sap, but had scarcely advanced 6′ towards the left before the mantelet reached the abrupt edge of the watercourse within the ditch. On the following day the sap on the right was met at the end of 12 paces by the same obstacle, which was the more difficult to surmount, seeing that a division of 400 Turks kept their station with inconceivable obstinacy in the ditch before front I. II. These brave fellows had covered themselves as well as they were able on the sole of the ditch by trenches and lodgments. Up to this time they had communicated with the garrison by the postern in the third front, but this retreat was now cut off by the progress of the works of attack, and the only one left to them in case of necessity was by the breach exposed to the whole fire of the besiegers. Spite of this, and although they had already lost half their number by the enfilading fire from the bâtardeau *v*, they maintained their post with unflinching courage, and materially impeded the progress of the covered sap by an admirably directed fire of musketry, and altogether prevented the possibility of a night surprise.

The continuation of the second parallel and of the crowning to the right of battery *r* had to be given up for the present, partly on account of the fire in the rear from the Turkish lodgments on the glacis in front of bastion IV., partly for want of pioneers. It likewise became necessary again to direct some guns upon bastion IV., as the Turks renewed their fire from thence. On the night of the 25th Colonel Poserowski stormed the lunettes *g* and *h* (Plan IV. fig. 1), and took a Turkish field-piece. During the following night four mine-shafts, *u*, were sunk to the left of the dismounting battery and the descent, and behind the counterscarp; they were 33 feet apart, and charged with 127 cwt. of powder: towards daybreak they exploded. The wall of the counterscarp in front of the shafts was thrown down, but the earth which was blown up did not fill up the watercourse as was expected. The Turks replied to the explosion by a fire of small arms from the opposite curtain, which lasted several hours, and materially increased the difficulty of replacing in the embrasures the guns which had been withdrawn during the explosion. The descent on the left of *r* had not been materially damaged; the edge of the entonnoir in front and the higher part of it at the back were crowned and occupied by skirmishers, and two covered saps, of which one was to turn in the direction of bastion II., were carried from it into the ditch. In order at least to dry up the watercourse, an opening was made quite at the bottom of bâtardeau *v*, through which the dammed-up water might run off.

We have seen that the covered sap and the entonnoir of the left wing, *o*, reached no farther than the middle of the ditch, and great difficulties stood in the way of their continuation. An attempt was made to carry a subterranean gallery to the foot of bastion I., but the soil consisted of a firm limestone deposit, through which the miners could not penetrate above 6′ in forty-eight hours. This work had therefore to be given up and the covered sap to be continued. When the base of the escarpment wall was reached, a gallery was carried beneath the point of bastion I.

The attack upon bastion II. was intrusted to the sappers of the life-guards. We have seen that at this point the covered sap had advanced as far as the watercourse, which was supposed to be about 10 feet deep. Accordingly on the 27th the sap leading into the ditch to the right of battery *r* was sunk stepwise to a depth of 10 feet, and then carried forward with a gradual downward slope. At four in the afternoon of the 28th daylight appeared through an opening in the side of the excavation, and the pioneers discovered to their surprise that they had not reached the sole of the cleft by 12′. The opposite bank was a smooth steep wall of earth 22′ in height. They likewise saw the Turks moving in great numbers to and fro between the lodgments and bastion I. Under these circumstances, which were the more difficult as the besieged had already observed the works and seemed to be taking measures of defence against them, the only thing to be done was to continue the underground gallery so far as to leave only a thin wall of earth which might be broken through in a moment as soon as preparations could be made for a descent into the cleft. In the mean time two armed sappers and two chasseurs were posted behind the opening, with strict orders to watch the enemy's movements, but not to fire unless in case of extreme necessity. But the Turks, who had already perceived the little opening, slily pulled out the stuff with which it had been filled up. From seven in the evening until midnight the Russians, however, kept perfectly quiet, and at length the Turks seemed to lose their apprehensions, and less frequently came to listen at the opening. At midnight, when all was ready, two sappers broke through the thin wall of earth which had been left at the moment just as the Turkish sentinel who was mounting guard in the watercourse moved away from the end of the gallery. Scarcely, however, had they done so before several Turks made their appearance out of the lodgment on the edge of the watercourse; the sappers hastily withdrew, and two others covered the opening with shields which had been prepared for the purpose. Now that their intentions were known, nothing was left to the Russians but to act resolutely on the offensive and to take advantage of the carelessness of the Turks, who had suffered the underground passage to be opened.

In the course of a few minutes a number of Turks assembled, and were received with a discharge of musketry through the loopholes in the shield, and with hand-grenades thrown over the top. They dispersed on either side and endeavoured to creep up to the opening of the gallery, but were always reached by a divergent fire from the safe position behind the shield. This skirmish, which occasioned great loss to the Turks, lasted no less than two hours, at the end of which they withdrew to their nearest entrenchments, whence they kept up a vigorous fire upon the gallery. The Russians at once proceeded to construct the descent, for which purpose two shields, each 12 feet long and 3 wide, and made of 1½-inch planks overlapping each other, were lowered as quickly as possible in a slanting direction from the two side walls of the gallery down to the watercourse. No sooner had the Turks observed this proceeding, which was new to them, than they again advanced towards the works and endeavoured to destroy the shields which had been lowered into the watercourse. Although strongly secured to the second framework from the opening of the gallery, the shields were very nearly thrown down. As soon as they were again set up and made fast, and a few feet of earth cut away, four skirmishers were placed behind them, who swept the ditch through the loopholes and prevented the Turks from coming near the works. Meanwhile two other shields, each 6 feet in length, were set up and made fast, so that by means of them the water might be reached. Thus much was finished by ten o'clock on the morning of the 28th, and nothing further was done during the day, because the matériel for crossing the watercourse and getting up to the bastion had to be got ready. In order to cover the intended movement, the lodgment in the counterscarp to the right of battery *r*, and the second parallel in the direction of beyond *g*, had been carried on under great difficulties. Loopholes had likewise been made in the counterscarp wall in order to post skirmishers there under cover from those of the enemy on the main wall.

At eight o'clock in the evening the passage across the watercourse was begun. It was first filled up with fascines, on each side of which were placed side by side a double row of gabions filled with brushwood, and on the top of these a single row made fast with stakes and with two rows of fascines laid lengthways. On the further side of the watercourse openings were left into the gallery, and lodgments constructed outside them for skirmishers, who would be able to see the approach of the enemy in good time, and thus to avert mischief. By this passage the Turks posted in the lodgments to the left of it as far as bastion I. were completely cut off, and in consequence the musketry fire gradually became fainter on that side, though it continued with unremitting violence from the entrenchments on the right of the crossing-place. The rapidity with which the work advanced, and its almost unexpected success, did not give the Turks time or opportunity to make a decisive attack upon them during the night. Every nerve was strained by the Russians to carry on the gallery, if possible, as far as the foot of the bastion before daybreak.

In order to construct a covered way up the scarp of the watercourse, two double rows of gabions filled with brushwood were placed up the slope of the scarp, and on the top of each of these a single row: the gabions were made fast with stakes, and the whole covered in with fascines, so as to protect the pioneers against stones and hand-grenades. Moreover, as the gallery advanced, a ladder was constructed to facilitate the ascent. The work proceeded with such extraordinary rapidity that by daybreak the gallery was carried up to the wall of the bastion, whence a second gallery to the right was constructed to the point of the bastion, and from there along the left face of bastion II.

At seven in the morning the first miner broke an entrance in the right face of the bastion at a place which had already been battered by artillery, and two hours later a second was made close to the right shoulder of the bastion. The crowning of the counterscarp had not yet advanced beyond the angle in front of bastion III., beyond which the Turks accordingly could assemble undisturbed, and soon placed guns in the ditch, with which they swept the left face of bastion II. lengthwise and destroyed the covered way to it, which had not been sufficiently covered in. Moreover the fierce fire of musketry from the lodgments in the ditch forced the miners to abandon for a time the works they had just begun. The covered way leading to the second gallery was, however, quickly repaired, and the mining was begun again, so that towards evening the first gallery had advanced 12' and the second 4'.

Towards evening a great concourse of Turks was seen in the ditch, in front of bastion III., among whom, to judge from his numerous suite, was a pasha. After talking for about a quarter of an hour, and pointing frequently towards the works, he withdrew to the fortress, followed by a great number of the assembled Turks. From all this the Russians inferred that the Turks intended to make a decisive attack upon them, and measures were taken accordingly.

By two o'clock in the morning the covered way round the left face of the bastion was completed, so that the miners could again get to the last two openings in the wall of the escarpment; by this time the first gallery had advanced 14 feet, and the miners began to sink the shaft, which, in case of necessity, was to be converted into a mine chamber, so that, at the worst, one of the four mines might be charged directly.

On the 1st of October, at three in the morning, a thick fog arose, which rendered it impossible to observe the enemy from a distance; at four the alarm was given. A body of Turks, above 1000 strong, had crept quietly along the wall of the counterscarp and in the watercourse, and attempted to approach the passage across the ditch. The skirmishers fired only a few shots upon the Turks, and then withdrew with the pioneers through the gallery to the glacis; but as this was very narrow, some of the miners and skirmishers had to make their escape from the violent rush of the Turks through the embrasures of the breaching battery.

The Turks rushed with frantic yells upon the gallery, began to pull down and set fire to all the material with furious and fanatical violence, and spread themselves from the commencement of the gallery to the mines, without taking any heed of the canister-shot from six guns placed upon the counterscarp, four which stood near the sea and enfiladed the ditch, or of the close fire of small arms from the embrasures of the counterscarp wall. The Turks, not content with destroying the works, endeavoured even to force their way through the embrasures of the two batteries, but were repulsed with considerable loss. Regardless of the inevitable destruction to which they were exposing themselves, they did not begin to retreat until six in the morning, taking with them their own killed and wounded, the heads of many of their enemies, and a Russian falconet, which had been placed beyond the wooden mantelet at the end of the sap, on the left face of bastion II., a point upon which four guns from the counterscarp could direct their fire, in order to sweep the ditch in front of bastion III. No sooner had the Turks retreated than the Russians set to work to restore the whole covered trench up to bastion II., and in a very short time they reconstructed it and rebuilt the wooden walls which had been burnt by the Turks, and which covered the descent into the water-course. By ten in the morning the covered trench was so far repaired that the miners were able to return to the first gallery, and by two in the afternoon to resume work in the second. The other galleries were given up, as it was clearly impossible to finish them at the same time with the first two. The covered trench along and behind the wall of the counterscarp was now carried beyond the angle before bastion III., and skirmishers were posted behind loopholes cut aslant in the wall; their fire forced the Turks, who had hitherto sheltered themselves behind the angle of the counterscarp, to retreat to some distance, taking with them the guns which swept the left face of the bastion.

At eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the 2nd the Russians suddenly heard the sound made by the advance of a countermine, and endeavoured to mislead the Turkish miners by knocking against the walls of the gallery. This unpleasant circumstance delayed the progress of the work considerably; nevertheless by evening the first gallery beneath bastion I. was carried to a depth of 10 feet, and the chamber for an overcharged mine was begun. At this time the second gallery was only 9 feet deep, and therefore nothing could be begun there but the chamber of an ordinary mine, as the object was to get both finished by the same time, so as to charge them without delay at daybreak.

As a fresh attack on the part of the Turks was expected that night, every measure of precaution was taken. An alarm was given at about ten at night; the Turks, who had shown themselves upon the curtain, came down to the works through the breach, attacked the covered trench leading to bastion II., and again began to tear down and carry away the materials; the miners, however, escaped unhurt, having received timely notice. After being exposed for some time to the murderous effects of the artillery and of a tremendous fire of musketry, the Turks gradually retreated into the fortress, after setting fire to the gabions and fascines, and to the covered trench near the bastion; this was burnt as far as the watercourse, where the fire went out.

On the following night the Turkish countermining became so audible in the gallery beneath bastion II., that, although the mine had only reached a length of 30 feet, and a continuation of it was extremely to be wished, it was resolved that the explosion should take place at once. The charge consisted of 75½ cwt. of powder.

By nine o'clock in the morning of the 3rd the covered trench to bastion II. was so far restored that nothing remained but for the miners to resume their work. Several volunteers immediately offered to ascertain whether an ambush had been placed for them. A sapper of the Emperor's body-guard, and a miner of the 2nd company of sappers and miners, advanced into the galleries, and came back with the welcome intelligence that the galleries were uninjured, but that they had found the corpses of several Turkish soldiers at the entrances of them, and that of an officer in the first gallery. Hereupon the miners immediately returned to their places, and the work was finished by about ten o'clock. Although the mines might have been charged at once, this had to be put off till next morning, as an order was issued to explode the mine beneath the bastion, which was quite ready, and to withdraw all the pioneers from the trenches until the explosion was over. By this proceeding the result of the mines beneath bastion II. was rendered very doubtful, as the countermines had already approached so near that the voices of the miners could be distinctly heard; and moreover, a night surprise from the Turks was fully to be expected. Under these difficult circumstances, the only thing to be done after completing the mines was to occupy the attention of the counterminers by knocking against the sides of the gallery during the whole day until evening, and to mask the entrances to them at night. By this time the second descent into the watercourse had advanced 40 feet, by means of underground galleries.

At ten o'clock in the evening the Turks came down the breach for the third time, and rushed with renewed fury upon the covered ways leading to the mines in bastion II. For upwards of half an hour they encountered the most tremendous fire of artillery and small arms, most likely in the hopes of discovering the galleries of the mines, but without success, as their entrances had been masked.

At eight in the morning of the 3rd of October the mine beneath bastion I. was fired. The clouds of dust and smoke thrown up led to the conclusion that its principal effect had been produced upon the counterscarp towards the sea; and in fact a great deal of earth was blown out in that direction. The entonnoir of the exploded mine had made an opening 8 paces wide in the inner slope of the breastwork of the bastion, but the bastion itself was very far from being laid open by it, as the garrison had erected a second and much wider breastwork within the first.

As soon as the explosion was over, the troops fell into their appointed places, and, as all the guns were loaded, a vehement fire quickly ensued.

The dust raised by the explosion still hung in a cloud over bastion I. when the Turks returned the fire with equal vigour, and at the same time took advantage of the damage done to the sap leading to tower T, in order to fire upon the artillerymen posted there. The Russians now availed themselves of the sap which had been reached by the entonnoir, and carried it on so as to crown the left edge of the entonnoir. This work was covered by a field-piece set up in lodgment *o*, over the first entonnoir, to the right of the stone mortar.

The covered trench before bastion II., which had been but little injured by the enemy, was repaired at nine in the morning of the 4th, whereupon the miners re-opened the entrances to the galleries, and immediately proceeded to charge the mines; they meanwhile concealed the real end of the work, which they had already reached, by continual feigned noises. The overcharged mine was loaded with 41 cwt., and the second mine with only 14 cwt. of powder. These mines had been intended to receive almost double the quantity; but the fear lest the Turks should anticipate the explosion by means of a crushing machine (which the Turks are said to have purposed doing on that very day), and possibly the great difficulty and danger attending the transport of the powder, induced the Russians to content themselves with a less powerful but sure effect.

The powder was brought up covered with hides, but the transport on the spot was a very hazardous affair, as it had to be carried from the bottom of the watercourse up to the scarp, along the steep, open sap, exposed to the reverse fire of the Turks from beyond the counterscarp before bastion III., a position still maintained by them even at this advanced stage of the siege. It became necessary to find some means of diverting the fire of shells and grenades; this was done as follows:—

The sap to the right of *g*, which had now almost reached the Turkish lodgments upon the glacis, advanced very slowly. Instead of a mantelet, the besiegers made use of a large box 12 feet long, and open towards the sap; it was made of 3½-inch plank, and had loopholes in the sides for skirmishers; as a further protection, slight fascines were laid upon the middle of it, and the whole was moved along by means of levers. On the slightest movement of this blind the Turks immediately directed all their mortar fire upon it. The continuation of the sap was accordingly delayed until such time as the mines should be charged, and ten skirmishers were posted in this blind, with orders to keep up a vigorous fire upon the enemy, while the pioneers threw out the earth as quickly as possible behind the box. No sooner had the skirmishers and sappers set to work than the Turks began to throw great numbers of shells and grenades, and opened a tremendous fire of small arms upon the blind, apparently directing their whole strength against this single object, with so much vehemence, that at one moment seventeen shells fell close to the box, and the eighteenth right into it, killing one skirmisher and wounding three. Spite, however, of the danger attending it, this feint was continued during the whole time of charging the mines.

At three in the afternoon the mines at length exploded with great effect, killing and wounding several hundred men, according to the account given by some Turkish prisoners. One of the counterminers was actually hurled into the breaching battery. Undaunted by this terrible destruction and slaughter, the Turks, immediately after the explosion, and just as if they had been prepared for its effects, opened a close fire of small arms from the further side of the entonnoir, from the part of the bastion left standing, and from the rest of the fortress; they likewise threw shells, hand-grenades, and stones into the entonnoir. Seven Russian guns, which were so placed that they could sweep the edge of the entonnoir unhindered, soon cleared away the palisades, hurdles, &c., thrown up by the explosion, from behind which the Turks fired upon their assailants; so that by evening the Turkish fire was nearly silenced.

The effect of the mines was highly satisfactory. The whole breastwork of the right face, and part of that upon the right flank, were thrown down, and the watercourse was filled up to a depth of 6 feet. The breach was perfectly practicable, had the Russians been inclined to attempt storming the place.

The communication with the new entonnoir was immediately restored by means of saps. In order to find out what the Turks were about, Second-lieutenant Bem, of the sappers of the lifeguards, ran up the crest of the entonnoir, and fortunately escaped unhurt. After looking about him sufficiently, he returned with the information that the garrison had not yet begun to make any preparations for defence. The besiegers now proceeded to crown the upper edge of the entonnoir with gabions and sand-bags. This was done as quietly as possible, because upon the slightest noise the Turks threw quantities of shells, grenades, and stones into the entonnoir. Moreover they fired over the main wall with guns at high elevation.

The gabions were placed below the edge of the entonnoir, in order at first to conceal the work from the Turks, and the earth which was to be heaped up behind them was scraped from the edge nearest the fortress by means of shovels fastened to long poles. Afterwards the Turks saved their enemies the trouble by erecting a wall of planks behind the entonnoir, and throwing a great deal of the earth across, thereby forwarding the work very much. In order to ease the ascent to the crown of the whole entonnoir, fascines were laid upon the slope so as to form steps up to the crowning. At two points ascending galleries were cut.

At about ten o'clock at night the Turks made repeated attempts to tear down and set fire to the material of the crowning, regardless of the loss they sustained from the skirmishers posted behind it. After a while, however, they withdrew, and made no further attempt.

From the entonnoir saps were carried in various directions; one towards the right along the crest of the parapet of the left face, a second towards the left along the flank, a third towards the breach next the bastion, and a fourth back again to the entonnoir of the mine, and towards the sap *w*, which had been carried from thence. Three mine-shafts were sunk in the glacis at *x*, in order to throw down the counterscarp at that point. On the right of the passage across the ditch lodgments were begun; at the end of several days they had, however, advanced very little, as the Turks still kept their position in the ditch before bastion III., and even had artillery there.

The besiegers had been far less successful before bastion I. than upon the right wing. At this point they only succeeded in crowning the edge of the entonnoir nearest to themselves. The ascent to the breach on the left, which had been completed as far as the breastwork, had to be given up because it was impossible to prevent the Turks from tearing down the blinds and gabions next to them.

The resolution was accordingly taken to storm bastion I. on the 6th of October. Several communications were made beforehand wide enough for columns to advance.

The orders were as follows:—

"Before daybreak the volunteers and other infantry troops appointed for the service, in all 400 men, under the command of Captain Dokudowski, will take bastion I., and immediately after the ruined houses beyond it, which by their commanding position increase the difficulty of effecting a lodgment upon the bastion. These troops will be closely followed by 200 pioneers and sailors, who will construct a lodgment upon the bastion."

The pioneers were divided into three sections, and commanded, as soon as they could see the inside of the bastion, to divide themselves along the intended line of the lodgment they were about to construct, so that one detachment should be upon the centre, one upon the right, and one upon the left wing of the line, while the fourth remained behind in reserve.

The volunteers, who were mostly sailors and soldiers of the Ismailoff regiment, occupied the sap from the entonnoir in bastion I. long before daybreak; behind them stood the pioneers carrying gabions: the reserve was placed in the trench behind the bâtardeau. The other division, intended to occupy the bastion, was drawn up in the 2nd parallel close to *u*.

The signal was given before daybreak, and the skirmishers with their reserve advanced upon the bastion. They found the breach perfectly practicable; the only impediment was the palisades, which had been brought down by the falling earth from the inner slope of the parapet. The detachment of infantry, which had stood next to battery *u* in the 2nd parallel, likewise reached the crest of the parapet just at the angle of the bastion in a very short time. The Russian troops drove the Turks out of the bastion without firing a shot, and then dispersed among the ruined houses. A few of the Christian inhabitants made their escape out of the town through the breach.

In the mean time a separate division of infantry, which advanced upon bastion II., out of the entonnoir by the breaching battery, fell upon the Turks who still maintained themselves in the ditch before the principal front, so that no way of retreat was left to them but that through the breach in the curtain next to bastion II., exposed to the canister-shot of the breaching battery. The foot of the breach was strewn with the corpses of these brave men.

Meanwhile the pioneers instantly set to work according to their orders, and began to throw up the lodgment, availing themselves of the wall of defence within the gorge of the bastion; but they were unable to cover the inside of the bastion against the opposite height, which was covered with ruined houses. The advanced divisions, too, soon gave way before the Turks, who had returned in increased force, and retreated into the bastion, and then, after a few unavailing efforts to maintain themselves in the lodgment, they and the pioneers withdrew into the trenches together, just as a reinforcement was coming to join them.

According to the Russian statement, 200 men were placed hors de combat in this fight, including almost all the officers of the covering party. According to other accounts, they had 80 killed and 300 wounded,—nearly two-thirds of the men engaged in the affair.

On the following day an equally abortive attempt was made to reach the top of the breastwork by carrying forward the sap. This was prevented by a shower of hand-grenades from the Turks, which was feebly returned by the Russian field-artillery.

The Russians now occupied the lodgments in the ditch before the principal front, which had at length been abandoned by the Turks after a brilliant defence. A sap was carried thence towards the scarp, and, as the three large breaches already made were considered insufficient, four new mines were made at *y*, in order to throw down the whole scarp of the curtain. In the 2nd parallel a battery of field-pieces was set up at *z* to batter bastion I. The sap in front of the entonnoir in bastion II., which had been directed towards the nearest breach in the curtain, had now reached it, and the digging away of the wall had proceeded 45 paces before it was perceived by the Turks. A shower of hand-grenades now, however, compelled the Russians to desist for a while from their attempt.

At one o'clock in the afternoon they resumed the work; the earth was cut away underneath, and the upper layer which fell in thrown into the watercourse, until the facing of palisades on the inner slope of the parapet was almost reached. The besieged had been forced to abandon bastion II., and to retreat from the works on the sea-shore as far as tower T; but they still occupied the ruins of the houses behind both these points.

On the 8th the governor of the place was informed by the Russians that the attempt to enter the town had only failed owing to the rashness of a few common soldiers; that the very small numbers employed showed that the capture of the fortress by storm was not the real object of the attack, but that the possibility of a real assault and the certainty of its success were sufficiently proved by the expedition. It is hard to say what effect these arguments may have produced upon the Pasha, but it is certain that the courage of the Moslems, which had probably been somewhat shaken by the frequent explosions of numerous mines, must have been mightily raised by the victory lately gained by Omar Vrione before the walls of Varna—a victory of which more presently—and by the total failure of the assault. Without doubt the Russians could only have aimed at crowning the breach with so small a force: it now, however, became necessary if possible to put an end to the tedious siege, and at the same time to a dangerous crisis in the campaign, by storming the place in right earnest.

Even should they succeed in throwing down the whole wall of the curtain of the principal front by fresh explosions, the storming would still be unavoidable, supposing the garrison continued to do its duty as it had done hitherto. It was utterly impossible to foresee that Omar Vrione's expedition would end as it did, and that the very Pasha under whose command Varna had so long and so nobly defended itself would turn traitor.

In order fully to understand the posture of affairs we must now revert to the events of the last four weeks on the southern side of Varna, and see what had happened since General Gollowin took up his position on Point Galata on the 11th September.

CHAPTER IX.

ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE VARNA — COMBAT AT KURT-TEPE — FALL OF VARNA.

We have already seen how ill the measures taken against Shumla, Silistria, and Varna turned out for the Russians from the time that their whole force had been engaged before these three strongholds, leaving no one corps that could be diverted to the support of any of these three separate divisions. And as yet the main body of the Turkish army had not reached the scene of action.

The Porte probably felt that the time was now come when a victory at the foot of the Balkan must decide the campaign in their favour. In August, therefore, the Grand Vizier, Mohammed Selim Pasha, moved his army towards Aidos, in which direction Omar Vrione was advancing from Shumla by Tschalikawack with a corps of some 14,000 men.

Unfortunately it is not in our power to calculate the exact strength of the Turkish army which the Grand Vizier, after such long preparation, was now leading to the Balkan. It is remarkable that, after all the time that had been spent in collecting an army, the Turks actually drew men from Shumla for their expedition to relieve Varna instead of sending reinforcements thither, as might have been expected. It is probable that the main army was composed chiefly of Asiatic hordes of no great use. Omar Vrione's troops, on the other hand, consisted principally of Arnauts, a wild, undisciplined, but brave soldatesca. They were chiefly Arnauts who by their brave defence of the ditch at Varna had so much impeded the progress of the siege.

After Omar Vrione had increased his army at Kamtchick to 25,000 or 30,000 men, he proceeded towards Varna. The advanced guard of General Gollowin was at Petrikoi, on the main road to Kamtchick, when the Pasha reached Hassanlar on the 24th by a side road, and began immediately to entrench himself there.

The Russian general sent detachments to reconnoitre the enemy, and in working through a thick wood they suddenly came upon the Turkish encampment at Hassanlar. Both parties were equally astonished. The Russians commenced firing their field-pieces, to which the Turks replied and made ready to attack. The leader of the Russian detachment fell back with his field-pieces and two squadrons, leaving the infantry in the wood to cover his retreat. No details were given of what subsequently happened, but of the 1500 men only 800 returned: General Harting was killed and a good many officers.

After this occurrence fresh troops were sent to the position of Galata-Burnu, and the command given to General Bistrom, who placed his corps of nine battalions and six squadrons, or about 6000 men, on a spot selected by General Gollowin on his flank.

On the 28th Omar Vrione continued his advance; the Grand Vizier, on the other hand, remained on the other side the Kamtchick near Dorwischkoi with some thousand men, and guarded the banks of the river by establishing several posts, among others one at Kioprikői, near Pravadi. He sent to Omar Vrione all the reinforcements that came to him from the Constantinople side of the Balkan. Field-Marshal Count Wittgenstein, whose wish had always been to concentrate his forces near Jenibazar, and to send twenty battalions and as many squadrons to Varna, now received orders to send all the troops he could collect in that direction. He had already given the regiment Ukraine orders to escort General Diebitsch to Varna, and Major-General Simansky was sent with the 20th regiment of Chasseurs in the same direction. Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg followed with the weak 1st brigade, and General Durnowo with the 19th division. This brigade numbered only 1700 bayonets, but the Prince received an intimation that he would be joined by four battalions of the 10th division under Prince Madatof, three squadrons of the Bug Lancers from Pravadi, besides two battalions of the 9th division from Kosludja: he was to take all the reinforcements that were expected from

Varna. The 3rd brigade of the 19th division was wanted at Shumla.

Adjutant-General Suchosanet had previously received orders to advance in the rear of the enemy by Gebedje and Hassanlar with the 1st brigade of horse-guards consisting of ten squadrons, and to send orders to Major-General Baron Delingshausen with the two infantry regiments of Ukraine and Odessa, together with some lancers and mounted pioneers, to advance and join him by Devna and Akenji. On the 27th this division attacked a hostile post left in Hassanlar, together with a quantity of workmen, and drove them out. The half-finished works raised by the Turks were of large compass, and seemed to be intended for the reception of an army, and the Russians thought it likely that the Grand Vizier had originally selected this point for his main camp, but had afterwards, on the advance of Omar Vrione, meant to convert it into a smaller entrenchment for a corps of observation.

Immediately afterwards General Simansky joined General Delingshausen; the former had beaten the Turks, who attacked him with several thousand men in the woods between Akindje and the river Pravadi.

On the 28th September Adjutant-General Suchosanet undertook a reconnaissance of the large Turkish camp on the heights of Kurt-tepe; he was only able to examine one side of it, and estimated the enemy's strength at 6000 men. But on that very day the

Pasha, as we shall presently see, had brought 15,000 men into action against General Bistrôm. That general had attempted to take a Turkish entrenchment, and had been beaten back with considerable loss. On the other hand, he repulsed three assaults on the left flank, the centre, and the right flank of his fortified position. During four hours the fight was continued with great fury; the Russian artillery and a charge with the bayonet of the 2nd battalion of grenadiers decided the combat: the loss on both sides was considerable. The Pasha, after the failure of this attack on General Bistrom's position, withdrew to the Kurt-Tepe, where the Turks began to fortify themselves in three separate camps.

Prince Eugène of Wirtemberg meanwhile advanced by Jasytepe and Devna. According to orders from head-quarters the brigade of General Madatof was not under Prince Eugene's command, but remained behind at Pravadi. On the other hand, on the 28th September, the 1st brigade of the 19th division formed a junction at Hassanlar with the division of General Suchosanet, and Prince Eugene took the command of this corps of ten battalions and fourteen squadrons. This corps consisted of 4500 muskets, from 1200 to 1400 cavalry, making up altogether barely 6000 men, with 46 guns. In Hassanlar he received orders from head-quarters at Varna to drive the Turks beyond the Kamtchik, in conjunction with General Bistrom. Early on the 29th September

Bulgarian delegates and some of the Christian population who had made their escape out of the Turkish fortifications came to the Russian quarters with the intelligence that the Turks had 50,000 men. But still more important than this doubtful intelligence was the information as to the nature of the country between the Russian and the Turkish positions. The leaders who were present and the commander of the outposts were unanimously of opinion that, considering the numerical superiority of the Turks, which was so much greater than had been supposed, and the local advantages of their position, an attack was unadvisable without a more minute consideration of the circumstances. Moreover a consultation with General Bistrom was essential, in order to come to some agreement as to the plan to be adopted, and all this required time. For these reasons the attack was delayed; General Bistrom was informed of this, and General Suchosanet was sent to the Emperor to lay before him the cause of the delay. In order not to undertake a bold and important step with insufficient means, Prince Eugene asked for reinforcements —for Prince Madatof's brigade from Pravadi, which could be replaced by troops from Shumla,—for the 1st brigade of guards from Varna,—and further, that General Bistrom might be placed under his command.

At the same time a reconnoitring party was sent out towards the Turkish quarters. From a height on the road from Missiplar the Turkish lines were seen along the front, facing the south-west. To an unpractised eye they appeared insignificant enough, but through a good telescope their great extent was discovered. It was clear that Omar Vrione had from 20,000 to 30,000 men assembled there. The interior of the camp was covered with huts; and without the camp the smoke arose from the watch-fires of such bodies of men as had come too late to find a place within the lines. The Prince felt convinced that without the necessary preparation the attack must fail, not so much owing to the number of the Turks as to the lay of the ground, where, through thick woods and deep ravines, narrow passes led to a fortified camp most advantageously situated, and where there was no space for the play of artillery or the forming of the troops anywhere near the Turkish quarters. It was only on the south side, on the road from Burgas, that the Turkish camp could be assaulted with any chance of success. This plan of attack would cut off the Turkish line of retreat, and they might therefore reckon upon an obstinate defence. In order to overcome this, and to turn so far to the right out of the road, it was necessary to be certain of success; a failure, if the Turks followed up their advantage, might compromise the fate of the army. The Prince represented this strongly in his second report to the Emperor. His plan was to occupy a clear plateau some 2000 paces to the west of the Turkish lines (see the plan of Varna), upon which the Turks were then erecting a redoubt. From thence the Prince intended to reconnoitre more closely, and to clear the ground for the attack with the axe; for the thick wood prevented the artillery from being brought into position except at such a distance as to be of no use, or so near that it ran great danger from a dash on the part of the Turks. The Prince and General Bistrom were then to make a simultaneous attack with the infantry when the artillery had produced its due effect on the dense Turkish masses, probably on the next day; and it is very possible that thus the Turks might have been induced from the danger of their position to fall back previous to the real assault, and before the communication in their rear was cut off.

Early on the morning of the 30th September an adjutant of General Diebitsch, however, arrived with the express order from the Emperor to attack immediately. At the same time the Emperor desired to know exactly when the columns would reach the Turkish position. The Prince gave an assurance that they should be on the spot at two o'clock in the afternoon. At the same moment General Suchosanet arrived and reported that all further reinforcement was refused. The Prince had no choice but to obey, and devote all his energy to an attack undertaken against his convictions.

On the morning of the 30th of September the Prince marched in two columns. The greater part of the cavalry (10 squadrons) marched from Missiplar; 10 battalions, 4 squadrons, and the artillery, under General Suchosanet, from Hassanlar. Both columns united by two o'clock on the flat brow, where the Turks (who had guessed the probable point of attack on the 29th) had pushed forward the entrenchment N. Generals Simansky and Delingshausen with the advanced guard took, without much loss, this fort, which was unfinished, and was commanded from the plateau. The cavalry, which were drawn up further to the right, marched at the same time up to the one small plateau behind the infantry at *b b*. On this crowded position the corps was immediately attacked on all sides. The Turkish hordes, among whom were some regular infantry, lay concealed in the wood, and from this secure position directed their fire against the Russians. To clear the way before him, the Prince threw some troops into the wood. One regiment soon disappeared from sight, but their dropping fire gradually becoming more distant made the retreat of the Turks on that point apparent. The regiment Ukraine repulsed every attack made against it near the fort, but to the left a strong corps of Turkish infantry occupied a deep ravine (11), into which it would have been necessary to descend in order to drive them out. The Russians, therefore, contented themselves with bringing some guns (*a*) in the rear to bear upon them, which held them in check. Between the fort N and the Turkish camp was a thick high wood, which was less dense just in front of the latter. As soon as the Russians came down from the edge of the valley on which the captured fort stood, they could not see on any side of them, and it was impossible to use their artillery. Ten 12-pounders were therefore placed on each side of the fort N; there was no room for more. The shot, it is true, reached the Turkish camp at a distance of 1500 paces, and the Turkish shot fell among the Russian ranks; but the damage done on either side was trifling. The rest of the Russian guns could not be brought into play at all, and were left behind under cover of some troops. The cavalry too could only act in small detachments.

In order, if possible, to find a better position for his artillery, Prince Eugene, who had been wounded in the arm during this hot encounter, ordered General Durnowo to advance with the 2 battalions Azoff to a spot which from the plateau, where they were, looked like an elevation. But this was in reality only a group of high trees, and General Durnowo, who soon found the Turks, but not the elevation, advanced still further into the wood, against express orders, driving the Turkish skirmishers before him. This advance was the more dangerous, as he left in his rear the Turkish hordes at *t*, against whom a battalion of the 20th regiment of Chasseurs was despatched.

About this time Adjutant Kuschelow brought from the Emperor a note written in pencil, in which he encouraged the troops to a vigorous attack, and promised the most active co-operation from General Bistrom. It was made known to the troops that his Majesty had selected a bold corps to do a deed of heroism, which announcement was received with enthusiasm. The troops longed to advance, and were waiting only for news of General Durnowo—whose movements in the wood remained hid—to advance as far as possible with the artillery, and to attack the Turks at once with the infantry. For, however hazardous the enterprise might be, there was now no room for delay, as it was imagined that General Bistrom was already engaged, and the enthusiasm of the troops must not be allowed time to cool.

Suddenly a close fire of infantry was seen at the edge of the wood, exactly in front of the Turkish camp. Scattered Turks ran in the direction of the camp, pursued by disordered masses of Russian soldiers. This was the regiment Azoff, which singly and boldly attacked the Turkish camp.

That regiment had shown some backwardness in the fight at Kölesch. A soldier, who had been asked whether he belonged to the regiment Azoff, said "God forbid!" The regiment now burned to wipe out the stain, and General Durnowo had found it impossible to restrain their ardour in presence of the enemy. He had suddenly found himself in the thick wood close upon the Turkish position, and engaged in a hot fire. To stand still under such circumstances would have cost many men to no purpose, and to retreat before Turks is the most dangerous measure of all. General Durnowo, therefore, had nothing for it but to advance. But the distance from all support deprived this enterprise of all possibility of success. Two adjutants, sent to General Durnowo with the order to abstain from this partial contest, did not find him. This brave officer was struck down by a bullet in the front ranks. The Prince sent to his assistance a battalion of the regiment Ukraine and one of the regiment Dnieper, but they could only protect the retreat of the regiment Azoff, which, pursued by a swarm of Turks, fell back out of the entrenchments.

All hope of finding a convenient position for the artillery had vanished, the cavalry was of no use, and nothing now remained but to advance with the infantry in mass. This the Russians did.

General Simansky had collected the scattered regiment of Azoff, and had joined it to the 1st battalions of Dnieper and Ukraine. To this was added the 2nd battalion of Dnieper, which at the beginning of the contest had pursued the Turks into the wood. The 2nd battalion of Ukraine followed as a support. On the left, General Nostitz advanced with the 20th regiment of Chasseurs and some squadrons of lancers of the guard to hold in check the Turkish hordes at *t*, who had been reinforced by large masses of troops from the entrenched camp: so that now only 2 battalions of Odessa remained behind on the plateau to protect the 36 guns.

The 5 battalions of the right flank again attacked the Turks, and a fearful contest ensued. The entrenchments themselves offered no very great impediment; indeed one battalion of Ukraine actually penetrated its enclosure, but could not hold its ground against the united forces of an enemy by no means despicable when fighting hand to hand. A tremendous attack was made on the rear of the weak Russian division, and it was forced to fall back upon the other battalions; while on their side the Russians put to flight the Turkish horse which attacked them. Major-General Nostitz forced his way with the Lancers of the guard through the underwood, and, in conjunction with the 20th regiment of Chasseurs, repulsed an attack made by the Turks on the left. On the right the dragoons of the guard and the Cossacks also forced their way through the wood.

It was, however, impossible to effect an entrance into the Turkish entrenchments, and the tail of the column was exposed for an hour to a terrible fire of canister shot, during which General Simansky fell.

A few reserve forces and a vigorous attack from Galata might possibly have turned the scale in favour of the Russians. General Bistrom was in an entrenched position, it is true, but it had no outlet from behind; and he had only 9 battalions and 6 squadrons. Of these, 2 battalions were in the forts on the Devna lowlands, so that General Bistrom had in fact only 4000 men wherewith to protect his lines, which were 4000 paces long, and to support Prince Eugene in his assault on the Turkish camp. To compass both objects with such small resources was manifestly impossible. Already, before the regiments Ukraine and Azoff made their vigorous attack on the southern side of the Turkish encampment,* 2 battalions of body grenadiers had advanced upon the northern camp, but were driven back after a fruitless attempt, with the loss of 500 men; here too the troops showed no lack of energy. Later in the day they perceived the confusion in the Turkish camp which was caused by the bold assault of the regiment of Azoff. Under these circumstances it seems that General Bistrom should have given up the defensive, and have attacked the Turks with his whole corps. The Russian entrenchments were not more than 1500 paces from the northern camp of the Turks, and the space between them was open and level, so that no impediment was offered by the nature of the ground. Varna, as we have already said, was but ill covered by the Russian position at Galata; and nothing would have attained that object more completely than by a victory over Omar Vrione. The presence of the chief of the Emperor's general staff might justify such a venture; and at the worst, General Bistrom could fall back upon Gebedje, and join Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg. But as no simultaneous general attack was made upon the Turkish main camp from Galata-Burnu, and the Prince had no reserve at his disposal, the only way to prevent the total destruction of the troops was to stop the engagement. This was a difficult measure, as the troops were entangled with the enemy. But the retreat from the Turkish camp was effected in as close order as the nature of the ground allowed, and the whole division was again concentrated on the before-mentioned small plateau, *e*, near the redoubt which the Russians had taken. The Turks, who were themselves in great anxiety, and had suffered great loss, did not venture out of their lines until they were quite certain of the cessation of the Russian attack; then only a few scattered horsemen sallied forth, and they were soon driven back.

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* In the position in which Omar Vrione stood, it is hard to say which was his right and which his left flank, as he had to make front on three sides—towards Varna, Galata, and Hassanlar.

The loss on the side of the Russians amounted to 1400 men. The commander-in-chief was wounded, and 2 generals killed. The chief of the brigade, the regimental chief, 2 captains of battalions, and 2 leaders of companies of the regiment of Azoff were all laid in one grave. The Russian soldiers, on the whole, distinguished themselves highly in this engagement.

Prince Eugene marched back to Hassanlar with his detachment during the night, as the position in front of the Turks in the midst of the wood was untenable from want of water. From Hassanlar 6 battalions and 4 squadrons were sent to join General Bistrom, and fresh reinforcements were sent to him from Varna, as his position was the source of great anxiety: the 3rd brigade of the 19th division, which Prince Eugene had asked for in vain, was likewise sent to General Bistrom.

The Prince himself, with 4 weak battalions and a few squadrons, occupied the post of Osmandji between Hassanlar and Gebedje, so as to be able, in case of necessity, to render further assistance to General Bistrom. After the action the Prince asked for reinforcements in order to renew the attack against the Turks, but his request was refused, as all the force that could be spared had been sent to General Bistrom. The Cossacks of the guard remained at Hassanlar, and made daily demonstrations in the Turkish rear.

The action at Kurt-tepe was one of the most brilliant of the campaign. Although the attack failed, the moral effect which the courage of the Russian troops produced upon the Turks did much towards bringing the campaign to a successful issue, adding a fresh proof that strict obedience to orders, even in the worst positions, is the first of military virtues. Forced against his will to make an attack, the issue of which he doubted, the Prince followed his instructions to the best of his ability. Only 2 battalions remained in reserve; all the others engaged in a bloody conflict, in which the infantry, unsupported by the cavalry or the artillery, and groping as it were in the dark, fought with consummate bravery.

The authorities at head-quarters seem to have wished to attain their object without affording the means. When we remember that about this time the fall of Varna was daily expected, it is perfectly obvious how unwelcome must have been the approach of a Turkish army of relief, which might frustrate the effects of a long and laborious siege, and perhaps alter the issue of the whole campaign. The intelligence given by General Suchosanet of the weakness of the Turkish corps was very consoling. The Russians believed it because it jumped with their wishes; for the contrary reason they put less faith in the representations made by Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg. It was known that the Grand Vizier intended to send 12,000 or 16,000 men to reinforce Omar Vrione's corps, while he himself stayed on the Kamtchick. It was for this reason that the Emperor had issued such peremptory orders to attack before the reinforcements could reach the Turkish camp. Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, on the other hand, maintained that the reinforcements had already reached Omar Vrione. The circumference of the Turkish entrenchments, and the bivouacs between them, embraced a circuit of about two miles, and the weakness of the vizier at Derwisch-Jowann confirmed the view taken by the Prince on the spot, in opposition to that which the Emperor had adopted on board the "Paris." Moreover, the Emperor expected a favourable result from the junction of General Bistrom with the Prince; and indeed the Turkish position could thus have been attacked from every side. What always occurs when forces are divided took place here: and the enterprise failed, owing to the absence of one guiding mind to conduct the whole. When we consider that General Bistrom's position by no means hindered the Turks from entering Varna, the question may be asked whether it would not have been better to have withdrawn the whole division of that General from Galata, and to have united it with that under Prince Eugene, for the attack upon the Turkish entrenchment at Kurt-tepe. This could have been done by the same route as that by which, after the fight, the reinforcements sent by the Prince reached Galata. Lastly, when we consider that the attack upon Omar Vrione in all probability would decide the fate of the campaign, it appears to us that to gain so great an object it would have been worth while to have deprived Pravadi of one portion of its garrison, or to have replaced that garrison, as far as was necessary, by troops taken from before Shumla. United with the brigade of Madatof, the corps of General Bistrom, the third brigade of the nineteenth division, and the other reinforcements which were spared, after the fight, from Varna, Prince Eugene would have been at the head of 15,000 men, which, under one leader, might have proved equal to the enterprise, difficult as it was. Supposing the attack from the west and the south to have been successful, possibly a great part of the defeated Turks would have thrown themselves into Varna; but we cannot look upon this as a disadvantage: nor could this have been prevented by the Russians in position before Galata. The presence of a beaten and disorganized mass of troops in Varna would only have hastened the fall of the besieged fortress.

To turn to the Turkish leaders, and their operations. It would appear that in the whole of this military drama the Grand Vizier played only a second-rate part. Otherwise he would not have delegated to Omar Vrione so important a matter as the relief of Varna, but have gone himself. The period was now past for holding the Turkish troops in reserve; the time for operations was slipping away; the campaign must soon be ended; and the moment was now come when the last soldier whom the Grand Vizier could still command in Rumelia ought to have been employed in bringing the campaign to a successful issue.

Undoubtedly the Vizier had given up to his subordinate officer the greatest and the best part of his troops, and had fallen back with merely a nominal army to the banks of the Kamtchik, where he placed his troops in an ill-fortified camp at Derwisch-Jowann. (See the plan of Derwisch-Jowann, Plan 10.) But on a day like that of the 30th of September, the mere appearance of only a few thousand Spahis in the rear of the small corps under Prince Eugene's command would have had the greatest effect. Omar Vrione went straight to his point. When he fortified himself in his quarters, though engaged in a purely offensive operation, he did so in accordance with the old-fashioned custom of the Turks, and with the conviction that his troops were not capable of resisting the Russians in the open field. His superior numbers, and the object of the enterprise, ought, however, to have released the Pasha from this old rule. After the rencontre of the 26th of September, and before Prince Eugene had got together his small corps, the Pasha advanced against the position of Galata, and attacked it. This point was nearest to him, and it was the most advisable measure he could have taken. Had he succeeded in breaking through, either in the front or on the right flank of the Russians, General Bistrom's division was utterly lost, and the communication with Varna completely restored. But such being the case there was the greater certainty of the most obstinate resistance on the part of the Russians. For such an object the four hours' encounter of the 28th of September was not sufficient; on the other hand, for a mere reconnaissance it was too much. The loss in men was considerable, and the failure depressed his soldiers.

The entrenched camp at Kurt-tepe appears to have been well chosen under all the circumstances of the case. From thence Omar Vrione was in a position to renew the attack upon the Russians at Galata; he could advance if he chose against Gebedsche, Devna, and Pravadi, or could expand his troops to the tongue of land between lake Devna and the sea. But this ought to have been done quickly: advantageous as the point was to an army acting on the offensive, it was little calculated for a long stay, situated as the post was in the middle of a wood, and having a dangerous and dissected line of retreat. The complete fortification of the Kurt-tepe was a piece of strategical folly, as the ravines that descended to the plain in every direction from the hill afforded support on all sides, in the event of an attack. Meanwhile the most fortunate thing that could happen to the Turks occurred on the 30th of September: the Russians did the Turks the favour of attacking them in their strong entrenchments.

After the Arnauts had repulsed the bold attack of the Russians, Omar Pasha's position was a proud one. It was the decisive moment of the whole campaign. But what did occur, or rather what did not occur, is beneath criticism.

After the retreat of the Prince, and indeed before that, on the 27th of September, Omar Vrione could undoubtedly have opened a communication with Varna. The three redoubts which General Gollowin had raised on the tongue of land between lake Devna and the sea, immediately at the foot of the woody heights, were most excellent against a sortie from the fortress, but were most disadvantageously situated in the event of an attack from the south. If Omar Vrione had occupied General Bistrom's attention by making a false attack on his front, and sent masses of his light troops against the redoubts, more especially that on lake Devna, which it was impossible to relieve, these redoubts could not have made a long resistance. In any case they could not prevent the relieving party from forcing its way into the fortress, a fact of which the Russians at head-quarters seemed fully aware.

It is a totally different question whether Varna could have been saved by such an addition to its forces. There was no lack, in the Turkish fortress, either of ammunition, provisions, or defenders. The courage of the garrison was not broken, nor was the place yet reduced to great straits. Jussuf Pasha had men enough to defend the breaches, but not quite enough to enable him to quit his stronghold so as to attack the Russians on the northern side and drive them away. A weak addition to his troops would be of no service to him, and Omar Vrione must have entered Varna with his whole force, and débouched again by the northern gate. We hold the first to have been quite possible, spite of the position occupied by General Bistrom; and the last was easy of execution, as the Turks were not at that time confined within their walls, but maintained themselves in their lodgments outside the ditch of the fortress, and immediately in the flank of the Russian lines of attack. The best thing that Omar Vrione could have done was undoubtedly on the 1st of October to have gone to Osmandjick in pursuit of Prince Eugene's corps, weakened as it was by losses in the battle of Kurt-tepe, and by the detachments that had been sent off, to have crushed it with ten times the number of men, and then to have gone by Gebedje, over or round the small lake Devna, by which means, on the 2nd or 3rd of October, he would have been in the rear of the Russian besieging corps, which at that time, owing to the great loss it had sustained during the siege, and the detachments that had been sent to Galata-Burnu and to Gebedje, scarcely amounted to 10,000 fighting men. We will not assert that even with three times that number of men Omar Vrione could have beaten the Russians in the open field. But at any rate they would have been forced to make head against him; and it may pretty safely be assumed that, under such circumstances, the garrison would have made a sortie to destroy the Russian lines of attack and the mines, and to take the guns placed in battery against the fortress: by which means the capture of Varna might have been delayed to an indefinite period.

Of the 72 battalions and 52 squadrons of the third and seventh corps, with which Count Wittgenstein intended to take Shumla, the following divisions had been removed :—

		Battalions.	Squadrons.
To Varna	of the 7th division . .	8	–
„	„ 10th „ . .	6	–
„	„ 18th „ . .	4	–
„	„ Mounted chasseurs	–	4
„	„ Lancers of the Bug	–	5
To stations	„ „ „	–	5
To Pravadi, under Prince Madatof	„ 10th division . .	4	–
„ „	„ Lancers of the Bug	–	5
To Devna, under General Delingshausen . . .	„ 9th division . .	2	–
„ „	„ 19th „ . .	2	–
„ „	„ Lancers of the Bug	–	5
Under General Diebitsch	„ 19th division . .	2	–
With General Simansky	„ 10th „ . .	2	–
„ Prince Eugene. .	„ 19th „ . .	4	–
„ General Bistrom .	„ „ „ . .	4	–

—making altogether 38 battalions and 24 squadrons that had been sent from Shumla.

Thus, there were before Shumla at this time only 34 battalions and 28 squadrons, which, from losses in battle and by disease, could scarcely amount to above 10,000 men. Hussein Pasha, even after the departure of Omar Vrione, must have had double that number of troops.

Had Omar Vrione succeeded in his enterprise, the campaign would have been ended : the Russians must have fallen back over the Danube, and the whole result of their enormous sacrifices would have been the possession of one place on the left bank of the river.

But Omar Vrione did nothing of all this. For three days he remained idle in his entrenchments in the wood, heard one mine after another explode before Varna, witnessed the progress of the siege, and the storming by the Russians, without taking any part whatever; and at length, when the Russian flag waved over the ruins of the fortress, he made a hasty retreat, as if the event which he had done his best to bring about had exceedingly surprised him. The connexion between a Pasha of Albania and the Ottoman Porte is very unlike that between an European commander and his sovereign, or his country; and other reasons, besides military ones, may have influenced Omar Vrione's proceedings.

The Russians, spite of all resistance, had nearly destroyed one whole front of the fortress of Varna by dint of springing mines and by undermining. For fourteen days the Turkish corps sent to relieve Varna had remained at a distance of only five miles from the fortress without rendering any assistance to the besieged garrison. The boldest of the defenders had fallen in the numerous sorties and in the heroical defence of the ditch, and, while the last hope of help from without disappeared, the example of one high in command within the fortress had the greatest influence on the besieged.

During the afternoon of the 10th October Jussuf Pasha, accompanied by a portion of the garrison, went to the Russian camp and threw himself upon the mercy of the Emperor. What negotiations preceded this step, and what measures were adopted to bring it about, are not known. Thus much is certain, that it was not owing to the place being untenable, for Isset-Mahommed, the Capitan Pasha, could not be prevailed upon to capitulate. He retired into the citadel and threatened to bury himself and a small band of faithful followers in the ruins of the fort. A heavy fire from all the batteries and from the fleet, which was opened upon Varna at Jussuf's instigation, shortly after he entered the Russian camp, decided the rest of the garrison and many of the inhabitants to quit Varna. At length on the following day, and after free exit had been granted to the Capitan Pasha and to 300 of his followers, the fortress was surrendered to the Russians. The place had resisted 89 days after the first investment, 70 days after the beginning of the regular siege, and 27 days after the first practicable breach had been effected; in all three times as long as Brailow.

The garrison, including the reinforcements that had entered the place by degrees, consisted of 20,000 men, not much stronger therefore than that of Brailow; but by the end of the siege it had diminished to one-third of that number: 7000 men were sent with Jussuf Pasha as prisoners of war into the Russian territories on the other side of the Danube. But for Jussuf's treachery* and Omar Vrione's obstinacy, the brave garrison of Varna might have cut its way out, and, spite of General Bistrom's position, have formed a junction with the Turkish corps at Kurt-tepe, and thence fallen back with it across the Kamtchik.

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* The grounds for Jussuf's treachery arose from some palace intrigue. His dismissal and the confiscation of his property in Rumelia had been decided upon while he was still valiantly defending Varna.

During the siege the Russians expended above 2500 cwt. of gunpowder, of which a large portion had been used for the enormous mines, without reckoning the somewhat short allowance of ammunition for the numerous field-pieces; 37,000 cannon-balls, 2500 ball-cartridges, and 8600 hollow shot: altogether about 50,000 shots had been fired against the fortress, more than three times as much as against Brailow. There was not a house in Varna that had not received some injury, and the Christian quarter, which was nearest to the front, was a heap of ruins. Varna had only 162 guns, whereas Brailow was armed with 300. The Russians had only placed 65 guns in battery, of which 8 were mortars, 23 heavy ships' ordnance, and 34 field-pieces. The real battering-train only reached Varna when it was no longer wanted. In all about 55,000 men out of the weak besieging force, or about 700 daily, were employed in the working parties, about half as many as at Brailow. The loss of the Russians is not given, but cannot be reckoned at less than at 5000 or 6000 men.

The marine artillery had done most service in the batteries, the 3rd brigade of the 7th division in covering the movements in the field, and the sailors in carrying on the works.

The Turks plainly showed that they knew nothing of the progress of a regular siege. They neglected to increase their guns on the point of attack before the Russians raised their batteries against them, and they threw away their shot; nor did they know how to make a proper use of counter-mines: but they showed the most unshaken courage behind fortifications, thrown up without system or regularity, but defended by them to the last moment. Their defence of the ditch was above all praise, and the resistance of the garrison for three weeks after two practicable breaches had been effected in the main wall is a very rare instance of manly resolution. The defence of Varna deserves mention among the most glorious on record, and has a remarkable character from the manner in which the besieged disputed the debatable ground outside the walls against their assailants. But no less praise should be awarded to the Russian officers and troops who overcame so many difficulties with such insufficient means.

From Kurt-tepe Omar Vrione could see everything that took place at Varna. After the surrender of the place, and as if with that his occupation was gone, he made a precipitate retreat beyond the Kamtchik. Prince Eugene, with only four battalions and ten squadrons, naturally did not venture too close to the connecting lines of the Turks, and was still less able to cut off their retreat; but he sent some cavalry after the retreating Pasha, and Generals Jefreimow and Nostitz came up with him not far from the ford over the Kamtchik. The cavalry fought in the wood; both generals were wounded, and forty Russians were killed.

General Bistrom's advanced guard also came up with a portion of the retreating Turks and took a flag. Thus, on the evening of the 11th October, the Prince united under his command at Petrikoi 14 battalions and 16 squadrons. Omar Vrione attempted to maintain a position on the left bank of the Kamtchik, but Prince Eugene attacked him on the 15th October, and after a hot engagement drove him with great loss across the Kamtchik into the entrenchments at Derwisch-Jowann, which the Pasha quitted the next day of his own accord and fell back upon Aidos, leaving only a weak garrison in the blockhouses at Derwisch-Jowann.*

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* Within the last two years, and since Baron von Molkte wrote his book, the fortress of Varna has been provided with a considerable armament of guns and mortars. Many additions have also been made to the fortifications: the ramparts, parapets, platforms, and embrasures have been put in order, and detached redoubts thrown up in advance. The design and arming of the new works have not been judicious in the first instance, but it is presumed will be improved by the French or English engineers now with the allied forces in Turkey.—TRANSLATOR.

CHAPTER X.

THE INVESTMENT OF SILISTRIA.

THE position of Silistria is equally important in a strategical point of view, and unfavourable for the purposes of fortification. The fortress was razed after it was taken in 1810, but soon rose again from its ruins, and numbered 24,000 inhabitants* when the Russians besieged it in 1828. Silistria† (Plan V.) describes a nearly exact semicircle, of which the diameter, 2000 paces in length, is turned towards the Danube. The place is surrounded by a fortification with ten fronts each 550 paces long; but with the exception of the two narrow works, Liman and

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* At present three-fourths of the space included within the walls are a waste. It is true there is a new city, but it does not contain above 4000 inhabitants. These have chiefly settled in the suburb of Wolna, built by the Russians, to the east of the fortress, and on the river. Inside the town a few streets have been built; there are besides some scattered small houses and the barracks built by the Russians along the curtain. In other respects the fortifications remain much the same as they were; indeed the Russians would have been very wrong to have altered them. When Sultan Mahmud was there in 1836 the four breaches in the bastions Ordu and Muftiereh-Tabiassi, and in the intermediate curtain, were not repaired, but only filled up with hurdles. Even the traces of the attack of 1810 were perfectly visible.

† In Russian accounts the tracings and profile of the place are given otherwise; for instance, the depth of the ditch is said to be above 24 feet. But we can only go by our own observation.

Tchengel Tabiassi, which connect it with the Danube and are principally intended to sweep the river, Silistria has neither permanent outworks nor a covered way beyond a few lodgments slightly thrown up outside the gates of the town, which would else be entirely open to the field, and might be directly bombarded. The glacis was from 2 to 4 feet high, and the ditch, as shown by the profile, not above 8 or at most 10 feet deep. The scarp and counterscarp were faced to that height with flints. Above the scarp rose a parapet 8 feet high and 20 feet broad, of which the inner slope was faced with palisades. The outer slope of the parapets of the bastions was very steep and set up with wattles; those of the curtain were faced with sods. The bastions mounted ten guns, which fired through embrasures, of which there were four on each face and only one on each flank, so that the lines of the ditch, which were very short, were very badly flanked. Two gates opened upon the river and two more on the land side.* There was no means of laying the ditch under water, as its bottom is above the level of the Danube, and no streams run into it. As a precaution against the Russian mines, a cunette 9 feet deep, but quite dry, had been hollowed out on the bottom of the ditch all round the front towards the land.

The very slight command of the fortress—of not more than 8 or 9 feet—renders the neighbouring heights more formidable. The table-land of Bulgaria, where it approaches very near to the Danube, is 200 feet high and perfectly flat, and at a distance of 1500 paces on an average from the main wall of the fortress it descends in a slope which would not be too steep to allow artillery to be mounted upon any part of it. At only 800 paces from the southern bastion (Muftiereh) the whole interior of the fortress can be completely overlooked as far as the gorge, which is turned towards the Danube. A battery at this point would take the three eastern fronts in reverse, and the two south-west fronts can be seen and enfiladed from D. Some of the heights rise from a distance of only 600 paces from the main wall, and upon these the besieging party might construct their batteries just as near and as high as they pleased, and might serve them until the end of the siege. The Danube, too, is not quite 1000 paces wide at this point, so that a very troublesome fire might be kept up upon the place from the opposite bank.

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* Now there is but one, the Stambul Kapu.

The only means of turning Silistria into a good fortress would be to erect four strong detached outworks at A, B, C, and D, and to construct a tête-du-pont on the left bank of the Danube just opposite the town (X).

We have already seen that the 4th division of lancers and the 16th infantry, consisting of 16 squadrons and 12 battalions, with about 36 field-guns, altogether 10,000 men, had been withdrawn from the corps under General Roth, and marched upon Silistria by the circuitous route through Hirsova. General Roth made his appearance before Silistria on the 21st July, at the very time when the main army arrived before Shumla and the corps under General Ushakoff before Varna. Like them, too, he had not a sufficient force, and no siege artillery, because only one battering-train had been provided for a campaign during which four sieges were expected to take place.

The garrison of Silistria was numerous; it consisted principally of the armed inhabitants of the town and its neighbourhood, amounting to about 6000 or 7000 men at arms. Besides these the greater part of the garrisons of Brailow, Tultcha, Matchin, and Hirsova had gone to Silistria. Thus at first the besieged were probably more numerous than the besiegers.* As soon as the Russians approached the place several sharp skirmishes took place, in which the Turks had the worst.

General Roth thought himself obliged at first to take up a purely defensive position beyond the range of the guns of the fortress, and he accordingly selected one upon the above-mentioned heights. The Turks attempted to prevent this by sorties on the 23rd, 24th, and 25th of July, but of course without success on ground so unfavourable to their attempt.

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* According to the Russian accounts they numbered 22,000; but this is greatly exaggerated.

General Roth's entrenchments consisted of a chain of works (No. I. to XIII.), partly closed and partly open, at the gorge, at the distance, on an average, of about 2000 paces from the fortress. The right of the line rested on the Lower Danube at the last redoubt. The high ground farther to the left was still in the possession of the Turks.

In this position the two hostile forces remained for four weeks, during which nothing took place but a few slight skirmishes by which the Russians could gain no possible advantage. Meanwhile the Turks kept possession of the heights at A and B, which were attacked by the besiegers on the 28th of August. The fight began at midnight, and lasted until the following afternoon. The Turks retook the height A three times, but were forced at length to abandon it to their enemies. Their final attack was made by a column of 3000 men, supported by 5 field-guns. As plateau B was entirely beyond reach of the fire from the fortress, the Turks always found themselves exposed at that point to that of the numerous Russian artillery. On their return to the fortress they were vigorously attacked by the lancer regiments of St. Petersburg and Charkow, and are said to have lost about 500 men. The losses on the side of the Russians are estimated by themselves at 72 killed and 312 wounded, including the colonels of both cavalry regiments.

The Russian position was completed by the construction of the works to No. XVIII. The left wing, however, remained at the distance of about 4000 paces from the fortress, and a mile from the Danube. On that side the level ground was commanded by the fortress and the work of Liman Tabiassi, and the events of the 11th of September show that the place had been incompletely surrounded just in the most important direction, towards Rustchuk and Shumla. On this day a corps of 5000 Turks advanced from Rustchuk, and, spite of the Russian position, joined the troops which advanced from Silistria to meet them. An attack made by the Turks upon the cavalry under General Kreutz was unsuccessful, but the Russians lost 8 officers and 158 privates.

Works were erected on the high ground at B, nearer to the fortress than any previous ones, but still at a distance of 1500 paces, and a trench, *a a*, was slightly thrown up from the redoubts on the right wing along the front of the other entrenchments half way up the slope: in making this trench the existing enclosures were used, and it served to cover the skirmishers.

The Russian lines were in a great degree protected from any attacks from the fortress by the heights upon which they stood. On the other hand, they could be but feebly manned, as they extended between three and four miles in length; they were broken by two deep valleys, and would have been little able to withstand any serious attack from the further side.

On the 10th of August the 2nd and 3rd squadrons of the Russian Danubian flotilla, in all 36 vessels, arrived before Silistria. It would have been of the highest importance to restore the communication with the Wallachian shore by means of a bridge of boats or rafts. An abundance of brushwood grew on the further side of the river, which on the right bank had to be brought from many miles' distance. A permanent way across the river would have rendered it far more easy to provide for the necessities of the troops, and, in case of misfortune, would have greatly facilitated their retreat, which would otherwise have to be made to Hirsova, at a distance of 70 miles through a hostile country, by no means to be looked upon as subdued so long as the doubtful state of things before Varna and Shumla might last. There is no doubt that the materials for a bridge might easily have been brought by the Ardshish and the Bortesa branch of the Danube, but all the energies of the Russians seem to have been paralysed towards the end of the campaign. The first point should have been to drive away the Turkish flotilla, which numbered only 12 vessels, and nothing would have been easier, as the Russians had possession of the left bank of the Danube, only 1000 paces off. We cannot, however, learn that anything of the sort was attempted: the only feat performed was the inevitable repulse of a few sorties made by the garrison. On the 15th of September the two divisions belonging to the 6th corps were ordered to Shumla, and relieved at Silistria by the 2nd corps-d'armée of General Tscherbatoff. When General Roth marched away a sortie was made by the brave commander of the place, Achmet Pasha, in person, at the head of 4000 men, and much blood was shed on both sides. Reckoning the strength of the 2nd corps, which came from the interior of Russia, at only 18,000 men, the number of the besiegers now greatly exceeded that of the besieged. Nevertheless during the next four weeks nothing effectual was done towards ending the siege of Silistria. General Tscherbatoff fell sick, and General Langeron undertook the command. The number of guns had now increased to 120, but there was no ammunition. At the same time disease spread with fearful violence and rapidity among the newly arrived troops, and a scarcity of provisions prevailed. According to the newspaper accounts 500 men died on the 4th and 5th of November only, within the Russian lines.

At Shumla Hussein Pasha had done but little since the middle of August. One of his divisions threatened Bazardjik, where the Russian hospitals were. The Russians could only send a small company against him, which was utterly annihilated, but no attack was made on the town. A sortie made from Shumla on the 11th of October was equally ineffectual.

On the 16th of October General Roth, with the 6th corps, marched from before Shumla by Jenibazar and Turkarautlar to Koludja, and General Rudsjewitsch with the 3rd corps to Silistria. At first the Russian troops leaving Shumla were but feebly pursued by the Turks, and it was not until the 19th of October and the following days that some sharp encounters took place between the rear-guard and a Turkish division of 8000 men at Aidochda. The Russians themselves owned to the loss of 800 men and the whole of their baggage. On the arrival of these troops at Silistria the Russian besieging corps consisted of two corps-d'armée, in all about 30,000 men. Their intention was to continue the blockade all through the winter, but they were soon forced to relinquish it. Incessant rain had flooded not only the trenches, but the whole country upon which they were to be constructed. Eight degrees of cold set in, and the rain turned to snow, which drifted over the Russian earth-huts and batteries. Fragments of ice floated down the Danube, and broke off all communication with the left bank, and with it the supply of food and ammunition, which were already becoming scarce. Above all, the 3rd corps imperatively needed quieter winter-quarters after the prodigious exertions and losses of the campaign; accordingly, after an ineffectual bombardment, which lasted forty-eight hours, the fruitless siege of Silistria was raised on the 10th of November. Only a very small part of the besieging corps could cross the river in boats. The remainder had to make a painful retreat across the devastated country, along roads so deep and muddy that it often took the strength of a whole battalion to get along one single heavy gun. It can hardly be doubted that under such circumstances a part of the artillery was left behind in the batteries, and that more fell into the hands of the Turks, who hotly pursued their retreating enemy.

The accounts of the operatioins against Silistria are very incomplete, chiefly perhaps because nothing was done. Instead of history the Turks write only inflated bombast, from which it is impossible to gather the truth, and even the superior officers seldom take a large view of events. The Russians, on the other hand, certainly could have no interest in making public their share in this part of the campaign. But if we may form an opinion from the scanty materials extant, and from the event itself, we must look upon the so-called siege of Silistria in 1828 as an ill-planned, feebly executed, and wholly unsuccessful attempt.

Out of the three corps-d'armée with which the Russians had begun the campaign one had been sent into Wallachia, where there was little to be done. The 6th corps was to cross the Danube at Oltenitza (opposite Turtukai). The undertaking was difficult, but easier than that at Satunovo; nevertheless it failed. It might have been foreseen that the 6th corps would not be able to advance into Bulgaria unsupported until the 3rd corps had got at least as far as Trajan's wall. It would therefore undoubtedly have been better to begin by incorporating with the 3rd corps the 10,000 men of the 6th, who were destined to act on the offensive on the farther side of the Danube. However slowly this force might have advanced towards the wall of Trajan, General Roth would then have certainly been able to reach Silistria on the 28th June, four weeks before he actually did so, and at a time when the defence of the place was left entirely to the inhabitants, and before the brave defenders of Brailow had arrived there. Such a weak fortress as Silistria, defended by a small garrison, might very probably have been taken at the first onset by 10,000 Russians with 50 guns, and its capture would have been of the highest importance. In the year 1809 this fortress, though feebly attacked, had not been able to hold out more than five days.

Brailow had fallen on the 18th June, and from that time the battering train, consisting of 100 guns, was disposable. The fate of this train is, however, involved in mystery—subsequently it was absent everywhere. It appears that single guns were taken from it to Varna, Silistria, and even to Shumla; but they did not arrive at Varna until months after they were wanted, or at Silistria until the besiegers would have been almost glad to be rid of them again. Now the distance from Brailow to Silistria is about 95 miles; Wallachia afforded plenty of means of transport, horses, carts, and draught oxen; there were practicable roads on either side of the river, or the transport might take place by water, as the Russian flotilla was so superior to that of the Turks both in number and efficiency that no serious resistance could be apprehended. Supposing fourteen days had been spent in repairs and preparations, and as many more in the transit of 95 miles, the artillery would still have arrived at Silistria at the same time as General Roth's division. It is therefore perfectly unintelligible why the besiegers were left without the most needful siege artillery.

It mattered not whether the operations of the main corps were directed against Varna or against Shumla; in either case Silistria lay in their rear. Nothing but the possession of this place could afford a base tolerably secure, though not more than 65 miles in breadth, and would set free 10,000 men who would be of the greatest use at other places, the Russian army being so reduced in numbers: this should have been a sufficient motive for proceeding with the utmost energy.

The insufficiency of the means of attack was not peculiar to Silistria, but occurred in a still greater degree before Varna, the siege of which presented much greater difficulties owing to its more favourable position and the greater strength of its fortifications. There. too, the garrison were stronger than the besiegers, and yet the attack was carried on with such vigour that even before the arrival of the guard the latter had approached 50 paces nearer to the place, of which the scarp was already much injured.

The investment of Silistria was far more easy than that of Varna, and yet it remained incomplete. The flotilla on the Danube contained 16 vessels, each of them armed with 3 heavy guns. These 48 guns might, if necessary, have been placed in batteries, like the ships' cannon at Varna, as the remaining 16 vessels with 1 gun each were quite strong enough to cope with the Turkish flotilla. In two whole months, however, the besiegers did not approach nearer to the place than 1500 paces with cannon and 700 with trenches for skirmishers. After the arrival of the 3rd corps in the middle of October the number of field-guns before Silistria must have exceeded 100; to these were added 64 pieces belonging to the flotilla, and by all accounts 120 battering guns, so that altogether 300 pieces of artillery were assembled before the place. To be sure, they could be of no use, but merely an incumbrance, unless care was taken to supply ammunition at the same time.

It is possible that more accurate information might explain and justify much that seems like want of vigour, a fault of which we do not find the Russians guilty on any other occasion during this campaign.

CHAPTER XI.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN WALLACHIA.

IT now only remains for us to revert to the events which took place in Wallachia after General Roth, with two divisions of his corps, was summoned in the beginning of July to assist in the operations on the right bank of the Danube, and General Geismar remained behind on the left bank with 16 squadrons and 12 battalions, besides 2 regiments of Cossacks, making up altogether 10,000 men.

To General Geismar was intrusted the difficult task of not only holding in check a wide tract of country, and keeping its nearly exhausted resources at the command of Russia, but also of guarding the long frontier line of 150 miles from Rustchuk to Widdin, upon which were the towns of Nicopolis and Rahova, with Turkish garrisons. Giurgevo and the fortified village of Kalafat were têtes-du-pont by means of which the strong garrisons of Rustchuk and Widdin could invade the unprotected country on the left side of the Danube at any moment.

We have already mentioned that the sorties from Giurgevo on the 2nd June and 3rd July were repulsed. After that the garrison at Rustchuk remained quiet; on the other hand, the Pasha of Widdin, who had a considerable force under his command, now bestirred himself. Not that the troops deserved the name of an army, but, counting his regular battalions, the Pasha could collect about 10,000 to 15,000 Osmanlis for a marauding expedition; and though the Russians did not much fear these troops of horsemen in the open field, it was very difficult to keep them from harassing the country.

General Geismar had advanced to Golenz close to Kalafat, so as to keep a watch on the enemy's movements. There he was attacked on the 18th August by superior numbers, and forced to retreat 25 miles to the fortified camp of Tchoroya, half way to Krajova. When attacked there too, the Russian general maintained his position behind his redoubts, but could not prevent the Turks from plundering Lesser Wallachia. All the provisions and forage collected in Golenz, 30,000 pounds of biscuits and above 1000 quarters of corn, besides immense stores of materials for building bridges, fell into the hands of the Turks, who likewise drove away numerous herds of oxen, and plundered and burned the whole district. The Pasha then returned to Widdin, but made another sortie on the 27th August, and drove General Geismar back to Krajova. This time the predatory hordes extended their incursions 100 miles, through the whole northern district of Lesser Wallachia. All the provisions they could find the Turks either carried away or destroyed without let or hindrance. General Geismar, however, collected all his forces together, crossed the Schill in two bodies, and the Turks then retreated, loaded with booty, to their fortified camp at Kalafat, where they remained quiet four weeks.

On the 24th September the Seraskier of Widdin, who had been now made Pasha of Lesser Wallachia, quitted his camp with 26,000 men, chiefly cavalry, and 30 guns, and marched on the 26th to the village of Bojeleschti, on the right flank of the Russian corps entrenched at Tchoroya, which did not consist of more than 4500 men with 14 guns: 1 battalion and 2 squadrons remained behind at the bridge over the Schill.

General Geismar felt the danger that threatened the Russian communications, and saw clearly not only that he could not maintain the position of Tchoroya against such overwhelming masses, but also that something extraordinary must be done at once in order to defeat the object of the Turks and to save the country as well as the Russian army from great mischief. He therefore determined to disregard the numerical superiority of the Turks, and to attack them at once. He was not restrained by the circumstance that the ground offered him no advantage, for he trusted to the bravery and discipline of his men and to the surprise which so bold an attack would cause the Turks. He also counted on the fatigue of the latter, of whom one portion had only just entered Widdin, and all were only just off a difficult march. The Russian infantry consisted of 16 companies of the Koliwar regiment, the Tomski line regiment, and the 34th regiment of chasseurs. The cavalry, consisted of the whole regiment of Kargopol and 3 squadrons of the new Russian dragoons and the Cossack regiment Solitrow. The distance from Tchoroya to Bojeleschti was about 5 miles, and the ground formed a large plateau, with an almost imperceptible slope towards the latter village, broken here and there by slight elevations, affording an uninterrupted view over the surrounding country. The march of the Russians could not be concealed from the Turks, and, besides determination and courage, it required an accurate knowledge and due appreciation of the Turkish and of the Russian troops to venture upon such an attack. General Geismar led his small force in the following order against the Pasha.

Two squares formed the head, each square consisting of 2 companies of the Tomski line regiment and the 34th chasseurs (A B). The two squares had two 12-pounders between them. (Plan No. 6.)

Right and left from these, en échelon, the above-mentioned regiments formed on each flank two other squares (C D). Six light field-pieces were equally distributed between the two divisions. These were followed by the Kargopol dragoon regiment; in divisions behind the intervals of the squares on both flanks (F); the 3 squadrons of the new Russian dragoon regiment (G), with 4 guns of the horse-artillery, were placed in the middle behind the vacant space of the head, and before that of the reserve. The latter, consisting of some grenadier companies, likewise formed 2 squares, between which were two light field-pieces (E).

The Cossack regiment Solotirow was divided, so as to cover the flanks on both wings (H). At about two o'clock in the afternoon the Russian corps appeared in this order opposite the Turks, who were posted advantageously on a height near Bojeleschti, and commenced a cannonade from their 12-pounders, to which the Turks replied from their batteries, without, however, stopping the Russian advance.

Almost at the same time a very large body of Turkish horse showed itself on the right wing of the Russians, as the latter were manœuvring in order to threaten the Turkish communications with Widdin; and although the Turks suffered severely from the Russian fire, they did not seem to pay much attention to it. A Russian dragoon regiment and some Cossacks attacked the Turks in divisions with such order and determination that after a short resistance the latter retired upon Bojeleschti.

Meanwhile the Russian infantry had continued their advance, and one portion of their guns was so placed on the hill, K, as to pour a heavy fire into the Turkish position. But the Turkish cavalry that had been driven back on the right wing, retreated under cover of the hedges and the houses of Bojeleschti; made a rapid circuit behind the Russian infantry; and suddenly appeared in increased numbers on the Russian left wing. One portion attacked the Cossacks, who were scarce able to resist the assault; another, some 5000 strong, advanced on the road to Tchoroya, where the Russians had their hospitals, their store of provisions, and their array of baggage-waggons.

The Russian general saw his danger. He ordered Count Tolstoy with 2 squadrons of his regiment to attack them, and that officer charged with such impetuosity as to drive the Turks back in great disorder. Meanwhile the 3rd squadron of the new Russian dragoons, supported by the reserve of the grenadiers, completed the defeat of the Turks, who retreated, not without loss, into their entrenchments.

During this encounter the Turkish infantry remained quietly in their position, which the Russians had approached by careful manœuvres to within a distance of 1300 or 1400 paces (K). It was now night, and the Turks showed no wish to continue the engagement. General Geismar, although he had not only kept his ground, but had also beaten back the Turkish assault, could not feel himself secure. He considered that, in such close proximity to the superior force of the Turks, retreat was at least as dangerous as attack, and that something decisive must be done. He therefore determined, favoured by the excessive darkness of the night and the carelessness of the Turks, to attack their camp. With this intent he formed all his infantry into 8 columns of attack, each column to consist of 2 companies; 6 columns were appointed for the assault, and 2 were to act as a reserve.

Four columns advanced straight upon the Turkish position. The 3rd division, likewise composed of two columns, attacked the left wing of the Turks. The 4th, of the same strength as the reserve, followed at a short distance, directing their march more against the right wing of the Turks. The whole of the artillery and cavalry remained in their position.

The Russians approached the Turkish encampment in the most profound silence, and came with no impediment upon the cavalry, who lay in front of the infantry. The cavalry, alarmed at the report of musketry, and in the greatest disorder, thought only of getting on their horses, and fled on the road to Widdin. The Vizier himself mounted a mule; his Seraskier, the Kiaja Bey, escaped on foot followed by the highest officers. Many of the cavalry fell beneath the bayonets of the Russians; nearly one-third of the horses were killed or left behind: no one thought of offering any resistance. The Russians then fell upon the infantry, who stood unmoved in their position, and, undismayed by the desertion of the cavalry, received the Russians with a steady fire.

Colonel Sawadsky, though wounded on the head, threw himself with the tirailleurs into the ditch, and drove out or killed the Turks who were in it. His small but bold columns followed him. The entrenchment was soon taken, and a gun captured. The Turks threw themselves into the houses in their rear, and made an obstinate defence.

At the same time Colonel Giwlogadow led his columns up to the retrenchment and took it by storm, spite of the sharp fire with which he was received. All who resisted were cut down, and the rest fled into the houses in the rear, where they renewed their defence. Two guns were taken by the Russians.

The General offered quarter to the Turks who were firing from the houses, but they only fired the more. He then ordered the reserve of grenadiers to advance, so as to penetrate to the left into the village, and end the fight. Major Danilowitsch, regardless of the murderous fire with which he was received, advanced at the head of his grenadiers through the hollow way leading to the village, but was killed by a bullet in the head. The next in rank took the command, and continued the attack. The Turks were everywhere beaten, and lost a gun.

Meanwhile Colonel Giwlogadow, who had been sent to the right, had stormed, and, after a strenuous opposition, taken an entrenchment defended by the Turkish regular infantry. One gun and 70 prisoners were taken.

The camp was taken on all sides. In a short time the whole village was in flames, and the Turks only ceased firing when the ruins fell upon them. The survivors made a precipitate retreat towards the fields, but were cut down or made prisoners by the Cossacks.

It was two o'clock in the morning when General Geismar gathered together his bold soldiers, and the trophies they had won, upon the smoking ruins of Bojeleschti. Besides the guns taken in the entrenchment, the Cossacks brought in 2 more. They had taken 7 guns altogether, and as many ammunition-waggons. In Bojeleschti alone 1000 men were killed, among whom was one of the five Pashas who accompanied the expedition. Only 507 prisoners were brought in. Arms for more than 10,000 men lay upon the field of battle. The whole camp — 24 waggons laden with military stores and 400 with provisions, 24 standards, two of which belonged to the regular infantry, and the Vizier's correspondence —fell into the hands of the Russians. Among the letters was one from the Sultan expressly ordering the Vizier to destroy General Geismar's corps. The Vizier, who had pompously exhibited this letter on his march from Widdin, now returned thither a fugitive and covered with ignominy. The impression which this event produced upon the Turks was so great that they murdered many of their officers who wanted to prevent them from crossing the Danube near Kalafat. The Turks themselves reckoned their loss at 3000 men.

The Russians also had lost a great many men in comparison with the number engaged, but few considering the victory they had obtained; their loss cannot be ascertained with certainty. After this battle Wallachia remained free from the incursions of the Turks: on the 25th of October the Turks, without being attacked, suddenly evacuated their important fortified position at Kalafat, which was immediately occupied by the Russians, and works thrown up in the direction of Widdin.

During the winter the tête-du-pont at Nicopolis was likewise taken. Tschapan-oglu (the Son of the Tiger), sprung from one of the noblest Asiatic families, had gone there with 12,000 horsemen. He sent Count Langeron a pouch of tobacco with a letter in which he announced his intention of driving the Russians out of the Principalities. Count Langeron replied by storming Kaleh. That place had been lately fortified with towers and a moat; but the water in the moat was frozen, and the town was taken in less than an hour on the 25th of January. 32 guns and 5 standards were taken, 250 Turks killed, and 350 taken prisoners. The commander of the place, Ibrahim Pasha, and 60 officers were likewise made prisoners.

General Malinofski immediately ordered an attack to be made on the neighbouring town of Turno. The suburb was taken, and the armed inhabitants cut down, but the citadel resisted. The Russians lost on that day 6 officers and 330 men.

On the 11th of February the citadel capitulated. The garrison of 1500 men were allowed free exit with their baggage, but left 51 guns and 3 standards in the hands of the Russians.

On the 18th of the same month a detachment of volunteers from the 9th regiment of chasseurs made an excursion over the Danube, and surprised the Turkish flotilla not far from Nicopolis. The Russians destroyed 29 vessels, stormed a Turkish fort, and threw the guns into the Danube: they lost only two men.

These occurrences, which more properly belong to the next campaign, are mentioned here only for the purpose of keeping the narrative connected.

The task intrusted to General Geismar was a thankless one, inasmuch as the greatest success could lead to no important victory, nor could it influence the issue of the campaign. Considering, however, the small means at his disposal, General Geismar accomplished the difficult mission intrusted to him with equal courage and prudence.

CHAPTER XII.

END OF THE CAMPAIGN.

THE fall of Varna gave the whole eastern portion of Bulgaria into the power of the Russians. Had the Turkish commanders been able to hold that important fortress, the Russians must have retreated across the Danube; but they could now venture to place some of their troops in winter quarters on the right bank of the river. The 6th and 7th corps, under the command of General Roth, were concentrated near Varna, and held Pravadi, Gebedje, Kosludja, Devna, and Bazardjik. The fortifications of Varna were repaired as well as was possible in the time. The guards went into Bessarabia; the 2nd and 3rd corps wintered for the most part in Moldavia and Wallachia. The head-quarters of General Wittgenstein were at Jassy. This position, with the left wing resting on the sea at Varna, and the right wing at Krajova and on the Schill, extended 250 miles: the Danube divided the Russian army into two parts. Silistria lay like the point of a wedge inserted into the Russian winter quarters, and the strong garrison of Rustchuk kept a footing on the Wallachian side of the Danube at Giurgevo. This state of things was not without its inconvenience, and even danger, to the Russians. But they reckoned on the want of enterprise which the Turks had shown during the whole summer, upon their ignorance of military science, and their dislike to a winter campaign. Isset Mahommed Pasha, who had been named Grand Vizier, had pledged himself to retake Varna during the course of the winter. After he had taken the command at Shumla, he actually did advance with some thousand men, on the 20th of November, as far as Pravadi; but after staying there four days, without doing anything of importance, he retired to Aidos and Shumla. Halil Pasha's expedition against General Roth's communications in January was equally abortive. On the 20th of January, Halil Pasha, with a strong division of cavalry, fell in with a post of Cossacks near Kosludja, and occupied the place. An attempt to carry Bazardjik by a coup-de-main, failed. General Ragofsky quickly got together two regiments of chasseurs, some Cossacks, and four guns, with which he retook Kosludja, strengthened Pravadi, and drove back the Turks with loss.

The Asiatic irregular troops could not be restrained from going home during the severe weather; they said they had left their winter stockings behind. In short, the Turks did just what was expected of them—namely, nothing; so that the Russians remained undisturbed during the whole winter in their extended line of quarters.

CHAPTER XIII.

CONCLUSION.

LET us briefly recapitulate the chief events of this campaign.

The Turkish declaration of war had appeared before the end of the year 1827; and yet the Russian operations, up to the end of May, 1828, had been limited to taking possession of the Danubian Principalities, a preliminary measure, in the execution of which no opposition was to be expected.

The real military operations began with the crossing of the Danube at Satunovo, on the 8th of June, so that from that time the Russians could only reckon on five months during which the weather would allow them to keep the field.

In the event of everything turning out favourably, the march to Constantinople must have been the end at first contemplated for the campaign. But the distance from the Lower Danube to Constantinople must be above 480 miles; and even under the most auspicious circumstances, that period of time would barely suffice for marching across so large an extent of country, and overcoming the difficulties by the way. The campaign for which every preparation had been made for the last seven years was therefore opened too late; the more so as the months of May and June are the most favourable months for marching across the arid and desolate steppes of the Dobrudscha, and towards the Balkan. We have already stated how unprepared the Russians might have taken the Turks in the course of the spring. This delay in offensive operations on the part of the Russians arose from political reasons.

But the smallness of the force which the greatest military power in Europe brought into the field, compared with the object it had in view, had far more to do with the turn which the campaign took than the delay. If the Russian government was guided by the recollection of the days when Munnich, Romanzoff, and Suwarrow, with 17,000 Russians, beat 160,000 Mussulmans, it should have been borne in mind that in the campaign of 1828-9 the Russians had not to fight the Turks in the endless steppes of Bessarabia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, but in the forests of the Balkan. On the former, European tactics have great advantage over undisciplined hordes, but in the forests of the Balkan the Turkish spahi, with his long rifle, mounted on his quick horse, and supported by swarms of skirmishers on foot, is by no means a despicable foe. Moreover experience of all former wars should have taught the Russians to expect an obstinate resistance from the Moslem behind stone walls.

It has been maintained that the Russian army was so weak for this reason—that, if the Russians had brought into the field a larger and more costly army, they must, at the conclusion of peace, have demanded from the Porte a larger compensation for war expenses. But we must observe that the first object was to gain the victory; and with so weak a force as the Russians had, it was quite possible to be in no condition to exact any compensation whatever from the Turks.

So early as when the Pruth was first crossed, and during the siege of Brailow, the second corps was summoned to reinforce the army; that is to say, before the operations of war had anywhere taken a threatening turn, and the army had as yet suffered no great loss. But what was perceived in May, when no change had taken place in the posture of affairs, ought to have been foreseen previously. The consequence of the delay was, that the reinforcements arrived when the campaign was ended.

Considering the great weakness of the army of operation, it would have been far better not to have occupied the Principalities at first, but to have left that to the subsequent corps. For the first operations the resources of Wallachia were not needed, as everything could be obtained from Bessarabia, or by sea. The occupation of the Principalities excited the jealousy of Europe, roused the Turks, and absorbed 20,000 men; about one-third of the Russian army. Subsequently a portion of these detachments was sent for to head-quarters. In no case could it be right to cross the Pruth sooner than the Danube.

It appears that the Russians expected to meet with far less opposition at Brailow than they really encountered. It is impossible now to say whether the place could have been taken by storm without a regular siege. The reconnoitring parties asserted that it was possible to approach it along the Danube without being exposed to the fire from the guns, that it was open in the gorge, and that the edge of the valley, which was not rocky, was assailable in several places. The storming of the 15th of June, on a breach that had not been reconnoitred, in the face of a garrison fully prepared, was at least equally hazardous. It would, however, be necessary to know whether the height of the water would have allowed of any approach by the valley; at any rate the Russians could not have reckoned with certainty upon the success of the enterprise.

It is only upon the supposition of meeting with little resistance at Brailow that we can account for the original division of the Russian forces. Had they succeeded in taking Brailow without much trouble, the 7th corps would have gone along the right bank of the Danube, with the battering train, to Silistria, thus securing the right flank of the 3rd, and opening the road by Turtukai for the 6th corps to march upon Shumla, whose garrison the latter corps would watch, while the main army invested Varna.

But Brailow did not fall so soon; the 3rd corps could not advance unsupported, and the 6th could not cross the Danube. Hence the slow advance of the 3rd corps, and the necessity of bringing one-half of the 6th corps all the way round by Hirsova to join it. The result was that five weeks elapsed after the passage of the Danube, and ten after the tardy opening of the campaign—nearly one-half of the time during which operations could be carried on—before the main corps of the Russians penetrated to within 20 miles of this side of the Balkan.

Moreover the main corps only amounted to 30,000 fighting men, and the Russians only made up this number by contenting themselves with an incomplete investment of Silistria and Giurgevo, leaving Rustchuk altogether unobserved. With such insufficient means, it was matter of doubt what to undertake first.

The march of the Russian army against Shumla at first sight looks like a bold attempt to crush the resistance of the Turks in its very centre. We have already stated our opinion that this attempt on Shumla was so great a strategical error that it necessarily entailed the failure of the campaign. Six weeks earlier, when Shumla was almost destitute of defenders, a coup-de-main against that important point might have been justified. But when the Russians formally sat down before it, they did all that the Turks could wish—they gave up the initiative and fought the

Turks exactly where they most excelled, behind walls and entrenchments.

But the Russian army seemed irresistibly attracted towards the stronger army of the Turks, and took up in face of it a covering position, which would have been right enough had there been anything to cover, and supposing that the Russians had not been deficient in men, in battering-trains, in short in everything for the investment of Varna. Under such circumstances mere defensive operations before Shumla could lead to no conceivable result; but the moment they commenced offensive operations, the Russians exposed themselves to imminent danger, with but small hope of success.

Forty thousand Turks, amply provided with everything they wanted, were posted in a central and almost unassailable position: opposite to them lay the Russian corps little more than half that number, on the circumference of a circle 20 miles long, which the Turks could cut through at every point by short and covered marches. The Seraskier could everywhere attack them with superior forces, and a concentration of the Russian forces on any threatened point was impossible, not only from the distance, but because in defending one point some other part of the lines of investment would be left bare of men. The whole Russian army was stretched out in a cordon before Shumla; there was no reserve, and, had there been one, place it where you would it must always have arrived too late, as on such ground it was impossible to discriminate beforehand between a real and a false attack.

But putting aside the immediate danger that threatened them, the Russians were in an awkward predicament. They were without light cavalry, one may almost say without any cavalry at all, in the face of a swarm of Turkish horsemen, while they might easily have drawn from the numerous hordes of Cossacks under the Russian sway an analogous body of horsemen invaluable for the protection of the army and for collecting provisions. They had not a single point within 100 miles in the rear whither they could transport their sick and wounded; nor had they any retreat open to them in case the strong garrisons of Rustchuk, Silistria, and Varna should break through the few troops that invested them, and bring together 30,000 in the rear of the Russians.

The Russian General must have seen the critical situation in which he was placed. But after the Russians had placed themselves in a false position by directing the whole offensive force of their army against Shumla, their only resource was to continue in the wrong course upon which they had entered. The Russians reckoned upon the moral superiority of their own troops and the inefficiency of the Turkish commanders. It is true that Hussein Pasha lay for four weeks from the end of July perfectly quiet, surveying from his cool, woody quarters the Russians, who, on the burnt-up plain, and amid untold privations and exertions, endeavoured in vain to cut off the sources of his abundance and his security. Inconvenienced by the non-arrival of some convoy, and possibly feeling that he ought to do something, he at length, on the 26th August, attacked both wings of the Russian position, and did them much mischief at Strandscha and Marasch. It was only the strenuous resistance offered by Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg that prevented the complete destruction of General Rudiger's and Durnowo's divisions, which were completely cut off from all support and communication.

This début of the old destroyer of the Janissaries showed not only the danger in which the Russians were placed, but also that their opponents were now aware of it. Count Wittgenstein unwillingly gave up one position after another, one fort after another, in the rear of the Turks, and collected his troops in front of the Turkish encampment. But that Hussein Pasha, as soon as he had secured a free passage for his supplies, should make no further attempt to drive back the weakened and extended investing Russian corps, was more than the Russians had any right to expect.

During the month of August the whole Russian army was separated into three distinct besieging corps—before Shumla, Silistria, and Varna; the sieges, however, proved incomplete on every point, and there was no reserve anywhere.

We have already observed that the Russians, even had they taken Shumla, would have gained but little. They would have deprived their opponents of a good position, but have gained none themselves. The local difficulty of the passage of the Balkan was not at Shumla, but beyond the Kamtchik, and it would be impossible for a weak army to cross that river unless not only Shumla but Silistria and Varna also were taken.

We have no intelligence respecting the proceedings of the Russians before Silistria. Silistria is the worst of all Turkish fortresses, and in the previous campaign had only held out five days. The Danube, since the capture of Brailow, had been opened to the Russian flotilla, and the resources of Wallachia were placed at the disposal of the Russians. The materials for a siege ought not therefore to have been wanting, and, in fact, the little that was taken there was more, in comparison, than was provided for the siege of other places. Without Silistria the operations of the Russians against Bulgaria would have no other basis than the sea. This might do so long as the Turks remained perfectly passive; but the case would be far otherwise were the Seraskier to advance from Shumla against Bazardjik.

Spite of the weakness of Silistria, and spite of its importance, the place was not taken. The complete investment of Varna only began when that of Shumla ceased, namely, with the arrival of the guards on the 9th September.

We have seen the difficulties and the obstinate resistance that the Russians had to encounter before Varna. Considering the utter inadequacy of the means employed, it is doubtful which was most admirable, the persevering energy of the attack, or the steady courage of the defence.

Let us examine the position of the Russians at the beginning of October. Since the passage of the Danube at Brailow they had nowhere obtained any important success over the foe they so much despised. At Bazardjik, Kosludja, and before Varna, during the month of July, they had had the worst in the open field against the newly-raised Turkish squadrons; at Jenibazar they had gained no advantage; and in surprises and fights before Shumla they had lost many men and even guns. Putting aside these small actions, all their greater enterprises had failed, and the crescent glittered on the minarets of Silistria and Varna, as well as over the lines at Shumla. The troops had suffered enormously, and the cavalry was almost destroyed. Moreover, the time for operations was over, and, if Varna held out, the Russians would be compelled to retire across the Danube—a retreat that might be fatal to the army.

Such was the state of things before the Turkish main army appeared in the field, and when the Russians only had to deal with the garrisons of four of the larger fortresses. We have already said that the Sultan, either afraid of a hostile landing near Constantinople, or the excitment prevailing among the population in that city, had kept the greater part of his troops there. It was not till towards the end of May that Hussein Pasha advanced from Constantinople to Shumla, or till the beginning of August that Isset Mohammed Pasha went to Varna. The Grand Vizier himself, however, delayed his march to Adrianople until the beginning of August, and it was only after all the Russian troops had been worn out that he appeared upon the scene of action with an entirely fresh army. His Commander-in-Chief, Omar Vrione, destroyed a Russian division at Hassanlar, and made a successful defence of his camp at Kurt-tepe.

With this the relief of Varna and the issue of the campaign appeared certain. The whole strategy of the Turks had hitherto consisted in passive resistance; by this system, and favoured by natural advantages of the ground, they had succeeded in driving their foe to the brink of destruction. It required only one last effort to hurl him over, but they were incapable of it.

Neither was it in the least owing to the combinations of Russian strategy that matters had come to a tolerable issue. The preparations were insufficient, the campaign begun too late, and the direction of the main army not likely to ensure a successful result.

But all these faults were atoned for by the innate excellence of the Russian troops. The self-sacrificing obedience of the commanders, the steadiness of the common soldiers, their power of endurance and unshaken bravery in time of danger, were the qualities that enabled them to avert the dangers of their position before Shumla, and to hold the Seraskier in check; to make up for all deficiencies and overcome all resistance at Varna; and to strike such terror into Omar Vrione that even after defeating the Russians he remained ten days in his camp, as it were thunderstruck, doing nothing, while Varna, the bulwark of the kingdom, fell before his eyes. We cannot say much for the skill of the Turkish commanders, but the conduct of the Turks, from the highest officer to the last soldier, at the storming of Brailow, their courage at Kurt-tepe, their steadiness in the mines and trenches before Varna, are far above all praise.

The fall of Varna was most fortunate for the Russians. It decided the campaign. Had Shumla fallen into their hands, instead of Varna, on the 11th of October—and it was against the former place that all their efforts had been directed—they might indeed have destroyed all the weak works of that position, but, with Varna and Silistria in their rear and cut off from the sea, it would have been impossible for them to take up their winter-quarters in Bulgaria. The strategical importance of Shumla is equally great to the Turks with or without earthworks, and the Russians would have had to take the position again in the next campaign.

If we consider the enormous sacrifices that the war cost the Russians in the year 1828, it is difficult to say whether they or the Turks won or lost it. It remained for a second campaign to decide the value of the first.

PART II.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1829.

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INTRODUCTION.

Although the campaign of the previous year ended with the fall of Varna, and although a portion of the Russian army wintered in Bulgaria on Turkish soil, yet Sultan Mahmud might well look upon the campaign as not altogether lost. Considering the unexampled embarrassments of his country, it was almost a triumph that he was not completely crushed, when fighting single-handed against so powerful an opponent as Russia.

The successes of the Russians had been obtained by long exertions and great sacrifices. Brailow, Shumla, and Varna had offered far greater resistance than had been expected, and that important place, Silistria, had withstood a four months' investment. But that which afforded most satisfaction to the Turks was, that newly-raised levies of the Pasha dared to encounter the veteran troops of the Emperor in the open field, and that even on particular occasions they had obtained over the Russians advantages which might almost be looked upon as positive victories.

The loss in stores and men was incontestably no greater on the side of the Turks than on that of the Russians, and was more easily replaced by the former, who were at home, than by the latter, who had to be supplied from the distant provinces of the empire. Oriental armies, too, are never really destroyed, but only dispersed, and can be reassembled in the course of the following campaign. The arms and accoutrements of the irregular troops—which constitute the greater portion of the force—belong to those who bear them, and are considered by them as most valuable property. Although the state contributes nothing towards the expense, the Spahi never appears without his horse, his lance, sword, and pistols. The Turkish cavalry had suffered but little; the Russian, on the contrary, was nearly annihilated. The Turks had only lost a few field-pieces, as in no case had one of the large divisions of their army been beaten. The garrisons of Brailow and of the strong places in the Dobrudscha had been allowed free exit to Silistria, Shumla, and Varna; the garrison of Varna was the only one that after a brave and obstinate defence had surrendered as prisoners of war to the Russians.

The condition of Constantinople in the spring of 1829 appeared one of profound peace, and the state of feeling was on the whole good. The people exulted over long processions of Russian prisoners of war, who were purposely paraded through the streets of Constantinople. The prisoners were well treated, and lodged for the most part in the Island of Princes. Even the unexpected sight of a Russian brig of war, which had been captured by the Turkish navy, and brought triumphantly into the Bosphorus, still farther flattered the national pride. The Balkan still passed with the Turks for an impregnable line of defence, which never had been and never could be crossed by an army of unbelievers; Shumla as the victorious bulwark against which all hostile efforts had again expended themselves in vain. Lastly, the delay in the opening of the campaign was considered at Constantinople as a proof of the complete exhaustion of Russia: it was not till June that the first news from the seat of war reached Constantinople—news, moreover, which sounded favourably for the cause of Islam. The Sultan could not believe that the rest of Europe would stand quietly by and see him utterly crushed. It was but lately that the ambassadors of England and France, who were staying at Corfu, had refused, as derogatory to the dignity of their respective governments, to return to Constantinople, until the Sultan signed the treaty of the 6th of July, 1827. Sultan Mahmud still obstinately refused this. Nevertheless, on the 18th of June, Sir Robert Gordon and Count Guilleminot, whose services to Turkey were recognised even by Moslems, had a solemn audience of the Sultan at Bujukdereh. The people greeted their appearance with joy, and flattered themselves that the frigate Blonde, which had been suffered to pass the Dardanelles with her cannons masked, was the forerunner of an English fleet which would free the Black Sea from the dominion of the Russians.

Nevertheless, the diplomatic relations were unchanged, and the only way to obtain the assistance of England was the acceptance, by the Porte, of the treaty of London. But this was the sore point—the one that touched Sultan Mahmud's personal pride to the quick. Every concession made to the Greeks in the Morea would have led to similar demands on the part of the other "rayahs" in Macedonia, Rumelia, and Bulgaria. It is remarkable enough that Sultan Mahmud, who, as he subsequently showed, had greater sympathy for his Christian subjects than probably any one of his predecessors, was driven by the insurrection of the Greeks to appear as their bitterest oppressor and persecutor. But had the Sultan actually signed the treaty which sanctioned the insurrection of his Christian subjects, it is matter of doubt whether England was then in a position to deprive the Russians of the advantages which she had won for them against her will over the Turks at Navarino. Undoubtedly the advance of a Russian army upon Varna without holding Silistria, or upon Adrianople without Shumla, was only possible whilst Russia held the undisputed command of the Black Sea. To restore this to the Turks would have been of the utmost importance; but the Russian fleet in the Euxine in the year 1829 consisted of 11 ships of the line, 2 of which were three-deckers; 8 frigates, 2 of which had 60 guns; and 12 corvettes and brigs of war: the squadron carried altogether 1800 guns, and had Sebastopol to fall back upon. Admiral Heyden's Russian squadron in the Mediterranean, which blockaded the Dardanelles, consisted of 8 ships of the line, 7 frigates, and about 20 smaller vessels, carrying altogether 1500 guns. All that the Turks had to oppose to this fleet were 8 ships of the line, 3 of which were three-deckers, 2 frigates, 5 corvettes, and 3 brigs—altogether about 1000 guns—for the much-wished-for Egyptian fleet never came. Had Admiral Malcolm's squadron entered the Dardanelles in order to join the Turkish fleet, it does not follow as a matter of course—spite of the acknowledged superiority of the British navy—that the Russians must have retreated to Sebastopol; to say nothing of the effect such a step on the part of England would have had upon the peace of Europe.

France was preparing for her Algerian expedition, and General Schneider's brigade was then in the Morea for the protection of the Greeks. She could scarcely change suddenly from this hostile attitude to a friendly one. Moreover, public feeling in France was so excited by the ordonnances of the 8th of August, 1829, that the government would avoid taking any step likely to lead to an European war.

In Vienna the Austrians had gone from excessive fear to excessive hope. From the small success of the first campaign, they had concluded that a second would completely exhaust the resources of the Czar, and they flattered themselves that Austria would be called upon to assume the part of mediator. It appears that the Porte was even advised by Austria to continue the war, although no promise of assistance was held out.

Nothing at that time did so much to preserve general peace as the attitude of Prussia. The court of Berlin was anxious for the termination of a war which might at any moment plunge Europe into confusion; but at the same time it desired that the terms should be honourable for Russia, with which power Prussia was intimately connected by the ties of policy and relationship.

Thus it was that in the year 1829 also the political conjuncture was such that Russia and Turkey were again left to fight out their quarrel single-handed.

For the reasons we have before stated, Sultan Mahmud was little inclined to give way, but made every preparation for a vigorous resistance. He made a general change in the commanders of his troops. The passive system adopted by Hussein Pasha, which had borne such good fruit in July and August of the former year, had not been considered sufficiently effective in September and October. The Sultan, however, appreciated the former services of his aged commander, and his power over the troops. He therefore gave him the command over the forces assembled in the camp at Aidos. Omar Vrione disappeared altogether from the scene of action, and the next year found him in open revolt against the Porte. Jussuf Pasha—strange to relate—had gone over to the Unbelievers. He sprang from one of the few aristocratic families in Turkey. As Dereh-Bey, or Prince of the Valley, he was an object of suspicion to the Sultan, who strove to destroy every hereditary power but his own. It was determined in the Divan to confiscate the extensive property belonging to him in the neighbourhood of Aidos, while Jussuf Pasha was still arresting the progress of the Russians at Varna. How far the then Capitan Pasha was a stranger to these intrigues; how far he was in earnest in his refusal to be a party to the capitulation which, with his handful of men, he could not prevent; why he did not cut his way out of Varna and join Omar Vrione—are questions that must remain unanswered. At any rate the Capitan Pasha reaped all the advantages, and was shortly afterwards made Grand Vizier. Isset Mohammed had promised to retake Varna during the course of the winter, but we have seen how little he was able to carry out his scheme. By his promotion as Rumeli Valessi at Rodosto, he disappeared from the scene of action, and his subsequent conduct in the campaign of 1839 justifies the conjecture that the honour of the defence of Varna belongs mainly to Jussuf Pasha, although he tarnished it by the final capitulation.

Reschid Mohammed Pasha, who was then in Epirus, was named to the command of the army. He had solved the difficult problem of keeping the Arnauts in obedience to the Porte, and was known for his firmness, rigour, justice, and personal courage.

The new Vizier went to Constantinople to receive his instructions, and thence to Shumla on the 21st of March, accompanied only by a small staff. In Shumla he found not more than 10,000 men. One portion of the corps which Hussein Pasha had collected there had been sent to Silistria, another to Aidos; the larger half, however, had dispersed of its own accord during the winter, and gradually reassembled in the camp near the Balkan.

Thus the spring passed away without any considerable military enterprises, as both the contending powers were occupied in making preparations. In Constantinople the troops were drilled under the personal inspection of the Sultan, and the regular army raised again to 60 battalions and 31 squadrons, or about 50,000 men, most of whom were sent to Shumla. This year again the Porte could only get the most unwarlike, the poorest, and worst class of the Osmanlis to serve in the regular army. It was only those who had scarce reached man's estate that could be induced to subject themselves to compulsory discipline; all the veteran soldiers were excluded as attached to the Janissaries. The recruits mostly came from Asia, and were obtained by violent measures. It cannot be doubted that at Constantinople the spirit of European tactics had made little progress; certain outward forms and details were looked upon as magical charms to insure victory. The foreign "officers of instruction" were not respected as a class; they could teach, but could not command. The command over the troops was never given but to Turks, whose knowledge of military tactics was exceedingly limited. Many of the innovations were absurd: for instance, the cavalry was by no means improved by substituting the long English stirrups for the short Turkish shovel stirrups, especially as the men wore no spurs; or by giving them lances, which only impeded them in the use of the sabre. They learned to ride in masses, but they lost the impetuosity of the wild Turkish charge; and with their endurance of new customs the old fanatical inspiration vanished. What was good in barbarian warfare was lost without gaining much benefit from the resources of civilization; popular prejudices were shaken, but the national spirit was destroyed at the same time, and the only change for the better was that the troops obeyed the orders of their leaders more than before.

We will not attempt to give an account of the whole force that the Turks could bring into the field, as it would rest chiefly upon mere conjecture, but we will mention the strength of the separate divisions as they come before us in action. The Bosniacks refused this year again to furnish their contingent, a great loss to the Turkish army, as they are one of the most warlike of the Mohammedan races. The same occurred with the warlike Arnauts, who held back until the Porte could find the high pay they asked for 30,000 men. No assistance was naturally to be expected from the Servians; indeed it would have required but little persuasion on the part of Russia to induce them and a portion of the Bulgarians to take up arms for her against their Turkish ruler. This course of proceeding, however, was contrary to the principles of the Czar, and might have led further than the Cabinet of St. Petersburg was then inclined to go. The Porte was therefore compelled to draw the greater part of its reinforcements from Asia. It may be assumed that by the beginning of the summer the Sultan had replaced the losses he had sustained in the previous campaign both in men and in the materials of war, and that the Turkish army was much in the same condition as it had been at the beginning of the war.

The assertion that the Emperor of Russia was ready at the commencement of the year 1829 to make peace with the Porte on payment of the expenses of the war is not compatible with the stern and haughty spirit of that monarch, who declared openly that he would not sheath the sword he had once drawn until the honour and the claims of his country had been satisfied. Russia had far greater interests at stake than a few millions of rubles or an extension of territory. The question at issue was the influence that Russia must needs possess in the Bosphorus, and the honour of her arms; for although the Russians had fought with great bravery in the campaign of 1828, they had not been altogether victorious, and the despised Turks had offered a resistance that no one had expected. The enemies of Russia saw with malicious pleasure the failure of her exertions, and the Czar resolved to carry on the war to a successful issue.

The Russian army had lost many men, not so much from war as from the climate, sickness, exhaustion, and privations arising from the crowding together of large masses of men for months together on the same spot. The greatest loss was before Shumla, where nothing was gained in return; thousands of Russians died at Varna after they had taken possession of the fortress and during the winter, owing to the sudden transition from violent exertion to complete inactivity. The severity of the winter of 1828 caused fresh sufferings to the troops, and many a Russian soldier, after coming above 1000 miles southward, fell a victim to intense cold under the 42nd degree of latitude, where but a short time before he had had to bear all the torments of a burning sky. Moreover the plague was making terrible havoc, and the army lost altogether 40,000 men, or, reckoning the guards and the 2nd corps, about one-half of its number. To this loss was added that of a very large portion of the military materials,—for instance, nearly all the horses. All this had to be replaced from the interior of Russia and with great difficulty. Even the food for the army had to be got from a great distance, as Wallachia was utterly exhausted, and south of the Danube most of the villages had been deserted. The seed was not sown, as the tiller of the soil had no hope of reaping the harvest, and, in consequence of the arbitrary measures and oppressions of the Russians, so difficult to avoid during war, many of the Bulgarians who had greeted the Russians as their deliverers were now ready to take up arms against the Czar.

Although in the previous campaign the army had been incontestably too small, in the succeeding one it was not only not reinforced but actually diminished. It is true that the 2nd corps remained with the army; but the guards and the division of mounted chasseurs were withdrawn and took no further part in the war. Fresh recruits had been raised the year before, but only reached the Danube in small bodies in the spring. Besides these additions the army of operation was only strengthened by reserves of the army and by Cossacks from the shores of the Black Sea and the Caucasus.

The Czar had determined not to be present during the campaign of 1829, and intrusted the chief command to Count Diebitsch, his former chief of the general staff. Count Diebitsch reached Jassy on the

24th February, where Count Wittgenstein gave up the command and took leave of the army in a proclamation. Many other changes took place in the command of the troops and the government of the Principalities.

It cannot be denied that Count Diebitsch's position was a far more important and favourable one than that of his predecessor in command. The experience of the former campaign was of great benefit to him and those under his command. No diplomatic body hung upon his heels, impeding his freedom of action; politics could have little influence on his plans, and from his great distance from St. Petersburg he was empowered and forced to act on purely military convictions and according to his own judgment. The present aspect of affairs guided him in his actions, and he had not at some critical moment to wait for his sovereign's sanction to take some step which was useless by the time the sanction arrived. His responsibility was increased, but with it he gained greater freedom of action and unusual authority.

General Diebitsch immediately devoted the greatest attention to the reorganisation of his army. The treatment of the soldier was much improved, the intolerable restraint and the unnatural stiff carriage somewhat abated. Nevertheless much still remained to be done; for instance, skirmishers were always forced to keep step and rank; for this reason they were only of use on level ground. The men's dress and accoutrements were changed for others better suited to the climate; the commissariat, a most important matter for the coming campaign, was put on a different footing; an immense baggage-train was unavoidable over uncultivated or wasted provinces. Long columns were composed of thousands of waggons drawn by oxen, which served a double purpose —for draught and for food. The parties covering these columns were armed and had two guns, so as to be able to defend themselves if necessary; but as these waggons could not be used on the other side of the Balkan, thousands of camels had been bought on the steppes of Asia for the use of the army. This useful, patient, and strong animal, which can carry a heavy burden even through snow and on the smallest amount of food, is especially fitted to follow the movements of an army. Spite, however, of all the measures taken, provisions were scant. Each soldier received one pound of meat and a glass of brandy three times a week, besides 12 biscuits and some oatmeal daily.

The cavalry made a splendid appearance at starting —they were entirely remounted. The front rank of the hussar regiments was provided with lances so as to keep out of the reach of the spahis' sabres, and the number of the Cossacks was much increased. The infantry bore traces of the hardships they had undergone in their bad winter quarters. According to the testimony of an eye-witness the men's faces wore an expression of sadness and pain. After all that they had suffered in the former campaign they looked upon themselves as martyrs to their religion and their emperor. Nowhere in the Russian quarters were to be seen or heard the jokes that never fail among German soldiers when in tolerable plight. Singing was the only expression of joy that was heard, but the songs had the melancholy character peculiar to the Sclavonian race. The soldiers were much given to religious ceremonies and crossed themselves at every meal; in every camp a tent was fitted up as a church, and mass celebrated daily.

The ordre de bataille of the preceding year gives the strength of the Russian army, minus the guards and the mounted chasseurs. The organisation of the corps d'armée, of the divisions and brigades, remained unaltered, but many changes took place among the commanders.

Count Pahlen commanded the 2nd corps d'armée, General Krassowsky the 3rd corps d'armée, General Roth the 6th, and Lieut.-General Rudiger the 7th.

There were besides 22 regiments of Cossacks. The squadrons, and especially the battalions, were weaker in numbers than in the preceding year; the companies, taken one with another, contained 32, the squadrons from 50 to 60 troopers: the Cossack regiments consisted of 200 or 250 men each; many were much weaker.

The cavalry consisted of 2 divisions of hussars, 2 of lancers, and 1 of dragoons—

Altogether about 88 squadrons, or		10,500 men.
Of Cossacks there were about		5,500 ,,
Altogether		16,000 ,,
The infantry consisted of 10 divisions, making up 120 battalions: at most		48,000 ,,
The artillery of 7 horse batteries, or	60 guns	
And 30 foot batteries, or	240 ,,	
Altogether	300 guns	4,000 ,,
Or of actual combatants		68,000 men.

The army, taken altogether, was just as strong as it had been during the previous campaign until the guards and the 2nd corps d'armée joined it: it was, however, somewhat stronger in artillery and light cavalry.

CHAPTER I.

TAKING OF SIZEBOLI IN THE SPRING — NAVAL ENTERPRISES OF THE TURKS.

As the Russian army advanced into the Dobrudscha and Bulgaria during the last campaign, it took possession of the places on the coast of the Black Sea opened its ports to the Russian fleet, and thus prepared for fresh advances on land by securing the supply of provisions by sea. Thus the march to Bazardjik was based upon Kostendje and Mangalia, and the siege of Varna upon Kavarna and Baltjik. Varna afforded a harbour for the fleet and a camp for the army, and was equally important as a defence for winter quarters and as a point of departure for further offensive operations.

As soon, however, as these were to be carried beyond the Balkan, it became necessary to secure a seaport on the further side of the mountains, across which the transport of provisions and military stores presented almost insuperable difficulties. It was of great importance to possess a place of this kind before the army crossed the Balkan, in order that, at the end of so laborious and hazardous an enterprise, the troops might find all that was necessary for their support at the southern foot of the mountains; the various divisions would by this means also be rendered far more independent in their movements than they could be so long as a communication with Varna remained a vital condition with them. Hitherto the fleet had followed the movements of the army, but now it preceded it, and thus indicated the direction it was about to take.

Around the large shallow bay to the southward of Emineh-Dagh (the promontory which forms the eastern termination of the Balkan) are scattered the seaport towns of Missivri, Ahiolo, Burgas, and Sizeboli (*vide* Plans of these towns). Of these places Burgas was the most considerable and the most conveniently placed for supplying a corps operating from Varna upon Rumelia. At the same time Burgas would be easily taken by sea, and might be defended advantageously towards the land. On the other hand, a tolerably strong body of troops would be required for the affair, as the close proximity of the Turkish corps d'armée stationed at Aidos rendered it difficult to make a coup de main upon Burgas, as well as to maintain possession of it.

Missivri and Ahiolo, when once taken, would require very slight means of defence, especially the former. But both lay too far in the rear if the army was to proceed further south. Accordingly Sizeboli was fixed upon, which lay further from the Russian lines of operation than Burgas, but in a very strong position, and possesses by far the best and safest harbour on the whole western coast of the Black Sea. Moreover the Turks would find far greater difficulty in sending assistance from Aidos to Sizeboli than to any of the other places.

On the 15th February the Russian vice-admiral Kumani undertook to make a coup de main upon Sizeboli with a few ships of war and some gunboats, 1 regiment of infantry, and 50 Cossacks. The defence of the place had been intrusted to a detachment of 1000 Albanians, who had recently marched out, leaving only a handful of their number behind. These surrendered after a mere cannonade from the ships' guns; the Russians took possession of the town, and at once erected two works, A and B, with good profiles and provided with blockhouses upon heights to the south of the place which immediately commands it. They subsequently erected a coast battery at D, and a work on the "Small Island" (Kutschuk Ada), upon which magazines and depôts were established. A few gunboats were moored so as to sweep the ground in front of the redoubts on the land side: in this manner the garrison as well as the fleet was completely covered.

The Sultan was extremely indignant that such an attempt should have been made so near Constantinople, and that it should so easily have succeeded. He commanded Hussein Pasha to retake the place, and sent orders to the Capitan Pasha to set sail at once with his whole fleet for the same purpose.

Although Aidos is only three short days' march from Sizeboli, it took Hussein no less than seven weeks to make his appearance before the latter place with a detachment of 4000 infantry and 1500 horse. Meanwhile the Russian entrenchments had been completed and the garrison was doubled. General Wachten was at Sizeboli in command of 3 regiments of infantry, or 3000 men, and 2 field-guns.

Early in the morning of the 9th April Hussein Pasha made a vigorous attack upon the works A and B. Regardless of the case-shot from the 8 ships' guns set up in the works, the Turks rushed into the ditch with fierce yells; a few more daring than the rest climbed the breastwork, and a Tchochodar, or cloak-bearer of the Pasha, was struck down within the redoubt. Upon the first alarm the garrison had hastened out of the town. Two battalions drew up upon the right and two upon the left of work A in order of attack, and the field-pieces were placed in line with them. Meanwhile General Wachten with the 5th battalion fell upon the rear of the storming party and drove them from the work. The Turks soon retreated before the combined fire of the work, the field-guns, and the fleet, which crossed each other upon the narrow neck of land. They were pursued as far as the high ground, and left 250 men dead upon the ground: the Russians lost 100 men.

Bold as the first onslaught of the Moslems had been, their courage was not enduring. No fresh attempt was made upon Sizeboli, and the Russians were left in tranquil possession of their important conquest until the end of the war. An attempt made by the Russians to take Ahiolo failed, but was attended with no great loss.

Nothing could be more unexpected than the appearance of a Turkish fleet in the Black Sea. The captain of the Russian ship Raphael, 45 guns, which was cruising in company with another vessel on the coast of Anatolia, fell in during the night with several ships which he took for his own squadron. He accordingly joined company with them without making any signal. Great was the amazement of the Turks next morning when they found the number of their ships increased by two, and still greater the alarm of the Russian captain, who found himself in the very midst of the enemy's ships. Such was the inexperience of the Turkish sailors that they would have remained in doubt which was the friend and which the foe if the Raphael had but hoisted the red flag; but the captain lost his head, and lowered the blue cross at the first shot from the admiral's vessel. The brig Mercury, on the other hand, which was to leeward, set every stitch of canvas, her gallant commander, Lieutenant Kasarski, nailed his flag to the mast, and the officers swore that the last of them left alive would fire a pistol into the powder-magazine and blow the brig to pieces rather than let her fall into the hands of the Turks. The Mercury succeeded in escaping from the awkward pursuit and ill-directed fire of the Capitan Bey.

The Turkish Admiral had made a prize, he himself knew not how or why. Allah had literally sent it to him in his sleep. It was none the less a subject of pride and exultation. St. Raphael was replaced by a fir cone and the vessel taken to Constantinople in triumph.

On the 5th July the Capitan Pasha once more set sail with the purpose of attacking the Russian squadron at Sizeboli. The Turkish fleet consisted now of 6 ships of the line, 3 frigates, 5 corvettes, and 3 brigs, the Russian prize included: this was nearly the whole naval force of the Porte. After ten days' sail they appeared before Sizeboli, giving chase to a Russian frigate. The Russian squadron lying at anchor there consisted of only 3 ships of the line and 2 frigates, and of course expected to be attacked in the harbour next morning by a force so much superior to their own. But, surprising as had been the arrival of the Ottoman flag, its disappearance was far more astonishing. Without firing a single shot, the Capitan availed himself of a north-east wind to sail back that same night into the Bosphorus, where he cast anchor on the following day.

Admiral Greig now blockaded the Bosphorus, and Admiral Heyden the Dardanelles. They cut off the communication on both sides, made numerous prizes, and harassed the coast. Achmet Papudji (the Shoemaker, so called from his former trade) did not tarnish his laurels by attempting any fresh enterprise, and the Turkish fleet remained quietly in safe anchorage.

If the respective expeditions of Hussein and Achmet, by land and by sea, had only been made at the same moment, which might easily have been done, Sizeboli might have been retaken from the Russians; but singly they both failed.

CHAPTER II.

OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN IN MAY — PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE AND SIEGE OF SILISTRIA.

THIS year again the commencement of the great operations was postponed until the month of May. Unfavourable weather, bad roads, and the height of the water in the Danube, are the causes assigned, but the real reason was that the regiments could not be filled up, or the preparations completed before. The passage of the Danube was to be effected by means of two bridges, one at Hirsova, and the other a little below Silistria, where the main stream might be approached by the road from Kalarasch, through the floods which covered the banks. At the former point a passage was effected in the beginning of May.

The 6th and 7th corps were already on the right bank of the Danube between Varna and Pravadi, where they had been quartered through the winter. They were now joined by 25 battalions of foot, and 5 regiments of horse, belonging partly to the 2nd and partly to the 3rd corps; these advanced by Hirsova.

General Diebitsch, in command of these troops, arrived on the 8th of May at Czernavoda, where the

Karasu lakes empty themselves into the Danube. The remainder of the 2nd and 3rd corps was left in Wallachia awaiting the completion of the bridge at Kalarasch, in order to cross over to the right bank of the Danube.

General Diebitsch had to open his campaign with a siege which ought to have been ended the year before. The garrison of Silistria was very numerous, and lay at a distance of only two days' march, right on the flank of every possible line of operation upon the Balkan. It was therefore necessary to begin by taking the place. As the shortest road thither, that by Rassova, was impassable by reason of the floods, the corps had to take the difficult and circuitous route by Kusgun. It took 9 days to march the 43 miles, and they did not reach Silistria until the 17th of May.

The fortifications of Silistria have already been described, and no alteration had been made in them since the siege of the previous year was raised, except a few temporary works, thrown up or rather dug out —for the main wall had a command of only 9 feet— before the eastern front of Stambul Tabia and the western gate of Rasgrad; these, however, were mere slight earthworks or lodgments, by means of which the Turks had enabled themselves to defend the ground in front in the same manner as at Varna.

The respect felt by the Russians for Turkish resistance, even behind the weakest walls, and their great disinclination to repeat any such attempts at storming as that of Brailow, is shown by the plan of attack drawn up by General Schilders, and approved by the General in command. Even the Turkish lodgments outside the ditch were not to be taken by attack when the works should reach them, but to be blown up by mining in order to dislodge the Turks. As the ditch was only 30 feet wide and 12 deep from its sole to the top of the glacis, it seemed possible that two or three mines in front of each bastion would throw the counterscarp against the main wall, so as completely to cover the revetment, which was not above 8 feet high, and make a practicable ascent. This would enable the Russians to take possession of the ditch by making descents, erecting batteries on the glacis, and using the cunette as a lodgment, whereupon they might make fresh mines beneath the flanks of the bastions and beneath the curtain, and then crown the entonnoirs under cover of the batteries on the glacis. Should the garrison still refuse to surrender, the crownings might be extended to the ruined bastions and curtain, and artillery be brought to bear upon the interior of the fortress, which must then be given up.

The southern front, between bastions 5 and 6, was manifestly that which could be attacked with most advantage. It could be fully enfiladed from D, and it would be possible to erect batteries in terraces on the slope of B, which would co-operate in the attack up to the last moment. Moreover the fortress had no outworks on this side; the valley between the heights A and B would cover the approach, and general watercourses and hollows might be converted into communications by means of traverses. Nevertheless it was resolved at head-quarters to attack the place on the eastern side, for the same reason that had decided the front of attack at Varna, namely, in order to profit by the support of the fleet. At both places, however, this turned out quite insufficient to warrant such a determination. The real attack accordingly commenced upon front 2—3, but was changed during the course of the siege to 5—6, upon which at first only a feigned attack had been made.

We must now revert to the measures formerly taken for the projected investment of Varna.

In order to re-establish the needful communication between the two banks of the Danube, the materials for a bridge of rafts had been collected at Bucharest, and put together at the mouth of the Ardshish. From Oltenitza the bridge was to be floated along the flooded marshes on the left bank of the river, at a sufficient distance from the fortress, as far as the dyke of Kalarasch. The attempt was, however, delayed so long, that the Turks had time to assemble a river flotilla at Rustchuk, and to bring it to Silistria; this was a great impediment to the Russian scheme. But the irresolution and want of concert in the proceedings of the Moslem allowed the transport to be safely effected almost before their eyes. The rafts were moored at first in the mouth of a small stream, the Bott, which empties itself into the Danube 9 or 10 miles above Silistria, and then transferred without danger to the crossing point, a little below the fortress, where they lay for the moment.

In order to cut off the communication by water with Rustchuk, batteries had been erected at the mouths of the Ardshish and the Bott. The Turks made four attempts to attack these batteries with their flotilla, but were repulsed with loss each time. The Russian infantry likewise occupied an island in the Danube, 2½ miles above Silistria, as well as the left bank of the river opposite to the fortress, but beyond the reach of its fire, and occupied themselves in making gabions, fascines, and other materials for a siege, with the brushwood which grew there in abundance. The heavy wood-work for mining operations, &c. &c. was mostly made at Galatz, and sent up the Danube.

The Russians had 96 pieces of artillery disposable for the siege—65 Russian guns, and 31 Turkish captured at Brailow.

On the 17th of May, at nine in the morning, General Diebitsch advanced upon the fortress from Czernavoda, with a part of the 2nd and 3rd corps drawn up in three columns. He found the Turks in possession of the works which the Russians had erected the year before, and had neglected to destroy.

They immediately offered a determined resistance, especially on the Russian left wing, where the troops had to take an hour's rest before they could renew the attack. At length, however, the trenches were taken. The Turks were reported to have lost 800 men, and the Russians 50 officers and 190 men.

The forts which had been begun during the former siege, 14 and 23 on height B, 19 on A, and 21 on C, were now completed, and the trench for skirmishers *a a* occupied by the Russian outposts.

The 31 guns taken at Brailow were placed together in a battery on the left bank of the Danube, opposite the fortress, and at a distance of not more than 1000 paces. The remainder of the siege artillery was likewise on the left bank, waiting to cross; 11 vessels belonging to the river fleet were moored below, and 5 above the fortress, so as to shut up the Danube altogether, and prevent the relief of the fortress by water.

The right wing of the Russian army was composed of the 9th division of infantry, 2 regiments of horse, 3 field batteries, and the 6th battalion of pioneers. In the centre was the 1st brigade of the 7th division of foot, with 1 field battery; on the left wing were 2 brigades of the 6th division of foot, 3 regiments of horse, and 3 field batteries. Head-quarters were established behind the right wing, and covered by a battalion of chasseurs. The besieging force was secured in the rear by the Cossacks, who patrolled on the roads to Shumla, Rustchuk, and Turtokai. Six battalions of the 8th division of foot, and 3 field batteries, 2 of them heavy ones, formed the reserve, which remained at a distance of 2½ miles from the fortress during the night before the investment, after which it was placed at Kaorgu, at the junction of the roads from Kalopetra and Almaluga. They drew up with two battalions on the front towards Silistria, and four towards Shumla, so as to cover the besieging force, and entrenched themselves in that order. The force of which the Russians could at first dispose for the attack amounted to 26 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 7 batteries, or about 14,000 or 15,000 men, and 56 field-guns. The garrison of Silistria, under Sert Mahommed Pasha, was estimated by the Russians, perhaps too highly, at 13,000 soldiers and 8000 armed inhabitants.

On the 19th of May, at two in the afternoon, the Turks made their first sortie, and advanced in several troops upon the left wing of the Russian skirmishers, whom they drove back, supported by the fire from the fortress; but they were finally repulsed with considerable loss. On the following night the Russians began operations without waiting for their artillery to cross the river. In order to cover the left flank, redoubt 30* was erected within cannon-shot of the fortress, on the road to Rasgrad, and on the western slope of height A. A communication was made along a deep watercourse between battery 22 on the right wing at D, and lodgments belonging to the line of skirmishers *b b*; the latter were enlarged, and the batteries 31, 32, and 33, for 8 guns, erected not so much to play upon the fortress itself, as to prevent sorties and divert the attention of the enemy from the eastern front. At the northern point of the nearest island below Silistria, a battery was armed with the guns of 5 yawls, which directed its fire upon the place from a distance of 1500 paces. The boats themselves were used to complete the bridge, as owing to the floods the materials at hand were insufficient. The lodgment *b b* was extended on the right as far as the river.

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* The works which had been abandoned the year before, and were repaired in part, retained their original numbers, with which the troops were familiar. Those which did not come into play during this siege have mostly been omitted in the plan to avoid confusion.

The Turks made a fresh sortie in thick darkness on the night of the 20th. They stole up to the lodgment *a a* between 19 and 23, and killed a few Russians, but were soon forced to retreat before the approach of the reserve. The garrison kept up a vigorous fire of artillery and threw a number of shells into 19, which did not, however, stop the works.

Meanwhile the rest of the 2nd corps had crossed the river on rafts and boats, and the 5th division now formed the right wing, the 6th the centre, and the 9th the left wing of the corps of investment. The 3rd battalion of pioneers, which had been occupied in preparing material on the left bank, now joined the corps, and a regiment of Cossacks joined General

Kreutz, who now commanded the whole 8th division of foot, 1 regiment of Cossacks, and 3 batteries. Thus 38 battalions, 20 squadrons, and 11 field-batteries, in all 21,000 men, now lay before Silistria with 88 field-guns: there were in reserve 12 battalions, 3 batteries, and 1 regiment of Cossacks, or 6500 men with 24 guns.

Between the 23rd and 26th of May the left wing of the Russians erected the dismounting batteries 34 and 35 at a distance of 600 paces from the main wall, and connected them by trenches: the guns for arming them had not yet arrived. All these works had hitherto been carried on by night, and as the batteries only had to be cut in the earth, a working party of 200 could finish a battery for 4 guns in one night. Henceforth, however, they were continued by day also, and, spite of the proximity of the Turkish guns, but little mischief was done. The attention of the Turks was now drawn to the front, 5, 6, before which they began to construct lodgments.

As it was still the intention at head-quarters to attack the fortress on the east front, the right wing of lodgment *b b* was converted into the first parallel during the night of the 25th. The batteries on the south side succeeded in engaging the attention of the garrison so completely that the works on the right wing were completed without the loss of a single man. The Russians then erected the works from 1 to 5 in the new parallel. The feigned attack was carried on at the same time, and the 2nd parallel, *c c*, was begun at 600 paces from the main wall. The lodgments which already existed, the watercourses, and the embankments formerly surrounding vineyards, were taken advantage of, so that the works were covered from the first and could be completed without loss. Nearly all the shells thrown from the fortress next day fell behind the 2nd parallel at 31 and 32, damaged several guns and carriages, and ploughed up the ground all around.

The timber for batteries 34 and 35 was carried during the night of the 27th to the slope of the hill and the necessary embrasures were cut. The 2nd parallel, *c c*, was extended from the road to Shumla almost as far as to that to Rasgrad.

At half-past two in the morning the Turks made a sortie against the left wing of the Russians; two columns of 500 men each stole along the hollow road to Rasgrad to the work 19, while a third column advanced further to the right upon 30. It so happened that they reached it at the moment of relieving guard in the trenches, and though the outposts were forced to retreat, the fresh guard, with the assistance of the reserve and the old guard, repulsed the Turks at the point of the bayonet. They left 30 men dead on the spot, while the Russians lost 1 officer and 40 men killed and wounded.

During the night of the 28th, battery 37 for 4 guns was begun opposite to bastion 5, and finished on the ensuing day. Some battering guns arrived in the mean time and battery 34 was armed with 3 pieces, the embrasures of which remained blinded, as this battery was not to open its fire until all the others were ready. The parallels on the right were extended as far as the road to Bazardjik, a communication opened between them, and the old lodgments and work 38 erected. Battery 31 was changed into a mortar-battery and armed with 2 13-inch mortars. One of the five guns which had been set up there was taken to 34 and 2 to 37, which now therefore mounted 8 guns in all. As soon as the morning mist had cleared off and the embrasures were unmasked, these batteries opened their fire at a distance of 600 paces. The Turks replied by a vigorous cannonade, but were forced to discontinue it at the end of a quarter of an hour, as their embrasures were ruined. Some deserters from the fortress, who joined the Russians on that day, reported that great alarm prevailed among the inhabitants of the town, that many had been killed, that the guns which had been dismounted and destroyed in the embrasures were several times replaced by fresh ones, which were likewise soon rendered unserviceable, and that the Pasha, amazed at the effect of the batteries, had promised the troops a large sum of money to take them. This information redoubled the watchfulness of the besiegers.

By the 3rd of June batteries 36, 39, and 40 were erected opposite to bastion 6, and armed partly with battering guns and partly with heavy field-pieces. They quickly silenced the fire in the flanks of bastions 5 and 6. The Turks, however, continued to erect lodgments before the attacked front, cut three embrasures in them, and armed them with artillery; they likewise re-established the embrasures in the curtain, placed fresh guns in them, and opened a vigorous fire upon the working parties by day as well as by night. They threw a vast number of shells into 32 and 34. It was now determined at head-quarters, as the feigned attack upon front 5, 6, had proved so successful, to turn it into a real one. That against the eastern front 2, 3, was to be kept up at the same time, partly in order to cover the passage about to be made across the Danube, and partly to prevent sorties on that side.

On the left wing the siege was greatly advanced during the night of the 3rd June by the carelessness of the Turks. The Russians intended to make use of a watercourse as a communication with a half parallel, which was to be formed 200 paces in advance of the 2nd parallel. When, however, the covering party was drawn up, it was discovered that the Turks had placed no posts of observation in front of their lodgments, and that it would be possible to advance with the working party 324 paces farther, where a ditch parallel with the counterscarp, and only 250 paces distant from it, afforded an admirable opportunity of immediately forming the 3rd parallel. Posts were placed immediately below the Turkish lodgments and the work began. The noise roused the garrison and a sharp fire began from the lodgments and from the main wall; but owing to the darkness and the uncertainty of the Turks as to the direction of their fire, the loss was comparatively trifling: 1 officer and 4 men were killed, and 5 officers and 28 men wounded. The attempt was as successful as it was bold, and the 3rd parallel, *f f*, was carried to the right of the watercourse *d*, as far as the graveyard, and finished that same night. On the left it could only be carried on for about 75 paces, as a heavy fire of canister prevented the work until daybreak. It cost 1 officer and 16 men to finish a single traverse. It was generally expected that the Turks would make a sortie on a large scale during the night of the 4th, and measures were taken for their reception. Accordingly no sooner had night fallen than a numerous body of Turks sallied forth to destroy the parallels before even the working party was wholly placed which was to carry on the 3rd parallel towards the left. The Turks first assembled in tolerably large numbers in the lodgments before the curtain, and then rushed upon the parallel, where they fought hand to hand with 17 chasseurs, and at the same time opened a close fire of musketry. Two other columns advanced at the same time, one against redoubt 30, the other along the bank of the Danube, so as to take the enemy in the rear. The Russian outposts attacked these columns with the bayonet and drove them back, and their reserved troops then came up and forced the Turks back into the fortress after a severe struggle. The Turks carried their wounded with them and left 40 men dead on the field; the Russians lost no less than 5 officers and 113 men. The 3rd parallel could not be continued that night, but a sap with traverses was begun from battery 37 to join its right wing: No. 32 was likewise turned into a mortar-battery.

The movements of the Grand Vizier upon General Roth, which will be described hereafter so as not to break the thread of our present narrative, had determined the General-in-chief to proceed with part of the corps of attack to the Balkan. He had been delayed by the expectation of the sortie we have just described, but at daybreak on the 5th General Diebitsch left Silistria with the 2nd corps-d'armée; 1 division of hussars and 1 brigade of foot had already been sent to General Kreutz at Kaorgu. Thus 20 battalions of foot, 2 of pioneers, and a few squadrons belonging to the 3rd corps-d'armée, were left before the fortress. The Russian accounts give their numbers at only 8000 in all, *i.e.* 300 men to each battalion. Even with the addition of 5 battalions belonging to the 8th division, 8 squadrons, and 3 regiments of Cossacks, which had until now been placed so as to cover the siege, the attacking force did not amount to more than 10,000 or 12,000 men, and the besieged were, without doubt, stronger than the besiegers. The only hope for the

Russians was to conceal the smallness of their numbers and to hasten the works as much as possible, so as entirely to confine the Turks within the fortress and to prevent them from making fresh sorties.

The canister and musketry from the lodgments both on the front of attack, 5, 6, and at the next, 6, 7, became very inconvenient at a distance of only 200 paces; nevertheless the besiegers carried the 3rd parallel 300 paces further beyond the road to Rasgrad and erected in it battery 42 for 6 guns and 43 for 7, besides a site for two 5½-inch mortars. Battery 41 for 8 guns was erected at *c*, *c*, opposite to bastion 4, in order to fire upon the lodgments before the front 4, 5.

No sorties were now to be feared except those which might be made by the Turks along the Upper Danube. To guard against these, battery 44 for 8 guns was erected on the left wing. This was intended to silence the fire from Liman Tabia and act against the gate Rasgrad Kapu in the 7th front. During the night of the 5th the Turks again attempted a sortie from this gate, but were driven back with little loss on the side of the Russians.

A violent fall of rain, which lasted twenty-four hours, flooded the trenches to such a degree that wells had to be dug in order to drain them. The works could not be resumed until the 9th.

The advantageous terraced position of the Russian batteries and their nearness to the fortress caused their fire to tell with destructive effect not only on bastions 5 and 6, but likewise on the faces and flanks of the contiguous bastions 4 and 7, which were turned towards the attack, as well as on the lodgments in front. The Shumla and Rasgrad gates were completely shattered, together with their respective bridges, and great damage was done within the town. Nevertheless the Turks continued to unmask fresh embrasures, and kept up a heavy fire of canister during the night in all directions, and an uninterrupted fire of small arms by day. On the 12th a powder-magazine accidentally exploded in the Turkish lodgment before the 4th front, which was thereupon abandoned by its garrison. On the other hand, the Turks threw up fresh lodgments before the front threatened with attack, and assembled behind them when about to make sorties.

All the deserters from the town stated that countermines were being made against the works of attack upon the bastions 5 and 6, and the curtain between them, and that some of these countermines were already charged. Moreover the nights had become so light, that it was utterly impossible to advance any further with flying sap. The Russians thought themselves too weak in numbers to attempt storming the lodgments, and confined themselves to the covered sap, which proceeded very slowly, owing to the various inequalities of the ground and its general fall towards the glacis, as well as to the close fire of the Turkish musketry. In this manner 6 branches were carried forward from the 3rd parallel F F, and directed not upon the salient of the bastion, but 2 against each bastion, and 2 against the middle of the curtain between them. They hoped in the sorties always to defend one sap by means of the other, and in case of the explosion of a mine, to have one of the two left uninjured. These saps had to be cut 5 or 6 feet deep, in order to protect them against the enfilading fire from the fortress, and to be blinded with a double row of planks, or with fascines laid across.

On the evening of the 13th news arrived of a victory won by the Russian general-in-chief at Kulewtsha. The corps of attack immediately opened a vigorous fire of artillery and small arms amid loud hurras, and the Turks conceiving that they were on the point of storming the fortress immediately manned their walls. Next day *Te Deum* was sung, and all work ceased. Information was received that disputes had arisen between the commandants of the fortress. Sert Mohammed Pasha was a weak and peaceable man; and although Mahmud Pasha of Three Tails, who held the command under him, would not hear of a capitulation, General Krassowski sent a polite letter into Silistria, giving an account of the Russian victory, and recommending the Turks to surrender at the mercy of the Emperor. The Pasha replied that "he was commanded by the law to defend himself to the very last." Meanwhile, in order to ascertain the truth, he sent two pigeons by a détour to Shumla, to the Vizier, begging him, if the battle were really lost, to let fly the black, and if won the white. It is said that the messenger of evil tidings soon returned.

On the 16th a new closed work, 46, was thrown up on the left wing of attack, and a sortie upon it repulsed. Moreover branches were carried from sap VI. (*fig.* 2) towards the left, and from 46 towards the Turkish lodgments before the 6th front.

The sap No. I. first reached the crest of the glacis, whereupon the crowning works were begun on either side, and shafts sunk for 4 double mines, *a*, *a*. The Russians determined, if necessary, to blow in the counterscarp at this point at once, without waiting for the termination of the works against bastion 6.

When sap II. approached the glacis, the Turks abandoned the part of lodgment 8 which lay nearest, and which seems to have been little more than a cleft in the earth, fully commanded in the rear from the small places of arms in the sap. The continuation of sap III. was thus rendered much more easy, but the Turks still held possession of the western part of their lodgment 5, and only retreated by degrees as they were reached by the saps which had to be provided with branches as lodgments for sharpshooters.

On the 20th of June the last heads of the sap reached the crest of the glacis, the crownings were continued, and mine-shafts were sunk and listeners constructed before bastion 6. The saps VIII. and IX. reached the Turkish outworks R and P. A sortie against the extreme left wing of the 3rd parallel was repulsed.

It had been observed that the Turks watched the movements of the besiegers from two minarets near the front of the attack, and that they redoubled their fire and threw shells whenever a good many men were assembled in the 3rd parallel and the communications leading into it; for instance, when the working parties or the sentries were relieved. Orders were accordingly given to concentrate the fire of the whole artillery upon these minarets, which were knocked down before ten rounds had been fired.

Although a Bimbashi who had been taken prisoner at Kulewtsha had been admitted into Silistria to give a report of the battle, and two Turkish officers visited the Russian camp as negotiators, no capitulation was made. Negotiations were therefore broken off on the 20th, and, in the evening of that day, the mines, *a*, before bastion 5, exploded.

When the shafts had been carried deep enough, horizontal galleries had been carried from the bottom of them, and then driven perpendicularly towards the counterscarp. At the end of them mines were made 13 feet from the revetment of the wall, and 8 feet below the bottom of the ditch. Each mine was charged with at least 21 cwt. of powder, on the calculation of 28 pounds of powder to one cubic saschen, or 140 cubic feet of earth, owing to the nature of the soil. It was expected that, as the shortest line of resistance was 21 feet, entonnoirs would be made having a radius of 28 feet.

The explosion not only destroyed the Turkish countermine,* but also filled up the ditch. The earth thrown against the escarpment out of the 1st and 4th entonnoirs, reached as high as the cordon of the revetment, and formed two easy ascents to the bastion, of which the parapet had already been knocked down by the dismounting battery. From the two middle entonnoirs the earth had only been thrown to the foot of the revetment wall, which turned out very advantageously, as men could be drawn up under cover in the hollow so produced. The main wall of the fortress might undoubtedly have been scaled after the explosion of these mines, and the Turks, expecting to be stormed, manned the exposed front. But the Russians had no intention of the kind, as they considered themselves much too weak; both sides, therefore, restricted themselves to a sharp fire, by which the Russians lost 3 officers and 43 men.

The damaged saps were immediately repaired, and descents made into the entonnoirs. It might be assumed, that as soon as the Turks had experienced the effect of the mines, they would not allow those in progress opposite to bastion 6 to be completed, but would play off their countermines against them.

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* It was afterwards ascertained that the countermines had been carried forward 62 feet, and had lain close to sap I.: and yet the besieged suffered themselves to be forestalled.

And accordingly, when the shafts *b b* had reached to a tolerable depth, the Russians heard the movements of the Turkish miners not far from the right service shaft; the mining-work itself was not heard.

On the night of the 20th, mine *d*, beneath the point of the counterscarp of the Turkish open-work W, close to bastion 6, was finished and charged with 10 cwt. of powder, with 21 feet line of least resistance. The object of this mine was to throw down the counterscarp, so as to fill up the ditch, and to create an entonnoir which would render the erection of a lodgment for skirmishers possible, so that the Turks might be driven out of their advanced work, which was not a strong one, without a hand-to-hand assault. A mine, *e*, had been begun for the same purpose beneath the centre Turkish outworks R.

At midnight mine *d* exploded, the ditch of the work was completely filled up, and an entonnoir created well-adapted to the construction of the lodgments; the angle of the counterscarp, however, was less damaged than had been hoped.

The discharge of small arms, and the shouts of the besiegers again caused the Turks to expect an assault; they therefore made a very ill-timed explosion of two of their mines (*q q*) in front of bastion 6, and next to sap V.; but they were so far in advance, that the mines in front of the crest of the glacis were not destroyed, and only a few men in the sap were hurt.

Towards daybreak the two mines *b b* were completed, and charged with 21½ cwt. each, the line of least resistance being 21 feet. They exploded simultaneously at 9 o'clock, and answered their purpose so far, that the counterscarp was thrown out against the bastion, the ditch completely filled up, and the Turkish gallery destroyed.

Soon after the mine *e* beneath the left projecting angle of the middle outwork exploded, and made an entonnoir large enough to contain a lodgment from which the Russians might drive the enemy out of their work by the fire of small arms alone, without recourse to the bayonet, and then occupy it themselves.

Next day the crowning of the glacis and the entonnoir were continued, two shafts sunk at *f f* opposite to the right face of bastion 6, in order to throw down the counterscarp, and a gallery, *g*, carried from the shaft beneath the Turkish outwork P.

Some heavy rain, which began in the evening and lasted 24 hours, interrupted nearly all the works by sap, as the general fall of the ground towards the glacis soon caused them all to be filled with water. At several points where the saps were 6 feet deep, the communication with the crowning work was entirely cut off, a circumstance of which the Turks neglected to avail themselves for making a sortie.

After great exertion the water was drained off next day, the communication with the aforesaid work restored, and the mining operations continued. The descent into the ditch from sap II. opposite to bastion 5, was to be effected by means of a gallery, which proceeded rapidly. As the counterscarp had no sunk foundation to impede the progress of the work, the miners proceeded unawares both too far and too deep, which they discovered when light fell into the gallery from the cunette of the ditch. It was now resolved to carry the gallery beneath the right shoulder of the bastion, although it would have been more easily reached by covered sap along the bottom of the ditch. But the Turks discovered the miners in the cunette while an attempt was being made to parley with them, rushed down with loud cries of "Allah," and hurled stones, small powder-barrels, and hand-grenades at them. Three miners were killed, and three more taken prisoners. Hereupon the Turks began to ram up the opening of the gallery with stones which they took from a part of the counterscarp, which was built without mortar. In so doing they accidentally reached the spot at which a small branch, intended to contain a few skirmishers as a reserve, had been carried from the gallery to the left along the revetment. Here the Turks made a large opening through which they fired at an angle into the gallery, and threw a number of lighted shells and hand-grenades. This continued till evening, when they withdrew, either because they had got tired of firing, or because they suffered too much from the grenades thrown into the ditch from cohorn mortars.

This accident turned to the advantage of the Russians; for while the Turks directed their whole attention to the gallery they had discovered, and endeavoured to hinder its completion, the former were able to carry on their other works of attack unmolested.

After the Turks had quitted the ditch, the opening into the gallery which they had rammed up was immediately cleared, the large opening in the revetment of the counterscarp filled up with sacks stuffed with earth, between which were left loopholes for skirmishers, so as to do as much damage as possible to the Turks whenever they should attack this point again.

At the same time a battery, *h*, was erected on the glacis opposite to the postern. In order to cover the postern the Turks had thrown up a tambour with two rows of gabions, filled with earth, and dug a separate entrance into the cunette. The battery *h* was intended to destroy the postern as well as the earthwork thrown up before it, and thus to deprive the Turks of access to the ditch. It would undoubtedly have been quite possible to drive the Turks out of the ditch long before by main force, which would have greatly abridged the subsequent works; but it could only have been done at the expense of a great loss of men, who could ill be spared. As it was, the Russians had lost 1 staff officer, 9 officers, and 153 men during the last three days.

On the morning of the 23rd the Turks made another attack upon the works in the ditch; and, spite of the fire of the skirmishers from behind the counterscarp, they soon reached the cunette, forced the working party and their coverers to retreat, and again rammed up the opening of the gallery with stones. They then broke a second opening in the revetment of the counterscarp, threw shells and grenades into the gallery, and finally attacked the crowning work of the glacis to the left of the sap III. They set fire to the mantelet, threw a number of hand-grenades and stones, and kept up a close fire of musketry. The explosion of the mine *f f*, which took place at this time, at length forced them to leave the crest of the glacis. Towards evening they withdrew from the descent into the ditch, whereupon the work in front of the gallery was immediately resumed by the Russians.

The mines *f* in front of the right face of bastion 6, had produced the same result as those in front of the left face.

The crowning of the glacis was now continued; at every point two more descents into the ditch were begun, and the mine *g*, beneath the furthermost Turkish outwork P, was finished.

During the night of the 23rd the Turks resolved to attack the entonnoir opposite to bastion 5, and approached it from the fourth side of the polygon, at the same time that they advanced in the cunette and along the counterscarp. The Russian volunteers, however, broke out from the crowning work, occupied the edge of the entonnoir, and prevented the Turks from entering it, while 2 companies sallied out of the entonnoir upon the Turks in front of it, and cut them down.

After the enemy was repulsed the working party proceeded to crown the entonnoir and to erect lodgments for skirmishers, which were completed by daybreak, although the Turks not only kept up a close fire of canister and small arms, but likewise threw shells, stones, hand-grenades and combustibles at the working party from the bastion 5.

As the gallery could not be continued, a blinded descent was begun, and the covering party placed behind the hillock thrown up by the explosion of the outer mine.

At midday on the 24th the Turks renewed their attack both upon the gallery opening into the cunette, upon the sap III., and upon the crowning work carried on opposite to the curtain. The working party was ordered to withdraw from the gallery, and were followed by their small covering party, which had stood behind the opening in the revetment of the counterscarp, and at the opening from the gallery into the cunette. This time the Turks were unable to set fire to the mantelet, and therefore endeavoured to pull it into the ditch with large hooks; they kept up a close fire of musketry all the time, and as usual threw a number of grenades, shells, and combustibles upon the saps; they were at length repulsed by the Russian reserve which hastened to the spot. The Turks now, for what reason we do not know, blew up their countermines *r r*, opposite the centre of the curtain, and situated between saps III. and IV., as far from the glacis as the one which had already exploded opposite to bastion 6. The explosion only slightly hurt a few men who happened to be in the communication nearest at hand.

On this day the battery opposite to the postern was finished, and from the moment that it began to play the Turks made no further attempt to enter the ditch. The whole of the cunette was occupied by the Russians, widened and defiladed with traverses made of gabions filled with fascines, and placed in double rows upon planks or fascines, which were laid across the cunette.

On the 25th of June the mine 1 beneath the right shoulder of bastion 5 was begun, and shortly afterwards a second mine, *h*, beneath the point of the same bastion, in order, by their explosion, to take the scarp, and to create an entonnoir fitted for the construction of a lodgment. The Russians hoped at the same time to destroy any works beneath the flanks of the bastion, which the Turks might be presumed to have made in order to reach the gallery which opened into the cunette, as their previous attempts upon it showed how much they dreaded it.

When the Turks perceived that it was no longer possible for them to attack the entonnoir opposite to bastion 5, they hit upon a singular mode of defence. On the morning of the 25th they began to roll down from the parapet of bastion 5 burning tubs filled with powder and some stinking material; when these tubs exploded, they spread such a suffocating smoke and stench, that the working party and their coverers were forced to retreat. The covering party, however, were soon led back by two officers, and reoccupied the entonnoir, after cutting down the Turks who had already established themselves there. As the Turks had thus had an opportunity of observing the mining operations, and must be expected to take measures in consequence, those operations were accelerated as much as possible.

At seven in the evening of the same day, the mine *g*, beneath the Turkish work P, exploded, and the right projecting angle of the work was wholly thrown down. The garrison took flight on the first alarm, and the Russian chasseurs entered the work without opposition. Hereupon General Berg took upon himself to storm the two adjacent Turkish works, R and W, which had also been almost abandoned by their defenders. The Russian volunteers took them with little trouble, and cut down a few Turks. Communications were then restored between the captured works, and their lines towards the fortress raised.

A descent as well as lodgments and communications was constructed from the entonnoir opposite to bastion 6, towards the right into the ditch and the cunette.

At six in the evening the Turks made a fresh attack upon the entonnoir, which they approached from the left along the ditch, but were repulsed by Russian volunteers. This was the last sortie made by the Turks; after this they confined themselves to musketry and to throwing stones and grenades.

During the night of the 25th the miners in the gallery under bastion 5 convinced themselves by listening that the Turks were carrying on extensive mining operations somewhere under the left flank of the bastion. Accordingly as soon as mine *i* beneath the shoulder of the bastion was finished it was charged with 16 cwt. of powder, as the object was to create an entonnoir with a radius of 25 feet, while the line of least resistance was 21 feet; and accordingly 25 lbs. of powder were allowed to 1 cubic saschen, or 140 cubic feet. The mine was fired at three in the morning, and at the explosion, which was very violent, two distinct reports were heard. It had been expected that this mine would only throw down part of the flank of the bastion, but it turned out that it had carried away not only the whole flank but likewise part of the curtain, which had manifestly been caused by the simultaneous explosion of a Russian and a Turkish mine. The Turks afterwards asserted that they had fired their countermine, although it was not quite ready, at the very moment at which they saw the Russians preparing to fire theirs. It is, however, far more probable that the fire spread from the Russian mine to the Turkish one, which lay close beneath. By the combined action of the two mines fragments of masonry from the revetment of the scarp were hurled much further than had been anticipated, so that 3 officers and 15 men, who were standing behind the crowning of the glacis before the middle of the curtain, were killed or wounded. During the night the mine beneath the point of bastion 5 was finished and loaded with 12 cwt. of powder, so as to create an ordinary entonnoir with the line of least resistance of 21 feet. The explosion took place at one in the morning, threw down the scarp, and made an entonnoir fitted for the erection of a lodgment.

After every one of these explosions the Turks, as usual, opened a sharp fire of musketry on every point of the front of attack; and, apparently in the expectation of being stormed, threw a number of shells, grenades, stones, and combustibles into the entonnoir. The besiegers advanced from the cunette towards the curtain to the left of the postern, first with single and then with covered sap, and soon after they carried a second sap towards the postern to the right of the first. Hereupon they broke through the walled revetment of the scarp in order to make mines *k* and *l*.

On the crest of the glacis, opposite the curtain, four batteries were erected, the two outer ones, T and U, in such a manner as to take the attacked flanks of the bastions 5 and 6 en écharpe; the middle ones, on the other hand, were directed against the points at which the curtain was to be thrown down. The two descents into the ditch *m* were completed. On the right wing of the lodgment, opposite bastion 5, a site was constructed for a gun to defend the entonnoirs of the mines and to fire upon the inside of the town. Meanwhile an experienced officer of engineers was directed to make two mines, *n*, *n*, one beneath the left flank of bastion 6, the other beneath the curtain, in such a manner that their simultaneous explosion would blow up the main wall, and that the battery T, which was being constructed on the glacis opposite the left flank of bastion 6, would be able to take the adjoining sixth side of the polygon 6, 7 in the rear. The object was to create a large entonnoir, not for the purpose of storming, but in order to construct in it a lodgment for skirmishers under cover of the battery, and from that lodgment to fire upon the inside of the bastion and upon a retrenchment which the Turks had thrown up behind the front of attack. The mines were finished in twenty-four hours and charged in the following manner. In consideration of the nature of the soil, 25 lbs. of powder were allowed to each 140 cubic feet of earth; the focus, *n′*, with the line of least resistance of 21 feet, was overcharged with 29½ cwt.

of powder; the focus, *n*, was as usual, and was charged with 1¼ cwt. at the same line of resistance.

At eight o'clock in the evening the mines exploded. At *n'* an elliptical entonnoir was formed, of which the largest radius was 64 and the smallest 51 feet. Focus *n* threw down 38 feet of the flank with all its masonry. The entonnoirs of the two mines, when dug out, formed a wide opening' of which the sole lay so low that battery T, upon the glacis, was able to sweep the whole curtain of the sixth front in the rear with diagonal fire. As usual, the Turks appeared upon the wall immediately after the explosion, and opened a vigorous fire in spite of the loss which they each time sustained from the Russian artillery. They were soon, however, forced to abandon the sixth front, as the traverses upon it no longer protected them from the fire in the rear through the entonnoir of the mine. The Turks declared that a single bullet from thence had killed 15 men.

Not content with this, and in order to make a similar opening in bastion 5, through which they might fire in the same manner upon the fourth front, the Russians carried the gallery beneath the right flank of this bastion. Moreover a third gallery at *c* was added to the galleries *k* and *l*. At daybreak on the 29th the Russians fired their mine *l* under the curtain. It was charged with 16 cwt. of powder, and with 21 feet line of least resistance it created an entonnoir 28 feet in diameter, threw down the revetment, and buried among other things Sert Mahommed Pasha's earth hut beneath the rampart which he had only just quitted. The canister fire from the battery on the glacis opposite the mine prevented the Turks from occupying the edge of the entonnoir, and the construction of the ascent to it was immediately begun. On the evening of this day the second mine, *k*, also exploded with like effect, so that by this time five large openings had been effected in the main wall. At the moment when the third mine, *c*, next to the postern, was about to be fired, envoys appeared from the fortress to negotiate a surrender. The fire of artillery was therefore suspended for the present, though the works of attack, especially the lodgment on bastion 6, were continued.

The envoys spun out the negotiations with Oriental dilatoriness, perhaps intentionally, in order to gain time to make fresh retrenchments within their half-ruined walls. The Russians therefore declared in very positive terms that they must either desist from all their unreasonable demands, and accept the terms which had already been offered to them, or prepare themselves for a renewal of the attack. Hereupon a protocol of surrender was signed at nine that evening by the Pasha's plenipotentiaries, according to which the garrison were to be prisoners of war. At ten o'clock the Turks compelled Sert Mahommed Pasha to go to the Russian camp and deliver himself up as a hostage for the fulfilment of the capitulation. Next day 9000 men, among whom were three regiments of regular infantry, laid down their arms. The fortress was given up to the Russians, and 8000 unarmed inhabitants and 1500 sick and wounded were left in the town. Assuming that half of the townspeople took part in the defence, and that the loss on the side of the Turks was severe (the Russians estimated it at 7000 men), the original strength of the garrison cannot be reckoned at less than 15,000 men: 230 pieces of artillery on the walls of the town, 31 on board gunboats, and 40 standards fell into the hands of the victors.

At Silistria the Turks had once more displayed their well-known bravery and resolution in the defence of strongholds, but they had likewise betrayed great ignorance and incapacity. Silistria had held out 44 days since the first investment, 35 since the opening of the first parallel, 25 since the completion of the third parallel, and 9 even after a perfectly practicable breach had been effected by mining at bastion 5. If we compare this defence with that of Brailow, which took place under somewhat analogous circumstances, we shall find that the latter held out only 38 days from its first investment, 27 from the opening of the trenches, 11 from that of the third parallel, and 3 from the construction of a practicable breach; 14,789 shots were fired against Brailow and 29,576 against Silistria, where the fire must have taken far greater effect, inasmuch as a very numerous garrison was crowded together with the townspeople within a very narrow space. Moreover Brailow had not, like Silistria, been wholly isolated from its very first, but had communicated with Matchin by means of the flotilla on the Danube during the earlier part of the siege. Brailow was a far stronger fortress, showed a much better profile, and was neither commanded nor capable of being bombarded from the opposite bank of the river like Silistria. In all these respects, then, Silistria may claim the glory of a much longer and more vigorous defence. It is true that at Brailow 8000 Turks were besieged by 18,000 Russians, whereas at Silistria the garrison was from the first quite as strong, and at last considerably stronger, than the corps of attack. Moreover the average number daily employed in the working parties before Brailow was 1500, while before Silistria it was not above 900 or 1000. The very fact that here, as at Varna and Shumla, a superior force should allow itself to be besieged at all, sufficiently proves the real superiority of a European regular army over the undisciplined Turkish hordes. This numerous garrison, which did not venture to face the Russians in the open field, was therefore only of advantage indirectly, inasmuch as they prevented the besiegers from storming, which they would scarcely have attempted even against a weaker garrison; while on the other hand it greatly increased the scarcity and sufferings of the town, which are said to have become very great after a total isolation of six weeks.

The only real advantage that the Turks could have derived from their numbers would have been in the sorties, and indeed their courage and energy in this respect were unbounded, but the ground was decidedly unfavourable to their success. Their expeditions were always undertaken in small numbers, and nowhere gained any decisive advantage such as might have arrested the progress of the siege. Their sorties, moreover, instead of being directed against the works of attack, were chiefly made upon the right flank of the investing corps, where only an attack en masse could have led to any result; but the Turks were just as little disposed to hazard a regular battle outside the walls of the fortress as the Russians were to risk storming it in full force. The greatest want of skill was shown by the Turkish counterminers; they suffered themselves to be forestalled at every point, frequently only by a few minutes. The counter-mines which they did fire exploded at wrong times and places, and produced scarcely any effect. Several shafts were never used at all, as after such repeated failures the garrison lost all hope of resisting the Russian miners.

The Turks at Silistria showed great courage in defending the weak retrenchments, which the Russians called lodgments, by means of which they endeavoured to supply their total want of outworks. A very humble idea must be formed of the nature of these entrenchments when we consider that the main wall had a command of only 8 feet, that the ground rose in front of it, and that the lodgments were constructed after the opening of the second parallel under the fire of the Russian dismounting batteries. Revetments were evidently out of the question, and although the works W, R, and P figure as imposing outworks on our plan in Fig. 2, which is borrowed from a Russian account of the siege, it is manifest that in reality they could not have been anything more than trenches some 4 or 5 feet deep, with the earth that had been dug out thrown up behind them to form a breastwork. The defence of the ditch was brilliant, and the erection of a retrenchment all along the front of attack plainly shows that a still longer resistance was intended. The principal causes of surrender seem to be disunion between the commandants and scarcity of provisions.

With regard to the attack, it was undoubtedly creditable to the Russians to have compelled a foe double their own number, and behind walls, to surrender; especially with means so insufficient at command; it is true that they were greatly assisted by the badness of the fortress and the mistakes committed by the garrison. The siege of Silistria was very remarkable, inasmuch as the artillery played a quite subordinate part in it, and the chief instrument was the earthwork and mining operations. It is true that a vast number of projectiles were thrown into the place from the batteries which surrounded it on every side; but the line of attack was neither enfiladed nor subject to ricochet fire, favourable as its position was for the purpose. Not above 16 or 20 guns were employed to dismount the guns, and not a single breach was effected. One would almost suppose that a great part of the Russian siege artillery never reached the right bank of the Danube, and indeed there is no account of the actual completion of the bridge. Every point was taken by means of the pickaxe and shovel. When the Russian miners once reached the foot of the scarp, they always contrived to finish and to charge a mine within twenty-four hours. At this rate they would have been able to blow up the whole front by degrees, provided they had sufficient powder; but entrenchment XX, made by the Turks, sufficiently proves that the end could not have been attained by these means only. Moreover, the 11 mines which exploded in the course of eight days, consumed no less than 336 cwt. of powder. Neither would it have been easy to reach the foot of the scarp by the method of attack pursued by the Russians. The reluctance displayed by them to venture a general assault upon so strong a garrison after the experience they had already had, or to risk on one day the success they could not fail to obtain by time and patience, was natural and justifiable, especially on this occasion, and at the beginning of a campaign. On the other hand it is impossible not to feel that they might frequently have proceeded with much greater rapidity. It was paying far too much respect to the lodgments to approach them step by step with double sap. If they and the ditch had been taken by assault, it would have materially shortened the siege. Owing to the course pursued, the works which at first proceeded so quickly lasted twenty-four days from the opening of the 3rd parallel, until the crowning of the glacis. The nearer the besiegers approached to the lodgments and the main wall, the more difficult did the continuation of the sap become; and it should be borne in mind, that the last ten days cost 35 officers and 870 men killed and wounded. Thus the advance of each day was purchased on an average by 4 officers and 90 men, or no less than a whole company, without counting those who fell sick at the work. It is not likely that more would have fallen in storming the lodgments and taking forcible possession of the entonnoirs of the mines; that is, if we may judge from the result at the lodgments on the 6th front, the taking of which was a departure from the system adopted by the Russians.

On the whole, however, it is undeniable that a saving of men was effected by the expenditure of time and labour. The siege of Silistria cost—

In killed . . .	1 general ..	1 staff officer ..	13 officers ..	819 men.
In wounded	16		84	1747
			115 officers ..	2566 men.

—not so many in all as had been killed on one day at the storming of Brailow. If to the above list we add those who fell sick, or were otherwise hurt during the siege, we shall find that the capture of Silistria was purchased at the expense of 3000 combatants and seven weeks of time. Silistria was to the campaign of 1829 what Brailow had been to that of 1828—the basis of all future operations.

It seems that the Russians had hoped to besiege and take Rustchuk before the time should arrive for operations in the open field. But Silistria had held out much longer than could have been expected from such a place when vigorously attacked. Moreover the force disposable at the termination of the siege was much too weak to undertake a second, and the moment of the great struggle rapidly drew near.

A concluding glance at the three sieges which have been described, will show us that Brailow, Silistria, and Varna occupied 50,000 Russians during a period of two to three months, and that this number was scarcely sufficient for the most pressing exigencies of the case.

If the Russians intended, and it can scarcely be doubted they did, to cross the Balkan during the first campaign, the three sieges should have been undertaken at the same time. Even then, as the Russians did not cross the Danube until the middle of June, the decisive operation must have been undertaken late in the autumn. At the beginning of the war the army consisted of only 65,000 men; and the tardy arrival of the guards and the 2nd corps-d'armée did little more than cover the enormous losses it had sustained: thus only 15,000 men were left for offensive action. The reciprocal action of time versus power was exemplified afresh on this occasion, and the Russians were compelled, by the weakness of their forces, to extend over two campaigns what might have been effected in one.

CHAPTER III.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF THE GRAND VIZIER — SKIRMISH OF ESKI-ARNAUTLAR AND BATTLE OF KULEWTSCHA.

THE first care of Reschid Mohammed Pasha, the new Grand Vizier, on reaching Shumla towards the end of March, had been to strengthen and organize the troops assembled in that place. The separate detachments of Asiatics were incorporated with the regular troops from Constantinople. The commissariat was established, and new communications opened. By his personal watchfulness and rigour, the Pasha established a discipline hitherto unknown in a Turkish army; and the fame of his justice to the Rayahs secured to Reschid Mohammed Pasha the affection of the Rumelian Christians. A common plan of operations for the coming campaign was arranged between him and Hussein Pasha, who was collecting a Turkish corps near Rutschuk, and they hoped in time to get together a body of 60,000 men, for whom provisions could be brought down the Upper Danube.

After Reschid Mohammed had organised his corps, he went a step further and led them into action: for the first time during the course of this war a Turkish commander took the initiative. On the 10th of May, just as the Russian General-in-chief had reached Trajan's Wall, the Vizier broke up his quarters at Shumla, and advanced in the direction of Pravadi. His strength during this expedition is estimated by the Russians at 40,000. It is not, however, at all probable that so large a force could have been collected at Shumla, and still less likely that the Turks would have left that place totally undefended. The Turkish corps destined for this active warfare, exclusive of the numerous baggage-train, could scarcely have exceeded 15,000 or 20,000 combatants.

The 7th corps-d'armée of the Russians had suffered excessively during the last campaign: the regiment Ufa had been almost destroyed at Marasch; the regiments Odessa and Azof at Kurt-tepe. These losses had been in some measure filled up by recruits from Russia, but ague and dysentery had made great havoc among the troops during the winter. 6 battalions had been sent to Sizeboli; 2 others were at Devno; 2 of the Kasan regiments were at Bazardjik; so that only 14 weak battalions of the 7th corps, or scarcely more than 5000 or 6000 men, were disposable. From the 6th corps-d'armée the 1st division of dragoons and the 17th of infantry had been sent into Wallachia to General Geismar; 4 battalions of the 16th division were at Pravadi; so that only 8 battalions of the 6th corps remained available for service. The 10th division formed the garrison of Varna, and had lost above one-half of its men during the winter from illness. The whole available force of the Russians in the field, on the right bank of the Danube, consisted, therefore, of only 22 battalions and some 30 squadrons, or from 12,000 to 14,000 men.

Could Reschid and Hussein Pasha have finished their preparations a few weeks sooner, they would only have had to encounter this number of Russians in the open field, against whom they could muster 60,000 men. With Shumla and Silistria as his base of operations, the Grand Vizier would have had the most perfect security and freedom of action; whereas all General Roth's communications lay on his right flank, and, spite of all the moral superiority of the Russians, their position would have been very critical. But even as it was, the conditions were not unfavourable for offensive operations.

The Turks advanced in 2 columns from Shumla upon Pravadi: one column, under Halil Pasha, went the straight road over the plateau; the second, under the Vizier himself, took the line to the left by Jenibazar and Newtscha (*see* the general map), threatening General Roth's communications with the Danube.

On the 17th of May, the same day that General Diebitsch appeared before Silistria, Reschid Mohammed reached Eski-Arnautlar. The Russians had erected five redoubts about this spot, advantageously situated on a height, and had made it into a central position, communicating on the left with the fortified village of Pravadi, distant only about 2½ miles. There the Russians had about 6 battalions, 12 field-guns, and a few Cossacks; the Russian force consisted of about 3000 men, according to their own account, which agrees with our estimate of the strength of their battalions.

The Turkish column of the left wing, under the command of the Grand Vizier, might number about 10,000 men, among whom were a few thousand horse. It was accompanied by an adequate park of artillery. After leaving a few troops as a reserve at convenient points, the Vizier at once attacked the Russian entrenchments. Three Turkish divisions, whose fronts were concealed behind some rising ground, deployed in good order, protected by skirmishers. They made a bold attack on the Russian entrenchments, and some few Turks forced their way into a Russian redoubt. General Roth, whose presence inspired his troops with life and vigour, drove the Turks out again, and for four hours maintained the unequal fight. At about nine o'clock in the morning, General Wachten hastened from Devno, with 4 battalions, 2 regiments of Cossacks, and 4 guns, threw himself upon the left flank of the Turks, and thus forced them to desist from the attack upon the position of Eski-Arnautlar. Some disorder in the Turkish troops, shown by their falling back upon the column of the right wing, and the belief that General Kuprianof, who commanded at Pravadi, must certainly have repulsed the attack made upon him by the right wing of the Turks, induced General Roth to send 4 battalions and 6 guns in pursuit of the Turks. Another battalion and a regiment of Chasseurs with 4 guns were sent as a support to this detachment. General Rynden pressed the Turks into the gorge of Dereköi (Village of the Valley); but where the gorge opens into the wide valley of Pravadi, he came suddenly upon the Turkish reserves, which had been originally intended to support the attack on Pravadi, and which now received the Grand Vizier in his retreat. The Turkish infantry, supported by 10 guns, opened such a heavy direct fire upon the advancing troops, as to mow down the front ranks of the Russian squares in a few minutes. The 6 Russian guns had only fired two rounds before all the gunners were killed. A swarm of 3000 or 4000 surrounded the Russians so closely that they were unable to cut their way through to the two battalions left at the upper entrance of the valley. It was equally impossible for those two battalions, spite of the greatest exertions on their part, to break their way through to their hardly pressed brethren in arms. General Rynden was killed; the regiment Ochorzk lost 22 officers out of 31, and was nearly cut to pieces by the Turks. Even the two reserve battalions were only saved by the appearance of Captain Lischin, who with a small force charged with the bayonet on the right flank of the Turks, who had broken their ranks to plunder the fallen Russians. At length General Kuprianof, who had made a sortie from Pravadi into the valley, appeared, and forced the Turks to retire, after a contest that had lasted from 5 in the morning until 8 in the evening. The Turks again collected their forces on the plateau of Rowno, whence they threatened a new attack upon Pravadi, and kept up their communications with Shumla.

The column of the right wing of the Vizier had stormed Pravadi in vain. The Russians had fortified the place on the north and south by embankments right across the valley, abutting on the steep acclivity on either side (see the Plan of Pravadi). Above the town also they had flooded the meadows. Towards the east the inaccessible rocks formed a natural citadel. Remains of towers, a doorway hewn into the rock, caves and cisterns, showed that the position had been previously used for purposes of defence. To the west, on the contrary, the Russians had been forced to erect a sort of crowning work on the level open edge of the valley which commanded the town. This consisted merely of an earthwork with palisades, not protected by a ditch, as the shallowness of the soil did not allow of deep cuttings. Covered batteries had been made out of the beams of the houses that were pulled down, and two mosques afforded bomb-proof shelter for the ammunition. But everything depended upon keeping possession of the work, as in the event of its falling into the hands of the Turks the town would no longer be tenable, though the citadel might still be held. But this naturally weak position resisted all the attacks of the Turks. It was an error in the arrangements of the Grand Vizier to combine an attack upon the entrenched position of Pravadi with the assault upon the Russians at Eski-Arnautlar. It would have been more to the purpose had he stationed a sufficient force in the valley to the north of Pravadi, to prevent any attack from that quarter, and had he kept his reserve in the rear of his left instead of his right wing. Had he succeeded in breaking through General Roth's position at Eski-Arnautlar, and in beating successively the Russian forces which had not yet formed a junction in the rear, the result would have been far more important than if he had taken Pravadi: most probably the Russians must in that case have evacuated Pravadi of their own accord.

The issue of this battle was of no advantage to the Turks. In that night and during the following morning 2 battalions and 4 guns from Devno entered the Russian camp; 6 battalions and 12 guns then came by forced marches from Bazardjik, and the Vizier soon fell back upon Shumla. Nevertheless he had reason, on the whole, to be well satisfied with his expedition. The Russians estimated their loss at 1000 killed and wounded, about one-seventh of the whole number of troops engaged on their side. Supposing the loss to have been equal on both sides, it was worse for the

Russians, already so weak in numbers, than for the Turks. At any rate the Turks were two or three times as numerous as their opponents, had fought with them for fifteen hours in the open plain, had even attacked them behind their entrenchments, and had captured some guns. The battle had been fought with unparalleled fierceness, and the skirmish of Eski-Arnautlar gave evidence of a revival of the old Turkish impetuosity and military ardour, which left room for the hope that—given a superiority in point of numbers, which was not unlikely to occur—the Turks would be able to cope with their Russian adversaries. Reschid and Halil, the two commanders, were wounded; they had given to their troops an example of personal bravery; and even the Russians confessed that the Turks, in their attack, had manifested a determination and combined action hitherto unknown in Turkish warfare.

The Vizier prepared for a fresh attack on a greater scale, but General Roth retired upon Kosludja, where he now concentrated his troops. The advanced guard alone kept possession of Devno and Arnautlar: Pravadi was garrisoned by 6 battalions.

Towards the end of May Reschid Mohammed left Shumla at the same time that Hussein Pasha advanced from Rutschuk, but they did not act sufficiently in concert. Hussein Pasha directed his march from Rutschuk upon Rasgrad, where he attempted to raise the Bulgarian peasantry, who showed but little inclination to take up arms. We have already observed that General Kreutz, with the 8th division and a few regiments of cavalry, chiefly Cossacks, had taken up a post of observation at Kaorgu, where he had entrenched himself, and had directed his chief attention to covering the rear of the besieging corps, and to keeping open its communications with the 6th and 7th corps. The communications between Pravadi by Kosludja, Bazardjik, and Kaorgu with Silistria, a distance of nearly 100 miles, were kept up by means of relays, and took 16 hours. An officer of Cossacks, who had ridden on the same horse that distance in 12 hours, had been promoted on the spot to be Major.

On receiving intelligence of the advance of Hussein, General Kreutz intrusted the command of the post of Kaorgu to General Madatof, and marched immediately with 8 battalions, 12 squadrons, and 12 guns to Rasgrad, where, on the 29th May, he dispersed the Turks who had begun to concentrate their forces. The Turks attempted to maintain themselves at Turtukai, but two Russian squadrons defeated the Turkish rear-guard which opposed them, and Hussein, who was not supported by the Vizier, fell back upon Rutschuk. General Kreutz, on the other hand, took up a position at Aftolar, about 10 miles to the south-east of Silistria.

The Grand Vizier meanwhile advanced upon Kosludja on the 28th May with 40,000 men: 20 regiments of regular infantry and 6 regiments of regular cavalry formed the kernel of his army. It is possible that Hussein Pasha's movement was only as a feint, to keep General Diebitsch at Silistria, so that the Vizier might have to deal only with General Roth. But General Roth, after reinforcing himself with a part of General Madatof's troops from Kaorgu, had brought together at Kosludja 24 battalions and 36 squadrons, which the Vizier, spite of his superior numbers, did not dare to attack in their advantageous position. He contented himself with a cannonade, and then withdrew to the plateau of Kuriwna, whence he made a regular attack upon Pravadi, which, however, proceeded badly.

After the Vizier had vigorously cannonaded the Russian crownwork with all his guns, he sent a Dehli, or fanatic, to examine the effect of his fire. This man galloped to within 50 paces of the wall, and although hundreds of shots were fired at him, he returned unhurt, and reported that "everything was as it was" ("Bir-schei yok"). The Pasha, who had expected to hear that not one stone of the fortifications had been left upon the other, would not believe that the garrison was still within them, and accused the Dehli of not having ridden near enough: the Dehli answered by showing his cloak pierced with bullets.

On receiving intelligence of the appearance of the Turkish main army in the open field, General Diebitsch determined to leave the further conduct of the siege of Silistria to General Krassowski with the greater part of the 3rd corps, and himself to advance with the 2nd corps, and 4 battalions and 16 squadrons of the 3rd corps, to Pravadi; to strengthen the garrison there on his march by the addition of General Kreutz; and then to fall upon the Grand Vizier, in conjunction with the 6th and 7th corps, commanded by Generals Roth and Rudiger. Should he succeed in forcing the Turks into action in the open field before they could reach Shumla, there could be scarcely any doubt as to the issue of the battle, spite of the numerical superiority of the Turks, and it was this rapid determination on the part of General Diebitsch that decided the fate of the whole campaign.

As we have before remarked, the gros of the 2nd corps, commanded by General Pahlen, viz. the 5th and 6th divisions of infantry and the 2nd of hussars, altogether about 15,000 men, left their position before Silistria early on the morning of the 5th June. The first day they marched as far as Kutschuk Kainardji; and although the distance was only 10 miles, the infantry did not reach their bivouac till nine o'clock in the evening. The baggage-train of the corps-d'armée was enormous, as several days' provision for man and horse had to be taken with them. Every village was deserted, the country desolate and wasted; not a living soul was to be seen, scarcely a trace to show that the land had ever been cultivated or inhabited.

On the 6th June the march was continued, but very slowly, owing to the oppressive heat. They hoped to reach Kaorgu, but were forced to halt after marching 19 miles. The head-quarters were fixed in the midst of cherry and walnut trees at Bairampunar; the corps encamped near Kissedjik. A refreshing shower towards evening gave the troops some relief. On the third day they reached Kaorgu: the distance was about 12 miles. The infantry started at five o'clock in the morning, but did not arrive till late in the afternoon. The country, which hitherto had been covered with brushwood and occasional clumps of trees, now became open and clear. At Kaorgu the junction with General Kreutz took place. This General had advanced from Aftolar with 4 battalions and 8 squadrons, and covered the right flank of the corps during the march. The 8 squadrons were sent forward on the same day under the command of General Kreutz as far as Kisildschilar as an advanced guard. General Madatof had already left the entrenched position of Kaorgu with 2 regiments of infantry and the 3rd regiment of hussars in order to effect a junction with General Roth. The entrenched position of Kaorgu was an isolated height with four *flèches* protected in their gorges with palisades; it was held by only one regiment of infantry and one of Cossacks. General Roth reported that his advanced guard, composed of 2 squadrons of hussars and 2 regiments of Cossacks, had repulsed 6000 Turkish horse, and that his infantry had taken a redoubt, so that the communication with Pravadi had been restored and the garrison of that place strengthened with 2 battalions. The troops, he added, were in good spirits, and were singing while the firing went on: only 20 prisoners had been brought in, from whom the Russians learned that the Grand Vizier, before leaving Shumla, had received 58,000 rations daily.

Early on the 8th June, first the cavalry, then the head-quarters, and lastly the infantry, began their march. They only went 12 miles that day, advancing on the following day through Alesfak. Half way, General Wachten, the chief of the staff of the 6th corps-d'armée, and at Alesfak General Delingshausen, the chief of the staff of the 7th corps-d'armée, joined General Diebitsch. Their reports agreed in stating that the Vizier's position on the plateau of Rovno and Kuriwna was very strong and difficult to attack in the front; that the approaches to this position were narrow and fortified; and that in front of it was stationed the Turkish cavalry in the valley of the river Pravadi, which flowed down from Newtscha. General Wachten was of opinion that the Vizier knew nothing of the march of the Russians, but General Delingshausen, on the contrary, thought that he was informed of it, but that he hoped to take Pravadi before the Russians should arrive. At head-quarters opinions as to the measures to be adopted were divided. General Buturlin wanted to advance upon Shumla by forced marches, and to take that place by surprise, as, besides the inhabitants, there were not above 6000 Turks left in it; others wished to relieve Pravadi. But General Diebitsch decided upon placing himself between Pravadi and Shumla, so as to intercept the return of the Grand Vizier upon Shumla, and force him to fight. Before this, however, the junction of the troops under Generals Roth and Rudiger was to be effected. The cavalry was pushed forward the same day towards Jasytepe, while the infantry lay on the other side of Kasildschilar, with the valley of Newtscha in their front. The advanced guard to the left at Molatsch restored the communication with General Roth, who had advanced from Kosludja to Eski-Arnautlar. In the evening divine service was celebrated. With the utmost exertion the Russians had taken five days to march the 60 miles from Silistria. The heat, the want of roads, the fatigue of the troops, but especially the necessity of an enormous baggage-train, were the causes of their slow advance.

The river Pravadi forms the boundary between the flat swelling land of Bulgaria and the range of limestone hills forming the northern abutments of the Balkan. To the north of the Pravadi the undulating ground falls in gradual slopes easy of ascent, but to the south are precipitous rocks which surround the flat, high plateau, as with a wall. The heights are covered with brushwood, the valleys eminently fruitful; but at that time they were quite uncultivated, as every hamlet was burnt and lay in ruins. The spot where a village had once stood was frequently marked by tall thistles which grew amid the ruins of the houses. The water of the brooks is muddy, and deposits a slimy clay in their beds: it is only in particular places that even the smallest brook is fordable.

As in order to advance upon Jenibazar it was necessary to surmount a height visible from the Turkish encampment on the plateau of Rowno, the Russians began their march at six in the evening. A thick fog hid the movements of the Russian troops, who reached Tauschan-Kosludja unobserved: they did not venture to light any fires during the night. General Roth had received orders to follow in the same direction after the others had gone. An advanced guard had been previously sent on to Jenibazar, whither 1000 Turkish cavalry had been pushed forward from Shumla. A Turkish aga, who was making a reconnaissance with 100 horse, was taken prisoner: he reported that at Shumla nothing was suspected of General Diebitsch's advance.

By daybreak the heads of General Roth's columns made their appearance. General Roth had left his watch-fires at Eski-Arnautlar burning, and executed his perilous flank movement parallel with the front of the Turkish encampment unperceived and with success. One regiment of the 3rd hussars and one of the 4th lancers were left behind in Pravadi, hidden in the valley, to follow the Vizier when he should break up his quarters. General Roth remained at Tauschan-Kosludja in his camp to close the valley; General Pahlen, on the other hand, advanced to Jenibazar, where a narrow bridge over the brook, just below the town, very much delayed the defiling of the troops. Two regiments of Cossacks of the advanced guard defeated the Turkish vanguard beyond the town, pursued them without drawing bit close to Shumla, and made some hundred prisoners.

From Jenibazar General Pahlen turned to the left towards Matara, and at midday on the 10th June took up a position with his front towards Pravadi. General Kreutz, with 2 regiments of lancers and 2 Cossack regiments, was sent forward towards Bulanik to keep a watch upon Shumla. Vely Bey, a son of the Vizier, with some thousand horsemen, had been despatched from Shumla to collect the vanguard that had been dispersed at Jenibazar. He vainly attempted to hold the retrenchment at the brook of Bulanik. General Kreutz (A A) pushed his way through the defile (Plan No. 7), and drove the Turks out of their position (*a a*). The Turks then took up their position in *b b*, while another body of horse (*c*, *c*), concealed in the valley, advanced on their right, in order to fall upon the left flank of the Russians should they continue their attack. General Kreutz took up his position opposite to them at B B, with the lancers in column, while the Cossacks deployed on either side: two guns, covered by a squadron, were placed on a hill on the left wing. Later in the day General Kreutz was reinforced by the 1st brigade of the 2nd division of hussars, who advanced from Matara against the right wing of the Turks drawn up in the valley (C). Veli Bey then fell back upon Shumla; the Turkish cavalry, however, concealed in the valley, remained to watch the movements of the Russians.

On the morning of the 10th June it was rumoured that the Turks were preparing to debouch out of the mountains by the way of Kulewtscha. It was known through a deserter that the Vizier had obtained information from Shumla of the skirmish at JeniBazar, and of the advance of the Russians upon Shumla; that he had raised the siege of Pravadi at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and had marched in the direction of Markoftscha. The Russians could already see some bodies of Turks on the edge of the wooded heights, and expected an attack towards evening. This caused great alarm in the Russian camp, as the troops were undoubtedly much scattered and the head-quarters greatly exposed.

The force with which General Diebitsch had undertaken to cut off the Vizier's retreat upon Shumla consisted of the following troops :—

	Squad.	Batt.	Guns.	
Of the 2nd corps:—				
2nd hussar div.	16	-	24	
5th inf. div.	-	8	16	The brigade of chasseurs remained before Silistria.
6th „	-	12	24	
Of the 3rd corps:—				
3rd hussar div.	12	-	16	Wittgenstein's regiment was at Pravadi.
7th inf. div.	-	4	8	The regiments Murom and Neschnigorod.
Of the 6th corps:—				
4th lancer div.	12	-	8	1 regiment at Pravadi.
16th inf. div.	-	6	20	Since the skirmish of Arnautlar the Ochotzk and the 31st regiment of chasseurs had been formed into 1 battalion. 4 battalions were at Pravadi. The 17th division was in Wallachia.
Of the 7th corps:—				
Lancers of the Bug	20	-	12	
18th inf. div.	-	10	10	2 batt. Kasan in Bazardjik.
19th „	-	4	8	2 batt. at Devno. 4 at Sizeboli.
	60	44	146	Of which 40 were 12-pounders.

—altogether, with Cossacks, but excluding the garrison of Pravadi, about 7000 horse, 21,200 infantry, or in all 28,000 fighting men with 146 guns, a division of the army fully able to cope with the 40,000 Turks.

But on the 10th June, the Russian force of 31,000 or 32,000, including the garrison of Pravadi, was distributed in the following manner:—

	Squad.	Batt.	Men.
Under General Kreutz at Bulanik, of Cossacks	16	42	2,500
„ „ Pahlen at Matara	20	24	1,400
„ „ Roth and Rudiger at Tauschan-Kosludja	24	20	12,000
„ „ Kuprianof at Pravadi	8	4	2,800

According to this, the Russian force on the 10th

June was divided and lay at Pravadi, Tauschan-Kosludja, Jenibazar, Matara, and Bulanik, over a curve 25 miles in length. The Grand Vizier, on the contrary, was encamped on the plateau between Markoftscha and Tjirkowna, in the centre of this curve, at an equal distance from the two extreme points, Pravadi and Shumla, and his army was three or four times as strong as each of the two main divisions of the Russian force, taken singly, viz. the nearest corps of Generals Pahlen and Roth. In order to effect a junction with the other, one of these two corps must march ten long miles by the defile of Jenibazar, and the first attack of the Turks, which is never to be despised, would have been decided one way or the other long before the junction could have taken place, had the Vizier attacked them on that day.

It remains doubtful whether the Vizier was actually aware while at Pravadi that the main army of the Russians was united under the commander-in-chief; but the appearance of a Russian force before Shumla induced him at once to return thither. The brigade of cavalry posted at Pravadi attempted to pursue him, but the Turkish horse turned upon the two Russian regiments with superior numbers, killed many men, and took four guns. The Vizier now had the choice between three ways—to the north by Newtscha and Jenibazar, in the middle by Markoftscha and Tjirkowna, or to the south by Kamarna and Marasch. By the first he could only reach Shumla after beating General Roth; the last was the safest, but the roads through the numerous valleys of the Kamtchik were so bad that he could not have taken his artillery with him. He therefore naturally selected the middle nearest road on the flat plateau, by which he could go with perfect safety to within 10 miles of Shumla. From thence he could see the Russian camp at Tauschan-Kosludja and at Matara spread out as on a map, and must have convinced himself that he had to deal with a considerable force. An attack upon the first encampment could only be effected by giving up all his communications, and even then it would not lead him directly to Shumla. It would therefore have been quite natural that he should attack General Pahlen. Whether, with his threefold superiority in point of numbers, he could have beaten that corps, we cannot say; but it is probable that he would have forced his way to Shumla, though he might have lost part of his guns and baggage. Besides, according to trustworthy accounts, since the Vizier's departure 5000 Albanians had joined the 6000 Turkish troops and the population capable of bearing arms in Shumla, so that simultaneously with the Vizier's attack a body of at least 10,000 men might have operated in the rear of General Pahlen, against whom General Kreutz could only have opposed 2500 men.

It had already been proposed during the march of the previous day in the Russian head-quarters, to effect a junction with General Roth, and advance from Newtscha upon the plateau and attack the Vizier at Pravadi itself. But the height could only be reached by one difficult defile; and as this arduous enterprise would have to be carried out in the immediate neighbourhood of the enemy, the commander-in-chief very properly rejected it. On the other hand, it would have been quite possible to have united the Russian forces on the 10th June at Matara. It is true that the 6th and 7th corps had performed a night march of 15 miles, but, thanks to the supineness of the Turkish cavalry in the Newtscha valley, this had been effected without impediment; the Russians, moreover, had rested on the previous day, and after some repose at Tauschan-Kosludja they might have crossed the brook of Jenibazar at noon. General Diebitsch would then have been ready with his whole force at Matara to oppose every advance of the Turks, whichever road they might take. This, however, had not been done, and it cannot be denied that General Diebitsch's position on the 10th June was very critical, had the Turks concentrated their forces against the separate Russian divisions, and had the garrison of Shumla co-operated with the corps at Pravadi.

But the Vizier would not have been a Turk, or fitted to command Turks, had he not put off to the following day everything that could, or even could not be postponed. Fortune smiled upon him during but a few hours—in war most precious. They passed unheeded, and General Diebitsch, who knew how to take advantage of his position, summoned the corps of Generals Roth and Rudiger to join him during the night. On the forenoon of the 11th June 28,000 Russians barred the Vizier's passage to Shumla.

As soon as the heads of the columns of the 6th and 7th corps were visible on the 11th June, the 2nd corps was pushed forward on to the right bank of the brook Bulanik (Plan 7). General Roth did not reach Matara until eleven o'clock in the forenoon. The following was the position of the Russians:—The head-quarters at the burial-ground to the right of Matara were covered by 5 battalions and 1 brigade of lancers; the artillery belonging to them was drawn up in front.

The 6th corps of General Roth and the 7th of General Rudiger formed the left wing. This first line of battle consisted of 12 battalions and 34 guns, which were posted in the intervals: the second line consisted of 8 battalions with 24 guns. On the left wing, even with the first line of battle, were 3 regiments of the 3rd hussars, 2 of the lancers of the Bug, 1 of the 4th division of lancers drawn up in 3 brigades, with 2 flying horse artillery batteries; some Cossacks covered the left flank.

Fourteen battalions of the 2nd corps under General Pahlen, with their artillery drawn up in two lines, formed the right wing on the further side of the brook Bulanik. The rest of the infantry of the corps had been sent forward under General Ostroschenko as an advanced guard. It consisted of the brigade of chasseurs of the 6th division, 4 battalions of the 11th and 12th regiments of chasseurs, 1 battalion Murom, 3 squadrons of the hussar regiments Irkutzk, the 2nd division of hussars, a detachment of Cossacks, and 4 flying horse artillery guns. This advanced guard (D D) was placed in and behind the villages Kulewtscha and Tjirkowna.

To the right of the last-named spot advanced posts of Cossacks (E E) stretched out towards the south as far as the village of Tjermedin, where the regiment Elizabethgrod was drawn up with the 2nd division of hussars: the two remaining regiments of this division were summoned to his assistance during the fight by General Kreutz (C). The Cossack posts extended along the brook Strandscha from Tjermedin as far as General Kreutz's position.

Early in the morning General Buturlin had made a reconnaissance along the road to Marasch and had seen nothing of the Turks. It seemed therefore very likely that the troops which had been seen on the previous day on the ridge of the high plateau over Kulewtscha, on both sides of the road leading from that village to Tjirkowna, were the advanced guard of the Turkish main corps, and that it was advancing along the shortest road from Pravadi to Shumla. Two Turkish battalions of regular infantry had formed hollow squares and placed 2 guns in the intervals. On the road itself was a strong battery; a mass of irregular infantry stood half hidden on the wooded ridge of the declivity; they were reckoned at from 6000 to 8000 men. As the Turks remained in this position till midday, General Diebitsch, in order to ascertain what the enemy's force really was, ordered General Ostroschenko to reconnoitre with his advanced guard.

This detachment crossed the bottom to the south of Tjirkowna, placed its right wing a little in front, and advanced with the artillery in the intervals against the height (G G). A concealed Turkish battery immediately opened a heavy canister fire, while masses of infantry and cavalry rushed upon the Russian columns, which had not time to form into squares. The Spahis charged at full gallop down the steep, broken, stony ground, where European cavalry could scarcely have gone at a foot's pace. The attack on the front was light, but both Russian flanks were enclosed by the Turks from the surrounding heights. The regular Turkish infantry, extending its line, fell upon the battalions of the 11th and 12th regiments of chasseurs, engaged them at close quarters, and drove them back upon Kulewtscha. On the right wing the battalion Murom, separated from the rest of the Russians by a ravine, was sore pressed. The hussar regiment Irkutzk, taken in the right flank by the Turkish horse, attempted to form into column in order to turn, but, not having time, charged full upon the Turks, and beat them off, but were immediately surrounded and driven back (G). The whole Turkish force then surrounded the battalion Murom, fired at 50 paces into the mass, and destroyed the whole battalion in a few minutes. After a momentary delay the Turkish mass rushed upon the hussars (*d d*). Meanwhile the brigade of chasseurs had been forced to fall back; the Turks pursued them and took the villages of Kulewtscha and Tjirkowna. Here the Russians not only lost a quantity of men, but two guns fell into the hands of the Turks. The hussars then rallied, attacked the enemy, far superior to them in numbers, and recovered their guns.

In order to support the advanced guard, General Pahlen had gone to the right with his corps in three lines of échelons. The first échelon (H) consisted of 2 battalions of the 1st brigade of the 6th division; the second (J) of the rest of that division, 4 battalions; the third (L) of 2 brigades of the 5th division, 8 battalions.

The first échelon had advanced as far as the ravine, to receive the remnant of the battalion Murom; but the Turks, who fought with great courage, pressed over the ravine, and General Pahlen's first échelon (H) fell back into a line with the second

(J). This was the moment when the Vizier should have brought the rest of his troops down from the height, so as to surround the left wing of the 2nd corps-d'armée, a manœuvre which the covered ground towards Tjermedin would have greatly favoured. The villages in the hands of the Turks covered their right flank; the corps of Generals Roth and Rudiger were more than two miles apart, and the Vizier had only to deal with 14 battalions and 12 squadrons, at most 8000 Russians. The fight lasted about an hour, and during that time the Russians lost at least 1500 men. The Vizier had brought 15,000 men into action; he must have had at least as many more in reserve: nevertheless this first successful attack was not followed up. On debouching beyond the villages the Turkish right wing was exposed to a concentric fire of grape-shot. The repulsed advanced guard had formed again at M, and was reinforced by a battery of 12 guns belonging to the division of the lancers of the Bug from Matara. This battery fired at N and afterwards at O, within a short distance of the Turks, advancing from Kulewtscha, and poured a destructive fire of grape-shot upon the thick masses in the valley. On the right wing General Pahlen alone had placed 35 guns in battery. The Turks could not return this fire, as they were unable to bring their clumsy guns into action. Thus the fight at last came to a stand, but was still continued with great vigour.

Meanwhile the 1st brigade of the 2nd division of hussars, which had been sent to strengthen General Kreutz at Bulanik (C), had been again withdrawn and placed on General Pahlen's right wing (at J). General Budberg attacked the Turks from thence with two regiments and drove them back, but did not pursue his advantage. The Turks retreated unpursued, and attempted no further attack; they took their wounded and dead with them, and cut off the ears of their Russian prisoners. By four o'clock in the afternoon the Turks had resumed their original position on the wooded heights, and, when the corps of Generals Roth and Rudiger had arrived, General Diebitsch determined to attack the Turks in their position (see the Plan 7).

The chasseur regiments of the 6th division under General Ostroschenko formed on the eastern outlets of Tjirkowna and to the south of the village (P); the 8 battalions of the 5th division, which stood at L, crossed the brook in a line with the advanced guard before Q; the 1st brigade of the 2nd division of hussars, with the horse artillery battery of 12-pounders, made a junction with them (at Q 1), and 2 battalions of the 16th division of General Roth's corps formed the extreme right wing of the line of attack (Q 2): 6 battalions of the 6th division, which had before formed the échelons H and J, and the rest of the 6th and 7th corps-d'armée, 18 battalions, together with a hussar regiment, remained in reserve (R).

The 2nd brigade of the 2nd division of hussars was sent back to General Kreutz, the division of lancers of the Bug to Marasch.

After these movements had been effected, 4 battalions of the 5th division, with General Arnoldi's horse artillery battery of 12-pounders at their head, and followed by the brigade of hussars and 2 battalions of the 16th division with another battery of 12-pounders, marched forward (to S).

The gorge between the steep hills became narrower and narrower, and the Russian front with it. The artillery opened its fire against the Turkish position on the wooded height, but with little effect. Moreover, the batteries, by advancing a little further, would be exposed to the fire of the Turkish skirmishers, supposing the latter to defend the mountain-pass. The cavalry could take no part in the attack, but for this the Turks did not wait. Some of their ammunition waggons exploded, either through their own negligence, or fired by the Russian shells; and this was the signal for a general retreat, which indeed had already partially commenced. The Russians succeeded in gaining the height: the Turkish battery at X was taken, and the Turks were pursued by the 5th division, the hussars of the 2nd division, and the Cossacks, as far as Markoftscha, where these troops met General Kuprianof advancing towards them from Pravadi.

The Turks, who had shown such courage but a few hours before in their attack, now offered scarce any opposition in the defence of their strong position. Their retreat soon turned into a disorderly flight. The Russians no longer found any resistance; the Turks broke their ranks, and disappeared singly in the wood; so that on that day scarce any prisoners were taken. The roads were full of artillery and other waggons, and, after all the material had fallen into the hands of the Russians, General Pahlen returned from the pursuit, because the foe was no longer to be found; but during the following day a number of prisoners were brought in. Among other trophies, besides a very large number of ammunition waggons, 56 guns were taken, all in bad condition and of different calibres; but still more various were the shot: among the canister-shot were balls of every size, mixed with bullets. The axles of the guns were of iron and very massive, the wheels clumsy. The guns, which were drawn partly by horses, partly by mules, had drag-ropes by means of which they could be moved by men during the action. A quantity of Turkish tents, of woollen material painted green, were immediately turned to use during the rain which had begun to fall. Huts, covered with larkspur and wild poppies, were built for the wounded.

If we examine the course of the battle of Kulewtscha, we find that General Diebitsch naturally took up his position so as to oppose the Vizier, upon whichever of the three roads to Shumla he should happen to advance, and to cut him off from that important post. The position selected by the Russians was therefore on the middle road of the three, which, moreover, was the shortest, and most probable line of retreat for the Turks, and from which, by a march of four miles, the Russians could oppose the Vizier on either of the two other roads. We have already observed that it was not possible to ascend the plateau from Newtscha; it was equally difficult from Matara, where the ridge of the heights was already occupied by the Turks. Nor would the Russians in that case have been able to command the roads by Jenibazar or Kamarna, which the Turks might take. Nothing therefore remained but to take up a position between Tjirkowna and Shumla. The distance between these two places was at most ten miles. While, on the one hand, it was not pleasant to take up a position close under the height, whence every movement could be seen, on the other hand, the nearer the Russians got to Shumla, the greater was the danger of being exposed to two attacks at the same time, one from the Vizier, and another from the garrison at Shumla. For this reason the position assigned to General Pahlen, near Tjirkowna, where he opposed the Vizier immediately on his debouching from the heights, was undoubtedly the right one. But it would appear that Generals Roth and Rüdiger should also have been sent thither. In that open country a brigade of cavalry pushed forward to Jenibazar would have discovered the march of the Vizier towards the northern road quite soon enough to have gone from Kulewtscha with the whole army to meet him in the district of Kalugro, without the necessity of General Roth's stay at Matara. The Vizier was just as likely to advance by Kamarna, and in that case General Roth at Matara was some miles distant from that road. When the Turks did eventually debouch by Tjirkowna, the battle was actually decided before the 6th or 7th corps could be brought up. As a reserve these two corps were too far off at Matara; to act on the offensive there was impossible; one half of the Russian army stood facing an almost inaccessible cliff not 1000 paces from them, so that the Turks could count every battalion, and could have fired upon the Russians in perfect safety if they had taken a battery up on the heights. Out of the whole infantry of the 6th and 7th corps, only two battalions took any part in the battle of Kulewtscha.

To return to the battle itself. The advanced guard, under General Ostroschenko, which, in the villages of Kulewtscha and Tjirkowna, was already above a mile from General Pahlen's corps, without any support, and in a mountain-pass surrounded on all sides by the Turks, was pushed still further forward. The commander-in-chief, it seems, wished to ascertain at any risk whether he had the main army or only a division of it before him, so as not to engage in a skirmish, while the Vizier escaped by some other road. There was reason for doubt, as the Turks, up to midday of the 11th of June, made no show of advancing, but waited for the attack. The advanced guard obtained the desired certainty, but paid dear for it. For the second time during this war an opportunity was afforded to the Turks of falling, with greatly superior numbers, upon a weak Russian division. The vicinity of the villages, and the admirable conduct of 3 squadrons of hussars, saved General Ostroschenko's battalions from being utterly cut to pieces; nevertheless, immediately after the battle, the 11th and 12th Chasseurs, and the regiment Murom—each regiment reduced to one battalion—had to be sent back to Jasytepe to form again.

The advance of General Pahlen put a stop to the battle which had begun so unfavourably to the Russians; but it is doubtful whether it would have cut off the Vizier's approach to Shumla, had the latter simply advanced with all the troops he had, in the direction of Tjermedin. It is probable that he would have lost the greater portion of his baggage and artillery, but his retreat upon Kötesch, the back-door of Shumla, could scarcely have been prevented. But the Vizier paused; his vanguard—most likely the best portion of his army—fell back; and in the interval Generals Roth and Rüdiger had reached the field of action.

As soon as it was certain that the Vizier was really before him, General Diebitsch, after collecting his forces, determined to act on the offensive. The project of attacking so strong a foe upon a rocky height, immediately after receiving a decided check, shows the determination of the Russian general and the confidence he had in his troops. The Russians could scarcely expect to meet with so little opposition as was actually the case. The attack, if the Turks only waited for it, could not be supported by either artillery or cavalry, and the infantry had to advance into a woody district, eminently unfavourable to the Russian mode of fighting.

But the Turks, to speak plainly, ran away. They again passed from the most foolhardy courage to utter cowardice, and their first impetuous charge changed at once into a disorderly flight. According to the report of a bimbaschi, or commander of a battalion, who had been taken prisoner, the Vizier knew nothing of General Diebitsch's march. He thought that General Roth alone attempted to cut off his communication with Shumla, and determined to attack him and then to return to Pravadi. After discovering that he had to do with a stronger force, it appears that the Vizier wished to gain the road from Kamarna to Marasch by a détour to the left, to which object a rear guard was destined. But such an army as the Vizier had under his command is always better fitted to make a bold attack than to retreat in the face of an enemy. The explosion of some ammunition-waggons (which it appears happens to the Turks in every engagement) gave the signal for a general dispersion. There may have been some treachery in this. The regular infantry, who could not accustom themselves to the trammels of discipline, were especially dissatisfied. "Whenever there was danger or difficulty to be encountered," said the deserters from that corps, "they were ordered forward. Above all, they were made to march too much." Many saw in this defeat a triumph of the old usages of Islam over the hated reforms; and a great portion of the regular infantry threw away their muskets, which were not their own property. Others fought on their own account, fired upon their officers, and plundered the neighbouring villages. It had been reported and believed among the regular troops that the Sultan intended to brand the men upon the forehead, so that they should be known if they deserted. Moreover the Turkish army appears to have been greatly in want of provisions. The prisoners were quite exhausted, and immediately asked for food, as they had fasted for several days. Many of the Asiatics lost their way and died in the woods of starvation. The Vizier himself reached Shumla by way of Marasch with only 600 horse.

The Russians stated their loss in the battle at 1500 killed and 1000 wounded, about 10 per cent.

of their whole force; but the loss fell upon a small portion of their army, almost exclusively upon the advanced guard and some battalions of the 6th division. Among the wounded were Generals Ostroschenko and Glasenap, besides 61 staff and other officers.

The loss on the side of the Turks in the battle was probably less: during the retreat the disbanding was universal; but a Turkish army is not easily destroyed—it can only be dispersed. Within fourteen days portions of the beaten army gradually found their way into Shumla in detached bodies and by various roads.

The Vizier's first enterprise in May, against General Roth, when no other enemy was in the field against him, cannot be considered a failure. It caused the Russians great loss, and improved the bodily training and the moral courage of the Turkish army. The second great enterprise in June was much more doubtful. Whichever way Reschid Mohammed moved, whether towards Silistria or Pravadi, he always found a Russian corps at a distance of only 4 marches from him, either on his right or his left, who were sure to make their presence be felt if he halted. Silistria was not so pressed as to require instant relief; besides, this could be more easily effected by Hussein Pasha from Rustchuk. The Vizier therefore directed his march against General Roth at Kosludja, where he no longer found his foe scattered in winter quarters, but collected and ready to receive him. He then turned against Pravadi, and pertinaciously attacked a place the possession of which could be but of small benefit to him. For eight days he stormed a weak hornwork on the western height in vain, and thus gave General Diebitsch time to come up with him and cut off his retreat upon Shumla. The attempt to regain that point cost him his army.

The former campaign was lost by the inactivity of Hussein Pasha and his subordinate Omar Vrione; the campaign of 1829 was ruined by the enterprising spirit of Reschid Pasha. There is this material difference, that Hussein Pasha, at the close of operations against a worn-out hostile force, might have acted with a great prospect of success and very little danger; whereas it was incumbent upon Reschid Pasha, at the beginning of a campaign, and against a fresh and strong army, to have proceeded with greater prudence. The Russians could desire nothing better than a battle in the open field with the main army of the Turks.

The battle of Kulewtscha changed the whole aspect of affairs, and the next step that General Diebitsch would take was anxiously looked for.

The naval expedition to Sizeboli, on the other side of the Balkan, and the whole posture of affairs, made it evident that it had from the first been the intention of the Russian commander to cross that bulwark of the Ottoman empire. General Diebitsch could scarcely have to send for fresh instructions to Warsaw, as nothing had occurred beyond what had been attempted and wished for from the beginning of the campaign—a victory over the Turkish main army. Moreover on the 27th a courier arrived bringing the reward for the victory that had been achieved. If therefore the passage across the Balkan was an essential part of the original plan of campaign, it appeared that the time was now come to carry it into effect, and any further delay could only render the undertaking more difficult.

It is true that Shumla had not fallen into the hands of the Russians, but this point only gains importance by the presence of an army. Its warlike population still gave Shumla a strong power of defence; but the remains of a beaten army without artillery afforded it no offensive strength that could not be paralysed by the presence of a corps of observation. Silistria was completely invested, Varna taken, and, with their operations based upon the Dobrudscha and the sea, the Russians could now cross the Balkan. The season was favourable for the purpose; the heat had not yet risen beyond 95°; grass and corn for the horses were to be found on the mountains, as well as on the southern side of the Balkan; heavy showers kept even the plain green. Immediately after the battle of Kulewtscha the appearance of a Russian army would everywhere cause a panic, whereas longer delay on their part would give the Turks time to collect their forces, and to fortify themselves in Aidos, Karnabat, and other strongholds, while the Russians would be daily losing a portion of their army by disease. The plague had already broken out in Pravadi, and the condition of the troops at Varna was frightful.

All these reasons were in favour of crossing the Balkan immediately, but the Russians were too weak. General Diebitsch had no more than 25,000 men; if he detached only 10,000 to observe the Vizier at Shumla he would have but 15,000 left to force his way through the defiles of the Balkan, to penetrate into the heart of an enemy's country, and possibly to withstand a popular and religious war. Silistria was hard pressed, and its fall was daily expected. Thus, if General Krassowski's corps was the only reinforcement that General Diebitsch could hope for, it was natural and justifiable in him to wait for the arrival of that corps before making so important an advance.

Other weighty considerations were superadded: negotiations had begun; the need of getting supplies sufficient to last the troops for many days, and which could not be procured on the spot,—the unavoidable necessity for sending out parties to discover the real extent of the victory the Russians had gained,—the desire of giving the troops some rest,—and lastly, the intention of covering the investiment of Silistria against any attempt at relief, on the part of the Turks in Rustchuk,*—and a thousand other minor considerations which generally escape the eye of the critic, and which General Clausewitz so aptly calls "the friction of the machine of war,"—all these together caused the truce that now intervened.

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[*] Rustchuk is now well defended: it has extensive curtains with flanking defences and large bastions enclosing the whole city. The enceinte comprises 5 miles; the river-side defences are very strong; the batteries from 3 to 45 feet above the water. The heavy guns, if well laid, will command the opposite bank of the river, and even as far as Giurgevo. There are boats enough in the creek to transport 5000 men across, and a gunboat flotilla.—TRANSLATOR.

CHAPTER IV.

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES FROM THE MIDDLE OF JUNE TO THE MIDDLE OF JULY—THE PASSAGE OF THE BALKAN — THE BATTLE NEAR AIDOS, JAMBOLI, AND SLIVNO — THE MARCH UPON ADRIANOPLE.

THE day after the battle a Te Deum was sung for the victory; General Roth then marched to Marasch and General Rüdiger to Eski-Stambul to cut off the retreat of the dispersed Turks upon Shumla. General Pahlen after returning from the pursuit remained stationary at Matara.

On the march to Eski-Stambul on the 12th of June, the hussars of the 3rd division under General Madatof came near some forts which the Turks had erected close to the old Russian redoubts No. 3 and 4. (See the Plan of Shumla.) The hussars attacked one of these forts, entered it by the gorge, and took it; the second fort offered some resistance, whereupon the hussars got off their horses and took it lance in hand. The third fort repulsed the attack of the hussars until the infantry arrived and put the garrison to the sword. 600 Turks were killed; 12 stands of colours, 5 guns, and a large camp behind the forts were taken; the Russians lost only 100 killed and wounded.

On the following day General Diebitsch and his staff reconnoitred the camp before Shumla. In the Russian head-quarters they were inclined to believe that during the panic immediately after the battle Shumla might be taken by a bold assault; and the result of the fight of the 12th, when even cavalry charged and took forts, appeared to countenance such an opinion: at all events, this exploit had great moral influence. On the other hand, it might well be surmised that 18,000 armed inhabitants could easily offer an obstinate resistance; that a failure might imperil the success which the Russians had already achieved; and even under the most favourable circumstances the possession of Shumla offered no positive advantage to the Russians, as after driving the Turks out of their encampment they would find them again on the other side of the Balkan; moreover, the Russians could not spare from offensive operations the troops necessary to keep such extended lines.

In the afternoon a heavy cannonade was heard in the direction of Marasch and Eski-Stambul; the fire was directed against detachments of Turkish cavalry that attempted to reach Shumla, in which they were successful. A sortie made by the Turks from the Matchin redoubt was unsuccessful.

During the following days negotiations were entered into with the Turks. A tent was erected between the outposts, in which the Russian Privy

Councillor Fonton met the Vizier's Plenipotentiaries. General Diebitsch caused the Turk to be informed, that in accordance with the Czar's instructions he looked upon the victory he had just obtained only as a step towards putting an end to the war by negotiation.

The Vizier replied, "that victory or defeat depended on the will of God, according to whose immutable decrees victory had inclined first to one side and then to the other at Pravadi and Kulewtscha. He himself was only a military vicegerent, and unacquainted with the political state of affairs." Without completely refusing to treat, the Vizier would not enter into any definitive terms. The Turks obtained leave to bury their dead at the redoubts 3 and 4. They buried on the spot only such corpses as had been gnawed by the dogs, the rest they carried with them to Shumla.

On the 15th of June the head-quarters were removed to before Shumla, and after pitching the tents a regular siege began. The Russians evacuated Eski-Stambul and Marasch. General Pahlen with the 2nd corps formed the right wing near the redoubt No. 26 (see the Plan of Shumla); General Roth with the 6th corps occupied the middle by Kassaply; General Rüdiger with the 7th corps the left wing towards Marasch. The battalions lay in columns towards the middle, the divisions in two lines, the artillery in the intervals between the columns. A division of the battalion 300 strong, newly raised by General Liprandi at Jassy, entered the camp. This battalion was composed of all sorts of vagabonds, of Arnauts, Wallachians, and Servians, armed after the Turkish fashion, who were to be used in the guerilla warfare in the Balkan.

On the 10th of June the Commander-in-Chief, accompanied by a small staff, again made a reconnoissance towards Shumla. They met with no Turks, but were regularly attacked by an enormous pack of dogs devouring the corpses on the field of battle. Some movement was taking place in the Turkish camp. A great number of the tents in the plain were struck, and appeared shortly afterwards on the heights of Strandscha. Hereupon the Russian army was pushed on to the right. The head-quarters and the 2nd corps were at Injeköi; the 6th to the right, the 7th to the left of Bulanik. The lancers, under General Kreutz, were sent forward on the road from Silistria; the 3rd division of hussars, under Prince Madatof, to Rasgrad, whither a corps of Arnauts was said to have advanced from Shumla, in order, after forming a junction with Hussein Pasha, to attempt the relief of the besieged town. Prince Madatof, however, returned 4 days afterwards without having met the enemy. The day before he reached Djummaja (or Eski-Shumla), a fresh force of 2000 men from Constantinople had passed through. The hamlets of this district were inhabited and prosperous, but, on seeing the Russians, the inhabitants took to flight or prepared to resist. Proclamations were issued, exhorting the people to remain quiet, and to stay in their houses; generally speaking, however, the feeling in Bulgaria was very hostile to the Russians. A number of Turks who had escaped from the field of battle at Kulewtscha were scattered among the villages and interrupted the communications; a strong detachment of cavalry had been despatched by the Turks from Shumla, in order to assemble the able-bodied men from the surrounding districts. The forests were full of Bulgarians, who waged war on their own account. Owing to the country being covered with underwood it was extremely difficult to keep open the communication with the Danube. Eleven staff officers had already been killed at the head of their columns by the skirmishers lying in ambuscade near the roads. In order to put a stop to this evil, 7 battalions and the whole 3rd division of hussars were detached to Djummaja, Rasgrad, and the surrounding districts. Two villages in the rear of Jenibazar were burnt, as some Russian officers had been fired at there.

On the 1st of July Colonel Howe was sent with 2 battalions to the Kamtchik, to reconnoitre. News soon arrived that he had been surrounded and attacked. Only one of the Cossacks whom he had despatched made his way back, and a brigade sent to his assistance no longer found him. Meanwhile, Colonel Howe returned in safety on the 4th of July. He had advanced as far as Jenikoi, on the Kamtchik. Attacked by 3000 horsemen, he had formed his 2 battalions into open squares, thrown out skirmishers, and had fallen back, fighting all the way, as the Turkish infantry advanced. He had brought back 40 wounded on camels, and had only left 9 dead.

Meanwhile, matters went on very quietly at Shumla. Many reconnaissances were made without much result. The hostile outposts were placed close to each other, without any shots being exchanged. The Turkish double videttes were established after the European fashion, their advanced posts being covered. The troops were exercised with the firelock in the camp. There were 12 regular battalions, of which one was dressed in red uniform. They moved in 2 lines, in column and line, with admirable precision; they deployed at double quick time; and were even exercised in skirmishing. Russian officers who were prisoners in Shumla sent for their baggage, and some Turks rode to the advanced posts, stuck their lances into the ground, laid aside their pistols, and begged leave to send money and provisions to their captive brethren; others inquired if it was really the intention of the Russians to cross the Balkan. When the news of the fall of Silistria reached head-quarters on the 2nd of July, the Russians fired a feu-de-joie of 101 guns. Alarmed by this, the Turks advanced in strong columns towards the outworks of the camp: a Turkish officer of rank, sent to reconnoitre, sat leisurely down on a carpet before the fortress, and sent his Tschochodar, or cloak-bearer, to the nearest post to ask what the firing meant. On receiving the answer, the Turks went quietly back to their quarters. It was reported in Shumla that the Russians were afraid of an attack, and wished to show that they still had plenty of powder and shot; that General Diebitsch was dead, and that a new commander had arrived.

As the Turkish irregular troops already began to desert, the Vizier cut the ears of all those who were discovered going towards their homes. In spite of all inducements held out to them, very few deserters came over to the Russians.

On the 1st of July a convoy of 200 waggons approached on its way from Eski-Stambul. The escort skirmished with the Russian outposts, and a troop of 150 Turkish horse sallied forth from the Matchin redoubt. The Cossacks made some prisoners; but the convoy succeeded in entering the Turkish lines.

On the 11th the Turks sent a division of cavalry to forage near Marasch. The Cossacks on the Russian left flank intercepted them, and made a few prisoners. The lancers of the Bug went to the assistance of the Cossacks, but a body of 3000

Turkish horse advanced, and drew up in 3 lines before the Russian entrenchments. General Rüdiger received orders to attack only in the event of the Turks advancing still farther. They did advance, and a skirmish took place, in which the Turks had the best of it. They, however, fired at too great a distance, and the loss on both sides was trifling; as there seemed no intention on either side of putting an end to the fight, the Turks brought up first 2, then 4, and lastly 8 guns, whereas General Rüdiger had but 4. Thus, from the vast superiority in artillery, the Russians were the weakest. The Russians did not fire their guns at all; the Turks galloped singly out of the ranks and fired off their carbines. At length General Rüdiger attacked them with 2 squadrons in advance, and 2 others in échellon on both wings. The 1st line of the Turks consisted of skirmishers, the 2nd was drawn close up to the guns, the 3rd was in reserve. When the Russian squadrons advanced, the 2 first lines of the Turkish troops fled, and their artillery was near falling into the hands of the Russians. But the échellons were too far in the rear, the Turkish reserve advanced, and both sides came to a dead stop. The Turks began to fire, the 2 Russian squadrons in front fell back, and the whole swarm of Turks rushed upon them until they in their turn encountered the 2 squadrons in échellon on the two flanks. The Turks then retired within their lines. Meanwhile, their artillery had found time to move off. The Grand Vizier himself was in great danger during this skirmish; two Cossacks closely pursued him, and one of his pages was cut down. At length a Dehli, who saw the danger to which he was exposed, attacked the Cossacks, and saved the Pasha. In this skirmish the Russians lost 50 horses.

While this was going on in Bulgaria, in Wallachia General Geismar, with the small force at his disposal—the 1st division of dragoons and the 17th of infantry, together with the 10th infantry brigade—had succeeded in holding in check the garrisons of the Upper Danube. He announced that an attack which he had made upon Rahova (on the Danube, between Nicopolis and Widdin) had been successful. Considerable cargoes of corn and other provisions were being continually carried from Widdin down the Danube; these went partly to provision Giurgevo and Rustchuk, and were partly conveyed thence by land to Shumla. In order to put a stop to this traffic, General Geismar determined to take up a strong position, *à cheval*, on the Danube, by taking Rahova, which the Turks had fortified.

With this view, the battalion of the 34th regiment of chasseurs, stationed with 2 guns on the Schyll, was reinforced with 2 battalions of the regiment Tomsk, 1 battalion of the regiment Kolywan, and 1 battalion of the regiment Tobolsk; besides this, 8 heavy guns and 8 horse-artillery guns, the dragoon regiment Moscow, 1 squadron of mounted pioneers, and 1 sotuja of Cossacks were ordered to join the chasseurs: 80 boats and 10 punts, built at Crajova, were floated down the Schyll as far as the confluence of that stream with the Danube, whither the whole detachment under the command of Count Tolstoi marched during the night of the 27th of May.

On the Turkish side of the Danube were 2 redoubts on the height, and 1 on the river side. The latter was armed with 3 guns, and, supported by some boats carrying a few light guns, commanded the mouth of the Schyll. At daybreak the Russians opened a heavy fire from 22 guns. At the same time 200 volunteers and 1 battalion of the 34th regiment of chasseurs crossed the Danube, in spite of a heavy fire from the houses, and made good their landing. Captain Grabbe was the first to spring on shore; at the head of his volunteers he attacked one of the redoubts on the hill. Although wounded, he stormed the fort with his weak detachment without waiting for the rest of the corps, and took it after an obstinate fight of 4 hours. Two companies occupied the heights which commanded the town. The garrison of the Turkish battery on the Danube was thus cut off from Rahova. Meanwhile, the regiment Tobolsk had landed below this battery, in which the Turks defended themselves with the courage of despair, and refused quarter: they were all cut to pieces. Several of the houses in the town had to be stormed singly, until at length the Pasha gave up the citadel: one of the Turkish vessels, with 1 gun, was taken. The Russians lost in this engagement 3 officers, 47 men; 11 officers and 175 men were wounded. One pasha, 6 pair of colours, and 5 guns were the trophies of the victory; the loss of the Turks amounted to 1500 men. The Christian population of Rahova was removed to the province of Kasan, where dwellings were provided for them.

But it was impossible at this time to penetrate further into Servia, and General Geismar had quite enough to do to protect the Principalities—which were now visited by a fearful pestilence—against fresh attacks from Widdin. For this reason the Russian troops evacuated Rahova.

Shumla had again kept the Russian troops four weeks under its walls, when at length the 3rd corps followed by an immense baggage-train advanced from Silistria. At first the 8th division, consisting of 8 battalions and 8 12-pounders, entered the camp. Then came the 9th division, and preparations were now made for crossing the Balkan. General Krassowski, with the 3rd corps, was left to watch Shumla; General Roth, with the 6th corps, was to proceed along the road from Varna to Burgas; while General Rüdiger, with the 7th corps, was to cross the mountains by the road from Pravadi to Aidos. General Pahlen, with the 2nd corps, was to act as a reserve to these two columns. The head-quarters followed with this corps.

The troops marched in caps, in uniform, and in linen trowsers. Their great-coats were rolled and strapped over the left, the knapsack over the right shoulder. In the latter the soldiers carried only one shirt and one pair of trowsers; but then each man took ten days' provisions. Their chacos and all their baggage remained behind.

Although the defence of the Balkan and of the Kamtchik was absolutely necessary under existing circumstances, Reschid Mohammed sent for a corps of 9 regiments of infantry destined for that purpose, and some thousand Albanians who were in the Balkan, to join him at Shumla. The surrender of Shumla, hitherto reckoned impregnable, would have produced the worst impression in Constantinople, which was already in a state of great fermentation. Before the Russians marched to the Balkan, Divine service was solemnly celebrated, and prayers were put up for the successful issue of the war.

The evening, before the 8th division entered the camp, General Roth, with 4 battalions of the 7th and 6 battalions of the 16th division of infantry—making altogether 10 battalions—16 squadrons, 2 regiments of Cossacks, and 32 guns, had proceeded in the direction of Devno. The 8th division then took up its position before Shumla. Early on the 15th of July, General Rüdiger, with 10 battalions of his corps, 2 regiments of Cossacks, and 24 guns, marched in the direction of Koprikoi, on the Kamtchik. His place in the camp was occupied by the 9th division under General Krassowski. Of the 10th division 5 battalions had remained behind to garrison Silistria; the remainder had gone to reinforce Generals Giesmar and Kisselef, to Rustchuk and Widdin. With the baggage of the 3rd corps-d'armée were 80 waggons containing Turkish families, who by the terms of the capitulation had free passage from Silistria to Shumla.

After General Pahlen, with 17 battalions, 8 squadrons, and 30 guns, had marched to the station of Jenibazar, General Krassowski broke up his quarters late in the evening of the 17th of July, as quietly as he could, in order there to take up a post of observation, with 24 battalions of the 3rd corps-d'armée, the regiment Wiätka, and the 38th regiment of chasseurs of the 7th corps, the 3rd division of hussars, a brigade of lancers of the Bug, and a brigade of the 2nd hussars—making 28 battalions, 34 squadrons, 2 regiments of Cossacks, and a numerous artillery—altogether about 15,000 men. A general staff-officer placed in observation on the left wing reported that this movement was not visible from Shumla. Most likely, however, the march was betrayed by a Russian officer who had deserted, as early on the morning of the following day the Turks sent out a strong reconnoitring party of 1000 men;

and after finding no Russians before Shumla, the Turks quietly returned to their quarters there.

It is evident that with reference to the march upon Koprikoi, General Krassowski had better have gone with his covering party to Marasch: indeed, he subsequently went thither. Possibly the Russians wished to find out, while the 2nd corps was still at hand to give its support, what the Vizier would do when he was free. He did exactly what was expected—nothing at all.

Before daybreak head-quarters with the 2nd corps left Jenibazar on the 18th of July: they halted from seven o'clock in the morning till four in the afternoon at Beilikoi, and towards dark they reached Devno, after marching 23 miles. The village was completely destroyed and deserted, but the Russians built some temporary barracks in the two redoubts with the ruins of the houses, and made a good road to connect Devno with Varna, in place of the old Turkish one, which was often flooded.

News came from General Roth that he had found 3000 Turks with 12 guns in an entrenched camp on the other side of the river near Podbaschi, not far from the mouth of the Kamtchik. The camp of Podbaschi was separated by a broad morass from another position still further in the rear, at Derwisch-jowan (see the Plan). Old oaks, thick-spreading ivy, and the rank vegetation of boggy land, rendered the place an impenetrable wilderness, which could only be crossed by one very bad road 2½ miles long. The Turks had encamped close to the banks of the Kamtchik: the entrenchment was 600 paces long, but open in the gorge: there were embrasures for their guns. To give effect to their fire they had cut down the wood to within 500 or 600 paces in front; but this had the effect of exposing their entrenched position, which could be overlooked and commanded from the left edge of the valley. The river was 50 paces broad at that spot, very deep and rapid; the ground was marshy and the banks were from 8 to 10 feet high. A bridge of boats used for crossing the river was drawn across to the Turkish side.

The works of Derwisch-jowan lay at the foot of the right edge of the valley, and consisted of a breastwork formed of wattles. After the Turks at Podbaschi had been cannonaded the whole day, General Roth marched to the right to turn the position, by crossing the river at a very difficult ford five miles higher up.

Meanwhile General Rüdiger had crossed the Kamtchik on the same day at Koprikoi. There he found Jussuf, a pasha of two tails, entrenched with 3000 men. While occupying his attention in front with 2 battalions, and 1 regiment of Cossacks under General Schirow, he himself crossed the river on pontoons at a place two or three miles lower down called Czalymale. There, towards daybreak, he came upon 1000 Turks, who fled, leaving 2 pairs of colours. General Rüdiger left 2 battalions at Czalymale and marched with 10 battalions to Koprikoi, where Jussuf Pasha had taken up a position on a height near the village. The Turkish entrenchments were now attacked by the brigade of chasseurs of the 19th division. The Turks only fired six rounds of canister-shot and fled. The 27th regiment of chasseurs threw aside their knapsacks and great-coats and pursued them. The Turks, during their retreat, defended their guns at the point of the bayonet; nevertheless 4 guns and 5 pairs of colours were taken: only 16 prisoners were captured, but many Turks were killed during the pursuit: the Russians lost in killed and wounded about 65 men and 2 officers. The whole camp and the baggage of the Turks fell into the hands of the Russians.

In order to secure the important passage of the river at Koprikoi (Bridge Village) a brigade was left there; the bridge over the Kamtchik was restored and a tête-du-pont built in front of it. This post formed the shortest means of communication between the army crossing the Balkan and the corps of observation before Shumla, which now received orders to remove to Marasch so as to secure the rear of the advancing army.

On the 19th of July the head-quarters advanced in the direction of Derwisch-jowan. The march led by Gebedje, where a bad dyke crosses the marsh and a wretched bridge spans the rapid river Devna. A triangular redoubt defends the defile on the right bank. The weather was wet when General Roth took this road, and the deep clay soil was much cut up. In the narrow hollow ways opposite Bujuk-Alladin and beyond Osmandjik the Russians had to leave the greater part of their waggons behind, and could not recover them till the following day. The order kept during this march was not much commended by eye-witnesses: the baggage-train was very great, but the confusion was still greater.

General Roth had left behind on the main road General Froloff with some battalions, and had gone himself to Dulgerarda (about 5 miles above Podbaschi on the Kamtchik). The roads were very bad, and four bridges had to be made across as many arms of the river. On the other side the Turks had thrown up some earthworks, which, however, were not provided with artillery, and at daybreak on the 19th of July the Russians crossed over. General Wiliamow, at the head of 4 battalions, attacked and took the nearest entrenchment. Hereupon General Roth prepared to attack the fortified camp of Derwisch-jowan. The greatest difficulty lay in the badness of the road, which had to be opened with the axe; the smallest was the resistance of the Turks. The entrenchments on the height were immediately taken. On this occasion a remarkable fight with cavalry occurred. A newly-formed regiment of Turkish lancers received the charge of a body of Cossacks, standing still and with couched lances. The Cossacks rushed on with wild cries, but turned round or turned aside on finding that the Turks held their ground. The lancer regiment of St. Petersburg followed the Cossacks, and the Turks hoped that the manœuvre would be repeated; but the lancers actually charged, dispersed the Turks, cut down a good many, and made the rest prisoners: 5 guns and 4 colours were taken in the fort. The position of Podbaschi would now have been easy to take in the gorge, but the 5th division of General Pahlen's corps had already effected this operation while the attack upon Derwisch-jowan was made: 200 volunteers of the 9th and 10th regiment of chasseurs had plunged into the river above the bridge and swam across. The Turks were so alarmed at this, that after one discharge they retreated, taking their guns with them. The Cossacks captured one gun during the retreat.

The head-quarters and the 2nd corps marched on the 20th of July as far as Derwisch-jowan. Although General Rüdiger had gained the passage over the river at Koprikoi, he did not pursue his march straight by Nadir-Dubrut to Aidos; but determined to go a great way round. The great difficulties of the Kirkgetjid valley (see the chapter on the Passes of the Balkan), and the ease with which any advance in that pass could be stopped, determined him to march along the right bank of the river as far as the bridge of Podbaschi, with the view likewise of opening this defile for General Roth, should the Turks still contest the passage across the Kamtchik. On the 20th, therefore, he went by Derwisch-jowan to Arnautlar. General Roth lay at Aspros, a large Bulgarian village in a ravine on the Black Sea. The inhabitants met him, bearing the cross before them.

On the following day the head-quarters advanced towards evening to Arnautlar; Generals Roth and Rüdiger likewise made short marches, the first to Erekliajakoi on the sea, the latter to Aiwadchik on the Kosakodereh. The roads were heavy, and in order to get the waggons along, the pioneers had to be assisted by numerous working parties from the infantry. The heat on that day was most oppressive; even in the evening the thermometer was at 82°, but stormy, cold weather set in, and it went down on the same day to below 54°.

The Russian engineers also threw up entrenchments at Arnautlar, but in a very unskilful manner, so as to be overlooked from the heights behind within musket-shot. An abattis was constructed with the fruit-trees belonging to the village, although the forest was just as near: this was done ostensibly in order to keep the well in the place under fire. Large provisions of hay had been got together at every halting place.

At four in the morning the head-quarters were removed to Erketsch, on the edge of the valley of the Nadir, where they were joined by the 7th corps. Some Turkish cavalry appeared in the valley below, was reinforced from Aidos, and brought up one gun. But no sooner had General Schirow set himself in motion with 2 regiments of Cossacks, in order to attack a foe five or six times stronger than himself, than the latter took flight without offering any resistance beyond firing one pistol-shot. The Cossacks pursued the fugitives for five miles before they could overtake them. A great number of Turks, when they found the strength of their horses failing, quietly dismounted and surrendered themselves prisoners: 130 prisoners and 2 standards were taken.

A sharp cannonade was now heard from the direction of the sea. Towards evening General Roth had fallen in with a Turkish division of 7000 men which was drawn up at Monastirkoi. This was a part of the corps under Abdur Rachman, the former Pasha of Bosnia, to whom had been intrusted the defence of the seaports and the blockade of Sizeboli, and who at the same time commanded the whole of the troops on the Kamtchik. General Roth occupied the attention of the Turks with 2 squadrons in front, while 4 others turned their right flank. The Turks soon fled, some towards Missivri, and some to Burgass, leaving behind them 2 cannon, 9 standards, and 800 prisoners. General Roth pursued them to Missivri and took the redoubt which stands in front of the narrow tongue of land (vide Plan).

A general shout of joy burst forth when the Russians came down from the mountains and saw the flags of their ships flying over the broad shining surface of the bay of Burgass. Admiral Greig lay there at anchor with 3 ships of the line, 5 frigates, and a number of transports loaded with provisions. The Turks now found themselves completely shut up in Missivri, but they might perfectly well have prolonged the defence of the place. The town stands upon a height which rises out of the sea, with perpendicular chalk cliffs, and is joined to the shore by a low neck of land nearly 1000 paces long, defended by a massive old tower.* The place can be bombarded from the redoubt and from the sea, but it would be difficult to take if well defended. On the other hand, the maintenance of Missivri would have little influence on the issue of the campaign, as it is difficult for the garrison to debouch out of the place; moreover, terms of capitulation had already been entered upon. The Turks demanded free exit, which was refused; and the commander of the place, Osman, a pasha of two tails, surrendered himself and his garrison of 2000 men prisoners of war. The Russians took 12 guns,

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* This, as well as the gate and the beautiful Byzantine church, was built by the Emperor Theophilos.

10 colours, and a new Turkish corvette pierced for 22 guns which was still on the stocks.

On the 23rd of July the Russian army concentrated itself still more to the east towards the sea, the head-quarters went as far as Injekoi-Turetzki, the 6th corps to Barakli, the 7th to Ahiolo; so that the whole body of troops were only distant one march from each other. General Schirrow's Cossacks captured 1000 puds of powder and 2000 measures of maize at Dautly.

General Diebitsch visited the admiral on board the Paris, whither a steamer from Sizeboli brought the news that the Turks had already quitted Ahiolo, and that the crew of a Russian frigate had already occupied the place, which was difficult to take from the land side (see the Plan), and had found there 12 guns, 1 mortar, 3 magazines of powder, and 1 of salt. On his return from the admiral's ship, General Diebitsch visited the Archimandrite in Missivri.

On the following day General Roth advanced upon Burgass. The Turks appeared before the town, where they found an advantageous position (Plan of Burgass). Attacked by the Russian chasseurs under General Nabel, they fled without offering any resistance, and the 6th Russian corps entered the town, where 10 guns and stores of all kinds fell into their hands. Intelligence arrived from General Poncet, who commanded at Sizeboli, that he had driven back the Turkish investing corps. All the maritime places round the broad basin of Burgass, so strong by nature, and so easy of defence, thus fell into the hands of the Russians. The 7th corps went that same day to Rumelikoi, a part of the 2nd to Eski-Baschly, to be near Generals Roth and Rüdiger in case of necessity. The rest of the 2nd corps and the head-quarters remained at Turetzki.

On the 24th of July the 6th corps from Burgass, and half the 2nd corps from Eski-Baschli, joined the 7th corps at Rumelikoi; the head-quarters with the remainder of the 2nd corps advanced as far as Eski-Baschli, which is only 3 miles from Rumelikoi. Here, on the 9th day from the time the head-quarters broke up from before Shumla, all the forces destined for offensive operations were assembled. In this short time the Russians had effected a march of above 100 miles through an unknown and difficult mountainous country. The formidable barrier of the Balkan had been crossed, the resistance at the Kamtchik and the Nadir had been overcome. By the capture of 4 strongholds on the sea-board, immediately in the rear of the corps of observation, the provisioning of the army was secured; the wet weather had supplied forage for the horses; and the fortifications of Pravadi, Devna, and Varna, Koprikoi and Arnautlar protected the communications with Bulgaria. The population on the southern side of the Balkan, consisting chiefly of Greeks, who had not yet suffered from the presence of an army nominally friendly to their cause, received the Russians with open arms, as their brethren in religion, and as their deliverers. The people remained at home, went about their daily avocations, and took advantage of the flight of their Turkish oppressors to carry their harvest. Many villagers begged to have Russians quartered upon them, as a protection against the wrath of the fugitive Osmanlis.

Many thousand Turkish families had fled to the mountains and woods. Emissaries were sent under the protection of a battalion to induce these families to return home quietly, on condition that they should deliver up their arms and give hostages for their good conduct. On receiving the assurance that they should not be sent to colonize Russia, they did not absolutely refuse the proffered terms, but asked for 5 days to consider them, as they wished to come in a body or not at all. At the end of that time, pressed by sheer want, the Turkish inhabitants of 18 villages gave up their arms and came back.

Up to this time General Diebitsch had undoubtedly acted with consummate vigour, decision, and good fortune. What stood him in good stead was the over-estimate of the Russian forces by the Turks. "It were easier," said an officer sent by Osman Pasha to reconnoitre, "to count the leaves of a forest than the heads of the enemy." The Turkish commanders believed that General Diebitsch was at the head of at least 100,000 men. But the Grand Vizier still remained behind his walls at Shumla; and in the Russian head-quarters there were many influential voices in favour of a retreat. They said that "it was impossible to give up the communications; that it was essential to hold the places on the coast, and then to fall back with the rest of the corps so as to take Shumla first, for which purpose a battering train should first be sent thither from Silistria. But above all they must wait for reinforcements;" although these, as it appeared, only consisted of the skeleton of the reduced 12th division which was to be shipped off to Sizeboli. It is true that the Archimandrite of Ahiolo was desired to work upon the Christian population, and induce such as were capable of bearing arms to assist in the liberation of their country. They were to be fed and paid, if necessary to be armed, to be incorporated as tirailleurs in the weakest regiments, and to assist in garrisoning the strongholds in the rear of the Russian army. But this reinforcement was neither numerous nor serviceable. On the other hand, there were not wanting voices to urge "that after once crossing the Balkan they ought not to halt half way. That the victories they had already achieved, the dispersion and demoralization of the Turkish forces, and the friendly disposition of the Christian population, made up for the numerical inferiority of the Russians. That it was notorious that there was only a small Turkish army at Adrianople. That longer delay would give the enemy time to strengthen and entrench this force. That if anything could induce the Vizier to quit his hiding-hole and advance into the plain, it would be a march upon the second metropolis of the state, distant only 65 miles, and that they would be sure to beat the Turks, however numerous, in the open field, as in this case General Krassowski's corps could be brought into play."

But their very success made the Russians uneasy. They had encountered so little opposition on the most difficult ground, that they could not but think that hitherto they had only had to contend with undisciplined hordes who were merely the forerunners of a real army, and this they expected to meet nowhere so certainly as at Aidos.

The same valley into which the sea at Burgass advances so deep inland stretches out into a wide plain between the Balkan and the Strandscha range of mountains as far as Karnabat. The gently undulating surface of the valley is plentifully supplied with wood and water, and is exceedingly fruitful. The rich clay-soil, the pasture-lands covered with herds of buffaloes, the luxuriant woods, the quantity of springs and streams, the number of prosperous villages, and the vicinity of seaports, render this district one of the most thriving in Turkey in Europe. This district is admirably adapted to be the station of a military colony, if the Turkish government were able to carry out such a scheme, after the example of Austria on her frontier-lands. Under good management the colony would thrive rapidly: protected by the mountains in their front, and situated upon the most important road to the capital, and the one most exposed to attack, such a military colony would defend the approaches to Constantinople far better than any fortress.

On the northern edge of this plain, and close to the foot of the Balkan, rise the minarets of Aïdos, a considerable but open town of 25,000 inhabitants. The lay of the ground is unfavourable to fortifications. To the east the ridge of the valley through which the brook Aidos flows, and which commands the town, might be included in the fortifications, but to the west, where the heights are from 1000 to 1800 paces distant, it would be difficult to include them within the lines.

On the 25th of July the 7th corps was pushed forward against this place. The Cossacks scoured the country close up to the town, but General Rüdiger had orders to avoid a general engagement.

Alarmed at the progress of the Russians, the Grand Vizier, after sending for Hussein Pasha from Rustchuk, had sent 10,000 or 12,000 men from Shumla to Aidos: these forces advanced against General Rüdiger on the heights to the east of the town, where the Turks had begun to throw up some entrenchments. The Russians brought up their guns and cannonaded the Turks. A brigade of lancers advanced to the attack, and the Turks, whose skirmishers had been beaten back, retired into Aidos. Without firing a shot the 37th regiment of chasseurs advanced against Aidos. The Turks fled, many were killed during the pursuit, 125 taken prisoners, and 3 guns captured, one of which was a Russian piece taken in the previous campaign. In the town were found 600 tents, 500 tons of powder, 3000 military cloaks, as well as great store of arms and ammunition.

On the following day as General Diebitsch was about to advance upon Aidos he received intelligence of its capture. The 2nd corps then assembled at Rumelikoi, the 6th joined the 7th at Aidos, the head-quarters were removed thither, and General Diebitsch took possession of the palace of Jussuf Pasha, the defender of Varna, which had been inhabited during the previous autumn by the Grand Vizier. On the following day everything was quiet.

The filth of the Turkish camp at Aidos, and of the town itself, was frightful: hundreds of dead bodies of men, horses, and camels lay festering in the streets and courts. The atmosphere was poisoned to such a degree that the seeds of the diseases which henceforth raged among the Russian troops were probably sown during their stay in Aidos.

General Ragofsky, with the regiment Wiätka, the

38th regiment of chasseurs, and 10 guns, joined the rest of the corps. He had come the straight road from Shumla by Köprikoi and Nadir-Derbent, having found a few small abattis in his way, but no Turkish troops. The 2nd division of hussars and a brigade of lancers of the Bug under General Petrischkof likewise joined the corps: they had come from Jenibazar by Gebedje and Erhetsch. The Russians had brought very little cavalry with them on their march across the Balkan, as they thought they would not be much needed and were afraid of getting no forage for the horses. These reinforcements were, therefore, very necessary for further offensive operations, and the want of more cavalry was much felt.

The Grand Vizier remained immoveable at Shumla. Exclusive of the male population fit to bear arms, but not to march, he could scarcely have had more than 15,000 men. General Krassowski had almost as many men, and if, instead of going back to Jenibazar, he fixed his head-quarters at Eski-Stambul, there was little fear of any force being detached to annoy the right flank of the Russians. All the troops that General Diebitsch could collect for offensive operations were assembled at Aidos: the force consisted of 41 battalions, 52 squadrons, and a numerous train of artillery—altogether 25,000 men and 96 guns. By the capture of the seaports the provisioning of the troops was placed on a new and secure basis. Intelligence came from Adrianople that there were only a few thousand men in the place, and that the Christian population longed for the arrival of the Russians. The battle of Aidos had produced its moral effect; every day the Turkish inhabitants came to the Russian outposts, and gave up their arms. They received in return a white flag which was to protect their hamlet from all hostilities on the part of the Russians. It was distinctly stated in General Diebitsch's proclamation that no soldiers should be quartered in the houses of the Turks, as that would have been intolerable to them on account of their hareems. General Diebitsch likewise promised that the women should be respected, the mosques were to remain open for religious service, the name of the Sultan to be mentioned as usual in the Friday's prayer, and the Turks, even in the provinces occupied by the Russians, were not to be considered as subjects of the Czar but of the Sultan. The Turkish Aynes or magistrates continued in office, subordinate, however, to the Russian military authorities. The Russians promised to pay ready money for everything.

Owing to these rational administrative measures the war on the south side of the Balkan lost the fearful character of a contest of nationalities and religions. The spirit of the Moslem seemed completely broken, and since the battle of Kulewtscha no trace remained of the courage of which the Turks had before given so many proofs. The

Russians did not expect any considerable reinforcements, and, if Adrianople was ever to be attacked by a weak force, the time was now come. On the 28th of July General Pahlen marched with the 2nd corps in a southerly direction by Russocastro to Karapunar, and sent an advanced guard under General Montresor to Umur-Faki. No enemy was to be seen: the Turks had everywhere fled, after first plundering and ill treating the Christian population of the villages. But the rest of the Russian army did not follow this movement of General Pahlen; several detachments were sent towards the Balkan, as the Russians were still anxious about their rightflank, and feared an attack from Shumla. General Sawadski, with the 14th regiment of chasseurs, some Cossacks, and 4 light hill-guns, advanced to Tjenga on the Deli-kamtchik, whence the road leads by Jenikoi to Pravadi, and where the Turks were supposed to have established a small post in the Balkan; General Nabel, with the Petersburg regiment of lancers, 2 battalions, and 2 guns, went to Tschalikawak on the Kutschuk-Kamtchik, on the road from Dobroll to Shumla; and the Cossacks occupied Jamboli and Slivno, where the road from Shumla by Djumaja and Osmanbasar to Kasan leaves the mountain pass. General Scheremetef followed them to Jamboli with the 2nd brigade of the 4th division of the lancers. Thus the corps, which had only just been concentrated, was again distributed from Burgass to Slivno, and from Tjenga to Umur-Faki, over an area nearly 70 miles in diameter.

On reaching Jamboli on the 31st of July, General Scheremetef sent 3 squadrons into the town; they were received with a heavy fire of musketry and artillery and driven out of the place. At the same time 6000 Turkish horse left their camp, on a height above Jamboli, and surrounded the place on both sides, in order to cut off the Russian cavalry. The latter had but just time to quit the town, and a fight of cavalry took place, in which the Russians, who were barely 800 strong, had to contend with an immensely superior force, for they had come across the 15,000 men sent by the Vizier on the 28th of July from Shumla, unperceived by General Krassowski at Jenibazar.

A Turkish regiment of regular cavalry attacked a Russian battery. These new regulars, in consequence of the discipline they had so laboriously acquired, advanced in a measured trot, without any of the wild impetuosity of the Spahis: they suffered so severely from the canister-shot, that they turned and fled.

The loss of the Russians was, however, very great. Fortunately for them, night put an end to the combat. Spite of their enormous numerical superiority, the Turks evacuated Jamboli, and retired during the darkness, the infantry to Adrianople, the cavalry towards Shumla, without being pursued. They left enormous stores in their camp: 39,000 pud of biscuits and 100,000 cartridges fell into the hands of those who, the day before, had lost the battle, and who fully expected to be cut to pieces next day in their isolated position.

General Krassowski announced that he had now advanced as far as Eski-Stambul, had fought there, and had sent detachments to Djumaja, whither almost all the disposable Turkish troops had gone from Shumla on the 7th of August; moreover, that the chasseurs on this occasion very nearly took the heights behind the Matchin redoubt.

As news was brought by the inhabitants of the country and by spies that Turkish troops had assembled in considerable force at Slivno, and that the Grand Vizier (which, however, was not true) had gone thither himself, General Diebitsch determined to make an expedition against that place with all the troops he could muster, excepting the 2nd corps, which, as we have before said, had already gone to Karapunar, in the direction of Adrianople. Even the isolated detachments in the Balkan were summoned for the purpose. The 1st brigade of the 12th division was embarked at Sebastopol and landed at Sizeboli. It relieved there, and in the other seaports, the 1st and 2nd brigades of the 19th division, which joined General Pahlen's corps. This was but a small reinforcement: scurvy had raged frightfully in Sizeboli: there were only 128 men left out of the whole regiment of Azof, and the regiments Dnieper and Ukraine had suffered quite as severely.

General Pahlen was ordered to push forward his 5th division on the road from Adrianople to Slivno, so as to cut off the enemy's retreat.

On the 9th of August the head-quarters and the 6th corps marched 15 miles, from Aidos to Karnabat, which the 7th corps had already reached. They set out at 4 o'clock in the morning of the 10th of August, rested at midday at Kassaply, and encamped in the evening at Dragodana. They marched above 20 miles that day. General Nabel was to have joined the main army with his detachment. He mustered his troops at Dobroll, but could not march till 10 o'clock in the morning, and only reached the bivouac at 12 o'clock at night, after a mountain march of nearly 28 miles. A halt was made on the following day, not only to rest his troops, but also in order to wait for the 5th division, which was to arrive on that day in a line with the main army. All this shows that General Diebitsch expected to find serious resistance at Slivno. The reports as to the strength of the enemy were exceedingly contradictory. Several pashas, the Vizier himself, and a large body of regular troops, were reported to have assembled there. In a letter from the Christian clergy of the place, the Russian General was implored to come as speedily as possible to put an end to the oppression of the Turks.

During the march to Slivno every hamlet was found deserted, and some burnt; their inhabitants had been driven into the woods by the Turks.

On the way to Dragodana a despatch was brought by an emissary of the Grand Vizier in answer to the proposals which General Diebitsch had made after the battle of Kulewtscha. Its purport was as follows:—"The Vizier had at that time been unable to accept the terms, as he was not then informed as to the state of things at Constantinople. But now that the foreign ambassadors had again met there, the negotiations for peace had taken so favourable a turn, that further bloodshed was unjustifiable." The Vizier therefore proposed an armistice, and requested to know the spot to which he should send his negotiators.

This intelligence caused general satisfaction, as all were heartily tired of the war and very uncertain as to the eventual issue of the enterprise on the other side of the Balkan. But as the Vizier's object clearly was to gain time to reach Adrianople, General Diebitsch had left the despatch unanswered till now, when he sent an officer to Slivno. This officer fell among some outposts before the town, who took away his papers: the increasing darkness and a dense wood prevented him from making out anything about the relative position or strength of the Turkish force. Thus much, however, he learnt, that the Turks had no suspicion whatever of the approach of the Russians.

In the evening, after the tattoo, General Rüdiger broke up his quarters, and marched with his infantry and the greater part of the disposable cavalry —namely, 1 brigade of the lancers of the Bug, 1 of the 2nd hussars, and 1 of the 4th division of lancers—to within 5 miles of Slivno. No watch-fires were allowed that night.

Between 12 and 3 the rest of the 6th corps followed; and after all the troops had assembled at about 5 o'clock in the morning of the 12th of August, a reconnaissance was made.

On that day there were present:—

	Batt.	Sqnad.	Guns.
Of the 16th division	6	-	0
„ 18th „	8	-	24
„ 19th „	4	-	8
„ 5th „	10	-	24
„ 7th „	2	-	4
„ lancers of the Bug . . .	-	12	8
„ „ 4th division .	-	16	8
„ hussars of the 2nd „	-	12	8
„ artillery of the Don . .	-	-	12
	30	40	96

—making altogether about 20,000 men.

At 7 o'clock all the troops advanced; the Cossacks in front, then the whole of the cavalry, and after them the 6th and the 7th corps, and the 5th division: 2 miles from Slivno they came upon the Turkish outposts. Some of the prisoners said that the Vizier had arrived the day before at Kasan, and was expected on that very day at Slivno. Hereupon the 2nd brigade of the lancers of the Bug, a regiment of Cossacks, and the 4th regiment of chasseurs, were sent forward 2½ miles to the right, towards the road debouching from the mountains.

General Rüdiger advanced to within gun-shot of the Turkish entrenchments, but was prevented by a thick wood from reconnoitring them thoroughly. On their right wing the ground was somewhat more open, and some Turkish infantry and cavalry were seen apparently making their way towards Jenisaagra. General Rüdiger received orders to go to the left to stop them; he had been joined by General Scheremetef's brigade, and had with him 24 squadrons and 28 guns. After using his artillery, he was to charge the enemy. On the right, Prince Gortschakoff, with 8 battalions and 24 guns of the 18th division, was to advance straight forward, and, with his right wing resting on the foot of the Balkan, to attack the Turks in an oak coppice in front.

A brisk cannonade soon forced the Turks to retire. As General Rüdiger advanced, the Turks opened a fire upon him from the entrenchments of their right wing. Meanwhile, Prince Gortschakoff commenced his attack, and as the Turks, after firing twice, withdrew their guns, he gained the top of a hill, whence he could overlook Slivno: it was already evacuated, and the Turks were flying in all directions, pursued by the Cossacks. The Christian inhabitants advanced in procession towards the Russians, the clergy bearing the cross and the holy water, the Bulgarians presenting bread and salt in token of submission; the 36th regiment of chasseurs took possession of the place without opposition.

On the Russian left wing the Courland regiment of lancers ascended the hills covered with vineyards to the south of Slivno, and approached the Turkish line of retreat upon Saagra and Kasanlik. The Turks seized upon a favourable opportunity to attack with superior forces two squadrons of the Courland lancers, who maintained a severe contest; after being thrice driven back, a third squadron came to their assistance, and they drove the Turks out of the field.

In this fight, which only lasted 3 hours, the Russians lost 1 officer and 12 men: the infantry had not fired a shot. The Turks, likewise, had but few men killed; during the pursuit, however, the Russians made 500 prisoners, and took 10 guns and 6 ammunition-waggons. The town was set on fire by the Turks, but the fire soon died out of itself. The prisoners said that 13 regiments of regular infantry and 2 of regular cavalry, under Halil Pasha, besides some thousand irregular horse, under Kösseh and Ibrahim Pasha, had been stationed at Slivno. The Turks, however, had only 10 guns to oppose to 96 Russian pieces. The report of the Grand Vizier's presence had only been spread in order to inspire the troops with greater courage. General Roth pursued the Turks in the direction of Kasanlik, as far as the heights of the Balkan, and then returned. The Russians pitched their camp at Slivno. A Cossack regiment was sent to Kasan in the Balkan, where 500 Turks were said to be posted. The deserted Turkish camp was immediately plundered by the Christian inhabitants of the town, who sought above all things to provide themselves with arms, and gave as much as a silver ruble to the Cossacks for a musket. The Turks who had fled from Slivno soon sent deputies with a flag of truce, and received permission to return.

At Aidos, Jamboli, and Slivno, on the 25th and 31st of July and 12th of August, all the corps were easily dispersed which the Vizier had detached on the right flank of the Russians, in order to prevent their advance upon Adrianople. The Russians were in possession of all the passes of the Balkan, from Cape Emineh to Kasan, and Reschid Mohammed's direct communication with Adrianople was cut off. He had scarcely any army left, and the defence of Shumla depended mainly upon the armed population of the town.

The Russians had gradually advanced from Burgas as far as Slivno, about 70 miles, along the foot of the Balkan, and were still at the same distance from Adrianople as they had been at Burgas. Some reinforcements had joined General Krassowski, who had nevertheless returned to Jenibazar; but none had joined the main army, unless indeed the 2nd brigade of the 19th division at Sizeboli were now disposable; on the contrary, the Russians had lost great numbers by the fevers, which were on the increase. However, the utter demoralization of the Turks, who gave up fortified positions on the mere appearance of hostile cavalry, even when, as at Jamboli, they were vastly superior in numbers to the Russians, clearly proved that the latter might venture anything against such a foe. They therefore determined to advance at once upon Adrianople.

The 37th regiment of chasseurs remained to garrison Slivno; all the other troops advanced on the 14th of August, two days after the fight, to Jamboli. At this place 30 Turkish families, with their mollah, had remained quietly in their houses, and the Christian population advanced in a long procession to meet the Russians. There was an ample supply of provisions in the town. A market, which was established in the camp, was plentifully supplied with poultry, and fruit of all sorts, especially melons and grapes. On the following day, the 15th of August, everything was quiet, and the Bulgarians attended Divine worship in the Russian camp in great numbers.

The first day's march took the 7th corps, on the 16th of August, to the village of Gaza-beili, on a brook which empties itself into the Tundscha, on its right bank. The rest of the army marched to Papaskoi, a distance of 24 miles. Only 2½ miles beyond

Jamboli the infantry had to wade through a ford 3 feet deep, although there had been time enough on the previous day to build a temporary bridge. Several of the small tributaries of the Tundscha, which had to be forded, were marshy at bottom, and had been rendered almost impassable by the cavalry which went through first. The 5th division, which formed the advanced guard, had started at three in the morning; but the head of the infantry did not reach Papaskoi until eight in the evening. The commanding officer, displeased at their delay, rode to meet them, and expressed his anger to the leaders. In order to appease his resentment they sent the singers in advance, who received a present of 100 rubles. The troops were terribly knocked up by such forced marches; there was no lack of water on the march, and the troops might just as well have halted for the night earlier on the road. It was certainly impossible for the Russians to march as quickly as the Turks, who had been dispersed at Slivno.

To advance upon Adrianople, by far the most difficult road—that along the left bank of the Tundscha—was chosen; probably in order to avoid crossing the river near the town, and so as to have the right flank covered by the stream against any attack from Philippopoli.

The Russians marched again at seven o'clock on the following morning: the 2nd corps formed the advanced guard: the second division of lancers, which grumbled at having to march behind the infantry, was put at the head after the first halt. The 7th corps came up across the bridge at Jenidschely, and followed the gros. General Budberg and his corps were despatched towards the left upon Kirklissa (Forty Churches).

Beyond Papaskoi the ground is more hilly and broken. The rocks have hardly any covering of earth, and marching on this burning stony ground was very painful and fatiguing. The Turks had destroyed all the fountains which afford such needful refreshment to the traveller in these regions, and the want of water was very distressing. After a march of nearly 20 miles, the Russians reached Bujuk Derbent, where they halted for the night and rested the following day. The 7th corps halted before, at Kutschuk Derbent. The troops suffered far more in this rocky desert than in crossing the Balkan; the heat was insupportable, and fever spread with increased virulence. The officers, especially those belonging to head-quarters, were the first to sink under the disease. The distance from Slivno to Derbent is nearly 60 miles, and five days had been consumed in marching it, so that the Russian troops had only advanced at the rate of 12 miles a-day; but as they had rested 2 days at Jamboli and Derbent, they had to make forced marches on the other days, which exhausted their strength.

The Bujuk Derbent (great pass) is a very difficult defile, but not a Turk was there to defend it. The Cossacks scoured the country towards Adrianople by Jenidje and Akbunar, and made several prisoners, who all agreed in reporting the garrison of the town at 8000 or 10,000 soldiers, and as many armed citizens. A reinforcement of 10,000 men was expected there every day, and entrenchments had lately been begun.

General Budberg sent word from Erekli, that Kirklissa seemed very feebly garrisoned, and received instructions to take the place as soon as his detachment should reach it.

General Krassowski sent from Shumla a second letter from the Grand Vizier, with whom General Madatof had had an interview. The Vizier requested General Diebitsch to halt, and to fix a place where negotiations might be begun—a proposal which could not but be very welcome to the Russian General.

On the 19th, just four weeks after the army had crossed the Balkan and taken the seaport towns, it advanced upon Adrianople. The troops encamped opposite the town in three lines, so that the right wing rested on the Tundscha. On the first line was the 2nd corps, with the old Seraglio on the further side of the river on their right; on the left a hill below which runs the high road from Derbent to Adrianople, and whence the whole town can be overlooked. The 5th corps was on the second, and the 7th on the third line. The Cossacks occupied all the heights as far as the ancient Justinian road to Constantinople. The commanding officer rode with the chief of the general staff, General Toll, and a small suite, to reconnoitre the town and the Turkish entrenchments. From a distance of many miles the Russians had seen the four tall minarets of the magnificent mosque of Sultan Selim; but it was not until they came very near to the town that the astonishing spectacle afforded by the former capital of the Ottoman empire met their eyes.

Adrianople lies at the confluence of the Tundscha, the Maritza, and the Arda, three considerable streams which can only be crossed by means of bridges, which meet in the town almost at right angles, and then pursue a united course. Four broad valleys are thus formed in the shape of a cross. Between these the hills rise gently but to a considerable height, and are covered with vineyards and orchards. The town itself lies partly on the low ground, partly on the foot of the nearest slope above the valley between the Tundscha and the lower Maritza. Upon the highest point rises the gigantic cupola of the Selimmidje. The old part of Adrianople is surrounded by a wall, but it is completely hidden by new buildings, and the town is overlooked on every side, although only from a distance. Without the town hollow roads, ditches, and garden-walls, afford great facilities for its defence, and the approaches may be covered by troops drawn up so as to rest upon the rivers, but only in corps of not less than 30,000 or 40,000 men. The new Turkish fortifications consisted merely of a ditch between the Tundscha and the upper and lower Maritza, flanked by a few unfinished batteries.

The first view of Adrianople is wonderfully beautiful: the white minarets and the lead-roofed cupolas of the mosques, baths, and caravanserais rise in countless numbers above the endless mass of flat roofs and the broad tops of the plane-trees. Magnificent stone bridges stretch across the rapid rivers; the dazzlingly white cotton sails of the vessels contrast with the broad green meadows, and gilded crescents glitter on every turret against the dark blue sky. On the right, beyond the Tundscha, over a grove of dark cypresses, rise the towers of the old Seraglio, in which dwelt the Ottoman rulers while they threatened the Byzantine Empire 400 years ago, just as the Ottoman Empire is now in its turn menaced by the Russians. As far as the eye can reach over the boundless landscape it sees nothing but fertile fields, groves of fruit-trees, and flourishing villages.

Such a sight was indeed enough to make the Russian soldier forget the toils, sufferings, and dangers he had undergone, and dream only of comfortable quarters and well-supplied markets. The sick hoped for rest and recovery within those walls where most of them were destined to find a grave. Those, however, who understood the actual state of affairs must have felt that they were either at the end of the war or at the beginning of their destruction; for the Russians had indeed reached Adrianople, but they had reached it with at most 20,000 men, while the town, if seriously bent upon defence, could bring into the field at least as many armed inhabitants. The Turkish corps which had been dispersed in the Balkan* marched to Adrianople by the most various routes, and a fresh Turkish army was advancing towards it from Sophia. Considerations, not of a military nature, must now decide the issue of the campaign, and we shall not have to relate any more purely military proceedings.

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* The passes from Shumla and Varna over the Balkan are now all practicable for artillery, and even for a siege train: they remain so all the year, except in very wet or snowy weather. They are strongly fortified: those nearest Sophia are the easiest to pass, and are also fortified.—TRANS.

CHAPTER V.

SURRENDER OF ADRIANOPLE — MILITARY POSITION OF CONSTANTINOPLE — NEGOTIATIONS — DEMONSTRATIONS — CONCLUSION OF PEACE.

THE exertions of two campaigns, an expenditure of 100 millions of rubles, and the sacrifice of considerably above 50,000 men, had brought 20,000 Russians to the gates of Adrianople. Such a force was totally inadequate to the task still to be accomplished, if that was to compel a peace at the point of the sword. The successes achieved by the Russians were by no means sufficient to exhaust all the means of defence of the Ottoman empire, but they had called into action elements of dissolution which were far more powerful than any hostile army in forcing the Porte to conclude a peace on terms unfavourable to itself. The unavoidable exclusion of the Rayahs, *i. e.* the larger half of the population, from the defence of the country, the discontent of the Mussulmans, the destruction of the old system of popular arming in consequence of the reform, the habitual insubordination of the Pashas of distant provinces, and, above all, the influence of European policy, led to a course of events which was no longer guided by the Russian army, but which, on the contrary, it was compelled blindly to follow. General Diebitsch's career of conquest was a slope upon which it was impossible to retreat or stand still, and which must lead him to fresh successes or to total destruction. But under the circumstances, even an army which seemed melting away under the hands of its leader was sufficient to urge on the Porte in the course it had already entered.

General Diebitsch was fully aware that in his position the greatest boldness was the greatest prudence, and he displayed both in a high degree when, with the wreck of an army and only a few remaining weeks of time, he ostensibly commenced undertakings which under any other circumstances would have required a fresh campaign and a fresh army.

We will not, however, anticipate events, but return to the Russian corps before Adrianople.

The town contained 80,000 inhabitants, of whom the greater part were Moslems, who had to defend their property, their wives, and their faith against the Russians. The corps under Abdurrahman Pasha had been scattered at Monastirkoi, and all the detachments successively sent by the Vizier had been dispersed at Aidos, Jamboli, Karnabat, and Slivno, without much loss on either side. The fugitives from an army of 40,000 or 50,000 men had many of them gone to Adrianople, and it was certain that a number of defenders at least equal to the attacking force could be posted behind garden-walls, hedges, and ditches, if the townspeople capable of bearing arms took part in the defence. Even if the Turks had no mind to defend the place, and were ready to surrender trophies and resources such as were contained in Adrianople without firing a shot, there was nothing to hinder Halil Pasha from marching southwards to Constantinople with 10,000 or 12,000 men, mostly regular infantry, and 2000 horse on the very day on which General Diebitsch approached from the north; for General Budberg's detachment, which menaced this retreat, consisted of only 2000 men in all, and did not reach Kirklissa until the evening of the 20th. It seemed quite incredible that, under such circumstances, the Turkish leaders would remain at Adrianople merely in order to capitulate; nevertheless they did so.

As early as the afternoon of the 19th of August, besides secret emissaries from the Christian clergy, Turkish delegates came to the Russian head-quarters to negotiate a free exit. This the Turkish corps might have made on the day before totally unopposed, and could still force it on the following day with six-fold numbers to those of the Russians, should Budberg venture to oppose their passage at Lule Burgass. Nothing could be more welcome to General Diebitsch. He professed himself not indisposed to grant what he was in fact totally unable to refuse, but he imposed certain conditions. Halil and Ibrahim Pasha and their troops received permission to return to their several homes, but not to retreat in the direction of Constantinople. They were first to deliver up their arms—a condition with which irregular troops would never have complied—as well as their standards, their artillery, and their stores of provisions and ammunition, into the hands of the Russians. In return the Russian commander promised the inhabitants security for their persons and properties, and the undisturbed exercise of every form of religious worship. General Diebitsch allowed the Turks only fourteen hours, *i. e.* till nine o'clock on the following morning, to decide whether they would accept or reject these conditions, for he very wisely reflected that the Pashas, who had now completely lost their heads, might otherwise collect their senses again. Moreover, if Adrianople did not surrender next morning he would be compelled to attack it, and he did not choose to betray the weakness of his forces by a longer delay. But the storming of Adrianople would be a very hazardous enterprise if any defence at all were made, and, even supposing the approaches were taken, 20,000 men would almost lose themselves in the labyrinth of streets of a town ten miles in circumference. It would then be impossible to prevent them from plundering, burning, and committing all sorts of excesses, which would rouse even the most peaceable citizens to resistance. Indeed, the military occupation of large towns, without previous agreement, is a problem for the solution of which the history of war offers few precedents.

The Russian army passed the night of the 19th of August under arms, in a state of anxious expectation. A great disturbance and movement prevailed in the town, and the torches and lights, which kept shifting from place to place, shone through the darkness up to the Russian camp. Before daybreak the Russian army was formed into 2 columns; the 2nd and 4th corps threatened the town, while the 7th corps, with the greater part of the cavalry and horse-artillery, made preparations to advance by Arnautkoi on the road to Kirklissa, so as to cut off the retreat upon Constantinople.

But the Pashas did not even wait for the expiration of the delay granted them for surrender. Two hours before the appointed time their envoys appeared to treat for more favourable terms. General Diebitsch replied by ordering his columns to advance, and, when they got near the advanced entrenchments, dense masses of townspeople, Turks and Christians, crowded out of the gates to offer their submission to the Russians. They brought with them wine, sweetmeats, fruit, and bread, so that the place looked like a fair. The Turkish troops threw away their detested firelocks and bayonets, and abandoned the works before the formalities of concluding a treaty could be gone through. The Pashas only had time to congratulate the Russian General, who made his entry into Adrianople like into a friendly town, where nothing but the garrison is being changed.

The cavalry at once moved off upon the main road to Constantinople: this movement was followed by the 2nd corps, which drew up before the gate on that road. The 6th corps occupied the road to Kirklissa, and the 7th took possession, for the present, of the handsome barracks standing high up on the hill between the Tundscha and the upper Maritza; the artillery also was placed in front of the barrack. The Russian commander established his head-quarters in the apartments which had been prepared for the Sultan in the old Seraglio. The numerous green tents of the Turks afforded very welcome shelter to the Russian soldiers. Fifty-six guns, several thousand firelocks, considerable stores of munitions of war, and the abundant resources afforded by a great town for the clothing and maintenance of an army, and, above all, the moral effect which its capture could not fail to produce throughout Europe, and especially at Constantinople, formed the bloodless trophies of the day.

A solemn service was performed next morning in the market-place. A Russian General was appointed commandant of the town, and the inhabitants were compelled to give up their arms. The Turkish Pasha continued to exercise the functions of civil governor. The mosques and other public places of meeting were guarded by Russian troops, but the corps itself occupied a bivouac upon a green island, shaded by the most magnificent plane-trees, and situated next to the Seraglio, between the Tundscha and the Maritza. Possibly the low position of the place, the excessive heat, the sudden transition from violent exertion to complete repose, and lastly, the want of good and sufficient food, greatly contributed to develop the seeds of disease already lurking in the Russian army. The constant rains soaked the ground and the beds of rushes upon which the Russians lay. The nights now began to be bitterly cold. Thousands of sick, chiefly diarrhœa patients, had to be brought into hospital in the town, and the corps, already so weak, became less numerous every day. The sojourn in Adrianople, which was undoubtedly most destructive to the troops, has often been made matter of reproach to General Diebitsch, and he has been blamed for not marching at once upon Constantinople. Before assenting to this we will examine the position of the Russian commander.*

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* Baron v. Müffling, who was sent by the Prussian Government in 1829-30 to Constantinople, to watch the course of events, states in his Memoirs ('Aus Meinem Leben') that he represented to General Diebitsch the necessity of keeping the Russian troops at Adrianople until the treaty was signed, as on the first detachment reaching Constantinople the Sultan would quit it, and great confusion would ensue;—that Diebitsch accordingly gave his troops the necessary orders. Baron v. Müffling adds that his messenger, on returning from Adrianople, found the roads filled with disorderly Turkish troops, marching towards Constantinople without their

Mustapha, Pasha of Scodra in Albania, an old Janissary, and a determined opponent of reform, was in close communication with the rebellious Bosniaks. It quite accorded with his interests that the military power of the Porte should be weakened, but by no means that the Ottoman rule in Turkey should be overthrown. He had hitherto contrived to evade the repeated commands of the Sultan under all sorts of pretexts, and had kept his forces intact until all the newly-raised armies of his master had been beaten and scattered by the Russians. He had taken no part in the war in Bulgaria, had arrived too late to defend the Balkan, or to save Adrianople; but when the capital of the Ottoman empire was threatened with an attack by the infidels, he was ready to defend it. He now appeared with 40,000 men, and, what is more, 40,000 Arnauts, at Sophia, while his advanced troops scoured the country as far as Philippopoli, 90 miles from Adrianople.

General Diebitsch still had 150 miles between him and the capital of Turkey. Between Adrianople and Karistiran, the ancient Justinian way is intersected by 40 tributaries of the Ergineh, which afford positions of defence at every two or three

officers, who kept at a distance from fear of being murdered by them; that the interpreter heard the Turkish soldiers say one to another that on reaching Constantinople they would set the old place on fire at every corner. Baron Müffling informed the Sultan of these plans; and these wild hordes were not allowed to enter Constantinople, but were shipped across to the Asiatic coast.—TRANS.

miles, supposing any Turkish corps had been disposed to occupy them. The ruins of the wall of Athanasius, extending right across the isthmus, form a fresh retrenchment; and the positions on the main road at Bujuk, and especially at Kutjuk Tchekmedje, are absolutely impregnable. They may, however, be avoided by a circuit on the north, as the so-called Strandscha mountains are, in fact, a mere chain of wooded hills from 600 to 800 feet high, and passable for infantry in every part. Two practicable roads from Serai by Jataldji and Litros, and from Kara-Burnu on the Black Sea by Boghaskoi, likewise lead to the capital. Although all these roads offer excellent positions for retrenchments, their capabilities of defence mattered little under existing circumstances. But it was impossible for the Russians to march upon Constantinople without leaving at least a few thousand men in so considerable a town as Adrianople, were it only to maintain order and protect the sick; it was, moreover, quite out of the question to advance while such an army as that commanded by the Pasha of Scodra remained in the rear unwatched. If only 6000 or 8000 men were appointed for this duty the Russian army would not number above 10,000 by the time it reached Constantinople.

The actual city of Constantinople, as our readers are well aware, occupies a triangular space between the sea of Marmora and the Golden Horn—the third front, facing the land, is about 8000 paces long from the seven towers of the Blaquernal, and is protected by a wall 30 or 40 feet high; the top of the wall is 4 or 5 feet wide, so that there is ample room to move about upon it; and as in most parts the battlements are still in good repair, the wall may be occupied by sharpshooters without further preparation. At regular intervals of 60 or 80 paces are projecting towers of several vaulted stories, which, however, were built by the Emperor Julian, and are, therefore, not calculated to resist artillery. As a defence against cannon-shot, earthworks might be thrown up against the wall, which might easily be lowered in places if necessary, as there is no want of space or material.

At a distance of 15 or 20 paces in front of the main wall is a lower one with small towers, and outside that a dry ditch from 10 to 15 feet deep with a faced scarp and counterscarp. The great wall extends for 17,000 paces more on the side towards the harbour and the sea, and is defended by 300 large towers in all. Immense fragments of the wall and halves of towers have fallen, and lie on the ground unbroken, but there is no regular breach on the side towards the land. In those parts which have remained standing, the stones and mortar have hardened in the course of fourteen centuries to the consistency of solid rock, and the whole is overgrown with gigantic ivy. Although the lofty battlements are visible from a distance of four or five miles off, on an approach within cannon-shot range the wall completely disappears behind a thick wood of cypresses which covers the extensive graveyards of the Moslems. It would, therefore, be very difficult to batter breaches in it, especially with field artillery; the effect produced by mortars would likewise be but trifling, as a space of more than 1000 paces behind the wall is occupied almost entirely by gardens. The actual city, which is chiefly inhabited by Mussulmans, does not begin for a whole mile within the walls at the gigantic mosque of Sultan Mahmoud. The seraglio, which stands upon the extreme point of land, is surrounded by massive walls and towers, and forms a strong citadel against the town, and the ancient Cyclobion at the southern extremity of the landward wall affords a safe redoubt with towers 80 feet high, and extremely thick. Five gates, protected by double towers, are open in the wall on the landward side, and a sixth is bricked up. The centre gate, which the Turks call Topkapu, or gate of artillery, and the Greeks the gate of St. Romanus, is the same that Mahmoud Gazi bombarded with his large cannon, and before which Constantine Palæologus fell.

The easiest approach to the wall of Constantinople is across the ground which lies between the brook Topjilar and the harbour. The hill, which falls with a rapid slope towards the latter and the open suburb of Eyoob, would favour a covered advance at this point. But at the foot of the hill, above a mile in advance of the landward wall, is a huge building

500 feet long, 300 wide, and flanked by lofty towers. This is the barrack of Ramis-tchiflik, built to contain 5000 or 6000 men. In front of it are some badly traced lines of entrenchment, which were thrown up on the first intelligence that the Russians had crossed the Balkan. 3000 paces further towards the left, on the high road to Adrianople, stands a still larger turreted edifice in the midst of the well-known plain of Daood Pasha, where for three centuries the Janissaries assembled before taking the field. From this spot marched the armies which conquered Hungary, threatened Vienna, and penetrated even into Styria. After the destruction of the Janissaries, Sultan Mahmoud built a barrack for 8000 of his newly-raised Nizam-jeditt on this spot. The barracks contain a mosque, a bath, and a kiosk for the Sultan, and measure 800 paces in the front. These enormous barracks (beyond comparison the largest buildings in Constantinople, not excepting even the mosques and palaces) form, as it were, detached forts in connexion with the large and massive Hastahane or hospital situated between them. These three buildings would contain 14,000 men, and afford an excellent support for the wing of a large army, which might encamp in safety between them and the landward wall. Some well-constructed trenches would render it extremely difficult to attack an army closely backed by the resources of so large a city. Neither is there any want upon these heights of the water so indispensable to a Turkish corps, as the

great conduits which supply Constantinople run right under both barracks through subterranean channels, and bring water in abundance.

The suburbs situated upon the steep slope to the north of the harbour, Pera Kassim-pasha, Haskoi, &c., are far less protected than Constantinople itself. They are quite open, and contain a population of above 100,000, of which more than half are Greeks, Armenians, Franks, and Jews. Very unwisely, all the great establishments belonging to the army and navy have been erected in this quarter,—the arsenal, the dockyards, the shipping stores, the artillery workshops, the cannon-foundry, the gun-manufactory, and the barracks of the bombardiers and artillerymen. It is true that Galata, the old Genoese factory, which once prescribed laws to the falling Byzantine empire, likewise is a kind of citadel. It is surrounded with high walls, behind which the streets descend like staircases so steeply, that they cannot even be overlooked from Pera, which stands above it. An immense round tower rises like a giant above this town still devoted to the trade with Europe. But it faces the harbour, and could contribute nothing to the defence of the place towards the land, neither does it protect any of the above-named establishments.

The approaches on this side might, however, be defended without difficulty; and supposing the Sultan had only a few thousand men left in the field, and were threatened by land both on the west and on the north, he might leave Constantinople to defend her own landward front, and draw up his little army on the plateau to the north of Pera. The advanced guard might take up a very favourable position on the grip at the post of Sindchirlikuju on the high road to Bujuk-dereh; the front would not be more than 1000 paces in length, and easily defended by temporary earthworks; both wings would rest on deep rocky ravines. The entrances into the "vale of sweet waters" are few and difficult, and might easily be guarded by special outposts. In order to attack this position in front, the invaders would be forced to detach a corps which would have to cross the valleys of the rivers Cydaris and Barbyses, passable only by means of bridges, and would be separated from the main body by a distance of 10 miles, and many very difficult passes. Such a corps would be in great danger of being surprised by the Turks from Eyoob, and it would have to be provisioned from Kilios or Derkos on the Black Sea. Rather greater numbers and some resolution would likewise enable the Turks to entrench themselves with great advantage on the narrow tongue of land to the west of the village of Kahathaneh.

A very important matter in the defence of Constantinople is the supply of water. As the town is entirely built on rocky heights, and the wells within the walls contain but little water, and that bitter, the first care of the Greek Emperors was to supply the town with this first of necessaries by means of very large canals. A vast quantity of moisture falls in the shape of snow and rain during the spring and winter months upon the range of wooded hills on the north of Constantinople towards the Black Sea. Here whole valleys were dammed up by gigantic walls, and so much water was collected in these artificial lakes that, in spite of the evaporation, it supplied the vast consumption of the city throughout the summer until the next rainy season. From these reservoirs the water was conveyed to the city for a distance of above 20 miles in arched brick conduits which followed a very winding course. Hills were cut through, and valleys crossed by aqueducts, many of which are 100 feet high, and above 1000 paces long. But as these conduits would have only to be cut in a single place in order to dry up all the fountains of Constantinople, the Emperors had taken the precaution of constructing large basins on elevated places within the walls, which were filled in times of peace, and could supply the city in case of a siege. The carelessness of the Turks has suffered all these great works to decay. The open cisterns are now filled up with gardens and houses, nay in one there is even a mosque, and are called Tchukur Bostan, or deep gardens. The vaulted ones, as, for instance, the Bin Bir Direk, or thousand columns, serve as a habitation to the silk-spinners, and are half filled up with rubbish. The successors of Mahmoud and Suleiman never dreamed that their descendants could ever be besieged; but things are greatly changed since their times, and it would now be highly advisable to restore the cisterns to their original purpose, which might easily be done. In the event of a complete investment of Constantinople, the numerous population could only subsist for a very short time on the bad water of the wells; but so long as the city is only attacked by land, good water can be got in abundance from the magnificent springs on the Asiatic shore, from Scutari Tchamlidje, Kara Kulak, and above all from the inexhaustible springs of Sultanieh, close to the sea-shore, at which whole fleets take in their supplies.

Neither can the city be short of provisions so long as the Turks remain masters of the sea of Marmora. The banks of this splendid inland sea feed numerous flocks, and grow wheat, olives, wine, fruits, and vegetables in abundance. The fertile plains of Broussa are in constant communication with the capital by the port of Mudania, and the sea affords an endless supply of excellent fish: the myriads of Palamedæ, which are hauled up by a single large net at the time of their passage through the Bosphorus, would alone prevent an actual famine; and even if a hostile fleet appeared in the Hellespont, it would scarcely be able to cut off the communications between Constantinople and Scutari and the coast of Asia. The Bosphorus between the two towns is only 1850 paces wide, and is completely commanded from the lofty shore of the Seraglio. The broad quays and the plateau of Gulhane are admirably adapted for placing artillery, and in the course of a few days the Turks, animated by the energy and activity of one man, General Sebastiani, mounted upon them several hundred pieces, sufficient effectually to prevent any hostile fleet from anchoring between the two towns, or even from interrupting the communication between them for a moment.

In order, therefore, to invest Constantinople completely, it would be necessary to have two armies in Europe, a third in Asia, and a fleet in the Sea of Marmora. The latter presupposes that the Turkish fleet should first be destroyed, and that one of the approaches to the capital, either the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus, should be forced.

The Dardanelles, our readers are aware, form a channel nearly 20 miles long, 2½ wide at their southern entrance between the so-called new castles, only 1980 paces between the old castles, and 2830 again at Nagara, the ancient Abydos. The real defence rests with the batteries erected on a space of 8000 paces between Sultan Hissar and Nagara; in fact, the only use of the new castles was to prevent a hostile fleet from anchoring within the straits. A few successful undertakings made of late years by the English and the French have given rise to a pretty general opinion that batteries cannot be defended against fleets, as the latter are able to concentrate hundreds of guns against each separate battery. Now, although the Dardanelles are armed with no less than 585 pieces mostly of very heavy calibre, there can be no doubt that the guns of a tolerably large fleet would be far more numerous. Moreover, a ship which can sail 10 knots an hour with a favourable wind, is not exposed to the fire of a battery for above six minutes at a time. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the conditions under which artillery acts at sea and on shore are very different and far more favourable to the latter. The utmost damage done by a cannon-ball from a ship is to kill a few men and to dismount a gun, whilst it is very possible that one fired from a battery may put a ship hors de combat. Men, guns, and munitions are infinitely safer behind breastworks than behind the wooden walls of a ship. The former offers a mark only 5 feet high, and the slightest rocking of a ship affects the elevation of the guns so greatly, that whole broadsides may go off too high or too low. The guns of the battery, on the other hand, are steady, the gunner can take aim quietly at a surface 30 feet high, 200 long, and vulnerable at every point, although certainly in motion. Moreover, the balls which strike too low, may still damage the ship by ricochet, and those which go too high may shatter the rigging. The conditions would be still more favourable to the shore artillery if (with the exception of Eski Hissarik and a few pieces upon the towers) all the guns did not fire *à fleur d'eau.* Batteries standing at a height of 20 or 30 feet have nothing to fear from ricochet from the water, but only from direct fire from the ships, and they are very unlikely to be hit at all. Another unfavourable circumstance in the fortifications on the Dardanelles is that all the breastworks and platforms are constructed of stone.

Another material point is the difference of calibre, for while ships usually carry at the utmost only 32-pounders,* the batteries on the Dardanelles contain 108 44-pounders, 19 60-pounders, 30 121-pounders throwing iron balls; besides 63 kemerliks or guns which throw stone balls, some of which are 1570 pounds in weight. These gigantic guns are some of them 28 in. in diameter, and a man may creep into them up to the breech; they lie on the ground on sleepers of oak, instead of on gun-carriages, with their butts against strong walls, so as to prevent the recoil, as it would be impossible to run them forward again in action—some of them are loaded with as much as 1 cwt. of powder. Baron de Tott gives a somewhat highflown description of the "earthquake" produced by their discharge. In most of them the touch-holes are as large as the barrel of a musket; the great mass of powder ignites slowly, and a good deal of it is always blown out of the mouth. The report is very violent, but dead, and is not nearly so painful to the ear as that of an 18-pounder in a casemate. It is easy to follow the ball, blackened with powder, with the eye, and it is frequently seen to split into two or more pieces; huge jets of water are thrown up where it strikes the surface of the sea, as the ball fired off in Europe slowly ricochets across the water till it reaches the Asiatic shore.

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* It must be borne in mind that this was written in 1845.—TRANS.

These giant cannons of the Dardanelles have this disadvantage, that they can only fire straight before them, and that they take very long to load, but then the effect of a single ball that does hit is tremendous.

When Admiral Duckworth sailed through the straits in 1807, all the preparations for defence were in the most wretched condition, nevertheless his fleet suffered considerable injury, especially from the kemerliks: a granite ball of 800 pounds' weight, 2 feet 2 inches in diameter, to the great astonishment of the sailors, broke through the whole bed for the anchor on board the Active, and after crushing this mass of strong timber, rolled slowly across the deck. Another ball carried away the wheel of the Republic, and killed or wounded 24 men. The mainmast of the Wyndham was carried away, and the forecastle of the Royal George, a 110-gun ship, was shattered by a single ball, so that she was near sinking, and could only be saved by very great exertions.

Our readers are no doubt aware that in sea-fights the holes made by the cannon-balls below the ship's water-line are plugged, by men appointed for the purpose, with conical pieces of wood, to prevent the water from pouring in. But it would manifestly be impossible to plug a hole 2½ feet in diameter.

Another circumstance by which the difficulty of attacking the Dardanelles is increased is that throughout the summer months the wind is always in the north. Merchant-ships frequently have to wait 6 weeks for a southerly wind strong enough to carry them up against the current which sets strongly towards the Ægean Sea. Sometimes a light southerly breeze blows at the new castles, but ceases at Nagara, while at Gallipoli the wind is all the time in the north.

A fleet coming from the Mediterranean can, therefore, never be certain of reaching Constantinople at the decisive moment, but may get there weeks too soon or too late, either of which may be equally disadvantageous. With a fresh and favourable wind, a ship could do nothing better than to keep to the right, and sail past immediately below Sultan Hissar; it will thus keep as far as possible from the 111 guns of Kilid Bahar, on the European side, and will only be exposed for one minute to the 197 at Sultan Hissar, on the Asiatic shore. It is true that in this one minute it may possibly be destroyed.

It may be said, that all these dangers and difficulties might be avoided by disembarking a body of troops, for which the safe roadstead between Tenedos and the Troad on the Asiatic coast presents the most favourable point. Most of the batteries there are closed at the gorge by very slight walls, and are commanded in the immediate neighbourhood. This is not, however, the case in all instances; for example, Kum Kaleh and Sultan Hissar, on the Asiatic side, are not commanded at all. These Hissars have walls 40 feet high and 18 feet thick. In the midst of Sultan Hissar is a donjon 70 feet high, and so massive as to form almost one block of stone, the platform of which contains 28 guns. This is also the case with the singularly shaped fort of Kilid Bahar, on the European side, and with such a profile, a fort, even if though it be commanded, is not to be taken at the first assault.

In and near Sultan Hissar and Kilid Bahar, at the narrowest point of the channel, are in all 290 guns, among which are 45 kemerliks, which would neither be easily passed by sea nor taken by land.

We do not mean to assert that it is impossible to force the Dardanelles. The reverse has already been proved, and there is no attempt, however daring, that may not be successful against a careless or cowardly foe. We only wish to show the real weight of an enterprise which has often been too lightly judged.

With respect to the second access to Constantinople by sea, the Bosphorus, here the elements seem to second a fleet coming out of the Black Sea. An almost uninterrupted northerly wind, which blows during the summer months, and a current which flows towards the south at the rate of 2½ miles an hour, are sure to carry the ships right down to Constantinople, but in what sort of condition they would arrive there is quite another question.

The Bosphorus is a winding channel, 19 miles long, and only half the width of the Dardanelles, armed with 392 guns. The terraced batteries by the side of the European and Asiatic light-houses, on either side of the entrance, are 2½ miles asunder, but between the castles of Karibsche and Poiros the distance is only half as great. These forts, built by Baron Tott, of soft green sandstone, have three stories of artillery, of which the second is casemated. The lowest is completely flooded at high water by the waves of the Euxine. These forts are defended towards the land by round casemated towers, which stand detached on the high ground.

Next to these batteries are Bujuk Liman, which lies on the European shore, *à fleur-d'eau*, and Filburnu on the Asiatic, perched high up on the side of a rocky cliff. These were built in 1794, by the French engineer, Mounnier. But the real defence consists in the co-operation of the four great forts, Roumeli and Anadoli Kawak, Telli-tabia, and Madjar Kalessi. Between these forts the Bosphorus is only 1497 and 1245 paces wide, and 166 heavy guns are so placed that they can concentrate their fire and support each other. A ship, while engaged in the closest fight with one of the batteries, is raked from stem to stern by all the rest. Nothing can be more favourable in this respect than the position of Madjar Kalessi, especially as the plateau, 30 or 40 feet above the 60 guns *à fleur-d'eau*, affords facilities for the construction of a terraced battery. The still defensible ruins of an old Genoese castle protect the fort from a coup-de-main from the land. Lower down the Bosphorus again widens, and there are only a few small batteries on the European side. In fact, only the northern end of the Bosphorus is calculated for defence, as the suburbs of Constantinople extend along its beautiful shore for nearly 14 miles without interruption.

The heights between which the Bosphorus winds like a broad river, rise towards the Black Sea to an elevation of 800 feet. Near the Sea of Marmora they are much lower and flatter, but fall steeply, in many places precipitously, down to the straits. This formation of the ground causes the batteries on the shore to be commanded, and greatly facilitates an attack upon them from the land, which could scarcely be prevented by the detached forts in their gorges. The disembarkation of troops for this purpose on the Asiatic coast would present considerable difficulty, as it is bounded almost on every side by steep basaltic cliffs. The nearest bay on the European coast, that of Kilios, is defended by a square fort with narrow bastions, and a wall 20 feet high; but a landing might be effected by means of flat-bottomed boats on any part of the low sandy beach between Kilios and Lake Derkos.

In order, however, to open the Bosphorus to a fleet by these means, it would be necessary to land troops on both shores, as the batteries of either side are sufficient to prevent the passage; and this might not be so easy, on account of the immediate vicinity of the capital, where a few thousand men could always be found to oppose such an attempt.

Moreover, the two old castles, Rumeli and Anadoli Hissar, which were built by the Turks immediately after the conquest of Constantinople, at the narrowest point of the Bosphorus, where the shores are only 958 paces asunder, afford excellent sites for two large batteries. It would be impossible to take them by a coup-de-main upon the gorge, especially in the case of the European fort, which is secured against any attempt of the kind, by walls 40 feet high, with strong battlements and gigantic towers. The ground falls so suddenly within the walls, that no view of it can be obtained from the hills behind, though they are much higher. Lastly, on the Seraglio Point, and the lofty open place of the Gulhane, 100 cannon might be mounted, which would be perfectly safe, and would command the passage between Constantinople and Scutari, which at this point is no wider than the narrowest part of the Dardanelles.

Such is the continental and maritime position of Byzantium, which stands on two quarters of the globe, and between two seas, and seems destined by nature to be the capital of the ancient continent.

We have dwelt at length upon the military importance of this city, because it had a great influence on the measures taken by General Diebitsch, and must always play a principal part in every eastern war. For many years the Lower Roman empire was in fact confined within the environs of Constantinople. Towns of half-a-million of inhabitants cannot be taken by force of arms; they fall by their own weakness. It is only when the population is utterly degraded like the Byzantine Romans of the 15th century, or divided against itself like the Parisians in the beginning of our own, that a hostile army can dare to enter it.

It is true that in Constantinople also, ever since the destruction of the Janissaries, a powerful faction had been waiting for a favourable moment to raise the standard of revolt. The embarrassment of the Turkish government since the Russians had performed the feat hitherto held impossible, of crossing the Balkan, went near to cause an outbreak of this feeling. But Sultan Mahmoud was beforehand with the Janissaries. Chosreef Pasha, an excellent head of the police for a Turkish city, had long been upon the traces of the conspirators, and a wholesale execution took place, with very little heed as to how many hundreds of innocent persons suffered, provided only the guilty did not escape. By these measures discontent was by no means appeased, but for the moment it was stifled. If, however, anything could reconcile the opposing parties, it was the appearance of a Russian force before the gates of a city which for four centuries had not beheld a foe. What the discontented Moslems wanted was the restoration of the old order, or disorder, of things, not the rule of unbelievers. They rejoiced to see the Porte in difficulties, but they felt that its destruction would involve theirs. Nearly all the Greek and Armenian Christians lived on the opposite side of the harbour, and in Constantinople itself they did not constitute above one-fourth of the population; added to which they are thoroughly servile from long habit, and would certainly not have joined either party until the Russians and Turks had fought it out. At the same time, though they no doubt sincerely wished the Porte to surrender on unfavourable terms, they had no wish to see the city stormed and their own property destroyed. The Russian bayonets might have been counted from the tops of the towers and minarets, as they glittered upon the plain of Daood Pasha; and the smallness of their numbers would have brought even the most cowardly upon the walls to defend what was dear to all against a handful of enemies. There were 15,000 men in the fortified camp at Ramis Tchiftlik, and as many more in the forts and batteries on the Bosphorus. Without counting the armed inhabitants, the Sultan could oppose the enemy with a superior force close before the walls of Constantinople, or he could employ it in defending them; and it is difficult to see how the Russians were to attack them. The winter was drawing near, and the fate of the invaders would have been a sad one if they had been forced to retreat while Mustafa and his Albanians were advancing from Philippopoli. After the description we have given, the reader can judge for himself how far General Diebitsch could rely upon the assistance of the fleets which were cruising in the Black Sea and in the Archipelago; and it must also be borne in mind, that, even if the Russian ships had effected a passage through either of the straits, they would in all probability have been followed into the Sea of Marmora by the English fleet under Admiral Malcolm, which would have joined the Turkish fleet lying at anchor in the Bosphorus.

It is pretty clear that the time of action was over for General Diebitsch; he could only make demonstrations which might overawe the Turks: this he accordingly did. The Russian army at Adrianople was estimated, even by the European ambassadors at Pera, at 60,000 men: if he had marched upon Constantinople this delusion would have been dispelled. At St. Petersburg the war was by no means looked upon as ended because the Balkan had been crossed, as is shown by the *ukase* of the 10th of August, ordering a levy of 3 souls upon every 500, which in Russia amounts to about 90,000 men. A few reserve regiments and companies of invalids were now directed upon Adrianople, Admiral Heyden's fleet was strengthened by three ships of the line and several frigates from the Baltic, and the second half of the loan of 42,000,000 florins negotiated with Holland was now raised. The position of General Diebitsch with 20,000 men in a hostile town of 80,000 inhabitants, half way between 30,000 Turks at Constantinople and 30,000 Albanians at Sophia, while his own corps was exhausted by exertion and disease, must have given rise to very serious uneasiness at St. Petersburg. General Krassowski had endeavoured to make himself master of Shumla, but had failed. He had commenced a regular siege, opened trenches, and had several skirmishes without taking one of the Turkish works. Prince Mâdatof had been mortally wounded, and General Kisselef found great difficulty in keeping the Turks out of Wallachia. Widdin, Nicopolis, Sistorvo, Rustchuk, and Giurgevo still held out, and the communication between these places by the Danube was restored. General Geismar, it is true, had crossed the river, but only in order to follow and observe the menacing movements of the Pasha of Scodra.

In consideration of these circumstances, no doubt, the Emperor Nicholas had already appointed Adjutant-General Count Alexis Orloff and privy councillor Count Pahlen to conduct negotiations for peace. The Russian plenipotentiaries arrived at Burgass on the 28th of August, and on the same day the envoys from the Porte reached Adrianople. The Sultan could not yet be convinced that the Russians were really so strong, and that his own resources were so wholly exhausted, as his own advisers and the European diplomatists assured him they were. The former were far more afraid of a tumult in the streets of the capital, which would cost them their places and their heads, than of a disadvantageous peace which would cost the Ottoman empire a few provinces. The diplomatists, on their part, while Diebitsch rested on his arms, were diligently working in his behalf. As representatives of their several courts they of course had to support interests altogether foreign to those of Turkey, and were anxious in the first place to put an end to a war which for two years had threatened the peace of Europe. Prussia especially was desirous to obtain an honourable and advantageous peace for an allied power whose ruler was nearly related to her own king, and moreover to avoid the endless difficulties which must arise if, under existing circumstances and before the conclusion of a treaty, an insurrection in Constantinople should put an end to the existence of the Ottoman empire. The important influence exercised by General Baron von Müffling, who was sent to Constantinople by the Prussian government, is well known, but any account of the negotiations is altogether beside our purpose. At all events, nothing could be more welcome, and indeed more indispensable, to General Diebitsch than a negotiation. As soon therefore as Mahmoud Sadik Effendi, the Defterdar or treasurer, and Abd-el-Kader Bey, the Kadi-Asker or chief magistrate of Rumelia, both men of high rank, arrived at Adrianople, he empowered General Gortschakoff and privy councillor Fonton to open the negotiations until the arrival of the imperial plenipotentiaries. They commenced on the 1st of September, and at first proceeded most satisfactorily, as the great object at Constantinople was to gain time enough to stifle the insurrection in blood. When this had been done, and perhaps also when the plenipotentiaries had convinced themselves of the weakness of the Russian army, and gained fresh courage from learning the position of Mustapha Pasha, of which they had known nothing until then, they raised fresh difficulties, and on the 8th of September declared that they had no instructions respecting the indemnity for the war claimed by Russia.

General Diebitsch assumed an appearance of perfect tranquillity founded on a conviction of his superior strength. He affected to be equally ready to conclude a peace on reasonable terms or to enforce one at the point of the sword. No sooner therefore did the Turks show any hesitation with respect to the point in question than some Russian divisions advanced towards Constantinople in order to give greater effect to the Russian demands.

In the course of a few days Admiral Greig, who was with his fleet in the Black Sea, took the ports of Wasiliko, Ajeboli, and Iniada (on the 29th of August), while Admiral Heyden sailed to Enos in the Ægean Sea.

General Pahlen had pushed forward with the 2nd corps to Kirklissa. On the 5th of September he quitted his camp there, and on the 6th reached Visa, a small town in the Strandja mountains, from whence he opened communications with the fleet which in the mean time had entered the bay of Midia, and now made its appearance at the mouth of the Bosphorus, where the Turkish fleet lay idly at anchor.

On the Russian right wing 1 regiment of Bug lancers, 4 pieces of horse artillery, and a few Cossacks had been pushed forward towards Demotika. This detachment was followed by General Sievers with 2 regiments of foot and 1 division of lancers. He took possession of the towns of Demotika and Ipsala without resistance and advanced upon Enos. The country people everywhere received him in a friendly manner, the Turks laid down their arms, and the Rayahs only implored protection for their homes. A troop of horse, the advanced guard of 1500 men which the Pasha was sending from Salonika to Constantinople, was scattered by the Russians, who reached Enos on the 7th of September. This place, defended by 54 guns, surrendered next day by capitulation. In the centre General Roth advanced with the 4th corps along the great road to Constantinople. He reached Eskibaba on the 7th and Lüleh Burgass on the 8th. The advanced guard went on to Karistiran and foraged as far as Tchorlu and Rodosto.

Thus on the day when the Turkish plenipotentiaries broke off the negotiations the advanced troops of the Russian army stood with their right wing at Midia on the Black Sea, and their left at Enos on the Ægean, covering a space of 110 miles. The two corps at Visa and Luleh Burgass amounted in all to about 8000 men, and might therefore pass for the advanced corps of a considerable army. As they had already marched half way from Adrianople to Constantinople it was time that the main body should make its appearance. This consisted of the 7th corps at Adrianople; from this corps 1 detachment with 2 guns had been sent to Hermanly in the direction of Philippopoli; the 37th regiment of chasseurs had remained at Slivno, and one regiment of Bug lancers had been sent to Enos. Thus, then, the so-called Gros consisted of 10 battalions and 15 squadrons; in all, after deducting the numerous sick, about 4000 or 5000 men. Such was the army which was to make head against 30,000 Arnauts, to keep in subjection a town of 80,000 inhabitants, and finally to conquer another city containing 500,000 souls.

General Diebitsch had allowed the Effendis five days to send for instructions to the Porte; if they did not arrive at the end of that time he threatened to go himself to Constantinople to fetch them. The affair had now reached its utmost point of tension, and some decision must speedily be taken. On the 14th of September the peace was actually signed. How far it would have been possible for the Russian General to take a single step towards putting his threats into execution if this signature had been refused our readers may judge. It is certain that this ratification released General Diebitsch from a position as anxious as could well be conceived, and which, if prolonged for a few days more, might have caused him to be hurled from the summit of victory and success to the lowest depths of ruin and destruction.

Serious danger still threatened on the part of the Arnauts. General Kisselef had followed the Pasha of Scodra to Vrazza, where he received news of the conclusion of the peace, and immediately halted. Mustapha, who had acted as a traitor to his sovereign, by his former delay, repeated his offence by his present disobedience. The campaign, the final issue of which he might have so greatly affected, appearing, as he did, last in the field with a numerous intact army composed of good materials, was now at an end. To the reiterated orders of the Sultan to withdraw his troops, he only replied that he had no money to pay them off. Regardless of the armistice he at the end of September pushed forward his advanced guard to Haskoi, between Philippopoli and Adrianople, and made preparations for seizing the town of Demotika. General Rüdiger was obliged to hasten with the 7th corps to the village of Mustapha Pasha, and General Scheremetef with his brigade of lancers to Demotika; but on the 2nd of October these divisions were recalled to Adrianople, which was almost without troops. The Pasha of Scodra now actually marched upon Philippopoli with 30,000 men, and sent word to General Diebitsch that on the following Saturday, 10th of

October, he should arrive at Adrianople, and take up his winter-quarters there.

Hereupon General Kisselef received orders to advance; his advanced guard, consisting of 4 battalions and 8 squadrons, 300 Cossacks, and 30 guns, fell in on the 16th of October with 1700 Turks, the Pasha's rear-guard, who were entrenched with 3 guns at Arnaut Kalessi. The Russian flag of truce was received with musket-shots, and the Arnauts made the attack, although the Turks wished for peace. The fight lasted until night, and was renewed on the following day, but the slaughter does not seem to have been great. The end was that the Arnauts were routed. General Geismar, however, expressly forbade his men to pursue them; he even allowed their baggage to follow them, and gave up the cannon which had been taken from them. General Kisselef halted at Gabrowa, and the Russians anxiously avoided the chance of a fresh collision, and took pains to spread the news that peace had been concluded.

It is hard to say what turn events might have taken if the Pasha of Scodra had carried on the war on his own account after the Sultan had given it up. But he now abandoned all hostilities against the Russians, and allied himself with the Cossacks in order to plunder the Turkish provinces. For a great part of the winter the Arnauts remained at Philippopoli, and then withdrew to their mountains loaded with booty, after laying waste the whole surrounding country, and losing 7000 of their number by disease.

All the other armies which the Sultan had brought into the field were scattered. Shumla, where the Grand Vizier still remained, was not entered at all by the Russians either during or after the campaign, and the commandant of Giurgevo, Kutshuk Achmet Pasha, refused to deliver up the key of his fortress, according to the conditions of peace, because it had not been taken. It was not until he had given way that the Russians quitted Adrianople, on the 20th of November, exactly three months after they had entered it. They left 5000 men behind them in hospital, of whom by far the greater number died. The head-quarters of General Diebitsch were removed to Burgass.

CHAPTER VI.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

If we look back upon the events of this last campaign, we find that operations were again delayed till the beginning of May, and that this time also the means employed were out of all proportion to the object to be attained. The whole campaign lasted four months. If we deduct the sojourn in Adrianople, the operations occupied a period of only three months, and consisted of one siege, one battle, and one march of somewhat under 500 miles.

In this year also the troops stationed for the defence of Wallachia against the Turkish hordes assembled at Rustchuk and Widdin were very insufficient, and General Geismar with his weak corps crossed the Danube and acted on the offensive.

It was a great advantage to the Russians that Varna had been captured during the previous campaign, and not less was the occupation of Sizeboli during the winter. The provisioning of the army on both sides of the Balkan, by means of the fleet in the Black Sea, was thus ensured.

But in order to secure a firm basis for his operations, General Diebitsch was forced in 1829 to renew the siege of Silistria, in which he had been foiled during the last campaign. It occupied one-third of the army during two-thirds of the whole campaign (from 17th of May to 13th of July, when General Krassowski's corps joined the main army), and the capture of the fortress cost the Russians 3000 men. The battle of Kulewtscha cost them as many more in about four hours, but it destroyed the whole Turkish army, and decided the campaign. Kulewtscha was the first and only occasion during both campaigns on which the Russians succeeded in collecting a sufficient force for decisive action, and thus ensured success. Considering the absolute weakness of the Russian army, the merit of its commander was the greater, as the junction of the corps of Silistria and Eski-Arnautlar, as well as the subsequent flank march, had to be executed in the face of the Vizier's army. General Diebitsch had judged the state of affairs correctly, and quickly made up his mind to act on the offensive. The preparations for the battle were boldly and well arranged, and the Vizier found himself placed in an unfavourable strategical position. Much cannot be said for the conduct of the battle, and General Ostroschenko appears to have been sacrificed without sufficient cause.

The question is forced upon us, what would have been the issue of the campaign had Reschid Mohammed either omitted his second offensive operation altogether, or, informed in due time of the advance of the Russian main army, immediately retired into his fortified camp? It is certain that General Diebitsch would not have invested the place again as he did in the previous campaign. A regular assault would have been equally ineffectual, and the strategical importance of Shumla would have been as great as in the previous campaign. After the fall of Silistria, the Russians could have placed 20,000 men before Shumla to keep the corps of the Grand Vizier in check: but whether under such circumstances they would have ventured—basing their operations upon Varna and Sizeboli—to cross the Balkan with at most 20,000 men, is a question we are unable to decide.

The very wreck of an army in Shumla detained the Russians for five weeks under the walls of that fortress – a delay entirely owing to the numerical weakness of the Russians, which forced them to wait for the corps occupied in the siege of Silistria.

The passage of the Balkan was in fact only effected by one route, as the 7th corps advanced from Köprikoi by Podbaschi to join the 6th and 2nd corps. Nine days after quitting Shumla the Russian army was united on the southern side of the mountains, not far from Aidos. The Turks had not defended the mountain-passes, the stand they made at Kamtchik and Nadir was feeble and desultory. This by no means lessens the merit and reputation of General Diebitsch. For when he boldly undertook with a weak army to penetrate into the heart of the Ottoman empire, he could not have foreseen that the Turks would offer so feeble an opposition. Until this period in the campaign, the Turks had fought well on all occasions. But from this time the demoralisation of the Turks, and the certainty of victory in the open field, freed the Russians from the necessity of any strategical combinations beyond the care of provisioning the army. It was only before the walls of some large Turkish town that the success of the Russians could end.

The obstinacy of Reschid Mohammed in remaining in Shumla can scarcely be approved. For full 14 days after General Diebitsch had broken up his camp before Shumla, and after the Russian general had beaten Abdur Rachman's corps, the Vizier, after leaving 10,000 men to support the armed inhabitants of the place, could have advanced with 20,000 by Kötesch, Eski-Stambul, and Kasan, to Slivno. Without exposing himself to the chance of a battle on the south side of the Balkan, which would probably have ended like that of Kulewtscha, the Vizier could have continued his march undisturbed on the right bank of the Tundscha to Adrianople, have there united his force with 12,000 Turks who came from Constantinople, and taken up an entrenched position; under these circumstances he might possibly have induced the Arnauts under the Pasha of Scodra to advance. Had a man of Reschid Mohammed's rank and determination been at Adrianople, this important town would certainly not have fallen without a blow, and at any rate the further advance of the Russians would have again been put in question.

Nevertheless the Vizier was very near being justified by the issue of events. It is certain that the opinion that it was impossible to penetrate further into Rumelia with a weak force until Shumla was taken, prevailed among officers high at head-quarters. The march upon Adrianople did not take place till full three weeks after the passage of the Balkan, and then only after the Grand Vizier's army had been beaten in three separate divisions at Aidos, Karnabat, and Slivno. If, on the contrary, the Pasha had kept his troops together in the camp, it is not improbable that the powerful attraction of Shumla in a strategical point of view would even yet have seized the Russians, and the Balkan would not have been crossed, or its spell broken.

The Russians arrived before Adrianople in so weak a state that they could effect nothing more by force of arms. But the Porte, owing to its obstinate adherence to the course upon which it had once entered, and to influences not of a military nature, persisted in the conclusion of a disadvantageous peace. Most undoubtedly, in this difficult position General Diebitsch showed himself to be an able diplomatist, as well as a successful general.

The terms of the treaty of Adrianople are well known; we have only to consider it in its military point of view, and in so far as it altered the means of resistance that the Turks could in future command. It cannot be denied that the peace was unfavourable to the Porte, but this is the natural condition of the conquered party. The Sultan might have avoided the appeal to arms by a much smaller sacrifice, but he elected war, and lost the game, or rather gave it up for lost from the moment that Adrianople fell. From the day on which the Russians appeared in the ancient metropolis of the kingdom, the Sultan and General Diebitsch played for high stakes, which might end fatally for either side.

The greatest danger for the Sultan was that of an insurrection in Constantinople. Nevertheless, Sultan Mahmoud for a long time resisted the pusillanimous advice of his ministers, who trembled for their heads, and the pressure of foreign powers, not one of whom had assisted him in the war, or was in a condition to support him in his extremity. He shed bitter tears when, on the 14th of September, he was compelled to bow his iron will to the still harder force of necessity, and for weeks he shut himself up in his palace at Therapia, crushed in spirit. For in signing that treaty he acknowledged that he had failed in the object for which he had striven all his life. Rivers of blood had been shed, the old institutions and sacred traditions of his country had been destroyed, the faith and the pride of his people had been undermined for the sake of reform—and now that reform was condemned by the event.

At the very commencement of the first campaign the Czar had loudly proclaimed that increase of territory was not the object of the war into which he had been forced, whatever might be the end. True to his word, the Czar restored to the Porte all the cities, harbours, fortresses, and districts that his armies had conquered in Rumelia and Bulgaria, from the Danube to the Hellespont. Even the Principalities on the left bank of the Danube remained subject to the Porte; the Pruth and the Danube were still, as before the war, the European boundary between Russia and Turkey. But, although Servia, Wallachia, and Moldavia remained subject to the Turk, they were placed under the protection of Russia. The six districts severed from Servia were restored; and the Turks (with the exception of those dwelling in the fortresses of Belgrade and of New Orsova) were ordered to quit the territory within 18 months. The undisturbed exercise of their religion, a national and independent administration, perfect security and free commerce, were insured to the Christian population of those districts. The fortresses held by Turkey on the left bank of the Danube—namely, Turnu, Kaleh, and Giurgevo—were to be given up, their fortifications, as well as those of Brailow, to be razed and not to be rebuilt, the towns incorporated with the Principalities, which were no longer to allow Turkish garrisons within their frontiers. There was no denying that the resources of these provinces were completely lost to the Turks in the event of a future war.

The Danube, too, no longer formed the strong barrier which in former wars had occupied the Russian army during a whole campaign.

Brailow was destroyed, even to the fort on the right bank of the Danube. Tultcha, Isakchi, and Matchin, as well as Kostendje, had been razed during the winter of 1828–9. Not so Hirsova, which, although easy to take from the Wallachian side of the Danube, forms an admirable tête du pont against the Turkish shore. For the same reason the Russians left standing the walled bastions of Giurgevo upon the river. It was laid down by the treaty that the valley of the Danube—that is to say, its most southern arm (Kedrilleh Boghas) should so mark the boundary between the two countries that all the islands belonged to the Russians. It is true that the latter bound themselves to erect neither forts nor houses upon these islands, but they claimed the right to establish their quarantine posts there, and accordingly, on the Sulina mouth of the river, the only navigable one, a very considerable settlement has sprung up by degrees in a place most important to Germany, from the strength of its position. Thus the curious fact occurs that, as the valley of the Danube towards the mouth of the river becomes broader and larger, the Russian frontier gradually approaches nearer to the Turkish. At Silistria the distance from the Wallachian shore is 1000 paces; at Hirsova it is only 500; and opposite Isakchi there are Russian posts within 200 paces of the Turkish town. At Tultcha, also, the distance is not above a musket-shot.

The quarantine stations can very easily be turned into military posts: with the exception of Tultcha, the above-named towns without the islands do not command the navigable channel of the Danube, and, consequently, lose their importance. Tultcha itself, in its new extended position, cannot be fortified. The treaty does not prevent the rebuilding of these towns, but they still lie open and defenceless. Silistria—which was held by the Russians till the end of 1835, until the 11½ millions of ducats, the sum levied upon the Turks as compensation for the war, had been paid—was not razed, but the breaches in the walls remained unrepaired. The inhabitants have almost all disappeared, and the interior of the town is desolate; while towards the east, immediately in front of the walls, the important suburb of Wolna has sprung up, which would much impede the defence of the town. Silistria can be turned into a good fortress only by the erection of 4 strong detached forts on the heights to the south, and by a tête du pont to the north: for the former the Turks have no money, and the latter is contrary to existing treaties. Lastly, Rustchuk has lost all offensive importance against the basis of a Russian army by the destruction of Giurgevo, its tête du pont.*

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* The reader must recollect that this work was published in 1845. —TRANS.

The more it has become necessary for the Porte since its repeated disasters to concentrate its forces, the more certain is it that the defence of Turkey in Europe, in the event of any future war, can only begin at the Balkan.

In spite of the enormous sums which he had to pay to Russia, Sultan Mahmoud, in the years 1834 to 1836, rebuilt Varna, the most important fortress of his empire, according to a plan in favour of which there is not much to be said. Shumla, which has lost nothing of its strategical importance, has been materially strengthened by the stone forts of Strandscha, Tschally, Feddaï, and Tschengel, as well as by the erection of large massive barracks, hospitals, and storehouses. Pravadi may be temporarily fortified with very slender means, and these three places will in future be able to arrest the progress of an army of 50,000 or 60,000 men for months beneath their walls. The difficulty of crossing the Balkan was formerly much over-estimated, but the result of the campaign of 1828-9 has caused many persons to imagine that it is no impediment at all.* We must not, however, forget that in that year the mountains were not defended at all. On the lowest pass, which is above 1800 feet high, General Roth had to assist his battalion of pioneers by a working party of 4000 men during two days, in order to break a way; and yet no enemy impeded his advance:

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* "What molehills to make such a fuss about!" exclaims a travelling English officer.

it was not until he reached the southern foot of the mountains that a few bodies of Turks appeared, none of whom offered any serious resistance. Were the Porte to establish military colonies of Ottoman race on the plain of Aidos and Karnabat, the Balkan would unquestionably become a very formidable barrier.

The war with Russia had annihilated the newly raised and laboriously-trained Turkish army, and, what was worse as regarded the future, had destroyed it in the opinion of the Mussulmans. If Turkey had enjoyed ten years of peace after the destruction of the Janissaries, Sultan Mahmoud's military creation might in that time have gained some strength; and, supported by an army upon which he could depend, the Sultan might have carried out the needful reforms in the administration of his country, have infused new life into the dead branches of the Ottoman Empire, and have made himself formidable to his neighbours.

All this was prevented by Russia, which nipped the Sultan's military reforms in the bud; and since that time the Porte has never been able to form an army, but what it has been immediately destroyed in fresh wars against the Arnauts, the Egyptians, and the Kurds.

By the treaty of Adrianople, moreover, the Sultan acknowledged the independence of Greece. This was far more than a mere loss of territory. Narrow as were the confines of the new Hellenic kingdom, to which perhaps so great a future is opened, its mere existence affords to hundreds of thousands of Greeks, who are scattered throughout the other provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the example of a successful rebellion. All the discontented Christian subjects of the Porte could now find foreign support and encouragement; the Wallachians and Moldavians looked towards Russia, the Bulgarians towards Servia, the Greeks towards Hellas. Besides, the inhabitants of the Morea and the Cyclades had hitherto supplied the Turkish fleets with crews, or at all events with its best seamen. Ever since these were lost to Turkey, it may be taken for granted that the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, with all its deficiencies, will always be superior to the Turkish.

Thus, in the event of a new war, there can be no doubt as to which power would have dominion in the Euxine. And it seems far from improbable that the Russians might land their army at once on the Thracian Chersonese, and by that means avoid a long march through a desolate country, as well as the resistance of the fortresses and the difficulties of the Balkan, and decide the fate of the war at once by an attack upon Constantinople.

During the fourth crusade the Venetians transported 40,000 Latin Christians to Byzantium. For this purpose they employed no less than 360 ships, accompanied by 70 provision transports, and convoyed by 50 galleys. The city was taken. In the year 1833 a peaceful manœuvre of the same kind was executed. The Russians were invited by the Porte, their embarkation was prepared, and no opposition offered to their landing. Eleven ships of the line and a proportionate number of smaller vessels were able to convey a corps of 10,000 men to Unkiar Skelessi. It cannot be denied that such a body of troops as this would be sufficient to decide the fate of the Turkish capital, either in case the Christian population were to take up arms against the Ottomans, or if the discontent among the Moslem were ever to break out into open insurrection, or if the dynasty of Osman, which seldom numbers more than two representatives at a time, were to become extinct; and it is manifest that the Russians, and the Russians only, are near enough and well enough prepared to take instant advantage of any event of the kind.

But unless we admit that the Sultan's throne is likely to become so rotten that it would crumble at the slightest pressure from without;—if, on the contrary, we believe that the Porte may be able to maintain its authority over its Mussulman and Christian subjects, and even to win over the latter to its interests;—we can by no means look upon such a rapid mode of military proceedings as possible. In this case neither 10,000 nor yet 20,000 men would be able to take Constantinople by storm.

Taught by the experience of the last campaigns, the Russians will probably in their next war enter Bulgaria with a much larger force. If the army were to cross the Danube at Hirsova with a real effective force of 120,000 men, to invest Silistria with 20,000, Varna with a like number, and to place 30,000 in observation before Shumla, it is not altogether impossible that the remaining 50,000 men based upon the seaports of the Black Sea might at once cross the Balkan. But then it is by no means certain that Adrianople would again fall into their hands without resistance, and, at any rate, the final decision of the question must at last take place under those ancient walls which delayed the fall of the lower Roman empire for a whole century.

APPENDIX.

Besides the enemy by whom they were openly opposed, the Russians had to contend with another invisible foe which hung upon their footsteps, crossed the Balkan with them, and attacked them with fearful violence after they had concluded a most advantageous peace; this foe was disease.

Formerly the European powers took the field with 40,000 or 50,000 men, who carried with them provisions, ovens, and tents, conquered a province and concluded a peace. In western Europe war has gradually become more and more a national struggle, but in such a country as Turkey, levies *en masse*, conscriptions, and other expedients of modern warfare are inapplicable. The want of roads, and of agriculture, the almost nomadic habits of the population, and the small number of at all considerable towns, make it necessary to adhere to the old system. The army had to be followed by immense magazines, and in the event of rapid and distant manœuvres, each soldier had to carry with him provisions for 10 days. Even these measures would have been insufficient had not the Russian operations been carried on near the coast of a sea of which they were absolute masters.

These are no doubt heavy shackles upon a General conducting an invasion, and they therefore give an incalculable advantage to the force which acts upon the defensive; but a still more serious difficulty is presented by the thought to be taken of the health of the troops and the care of the sick. Supplies of food might be brought by sea, but the erection of vast hospitals requires a firm footing on shore; whereas, only 3 months before the conclusion of the peace, neither Silistria nor Shumla, both on the flank of the Russian line of operations, were taken. But this difficulty was nothing compared to that which arose out of the enormous spread and intense malignity of the diseases by which the Russian troops were attacked. Owing to the former, all the preparations for sickness turned out totally insufficient; and owing to the latter, those who were appointed to heal and to tend the sick were among the very first to die.

Several German surgeons in the Russian service have drawn a fearful picture of the state of an army which, though victorious in the field, was completely vanquished in the hospitals.

We know of old that armies which took the field in Dacia and Pannonia have always been visited by pestilence, although the country cannot be said to be unhealthy to the inhabitants, whose clothing, diet, and habits are fitted to the climate. In this part of Turkey, as in all others, no such thing is known as really hard labour. The life of an Oriental is simple and tranquil: he rises early, eats his first meal at 9 o'clock, sits during the heat of the day under a vine-clad trellis or a plane-tree, drinks sherbet, and tastes no stimulant more powerful than coffee and a pipe; towards sunset he eats another frugal meal of vegetables, and goes to bed so early that in a Turkish village no one is seen out of doors after 8 o'clock. As soon as the great heats begin, usually in May, epidemic fevers frequently break out even among the natives, who then go into a sort of voluntary quarantine in their summer houses, or up into the mountains. By the middle of July the spring fevers usually subside owing to the want of communication; for the villages are almost empty during that time, and there are towns in Asia Minor, as, for instance, Malatia, where in summer not a soul is to be seen—the 20,000 or 30,000 inhabitants having removed to their summer quarters several miles off by the side of flowing streams, and beneath the cool shade of trees. The whole Kurdish and Turkoman population pass the summer under tents of goat's hair, and remove higher up the mountains in proportion to the increase of the heat.

The clothing of the natives is as well adapted to the climate as their food and dwellings. They never go uncovered, but protect their heads by a thick covering against the dangerous stroke of the sun. Furs, which in our northern climate are so seldom used, are there worn by every one: a temperature of 70°, so refreshing to us after sunset, is there felt as intense cold after a heat of from 90° to 108° in the shade, and very warm clothing becomes indispensable. Moreover, on the north of the Balkan no sooner has the short twilight begun than a dew falls which wets the clothes and bedding of those who sleep in the open air like a heavy rain.

Still greater than the difference of temperature between noon and night is that between summer and winter. On the Danube the winter is at least as long, and at least as severe, as on the Elbe. Early in November the plains are covered with deep snow, which, even south of the Balkan and in the valleys about Constantinople where the sun does not penetrate, lasts until late in the spring; on the mountains and high table-lands the traveller frequently has to ride during the month of March under a burning sun across interminable fields of snow, so dazzling as almost to blind him.

In the year 1838 the Porte assembled an army of 36,000 men at the foot of the Taurus. Although encamped upon the plain of Charpat, 3000 feet above the level of the sea, and composed entirely of natives, mostly Kurds, the change in their mode of life, and the European clothing, caused a terrible mortality. Fever, dysentery, and typhus prevailed to such an extent that several regiments lost half their numbers within the year. The pernicious influence of the climate could not fail to be much more strongly felt by a foreign army. The easy, indolent life of the Orientals was impossible in the Russian camp. During the heat of the day the soldiers had to undergo the greatest fatigue, and to sleep during the cold nights exposed to the dew on the steaming earth; their clothes, which they could scarcely ever take off, were tight and inconvenient, and the covering of the head especially heavy and useless. The food was that eaten by the soldiers in northern latitudes and in winter: it consisted of meat, oatmeal, and brandy; the latter was intended always to be mixed with water, but this was often neglected. Vegetables were not to be had, nor any other bread than the black biscuit, which is so convenient to keep and to carry; but it is stated by the surgeons that this biscuit, though softened in water and broken up, passed through the bowels wholly undigested owing to the enfeebled state of the men's stomachs. In Wallachia and Bulgaria the water was for the most part bad, muddy, and chalky, and at Shumla it was so scarce that they had barely enough to drink, and none for washing and bathing, so that want of cleanliness was added to their other ills. For great numbers to live together in a small space is always unwholesome, and how much more must this have been the case where so many of the number were sick and enfeebled, and where numbers of corpses were buried every day!

No sooner, indeed, had the Russian army entered the Principalities than a vast number of the soldiers fell ill. The surgeons were unanimous in considering the disease to be of a very malignant character, but they differed as to whether it were a low gastric or a putrid fever,—whether typhus or the plague. The name, it is true, did not matter much, as the plague is closely related to those diseases, and indeed is perhaps merely another form of them aggravated by the influences of soil and climate. The characteristic symptoms, such as buboes, carbuncles, and boils, made their appearance, but no one liked to utter the dreaded name, or to resort to quarantine regulations which were hardly compatible with a campaign.

Some measures of the kind were, however, indispensable; for though a few recent experiments * have appeared to prove the contrary, long and frequent experience has shown that infection may be communicated by the touch of plague-stricken persons, and still more by that of their clothes.†

Before the breaking out of the war there were in Russia two lines of quarantine, on the Dnieper and the Pruth; the former had been taken off at the beginning of the campaign in order to facilitate communication. But before the entrance of the Russian troops, scattered cases of plague had appeared in Wallachia, and the Hospodar had established a plague-hospital

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* In 1837 and 1838 Dr. Bulard shut himself up in the plague hospitals—touched the sick and the dead, slept beside them in their beds, inoculated himself with the matter from the buboes, and remained well. In like manner an Armenian priest lived for many years in the plague hospital at Pera.

† A Russian physician lost, one after another, four attendants who brushed his clothes, while he himself was spared.

at Dudeshteh. The cases became more numerous in the spring, and by the middle of May four convents were filled with the sick. Now the quarantine on the Pruth was taken off and that on the Dnieper reimposed with a duration of 16 days, and boards of inspection were organised at Bucharest and Jassy. A little later the main army before Shumla had to be protected by quarantine regulations, not only against Turkish deserters, but also against Wallachia. Unfortunately, the plague broke out in Hirsova, the principal point of communication between the army and Russia, and it became necessary to establish a quarantine at Bazardchik. At Varna the troops were inspected every week, and these precautionary measures were so far successful that the main corps in Bulgaria remained free from the plague all through the year 1828. As the inhabitants had foretold, the character of the disease in the Principalities changed when the hot weather set in; it did not however die out, as the communication could not be entirely stopped; at one time the Russians were infected by the natives, at another the natives by the Russians; it was in vain that the sick soldiers were lodged in separate huts of brushwood, that the clothes, linen, and even the munitions of whole battalions were cleansed, and a number of suspected houses burnt. Spite of all these precautions, the sickness continued to spread in the Principalities throughout the autumn, and by the middle of November 40 villages were infected. It was not until the severe cold set in in December that the plague entirely ceased among the troops that were besieging Giurgevo and Kalarash, and in the hospitals at Bucharest it still continued. What made the matter worse was that those hospitals were only calculated for the reception of 500 sick, whereas thousands were brought thither from all directions, of whom a great number proved to be infected with the plague. On the 11th of February, 1829, 61 villages were purified by order of General Roth.

Hitherto we have spoken only of the plague, but nervous, intermittent, and putrid fevers, dysentery, scurvy, and inflammatory disorders, prevailed everywhere, and destroyed ten times as many soldiers as the plague, which had hitherto been confined within narrow limits.

Meanwhile the opening of the new campaign drew near; the cycle of diseases of the first campaign was closed, and in February, 1829, the number of the sick and dead was at its minimum between the two campaigns. The diseases had reached their acme in September and October; during the latter month alone 20,000 sick had been received in the hospitals, without counting the field hospitals. The greatest number of deaths had occurred in January, 1829; for in this month, during which there was an armistice, 6000 men died; but the relative mortality of the first campaign did not reach its highest point until February, 1829, when one out of four of the sick died. The intensity of the disease is shown in the following table.

The number of deaths per cent. were, in—

	1828.								1829.	
	May.	June.	July.	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.
In the Regimental Hospitals	1·8	2·7	2·0	2·7	5·6	7·2	10·9	10·5	..	..
In the Hospitals	7·4	7·2	10·2	16·6	18·9	22·3	23·4	23·3	25·5	28·8

The vast amount of illness is shown by the fact, that during the ten months from May, 1828, to February, 1829, no less than 75,226 of the less serious cases were treated in the field hospitals, and 134,882 serious cases in the hospitals, making altogether 210,108 sick.

Reckoning the whole strength of the Russian army, including non-combatants, at 100,000 men, which is a very liberal calculation, every man had, on an average, therefore, been twice in hospital. From this positive information, and the rates of per centage given in the table, it appears that during the first campaign, and the subsequent winter quarters, the Russians lost at least 82,000 men in the hospitals. This number does not of course include those who were killed on the field of battle, and therefore were not brought into hospital at all. It may therefore be said, without exaggeration, that this first campaign cost the Russians nearly one-half of their actual effective force.

In the middle of May, 1829, symptoms of plague broke out for the first time on the right bank of the Danube, at Czernavoda, Babadagh, Kostendje, Mangalia, Bazardchik, Kavarna, and at last in Varna, the most important point of all, at which were the reserves, magazines, and arsenals of the whole army, and a depôt of 4000 invalids. The infection was supposed to have been spread by the distribution of the munitions which had belonged to the deceased soldiers of the 16th division of infantry, and which had been kept shut up for a long time in a magazine. At all events the guardians of the arsenal were the first who died with positive symptoms of plague. However, the close quarters of the troops, the bad food, and the exhalations from so many dead bodies, generated scurvy and the most malignant forms of fever. In the middle of June the numbers daily admitted into the hospital at Varna amounted to from 50 to 80, and the death of eight surgeons deprived the sick of almost all assistance. A few battalions were removed to an encampment outside the town; the men were made to bathe in the sea; the tents were fumigated with vinegar; the munitions were aired; the clothes of the dead burnt; and a space enclosed with ditches set apart for plague-stricken patients.

The appearance of this plague-hospital, if such it can be called, was frightful. The sick staggered about, gasping beneath the burning sun among the dying and the dead. In June the plague reached such a height, that above 1000 men a-week were brought into the plague-hospital. By the 26th of August 5509 sick had been received there: of these 3959 died.

On one day, the 25th of June, there were 300 deaths; the corpses were heaped up like logs, and carted away. Out of 41 surgeons 28 were infected, and of these 20 died. Out of 7 apothecaries 4 died, besides 30 dressers, hospital attendants, &c. As the surgeons only arrived a few at a time, intervals occurred during which there was only one doctor to take care of all these sick. The enormous mortality among the surgeons was the more unfortunate, as they were replaced for the most part by inexperienced young men, generally foreigners and unable to speak the language. Not only in the hospitals, but on every road into the town, in every field, and behind every hedge, were found dead and dying men, while drinking and riot was going on in the tents of the cantiniers.

The state of things was no better in other places. Brailow was completely deserted; even the posting-house was removed out of the town, so that travellers might not be forced to enter it; 1200 men were treated there for plague in June; of these 774 died; almost all the surgeons and hospital officers were dead. In Slobodjeh the entire management of the plague hospital was left in the hands of one single non-commissioned officer. The plague had also broken out in Bessarabia. At this time the main corps of the Russian army lay before Shumla, and it was of course of vital importance to protect it from the fearful pestilence. The corps was surrounded in the rear by a cordon of outposts. The large convoys which had been despatched with proper precautions were suffered to pass free, but the carts of the cantiniers, which were to supply the head-quarters, were stopped here in crowds, while the greatest scarcity prevailed in the camp. Spite of all, the infection crept through, but the cases of plague were scattered, and on the whole the state of health of the main army was good. What the troops chiefly suffered from was dysentery.

As soon as the army had begun to cross the Balkan, all the sick in the ambulances of head-quarters were transported to Balchik. The troops which had to pass through suspected places marched between cordons of outposts, to prevent all communication with the inhabitants. All the convoys from Varna were purified before starting, and re-examined on their arrival. A strict quarantine was introduced along the course of the Kamtchik, and the seaports in the bay of Burgass were provided with lazarettos.

A great number of men sunk under the fatigue during the first few days' march. By the time they had reached Devno the number of sick in the ambulance had reached 400, who were suffering from diarrhœa, jaundice, and scurvy. Many of the men threw away their ten days' provision of oatmeal and biscuit, unable to bear the weight. The corps reached the first ascent of the mountain with sadly thinned ranks, and even at

Derweesh-Jowann a hospital had to be established under temporary huts for the accommodation of 600 sick.

At the southern foot of the mountain the troops rested from their long fatigues and privations, beneath the shade of fine oaks and beeches, and amid gardens affording vegetables and half-ripe grapes. The soldiers were rejoiced and encouraged by their successful passage of the Balkan, and were filled with fresh life and hope. Only about 50 men had been wounded at the taking of Aidos, and there were not 100 sick in the town. In Aidos the streets had to be cleared of the dead bodies of the besieged, and the houses to be cleansed from dirt. No symptom of plague showed itself here, but the army was now attacked by intermittent fevers. In a very few days both officers and men complained of inconceivable languor and fatigue, insomuch that many of them could scarcely walk. Besides the intermittent, they were attacked by continued fever, accompanied by delirium, and such relaxation of the capillaries, that the slightest blow, or even touch, caused blue marks in the skin; the bite of the flies, which attacked these patients with especial avidity, produced purple spots half an inch in diameter, in a few moments. On the fifth or sixth day the patients died in a state of unconsciousness, and their bodies immediately began to decompose like those of hunted animals. The intermittent fevers, with redoubled paroxysms, rendered the patients weary of life, and were worse than the plague. Very few had been wounded, but these were attacked by tetanus; more than half the number of deaths, however, were caused by dysentery.

Every day hundreds left the ranks of the army already so much enfeebled; some lost their senses for thirty-six hours in the paroxysms of fever, others were perishing of thirst. The hospitals on the further side the Balkan filled so fast that there was neither room to receive the sick nor clothes and linen for their use. Most of the necessaries had been left behind in Bulgaria, where, during the month of July alone, 19,000 sick had been added to the 18,000 who had been left there. Thus during the month of July no less than 40,000 men, more than half the active force of the army, lay in hospital. As yet the plague had not followed the main army, but it hung like a black cloud over the northern horizon of Bulgaria. The quarantine establishment on the Kamtchik was filled with persons suspected of plague, and the character of the continued fevers became so malignant that it threatened to turn to plague. During the month of September 2096 men lay sick at Burgass, 6 of whom had buboes. In October, out of 2117 sick, 53 had the plague, and in November one half the whole number of sick were plague-stricken. The quarantine had been kept up with the utmost rigour, and it seems probable that the plague had developed itself from the fever without contagion.

Meanwhile the main army was advancing upon Adrianople. During the forced marches thither from Slivno half the pack-horses died of fatigue. The number of sick in the ambulance rose to 800; these were left behind in Bujukderbent, but during the two days' march to Adrianople the ambulance was again filled with 26 officers and 226 privates: a great number died on the march. In the Kamschatka reserve regiment, which had followed the corps from Sizeboli, symptoms of plague appeared, but it was kept down by immediate separation. At Adrianople an hospital was established in the newly-erected Turkish barracks, a large square building standing on a height to the west of the town. The building consisted of two stories, with 100 windows on each of the shorter fronts and 150 on the longer ones. It contained a mosque with a tall minaret, large marble baths, spacious kitchens, and a kiosk commanding a magnificent view of the town in the valley beneath. In front extended a large green, a grove of plane-trees, and several gardens and cemeteries. An invading army might be considered fortunate in finding such quarters for their sick in this country; but owing to the probability of being soon forced to return home, the needful arrangements were made in the most temporary manner. We have already seen how long the stay of the Russians at Adrianople was protracted, and during three whole months they made shift as though they were to leave it at the end of three days: they were not prepared either for the enormous increase in the number of sick, or for the rigour of the winter. The hospital filled fast:

by the time the army had been in Adrianople a week 1616 sick were taken there; by the 1st of September it contained 3666, and by the middle of the month 4641, one-fourth of the whole remaining disposable force. After the conclusion of the war the plague broke out in the hospital in its most fearful shape, and in the midst of peace carried off those who had withstood the sword, fatigue, and disease until the end of the campaign.

To these immense numbers of sick nothing could be afforded but a bare shelter. Adrianople did not contain a supply of stores sufficient to last any length of time; the most ordinary food was wanting; there was not even hay or straw to litter down the sick upon the wooden pallets of the barracks; they were laid upon torn-up Turkish tents with knapsacks as pillows and no covering but their cloaks. The winter set in with fearful severity; most of the windows were unglazed, and the doors would not shut. In a short time the beautiful grove of plane-trees had disappeared, for even the healthy troops wanted firewood, and the very bones of the dead out of the cemeteries were used as fuel. At first there was no lack of surgeons, but the work they had to do was beyond human powers: there were no dressers to be found at all and scarcely any hospital attendants. The doctors were forced to prepare and administer their remedies themselves, and when the plague broke out they nearly all fell victims to it, as was the case wherever it prevailed.

One of the greatest evils was the very defective arrangements for maintaining cleanliness. With 5000 patients, half of them suffering from dysentery, it was more than fifty men could do to keep up any cleanliness at all. In addition to this the drains had got stopped up, and the most horrible stench pervaded the whole building.

During the first months spent by the Russians at Adrianople intermittent fevers swept off the sick by hundreds. The paroxysms appeared in a double form, the first lasting sometimes as long as 18 hours, the second paroxysm beginning after the interval of an hour, so that the patients were 36 hours under the influence of the disorder and only 12 hours free from it. They generally died at the end of 18 or 21 days; if the disease lasted longer it usually terminated in scurvy or dropsy. The only remedy was quinine, and of this they had no supply. According to the report of the Russian surgeon-general there were not more than 500 men in the whole army who could say that they had not been attacked by fever at all, and many of these were seized after their return home with the disorder in an aggravated form.

The most harassing of all the diseases was dysentery. Administering the medicines was the easiest part of the task; the proper nursing of the sufferers, which would have required almost as many attendants as patients, and the washing of linen, was impossible, and accordingly the most frightful want of cleanliness was unavoidable. Linen and fur coats for 2000 men were sent from Ahiolo to Adrianople, but did not arrive until December, having been delayed by the badness of the roads and by the breaking out of the plague among the drivers of the baggage-waggons. During the last half of September all diseases and all relapses, as well as the intermitting and continued fevers, took the form of the most exhausting diarrhœa and fatal dysentery.

During the month of October 1300 men died at Adrianople alone of diarrhœa; 1500 were sent thither from Kirklissa suffering under the same disease, and scarcely able to reach the hospital from exhaustion. The diarrhœa patients, whose vital powers were completely exhausted, perished with cold like flies in autumn with the thermometer at about 41°. In order to protect their feet against cold they kept on their boots until they complained of violent pains in their feet, and upon their feet being examined, about the 16th of October, they were found to have mortification in the toes, arising from want of external and of vital heat.*

According to the terms of the treaty of peace the Russian army was to go into winter quarters at Burgass, but it was absolutely impossible to transport such a number of sick people along such roads: 4700 sick, with 300 or 400 men commanded to serve as attendants, had to remain at Adrianople under cover of the 36th regiment of chasseurs, making altogether about 6000 men.

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* During the winter of 1838-39 14 men had their feet frozen in bed in the hospital at Malatia. At that time dysentery again raged among the Russian troops.

Before the departure of the corps on the 29th of October the first case of plague occurred in the hospital, and soon afterwards the disease spread with irresistible violence until not one of the 300 wards was free from it.

The external symptoms of the plague are described by the Russian physicians as follows. The outbreak of the disorder usually takes place at sunset; it begins with shiverings, which soon become rigor, and change towards midnight into violent heat with delirium, resembling an inflammatory fever. In this stage the patient is very talkative, and maintains that his illness is of no consequence. If any one approaches him, he jumps up, but immediately staggers backwards, or falls as if struck by lightning: the face is swollen, the expression altered, and the eyes fixed and covered with a white film. The patient sees and hears imperfectly and speaks thick, but much and fast; his memory is so weak that he often does not know his own name or that of his regiment: on the whole his appearance is that of a drunken man. In a subsequent stage of the disease he sinks into torpid silence and plucks at his clothes; he complains of cold, crawls about on the earth, heedless of the injuries he inflicts upon himself, and often dies at the very moment that he is tearing his neighbour in order to drag off his clothing for himself. The breaking out of the buboes does not save him from death, which ensues at the end of forty-eight, or twenty-four, and sometimes of even four hours. The only favourable crisis is violent perspiration.

In a disease of which the course was so rapid all internal remedies were found unavailing. At Varna, pouring cold water over the patients had sometimes cured and always relieved them, but at Adrianople the weather was too unfavourable, and the patients too sensitive to cold, to admit of this treatment, and the only thing which afforded any relief was external friction with oil. Towards the end of September the plague reached its utmost height; from 50 to 70 men died every day, and the disease only died out in the following March from want of more victims.

Only two transports went to Burgass at all, one in December with 300 convalescents, and one in May with 170 sick. They were escorted by 300 or 400 men in good health; all the rest had perished. Of the 6000 who stayed behind in Adrianople 5200 died.

The plague also spread in the winter quarters on the other side of the Balkan—not a regiment, not an hospital, not even the head-quarters at Burgass were exempt. The whole army, if such a wreck deserves the name, was subjected to a purification, and was not suffered to re-enter Russia until it had performed a quarantine of twenty-one days. One ship of the line and two frigates had to be devoted to fetching the sick, who still amounted, after all the mortality at Burgass, to 3684, of which 600 were plague-stricken: they were conveyed to Kinburn and Ovidiopol. It was not till the 25th of June, 1830, that head-quarters reached Tultchin.

The enormous increase in the mortality in the Russian army during the campaign of 1829, as compared with that of the former, great as it was, may be seen at a glance by comparing the following table with the one given above.

The number of deaths per cent. was as follows:—

1829.	Mar.	Apr.	May.	June.	July.	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
In the Regimental Hospitals	..	..	9·3	10·7	10·0	11·1	14·3	18·8	27·3	19·6
In the Hospitals	20·4	25·6	29·2	56·6	41·1	33·7	34·6	42·0	45·6	39·1

On an average, therefore, there died in 1828—

In the Field Regimental Hospitals, 5 per cent. In the Hospitals, 19·2 per cent.

And in 1829—

In the Field Regimental Hospitals, 14·6 per cent. In the Hospitals, 37·0 per cent.

The mortality in the regimental hospitals was therefore three times as great as that of the former year; in the hospitals it was double. It is impossible to say what the proportion might have been had a third campaign become necessary.

The number of the sick and dead in the year 1829 is nowhere fully given, but the following data may be taken for granted.

In the regular hospitals alone were—

1829.	Received.		Of these there died.	
In March	12,170	Sick	$\frac{1}{5}$ = 2,434	„
April	17,625	„	$\frac{1}{4}$ = 4,406	„
May	14,419	„	$\frac{1}{3}$ = 4,806	„
June	18,000	„	above $\frac{1}{2}$ = 9,500	„
July	19,000	„	$\frac{2}{5}$ = 7,600	„
That is, during 5 months	81,214	Sick.	28,746	died.

During the following months the mortality rose from one-third to two-fifths, and even to one-half. The number of sick continued to increase in the small army at Adrianople, and the deaths during the five last months of the year were at least as numerous as during the five previous months. We know that 5200 men more died out of the number left behind there. If to all these we add the deaths which took place in the field hospitals and the number of those killed in battle, we shall probably fall far short of the truth if we reckon the loss sustained by the Russians during their last campaign at 60,000 men.

This estimate no doubt includes part of the great body of non-combatants and of the small reinforcements which followed the main body from Sizeboli to Adrianople. We may, however, assume that not more than 10,000 or 15,000 combatants returned home across the Pruth; and that the Russian army was almost wholly destroyed during the second campaign.

Such an extraordinary state of health, or rather of sickness, could not have been foreseen; it far exceeded all calculation, and it is difficult to form a conception of an army engaged in offensive operations of which the larger half is lying sick in the hospitals. The blame which has been cast upon the higher branches of military administration in this respect appears to us unjust; it was manifestly impossible in such a country to carry the means and appliances for nursing and curing 40,000 sick, or to enforce during a campaign the quarantine regulations necessary in a time of plague. But such a state of things as that which we have just described must not be left out of our calculations in forming an opinion as to the performances of an army and its leaders.

The Russian soldier would seem to be as patient and enduring under hardship, fatigue, privation, and suffering as he is brave in the moment of danger. As far as the commander is concerned, it was the hard fate of Prince Sabalkanski to be opposed in each of the two campaigns in which he commanded not only by the armed foe but by a secret and fatal enemy—in Turkey by the plague and in Poland by the cholera, to which he himself at length fell a victim. Not to mention the diminution in the material forces at his command, it requires boundless strength of purpose in the leader of an army, while witnessing such terrible and wide-spread suffering, not to lose sight of the final object, which cannot be attained by waiting or temporising, but only by incessant vigour and rapid action.

With regard to the campaign in Turkey, we think that history will say thus much in praise of General Diebitsch. He undertook nothing with the inadequate means at his command but what was indispensable for the attainment of his object. He besieged one fortress and fought one battle, but this brought him into the very heart of the hostile empire. He arrived there followed by the shadow of an army, but with the reputation of irresistible success. To the sagacious, bold, and prudent conduct of General Diebitsch at Adrianople Russia owes the fortunate issue of a campaign which would have led to far different results if the Sultan and the European diplomatists had been at all aware of the real state of things.

THE END.

LONDON: PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET,
AND CHARING CROSS.

Pl. No 6.

Engagement at BOJELESCHI on the 26th Sept 1828.

Pl. No 1.


Scale of 1000 Paces
F
G
F
H
D
C
H
A
B
K
Bojeleschi
Wadin
Russian
Turkish
THE DANUBE
ISAKTCHI
Ruins of a Castle
Tête du pont B
Old Turkish Entrenchment
Scale of 3000 Paces

MAP OF ISAKTCHI, AND THE PASSAGE OF THE RIVER AT SATUNOWO in the year 1828

Published by John Murray Albemarle St.

Pl. No. 2.

BRAILOV OR JBRAIL.

WITH THE WORKS MADE BY THE RUSSIANS AT THEIR ATTACK OF THAT FORTRESS IN THE YEAR 1828.


Suburbs
THE DANUBE
Fig 2
Fig 3
Fig 4
Scale of the Fortress 3000 Paces
Scale of both of the views of the parallels of attack

Published by John Murray Albemarle St. 1834
Ford & West Lithrs.

PLAN
of the
FIELD OF OPERATIONS
against
SHUMLA.


Scale of 5000 Paces
From Gradeschai
Ortahei
Dormus
Strandscha Tabia
Strandscha
Hald Tabia
Hussein Tab
Makak
New Hospital
Powder Mag
Hambar
SHUMLA
Barracks
Mosques
Chief Mosque
Tschelle Tabia
Ibrahim
Sultan Tab
Tschingel Tab
To Pravadi & Varna
Strandscha Fl.
Flat Plateau covered with thick Forest
From Dschuma
From Nardeschik
From Machmudkoi
Kiotesch
Mill
Tschingel
Bokludscha Valley
Kasaplar
Trudscha
Osmer
Tschiftlik
Marasch
Great Kamtschik
Welibeikoi
Beschewbi
Eskistambul
From Karnabat
Salman

Published by John Murray. Albemarle St 1854.

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
PLAN
and Environs
of
VARNA.
Fig. 1.
LAKE OF DEWNO
VARNA
Castle
D
T
BLACK SEA
Tschafflik Burnou
Galata Burnou
Galata
A
Fountain
Entrenchments
Fig. 2.
Scale of 300 Paces
Scale of 3000 Paces

Ford & West Lithrs 54 Hatton Garden

PLAN OF SIEGE OF SILISTRIA IN THE YEARS 1828 & 1829.

Pl. Nº 5.


Scale of 1000 Paces
THE DANUBE
Ferry
Ferry
SILISTRIA
Hospital
Bath
Mosque
Powder Magazine
Mosque
Mosque
Fig. 2
Scale of 200 Paces

Publish'd by John Murray, Albemarle Street 1854.

Ford & West Lith.



BATTLE OF KULEWTSCHA.

On 11th June, 1829.

Budanik
Kulewtscha
Tschurkowna
Tscheremedin
Scale


STRAITS OF THE DARDANELLES
Fort Bochaly
34 Guns
BAY OF VRILIA
Fort Nagara
73 Guns
Ruins of Ancient Abydos covered with fragments of Stone
Giants Monument
Spring
Ruins of a Tower
Hill of Xerxes
Tekieh
Dervish Convent
Village of Mailos
Kjöschec Burun
29 Guns
Tscham Burun
16 Guns
Graves
House destroyed
Fisherman's Hut
Hadschi Omar Burun
Fountain
Barracks
Degermen Burun
20 Guns
TSCHANAK KALESSI
Pascha Tabiassi
Sultani Hissar
179 Guns
Tschimenni Tab:
Rodius or Dardanelles
Burial Ground
Mosque
Kilid Bahr
41 Guns
Burial Ground
Namasgiach Tabiassi 50 Guns

Bowen & West l.

[illegible]

PLANS OF TOWNS ON THE DANUBE & BALKAN.


PRAVADI
Dinfarköi
Mosques
to Schumla
to Varna
Scale of 4000 Paces
The Danube
Frontier Guard
Boghasköi
(or Czernewoda)
from Machmudkoi
Scale of 3000 Paces
MOUNTAIN PASS OF KASAN
Kasan
Barren Mountains
Mountains with Forest
Scale 1: 200000
to Dobrol
to Dobrol & Karnabat
TIRNOWA
Scale 1:50 000
The Danube
HIRSOVA
Frontier Guard
Old Castle
Mosque
Mills
Scale of 3000 Paces
The Danube
MATCHIN
Mills
Guard
Old Entrenchment
to Hirsova

Published by John Murray Albemarle St 1854

Ford & West Lith.rs

PLANS OF TURKISH TOWNS ON THE BLACK SEA.

Plate 10.


Field of Battle
KAVARNA
Moradji Tepe
To Stoffrish
Karaul Tepe
Dam with Palisades
Mole
Old Batt.y
AHIOLO
Lake
Inundations for Salt
Deposit
Schutzenst
BALTSCHIK
Anchorage
Bujuk Ada
Kutschuk Ada
Batt.y
SIZEBOLI
Roads
Entrenchment
Athanaskoi
Athanasch
Lake
Mugresch
Lake
Vineyard
Aqueduct
Hut
From Bardenhof
Landing Place
Batt.y
BURGAS
Bock & Wien Lithog.

Published by John Murray, Albemarle St. 1854.

Scale 1:50,000.

PLANS OF TURKISH TOWNS ON THE BLACK SEA & DANUBE.

Plate II.


The Danube
Island with Low Grass
Vineyards with Fruit Trees
Kiosk
Ordukapusu
Dach
Open Plain
Tasch Achmet Tab.
Vineyards on a sloping plain with Fruit Trees
Kalm Alak Tabias
Jokale Kap.
Gymnick K.
Lom Aban Tabias
Bala Basar Kap.
Senna Tschatteh
Degirmen Tab.
Vineyards with Fruit Trees
Vineyard & Orchard
RUSTCHUK
Scale of 3500 Paces


Position of Tuldscha in the year 1828.
The Danube
From Isaktscha
Mosques
Bath
Marsh
Lake
TULDSCHA


Old Batt.y
Anchorage
Old Batt.y
Old Batt.y
Anchorage
MISSIVRI


Trajan's Wall
Trajan's Wall
Ruins of Roman Houses on the Rocks
Camp
KÜSTENDJI

Published by John Murray, Albemarle St. 1854.

Kell & Son, Lith.

PASSES OF THE BALKAN.



MOUNTAIN PASS OF TSCHALIKAWAK.

HIGHEST PART OF THE PASSAGE OVER THE SCHIBKA BALKAN.

Podbascho
Pontoon Bridge
to Varna
Derwisch Jowan
Old Field Entrenchment
Lower Range or Emineh Dagh
Scale 1:50,000
Balkir Dagh
Site of Tschalikawak destroyed in 1829
Tschalikawak
High Road to Schumla
to Tschenga
Dobrol
From Jenibazar & Kasan
From Karnabat
Scale 1:200000.
Sitt Nikolo Mountain
Scale 1:43666.

Published by John Murray, Albemarle St 1854

Bird & West. Lith.

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